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		<title>ILW.COM Discussion Board - April 16 - The 2019 H1B lottery ended</title>
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			<title>ILW.COM Discussion Board - April 16 - The 2019 H1B lottery ended</title>
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			<title>Oct 21 - Filing Appeal at BIA, US Tourism</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/recent-issues/646096-oct-21-filing-appeal-at-bia-us-tourism</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 14:11:35 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: Filing Appeal at BIA, US Tourism&lt;br&gt; 
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About  
How Do You Lose an Appeal at the BIA? File an Appeal at the BIA,  
When Will America...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: Filing Appeal at BIA, US Tourism&lt;br&gt;<br />
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About <br />
How Do You Lose an Appeal at the BIA? File an Appeal at the BIA, <br />
When Will America Finally Implement the 9/11 Commission's Security Recommendations?,<br />
CRS Report on U.S. Tourism: Recent Developments and Data<br />
and more. Please scroll down to find the item(s) below.<br />
Please let us know your thoughts by writing to us at &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:editor@ilw.com&quot;&gt;editor@ilw.com&lt;/a&gt;<br />
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Blogging: How Do You Lose an Appeal at the BIA? File an Appeal at the BIA by Jason Dzubow<br />
<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/blogs/immigrationlawblogs/646094-when-will-america-finally-implement-the-9-11-commission-s-security-recommendations-by-nolan-rappaport&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
Blogging: When Will America Finally Implement the 9/11 Commission's Security Recommendations? by Nolan Rappaport<br />
<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/646054-news-crs-report-on-u-s-tourism-recent-developments-and-data&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
News: CRS Report on U.S. Tourism: Recent Developments and Data<br />
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Headline: 'Hunted like animals': inside Trump's war on the people who build America<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2026/oct/21/trump-ice-construction-worker-deportation&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
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Headline:  Trump and Republicans blame France's immigrants for riots without evidence<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/france-riots-trump-immigration-claims-f6c26eb78303dbf5a904bd41e0728052&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
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Headline: Tenney, Ellman clash over economy, immigration and foreign affairs in NY-24 debate<br />
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Headline: Could Ilhan Omar lose her US citizenship? Former immigration judge reacts to probe<br />
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<br />
Headline: Asian-Americans report rise in hate speech tied to immigration<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2026/10/20/nx-s1-6003567/asian-americans-report-rise-in-hate-speech-tied-to-immigration&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
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			<category domain="https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/recent-issues">Immigration Daily</category>
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			<title>News: CRS Report on U.S. Tourism: Recent Developments and Data</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/646054-news-crs-report-on-u-s-tourism-recent-developments-and-data</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 11:15:30 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;embed src=&quot;https://ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/20261021CRS1.pdf&quot; width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;1000&quot;&gt; &lt;p&gt;If you are having difficulty viewing this document please &lt;a href=&quot;https://ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/20261021CRS1.pdf&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;click...]]></description>
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			<title>Article: Trump Administration Proposes $70,000 Fee on International Students Seeking Post-Graduate Employment by Aaron Reichlin-Melnick for Immigration Impact</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/644752-article-trump-administration-proposes-70-000-fee-on-international-students-seeking-post-graduate-employment-by-aaron-reichlin-melnick-for-immigration-impact</link>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 15:34:56 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC &quot;-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN&quot;&gt;&lt;html&gt;&lt;head&gt;&lt;META http-equiv=&quot;Content-Type&quot; content=&quot;text/html; charset=utf-8&quot;&gt;&lt;/head&gt;&lt;body&gt;&lt;div&gt; 
&lt;h3&gt; 
Trump Administration Proposes $70,000 Fee on International Students Seeking...]]></description>
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&lt;h3&gt;<br />
Trump Administration Proposes $70,000 Fee on International Students Seeking Post-Graduate Employment<br />
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;h4&gt;&lt;i&gt;by &lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/644752-article-trump-administration-proposes-70-000-fee-on-international-students-seeking-post-graduate-employment-by-aaron-reichlin-melnick-for-immigration-impact&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;<br />
Aaron Reichlin-Melnick<br />
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;<br />
&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;<br />
&lt;br&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;For decades, some foreign students who graduate from an American university have been able to remain in the United States for at least one year to pursue employment through Optional Practical Training (OPT) in their field of study. Graduates of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/stem-list.pdf&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener&quot;&gt;certain&lt;/a&gt; STEM programs are permitted to remain for an additional 24 months, allowing them to work for up to three years post-graduation. This program has fueled a rise in foreign student admissions and become a vital pipeline for top students seeking to eventually immigrate to the United States permanently.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;But now the fate of the program is in limbo, as &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/10/08/2026-20660/optional-practical-training-fees&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener&quot;&gt;the Trump administration is proposing&lt;/a&gt; to levy exorbitant new fees on universities for each student seeking OPT; $70,000 for the first year of a student&amp;rsquo;s participation and $30,000 for the additional 24-month extension for STEM OPT. The fees would only apply to students who have not received an OPT recommendation from their Designated School Official when the rule goes into effect; any students currently utilizing OPT or who have applications pending would not be impacted.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in the Federal Register on October 8 claims that imposing these high fees is necessary to &amp;ldquo;combat fraud and abuse&amp;rdquo; in the program, although the government admits the fees would &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; be used to increase fraud detection and would instead be deposited as general funds in the U.S. Treasury.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;How the Proposed Fees Could Affect Universities and Tuition&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;In addition, the Trump administration says the fees are necessary because STEM OPT applicants are competing with American tech workers, framing their argument as a fight against &amp;ldquo;large-scale replacement of American workers.&amp;rdquo; DHS is clear that one main purpose of the fees is to &amp;ldquo;discourage aliens from using the OPT program.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Under the proposed new rule, schools themselves would be required to pay the $70,000 and $30,000 fees, rather than the applicants for OPT or their temporary employers. The Trump administration readily admits that universities could pass these costs along to American students, which could mean a sharp decline in foreign students in the U.S. or a rise in tuition rates, or both.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;The rule could increase tuition for American students by reducing the overall number of international students, who generally pay higher tuition and help subsidize attendance for domestic students. A &lt;a href=&quot;https://agglomerations.eig.org/p/a-100000-tax-on-foreign-students&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener&quot;&gt;recent study&lt;/a&gt; by the Economic Innovation Group predicted that a $100,000 fee on STEM OPT participation would lead to an overall reduction of 35 percent of international applicants for graduate programs, forcing universities to reduce overall enrollment slots and raise tuition for Americans, and potentially leading to the cancellation of some Master&amp;rsquo;s degree programs.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;This would have a significant economic impact on universities in general, and the communities in which they sit, potentially leading to layoffs and other negative impacts. Economist Michael Clemens argues in a new study that a $100,000 OPT fee would cost American universities up to $4 billion a year in lost revenue. Beyond direct impacts on communities, a massive drop in OPT and foreign STEM students would reduce the &lt;a href=&quot;https://hoover-s3-website.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/research/docs/Hoover_HAI_TalentReport_Final.pdf&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener&quot;&gt;STEM pipeline&lt;/a&gt; into the United States, reducing our global competitiveness.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;Uncertainty Alone Could Deter Future International Students&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Another likely outcome of the rule would be a large-scale abandonment of OPT in general. A &lt;a href=&quot;https://ifp.org/wp-content/uploads/26-10-06-International-Student-Survey-on-OPT-and-Experiential-Learning.pdf&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener&quot;&gt;survey of international students&lt;/a&gt; studying in the United States found that 80% of students would reconsider their decision to stay if there was a $100,000 fee to participate in the full length of STEM OPT. Even if schools ended up paying for these fees, 40% fewer students said they would seek to stay here, instead returning to their home countries and taking their skills with them.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Despite these concerns, the proposed OPT rule largely ignores possible impacts on universities and American competitiveness, declaring such impacts too speculative to take fully into consideration. The rule doubles down on this uncertainty by stating the possible costs of the rule to the public could be anywhere from $32 million a year to over $8 billion a year, a staggering range.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Crucially, while the rule makes clear that the STEM OPT program is lawful, DHS issues a veiled threat against potential challenges to this new rule, stating that &amp;ldquo;without the fees proposed in this rule, it cannot operate OPT consistent with its focus on preventing fraud and may shut down the program entirely.&amp;rdquo; But this claim is somewhat undermined by the fact that the fees are not related in any way to fraud detection, with DHS admitting that any $70,000 or $30,000 payment would be &amp;ldquo;specifically earmarked for ICE [Student and Exchange Visitor Program] or immigration enforcement activities.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;What Comes Next?&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;DHS is currently accepting comments on the rule through November 9, 2026. After that, DHS is required to review and respond to all the comments, and then will aim to finalize the rule, with or without edits. Once the rule is finalized, lawsuits are almost certain. A similar $100,000 fee on H-1B visa petitions implemented by a Trump executive order has been blocked in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/second-judge-blocks-trumps-100000-fee-new-h-1b-worker-visas-2026-10-01/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener&quot;&gt;two different courts&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Regardless of whether the rule goes into effect, the uncertainty caused by the Trump administration&amp;rsquo;s latest attacks on OPT will likely continue to deter students from coming to this country. These impacts are already being felt. In the 2026-2027 academic year, schools reported a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nafsa.org/fall2026outlook&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener&quot;&gt;10 percent drop&lt;/a&gt; in international student enrollment. As the United States loses its luster for some of the world&amp;rsquo;s smartest young people, impacts could be felt for years to come.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;This post originally appeared on &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/trump-stem-opt-fee-post-graduate-international-students/&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Immigration Impact&lt;/a&gt; Reprinted with permission.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;/span&gt;<br />
&lt;hr&gt;&lt;h4&gt;<br />
&lt;a name=&quot;0.1_bio&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;<br />
About The Author&lt;br&gt;<br />
&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
&lt;b&gt;Aaron Reichlin-Melnick&lt;/b&gt;<br />
<br />
 is a Senior Fellow at the American Immigration Council. He previously worked as a Staff Attorney at the Council, working on impact litigation, Freedom of Information Act litigations, and practice advisories. Prior to joining the Council, he was an Immigrant Justice Corps Fellow placed as a Staff Attorney at the Immigration Law Unit of The Legal Aid Society in New York City, representing immigrants placed in removal proceedings because of a prior criminal conviction. Aaron holds a J.D. from the Georgetown University Law Center and a B.A. in Politics and East Asian Studies from Brandeis University<br />
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&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;<br />
&lt;div&gt;The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of &lt;span&gt;<br />
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			<title><![CDATA[Article: How a Minnesota State 'Truth Council' Has Exposed the Harms of Operation Metro Surge by Aaron Reichlin-Melnick for Immigration Impact]]></title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/645972-article-how-a-minnesota-state-truth-council-has-exposed-the-harms-of-operation-metro-surge-by-aaron-reichlin-melnick-for-immigration-impact</link>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 15:34:00 GMT</pubDate>
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&lt;h3&gt; 
 
How a Minnesota State 'Truth Council' Has Exposed the Harms of Operation Metro...]]></description>
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&lt;h3&gt;<br />
<br />
How a Minnesota State 'Truth Council' Has Exposed the Harms of Operation Metro Surge<br />
<br />
<br />
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;h4&gt;&lt;i&gt;by &lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/645972-article-how-a-minnesota-state-truth-council-has-exposed-the-harms-of-operation-metro-surge-by-aaron-reichlin-melnick-for-immigration-impact&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;<br />
<br />
Aaron Reichlin-Melnick<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;<br />
&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;<br />
&lt;/br&gt;<br />
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&lt;p&gt;Last December, thousands of agents descended on the Minneapolis metro area in a pair of federal immigration enforcement operations. What followed was chaos: federal officers arrested thousands of immigrants (some here lawfully), violently clashed with protestors, deployed tear gas in residential communities, and shot and killed two U.S. citizens, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-deaths-shootings-2026/&quot;&gt;Alex Pretti&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/renee-good-family-lawsuits-immunity-ice-shootings/&quot;&gt;Renee Good&lt;/a&gt;. The operations, targeting Minneapolis&amp;rsquo; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2025/12/05/nx-s1-5632602/trumps-garbage-comment-met-with-disappointment-in-somalia&quot;&gt;Somali&lt;/a&gt; community, would turn out to be two of the largest federal enforcement operations in U.S. history.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Minnesota Governor Tim Walz signed Executive Order 26-05 in March 2026, which called for establishing a council whose aim would be to build a historical record of what happened during &amp;ldquo;Operation Metro Surge&amp;rdquo; and &amp;ldquo;Operation PARRIS.&amp;rdquo; The Truth Council&amp;rsquo;s mandate was to document the actions of federal immigration agents, the impact on the residents of Minneapolis, and the ways local organizations and individuals supported each other and protested during the operation, often at great personal risk.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;The Truth Council has met 13 times since June, collecting data and hearing direct testimony from impacted community members. The interim reports released by the Truth Council paint a picture of a city thrown into chaos and dramatically disrupted for months, imposing severe economic costs not only on individual residents, but on businesses, schools, and the local government. They also make clear that this innovative effort to hold the Department of Homeland Security accountable for its actions during the operations have been valuable and could be replicated by other states facing widespread impacts of mass deportation.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;Economic impact of Operations Metro Surge and PARRIS&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;In early September, the Truth Council published its first reports on the impacts of the federal surge. A September 9 &lt;a href=&quot;https://mn.gov/governor/assets/MN%20Truth%20Council%20Data%20Report%20-%20Economic%20Damage_tcm1055-767369.pdf&quot;&gt;report on the impact on wages and labor markets&lt;/a&gt; found that workers in the Twin Cities metro area lost $244 million in wages as the federal operation closed businesses and forced many employees to remain home. Businesses lost $445 million in revenue as they either shut their doors or saw dramatically fewer customers. In total, 60% of businesses reported a measurable drop in revenue, with restaurants and retail seeing the biggest impact.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;The impact of Operations Metro Surge and PARRIS on children&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Another report released on September 9 tracked the impact of the federal operations on children in the Twin Cities metro area. In total, more than 70 Minnesota children were detained between December 1, 2025, and March 10, 2026, many of whom were detained for weeks and some deported.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Children&amp;rsquo;s education in particular was impacted. 80% of public school leaders statewide reported that the federal operations &amp;ldquo;negatively impacted students&amp;rsquo; ability to learn,&amp;rdquo; with more than 75% of schools reporting that absences increased during the surge. One school district reported that nearly 30% of its students avoided going to school in the week after federal agents detained a student.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Many children also missed healthcare appointments during the surge, as they remained at home out of fear of leaving the house, with an 80% increase in missed pediatric care for Spanish-speaking families.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Food insecurity also increased during this time, as students missed meals that they would have received at school. In total, Minneapolis schools served over 183,000 fewer meals in January than compared to the previous year. A &lt;a href=&quot;https://mn.gov/governor/assets/MN%20Truth%20Council%20Data%20Report%20-%20Barriers%20to%20Basic%20Needs_tcm1055-767331.pdf&quot;&gt;separate report&lt;/a&gt; released by the Truth Council drives home this impact, revealing that requests for food assistance from the Twin Cities United Way nearly doubled in January.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;Widespread use of force and threats by federal officers&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;On September 29, the Truth Council published a report &lt;a href=&quot;https://mn.gov/governor/assets/Crowd-Sourced%20Volunteer%20Data%20Testimony%20September%2028%2C%202026_tcm1055-769791.pdf&quot;&gt;collecting crowd-sourced volunteer data testimony&lt;/a&gt; on federal misconduct. The report brings together nearly 4,200 individual reports of actions taken by federal immigration officers during the two operations and in the months after. In 431 of these actions &amp;mdash; more than 10% &amp;mdash; observers reported threats or other hostile actions made by federal agents, with 287 of those directed at the observers themselves. In 55 cases, the officer drew their gun, and in 60 cases, their officer drew a weapon such as a taser or a pepper ball gun.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;This latter finding comes just as Minnesota seeks to hold ICE officer Gregory Moran Jr. for an incident in February where the state &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.courthousenews.com/ice-agent-testifies-in-minnesota-assault-case-as-judge-weighs-jurisdiction/&quot;&gt;alleges&lt;/a&gt; that he drew his weapon and pointed it at a Minnesota man in an accused road rage incident, after he was blocked from driving on the shoulder in his unmarked rental SUV.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;Measuring the groundswell of opposition to the federal surge&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;The reports also highlight the ways in which the Minneapolis volunteers came together to support individuals impacted by the federal surge. According to &lt;a href=&quot;https://mn.gov/governor/assets/MN%20Truth%20Council%20Data%20Report%20-%20Community%20Systems_tcm1055-769792.pdf&quot;&gt;another report&lt;/a&gt; released on September 29, three organizations alone (Faith in Minnesota, MN Unidos, and the Immigrant Defense Network) carried out over 100,000 trainings for volunteers seeking to help. Mutual Aid networks helped provide over $21 million for rent relief in the Twin Cities metro area, with 42 separate faith, school, and neighborhood funds providing immediate rent relief.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Faith in Minnesota, a faith-based community organization, testified that it alone raised $7.7 million in mutual aid and trained 6,500 people. Amazingly, just 1% said they would not volunteer again in the future, despite &amp;ldquo;threats and other significant challenges faced.&amp;rdquo; Of their volunteers, 81% said &amp;ldquo;protecting my community&amp;rdquo; was a top motivation for volunteering, followed by &amp;ldquo;faith or spiritual calling&amp;rdquo; at 69% and &amp;ldquo;anger or urgency&amp;rdquo; at 65%. This level of volunteer engagement fueled the groundswell of opposition that the Trump administration faced during Operations Metro Surge and PARRIS.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;Educating the public on the federal government&amp;rsquo;s actions&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Finally, on September 29, the Truth Council also &lt;a href=&quot;https://mn.gov/governor/assets/MN%20Truth%20Council%20Data%20Report%20-%20Policies%20and%20Systems%20Contributing%20to%20Harm_tcm1055-769793.pdf&quot;&gt;published a data report&lt;/a&gt; collecting information on the immigration policies and systems which led to the harms of Operations Metro Surge and PARRIS One portion of that report examines the claim made by federal officials that the operation targeted &amp;ldquo;the worst of the worst.&amp;rdquo;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Truth Council found that DHS listed 677 people on its &amp;ldquo;worst of the worst&amp;rdquo; website from the Minnesota operations. However, the Minnesota Department of Corrections audited each case, and determined that 72% (487) had never served time for a felony in Minnesota, and that 27% were in fact directly transferred to ICE through existing procedures. The Truth Council&amp;rsquo;s final meeting occurred on October 13 and a final report is forthcoming.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This experiment in accountability &amp;ndash; following the Illinois Accountability Commission&amp;rsquo;s documentation of &amp;ldquo;Operation Midway Blitz &amp;ndash; has proven that local communities have a vital role in building a historical record of the impact of mass deportation operations. And while the Trump administration has since abandoned the mass raids that characterized Operations Metro Surge and PARRIS (opting for ramping up enforcement more (&quot;quietly&quot;), the harm that was caused remains visible in Minneapolis.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
<br />
<br />
&lt;p&gt;This post originally appeared on &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/minnesota-state-truth-council-operation-metro-surge/&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Immigration Impact &lt;/a&gt; Reprinted with permission.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
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&lt;hr&gt;&lt;h4&gt;<br />
&lt;a name=&quot;0.1_bio&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;<br />
About The Author&lt;br&gt;<br />
&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
<br />
<br />
&lt;b&gt;Aaron Reichlin-Melnick&lt;/b&gt;<br />
is a Senior Fellow at the American Immigration Council. He previously worked as a Staff Attorney at the Council, working on impact litigation, Freedom of Information Act litigations, and practice advisories. Prior to joining the Council, he was an Immigrant Justice Corps Fellow placed as a Staff Attorney at the Immigration Law Unit of The Legal Aid Society in New York City, representing immigrants placed in removal proceedings because of a prior criminal conviction. Aaron holds a J.D. from the Georgetown University Law Center and a B.A. in Politics and East Asian Studies from Brandeis University<br />
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/hr&gt;<br />
<br />
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			<title>Oct 20 - Operation Metro Surge, H1B Executive Actions</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/recent-issues/645977-oct-20-operation-metro-surge-h1b-executive-actions</link>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 15:29:01 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: Operation Metro Surge, H1B Executive Actions&lt;br&gt; 
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About  
How a Minnesota State 'Truth Council' Has Exposed the Harms of Operation...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: Operation Metro Surge, H1B Executive Actions&lt;br&gt;<br />
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About <br />
How a Minnesota State 'Truth Council' Has Exposed the Harms of Operation Metro Surge, <br />
Trump Expanded Mandatory Immigration Detention. Will the Supreme Court Uphold It?, <br />
CRS Report on H-1B Executive Actions in 2026 <br />
and more. Please scroll down to find the item(s) below.<br />
Please let us know your thoughts by writing to us at &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:editor@ilw.com&quot;&gt;editor@ilw.com&lt;/a&gt;<br />
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Article: How a Minnesota State 'Truth Council' Has Exposed the Harms of Operation Metro Surge by Aaron Reichlin-Melnick for Immigration Impact<br />
<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/blogs/immigrationlawblogs/645974-trump-expanded-mandatory-immigration-detention-will-the-supreme-court-uphold-it-by-nolan-rappaport&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
Blogging: Trump Expanded Mandatory Immigration Detention. Will the Supreme Court Uphold It? by Nolan Rappaport<br />
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News: CRS Report on H-1B Executive Actions in 2026<br />
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Headline: Trump officials soften approach to key immigration policy ahead of midterms<br />
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Headline: Mahmoud Khalil Appeals to Supreme Court to Halt Deportation<br />
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			<title>News: CRS Report on H-1B Executive Actions in 2026</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645975-news-crs-report-on-h-1b-executive-actions-in-2026</link>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 15:16:32 GMT</pubDate>
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			<title>Oct 19 - CRS on H2A Wage Methodology</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/recent-issues/645952-oct-19-crs-on-h2a-wage-methodology</link>
			<pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 13:48:37 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: CRS on H2A Wage Methodology&lt;br&gt; 
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About  
CRS Report on New Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for Temporary Employment of H-2A...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: CRS on H2A Wage Methodology&lt;br&gt;<br />
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About <br />
CRS Report on New Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in the United States <br />
and more. Please scroll down to find the item(s) below.<br />
Please let us know your thoughts by writing to us at &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:editor@ilw.com&quot;&gt;editor@ilw.com&lt;/a&gt;<br />
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News: CRS Report on New Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in the United States<br />
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Headline: With an ad aimed at Trump, this Republican exposed GOP angst about Latino voters<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2026/10/18/nx-s1-5978762/maria-elvira-salazar-immigration-trump&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
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&lt;span class=&quot;ilwFinePrint&quot;&gt;An Important disclaimer! The<br />
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			<title>News: CRS Report on New Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in the United States</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645866-news-crs-report-on-new-adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-the-united-states</link>
			<pubDate>Mon, 19 Oct 2026 07:51:22 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;embed src=&quot;https://ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/20261019CRS.pdf&quot; width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;1000&quot;&gt; &lt;p&gt;If you are having difficulty viewing this document please &lt;a href=&quot;https://ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/20261019CRS.pdf&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;click...]]></description>
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			<title>Oct 16 - Extension Deference Ends, CRS on Federal Funding Conditions</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/recent-issues/645426-oct-16-extension-deference-ends-crs-on-federal-funding-conditions</link>
			<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 13:44:21 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: Extension Deference Ends, CRS on Federal Funding Conditions  &lt;br&gt; 
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About 
Proposed Rule to End Deference in H-1B and Other...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: Extension Deference Ends, CRS on Federal Funding Conditions  &lt;br&gt;<br />
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About<br />
Proposed Rule to End Deference in H-1B and Other Nonimmigrant Visa Extensions,<br />
CRS Report on Federal Funding Conditions: Constitutional Limits from the Spending Clause and Related Legal Doctrines<br />
and more. Please scroll down to find the item(s) below.<br />
Please let us know your thoughts by writing to us at &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:editor@ilw.com&quot;&gt;editor@ilw.com&lt;/a&gt;<br />
&lt;/p&gt;<br />
<br />
&lt;!-- END Comment --&gt;<br />
&lt;!-- Article; Blogging; News --&gt; &lt;!--t &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt; --&gt;<br />
<br />
<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/blogs/cmusillo/645365-proposed-rule-to-end-deference-in-h-1b-and-other-nonimmigrant-visa-extensions&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
Blogging: Proposed Rule to End Deference in H-1B and Other Nonimmigrant Visa Extensions by Chris Musillo<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645402-news-crs-report-on-federal-funding-conditions-constitutional-limits-from-the-spending-clause-and-related-legal-doctrines&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
News: CRS Report on Federal Funding Conditions: Constitutional Limits from the Spending Clause and Related Legal Doctrines<br />
<br />
&lt;br /&gt;<br />
&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
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&lt;p&gt;<br />
Headline: US probes Omar's decades-old immigration paperwork with eye toward deportation, sources say<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-probes-omars-decades-old-immigration-paperwork-with-eye-toward-deportation-2026-10-16/&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: Trump administration sued over accelerated immigration process for migrant kids<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://edition.cnn.com/2026/10/15/politics/lawsuit-accelerated-immigration-process-migrant-kids&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: Manhattan DA charges woman with stealing $25K in immigration fraud scheme<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://gothamist.com/news/manhattan-da-charges-woman-stole-25k-in-immigration-fraud-scheme&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: Bonta files 100th lawsuit against Trump administration, this time seeking to block ICE activity at state courthouses<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://spectrumlocalnews.com/ca/california/politics/2026/10/15/bonta-100th-lawsuit-trump-administration-ice-courthouses&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: Oaxacan festival postponed second year in a row because of immigration crackdown<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.kpbs.org/news/border-immigration/2026/10/15/oaxacan-festival-postponed-second-year-in-a-row-because-of-immigration-crackdown&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
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&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/blogs/idblog/644756-letters-of-the-week-oct-12-oct-16&quot; target=&quot;blank&quot;&gt;Letters of the Week: &lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;<br />
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&lt;hr class=&quot;ilwDailyLine&quot;/&gt;<br />
&lt;span class=&quot;ilwFinePrint&quot;&gt;An Important disclaimer! The<br />
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Transmission of this information is not intended to create, and<br />
receipt by you does not constitute, an attorney-client<br />
relationship. Readers must not act upon any information without<br />
first seeking advice from a qualified attorney. Copyright<br />
1995-2017 American Immigration LLC, ILW.COM. Send correspondence<br />
and articles to &lt;a href=<br />
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&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/advisoryboard.shtm&quot;&gt;Advisory<br />
Board&lt;/a&gt;: Jason Dzubow, Rami Fakhoury, Matthew Kolken, Chris Musillo,<br />
Lory Rosenberg, Greg Siskind, Joel Stewart, Margaret Wong<br />
&lt;!--END PublisherEditor--&gt;]]></content:encoded>
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			<title>News: CRS Report on Federal Funding Conditions: Constitutional Limits from the Spending Clause and Related Legal Doctrines</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645402-news-crs-report-on-federal-funding-conditions-constitutional-limits-from-the-spending-clause-and-related-legal-doctrines</link>
			<pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 07:46:47 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;embed src=&quot;https://ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/CRS20261016_3.pdf&quot; width=&quot;800&quot; height=&quot;1000&quot;&gt; &lt;p&gt;If you are having difficulty viewing this document please &lt;a href=&quot;https://ilw.com/immigrationdaily/news/CRS20261016_3.pdf&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;click...]]></description>
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		</item>
		<item>
			<title>Oct 15 - Automatic Extensions End, Immigration Civil Penalties</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/recent-issues/645315-oct-15-automatic-extensions-end-immigration-civil-penalties</link>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 13:36:46 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: Automatic Extensions End, Immigration Civil Penalties  &lt;br&gt; 
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About 
Renée Good’s Family Files Lawsuits Challenging Federal Immunity...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: Automatic Extensions End, Immigration Civil Penalties  &lt;br&gt;<br />
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About<br />
Renée Good’s Family Files Lawsuits Challenging Federal Immunity as ICE Shootings Continue,<br />
DHS Finalizes Rule on Immigration Civil Penalties,<br />
DHS Finalizes Rule Ending Automatic EAD Extensions<br />
and more. Please scroll down to find the item(s) below.<br />
Please let us know your thoughts by writing to us at &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:editor@ilw.com&quot;&gt;editor@ilw.com&lt;/a&gt;<br />
&lt;/p&gt;<br />
<br />
&lt;!-- END Comment --&gt;<br />
&lt;!-- Article; Blogging; News --&gt; &lt;!--t &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt; --&gt;<br />
<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/645231-article-ren%C3%A9e-good%E2%80%99s-family-files-lawsuits-challenging-federal-immunity-as-ice-shootings-continue-by-nayna-gupta-for-immigration-impact&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
Article: Renée Good’s Family Files Lawsuits Challenging Federal Immunity as ICE Shootings Continue by Nayna Gupta for Immigration Impact<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645234-news-dhs-finalizes-rule-on-immigration-civil-penalties&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
News: DHS Finalizes Rule on Immigration Civil Penalties<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645235-news-dhs-finalizes-rule-ending-automatic-ead-extensions&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
News: DHS Finalizes Rule Ending Automatic EAD Extensions<br />
<br />
&lt;br /&gt;<br />
&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;!-- END Article; Blogging; News --&gt;<br />
&lt;!-- Focus --&gt;<br />
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&lt;p&gt;Focus: Pass it On&lt;br /&gt; If you find Immigration Daily a valuable resource, won't you please share it with your friends and colleagues? We thank you for it and they will too. To begin receiving your email version of Immigration Daily, simply submit your email address in the &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ilw.com/&quot;&gt;text box the top right corner of our homepage.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
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&lt;!-- Headline: &lt;a href=&quot;&quot;&gt;Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br/&gt; --&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;<br />
Headline: Tension erupts during House midterm debate as Lawler fact-checks New York Democrat opponent on immigration<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.foxnews.com/politics/tension-erupts-house-midterm-debate-lawler-fact-checks-ny-democrat-opponent-immigration&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: Exclusive: Judge limited Justice Department access to Rep. Ilhan Omar’s records in sprawling immigration fraud probe<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://edition.cnn.com/2026/10/14/politics/judge-limited-justice-department-access-rep-ilhan-omar-records-immigration-fraud&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: ‘Will I be next?’: Maine immigrants traumatized by latest ICE shooting<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://mainebeacon.com/will-i-be-next-maine-immigrants-traumatized-by-latest-ice-shooting/&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: DHS rejects watchdog’s call for ICE to use auto-activated body cameras<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2026/10/14/dhs-rejects-watchdog-suggestion-auto-activation-ice-body-cameras/&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: Immigration attorney discusses ICE activity across Central Valley<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://kmph.com/news/local/immigration-attorney-discusses-ice-activity-across-central-valley-fresno-county-community-agency-resources-advocacy-services-caras&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;!-- Service Provider --&gt;<br />
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&lt;p&gt;<br />
&lt;hr class=&quot;ilwDailyLine&quot;/&gt;<br />
&lt;span class=&quot;ilwFinePrint&quot;&gt;An Important disclaimer! The<br />
information provided on this page is not legal advice.<br />
Transmission of this information is not intended to create, and<br />
receipt by you does not constitute, an attorney-client<br />
relationship. Readers must not act upon any information without<br />
first seeking advice from a qualified attorney. Copyright<br />
1995-2017 American Immigration LLC, ILW.COM. Send correspondence<br />
and articles to &lt;a href=<br />
&quot;mailto:editor@ilw.com&quot;&gt;editor@ilw.com&lt;/a&gt;. Letters and articles<br />
may be edited and may be published and otherwise used in any<br />
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&lt;hr class=&quot;ilwDailyLine&quot;/&gt;<br />
&lt;a name=&quot;publisher&quot; id=&quot;publisher&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;!--PublisherEditor--&gt;<br />
Publisher: Sam Udani ISSN: 1930-062X&lt;br/&gt;<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.ilw.com/immigrationdaily/advisoryboard.shtm&quot;&gt;Advisory<br />
Board&lt;/a&gt;: Jason Dzubow, Rami Fakhoury, Matthew Kolken, Chris Musillo,<br />
Lory Rosenberg, Greg Siskind, Joel Stewart, Margaret Wong<br />
&lt;!--END PublisherEditor--&gt;]]></content:encoded>
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			<title>Article: Renée Good’s Family Files Lawsuits Challenging Federal Immunity as ICE Shootings Continue by Nayna Gupta for Immigration Impact</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/645231-article-renée-good’s-family-files-lawsuits-challenging-federal-immunity-as-ice-shootings-continue-by-nayna-gupta-for-immigration-impact</link>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 10:24:37 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC &quot;-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN&quot;&gt;&lt;html&gt;&lt;head&gt;&lt;META http-equiv=&quot;Content-Type&quot; content=&quot;text/html; charset=utf-8&quot;&gt;&lt;/head&gt;&lt;body&gt;&lt;div&gt; 
&lt;h3&gt; 
Renée Good’s Family Files Lawsuits Challenging Federal Immunity as ICE Shootings...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC &quot;-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN&quot;&gt;&lt;html&gt;&lt;head&gt;&lt;META http-equiv=&quot;Content-Type&quot; content=&quot;text/html; charset=utf-8&quot;&gt;&lt;/head&gt;&lt;body&gt;&lt;div&gt;<br />
&lt;h3&gt;<br />
Renée Good’s Family Files Lawsuits Challenging Federal Immunity as ICE Shootings Continue<br />
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;h4&gt;&lt;i&gt;by &lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles/645231-news-ren%C3%A9e-good%E2%80%99s-family-files-lawsuits-challenging-federal-immunity-as-ice-shootings-continue-by-nayna-gupta-for-immigration-impact&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;<br />
Nayna Gupta<br />
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;<br />
&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;<br />
&lt;br&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;The increasingly violent reality of the Trump administration&amp;rsquo;s mass deportation agenda came into sharp focus again last week when plainclothes ICE officers opened fire on a car in New York City within seconds of surrounding the vehicle, wounding 28-year-old Oscar Belgal while his terrified 5-year-old son sat in the back seat. This alarming use of force, echoing across the country as communities grapple with a sharp rise in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/fact-sheet/ice-cbp-legal-analysis/&quot;&gt;immigration enforcement violence&lt;/a&gt;, provides context for a major legal battle unfolding in Minnesota.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Just days before the New York shooting, the family of Ren&amp;eacute;e Good, a 37-year-old mother of three who was shot and killed by a U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer in Minneapolis earlier this year, filed two significant &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.rblaw.net/pressrelease-civil-lawsuits-united-states-individual-federal-agents-officials-death-renee-good&quot;&gt;federal lawsuits&lt;/a&gt; against the U.S. government and top administration officials.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Good&amp;rsquo;s family and lawyers seek to use two distinct legal paths to force accountability through the U.S. federal courts, even though doctrines such as qualified and sovereign immunity usually protect federal law enforcement officers and the administration&amp;rsquo;s top political leaders from facing civil rights lawsuits. The twin lawsuits target both the officer that killed Good and the systemic policies that the lawsuit claims made her death inevitable and near-guaranteed impunity for the officer&amp;rsquo;s deadly use of force.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;Minneapolis deadly encounter&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;On January 7, 2026, during a tense confrontation between protesters and federal immigration officers deployed to Minneapolis as a part of the administration&amp;rsquo;s &amp;ldquo;Operation Metro Surge,&amp;rdquo; ICE officer Jonathan Ross fired three shots into Good&amp;rsquo;s car as she attempted to drive away. One bullet struck her in the head, killing her.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;While the Trump administration initially &lt;a href=&quot;https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5679268-noem-defends-ice-officer/&quot;&gt;claimed&lt;/a&gt; that Good was a &amp;ldquo;domestic terrorist&amp;rdquo; trying to run over the officer, the lawsuit argues that video footage clearly shows Good steering her vehicle away and talking to the officers using deescalating language. Good was a U.S. citizen and had no criminal history. After Good&amp;rsquo;s death, the administration neither indicted nor fired Ross and he is still in the agency as an active ICE officer.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;A double attack on impunity&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;To overcome the significant legal doctrines that protect ICE officers and the federal government from liability, the lawsuits &amp;mdash; filed by Good&amp;rsquo;s partner and her brother &amp;mdash; rely on a two-part approach primarily via two legal statutes.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Federal Tort Claims Act&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;The first claim uses the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and names the United Sates as the sole defendant. It accuses the government of battery, assault, false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress that directly caused Good&amp;rsquo;s wrongful death. By using the FTCA, Good&amp;rsquo;s family and attorneys seek to hold the Trump administration liable for torts committed by federal immigration officers acting within the scope of their federal employment.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Typically, sovereign immunity protects the U.S. government from lawsuits; but Congress&amp;rsquo; enactment of the FTCA provides an exception giving victims injured by government actions a mechanism for filing a lawsuit to seek damages. In the Good lawsuit, the FTCA legal claim focuses primarily on the mechanics of the shooting itself and the immediate liability of the government.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Parallel to the FTCA claim is the second and more politically explosive lawsuit, which uses a provision of the Reconstruction-era Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. Congress designed the law to protect citizens from organized and systemic civil rights violations. At that time, local and state authorities routinely refused to prosecute Ku Klux Klan members for violence they inflicted upon newly freed Black Americans. Congress responded by enacting this law to explicitly enforce the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment and ensure protection of civil and voting rights.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;The Good lawsuit brings claims under two provisions of the statute, 42 U.S.C. Section1985(3) and 1986, to allege a broad Trump administration conspiracy to violate civil rights, naming not only Officer Ross, but also senior administration officials including Stephen Miller, Tom Homan, and former DHS Secretary Kristi Noem.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;The Section 1985(3) claim alleges that these officials conspired with private actors, including far-right online provocateurs whose allegations against the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2026/01/02/nx-s1-5664111/right-wing-influencers-fraud-claim-leads-to-threats-for-somali-daycare-owners&quot;&gt;Somali community&lt;/a&gt; in Minnesota led directly to the administration&amp;rsquo;s Operation Metro Surge, as well as private corporations whose &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/30/technology/tech-ice-facial-recognition-palantir.html&quot;&gt;technology&lt;/a&gt; was used to target neighborhoods for enforcement and track observers and protestors. The Section 1986 claim arises from the officials&amp;rsquo; failure to prevent the wrongs of the alleged conspiracy.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;At the core of the Ku Klux Klan Act claim, Good&amp;rsquo;s lawyers argue that her death was not an isolated operational error, but the &amp;ldquo;predictable result&amp;rdquo; of an unconstitutional campaign driven by racial animus targeting Hispanic and Somali communities. The family alleges that Trump administration officials deliberately structured federal immigration crackdowns to encourage aggressive, hostile confrontations, while signaling to rank-and-file officers that they would never face legal consequences for using excessive force.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Bringing claims under Sections 1985 and 1986 avoids the strict legal limitations of &amp;ldquo;Bivens actions&amp;rdquo; which in the past allowed individuals to sue federal enforcement officers for Fourth Amendment violations but which the Supreme Court has heavily curtailed in recent decades.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;h2&gt;Systemic reckoning or indefinite impunity?&lt;/h2&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;By linking executive policy to field-level operations, the lawsuit seeks to provide an alternative route to challenge immunity for high-ranking political appointees. If the federal court moves the case forward, it could establish a major precedent for holding top level administration officials accountable for the actions of ICE field officers. If the court does not allow the lawsuit to proceed, then the only way to ensure individual officials&amp;rsquo; accountability for unlawful immigration enforcement violence will be for Congress to make o&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/report/immigration-enforcement/&quot;&gt;verdue changes to outdated immigration laws&lt;/a&gt; which for decades have permitted immigration agent officers and agencies to operate with significant impunity. Congress could pass a law that would create a clear cause of action so that victims of constitutional violations committed by federal law enforcement officers can sue in federal court. When local police officers violate the Constitution, they can be sued in federal court; but when federal law enforcement agents commit the same violations there is no parallel recourse.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;While the Good family seeks unspecified compensatory damages, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2026/10/01/nx-s1-5986224/renee-good-ice-lawsuit-minneapolis&quot;&gt;their primary focus is public accountability&lt;/a&gt;. At an emotional Minneapolis press conference, Renee Good&amp;rsquo;s partner Becca Good stated: &amp;ldquo;The whole world had to watch as our entire universe was destroyed. We were all robbed.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;Following so closely on the heels of the recent New York City ICE shooting, the Renee Good lawsuits will test whether the federal judiciary is willing to hold federal officers accountable or continue to allow them to operate with near impunity on American soil.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;p&gt;This post originally appeared on &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/renee-good-family-lawsuits-immunity-ice-shootings/&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Immigration Impact&lt;/a&gt; Reprinted with permission.&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;/span&gt;<br />
&lt;hr&gt;&lt;h4&gt;<br />
&lt;a name=&quot;0.1_bio&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;<br />
About The Author&lt;br&gt;<br />
&lt;/h4&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
&lt;b&gt;Nayna Gupta&lt;/b&gt;<br />
is a Policy Director at the American Immigration Council.<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
&lt;/p&gt;&lt;hr&gt;<br />
&lt;div&gt;The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of &lt;span&gt;<br />
&lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://ILW.COM&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;ILW.COM&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/body&gt;&lt;/html&gt;]]></content:encoded>
			<category domain="https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/articles">Articles1</category>
			<dc:creator>ImmigrationDaily</dc:creator>
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		</item>
		<item>
			<title>News: DHS Finalizes Rule Ending Automatic EAD Extensions</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645235-news-dhs-finalizes-rule-ending-automatic-ead-extensions</link>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 08:54:54 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;pre&gt;[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 197 (Wednesday, October 14, 2026)] 
[Rules and Regulations] 
[Pages 65306-65368] 
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.gpo.gov/&quot;&gt;www.gpo.gov&lt;/a&gt;] 
[FR Doc...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;pre&gt;[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 197 (Wednesday, October 14, 2026)]<br />
[Rules and Regulations]<br />
[Pages 65306-65368]<br />
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.gpo.gov/&quot;&gt;www.gpo.gov&lt;/a&gt;]<br />
[FR Doc No: 2026-20955]<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
[[Page 65305]]<br />
<br />
Vol. 91<br />
<br />
Wednesday,<br />
<br />
No. 197<br />
<br />
October 14, 2026<br />
<br />
Part II<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Department of Homeland Security<br />
<br />
<br />
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<br />
<br />
<br />
8 CFR Part 274a<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
Removal of Automatic Extensions for Certain Employment Authorization <br />
Documents; Final Rule<br />
<br />
Federal Register / Vol. 91 , No. 197 / Wednesday, October 14, 2026 / <br />
Rules and Regulations<br />
<br />
[[Page 65306]]<br />
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY<br />
<br />
8 CFR Part 274a<br />
<br />
[CIS No. 2859-26; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0271]<br />
RIN 1615-AD05<br />
<br />
<br />
Removal of Automatic Extensions for Certain Employment <br />
Authorization Documents<br />
<br />
AGENCY: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, DHS.<br />
<br />
ACTION: Final rule.<br />
<br />
-----------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
SUMMARY: On October 30, 2025, DHS published an interim final rule (IFR) <br />
that amended DHS regulations to end the practice of automatically <br />
extending the validity of employment authorization documents (Forms I-<br />
766 or EADs) for aliens who have timely filed an application to renew <br />
their EAD in certain employment authorization categories. This final <br />
rule responds to comments received on the IFR and reaffirms and <br />
finalizes the provisions of the IFR. Ending the automatic extension of <br />
EADs enhances benefit integrity and prioritizes the proper vetting and <br />
screening of aliens before granting a new period of employment <br />
authorization and/or a new EAD.<br />
<br />
DATES:  This final rule is effective on October 14, 2026.<br />
<br />
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Business and Foreign Workers Division, <br />
Office of Policy and Strategy, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration <br />
Services (USCIS), DHS, 5900 Capital Gateway Drive, MD, Camp Springs, <br />
20746; telephone (240) 721-3000 (this is not a toll-free number).<br />
<br />
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:<br />
<br />
Table of Contents<br />
<br />
I. Executive Summary<br />
    A. Basis and Purpose<br />
    B. Legal Authority<br />
    C. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action<br />
    D. Costs and Benefits<br />
II. Background<br />
    A. Legal Authority<br />
    B. Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization and <br />
Documentation<br />
    C. Increasing the Automatic Extension Period From a Maximum of <br />
180 Days to a Maximum of 540 Days<br />
    D. The 2025 Interim Final Rule Removed Automatic Extensions for <br />
Certain Employment Authorization Documents<br />
    1. Added New 8 CFR 274a.13(e)<br />
    2. Modified the Heading of 8 CFR 274a.13(d)<br />
    E. Severability<br />
III. Changes in the Final Rule<br />
IV. Response to Public Comments on the Interim Final Rule<br />
    A. Summary of Comments<br />
    B. Comments in Support of the Rule<br />
    C. Comments in Opposition to the Rule and Mixed Comments<br />
    1. DHS Legal Authority<br />
    i. DHS Statutory Authority and Congressional Intent<br />
    ii. Constitutional Concerns<br />
    iii. International Law and Refugee Protections<br />
    2. DHS Justification and Need for the Rule<br />
    i. Security Rationale for the Rule<br />
    a. General Security Rationale Comments<br />
    b. Lack of Evidence Supporting Security Rationale<br />
    c. Prior Vetting of Renewal Applicants and Existing Security <br />
Measures<br />
    d. Rule Would Not Strengthen Security<br />
    e. Other Comments on Security Rationale<br />
    ii. Consistency in USCIS Rationale and Reversal of Longstanding <br />
Policy<br />
    iii. Lack of Acknowledgement of the Backlog and Other <br />
Operational Realities<br />
    iv. ``Proper Planning'' Rationale<br />
    3. Rationale for Eliminating the Automatic Extension of EADs<br />
    4. Impact on USCIS Processing<br />
    i. Administrative Burden and Efficiency<br />
    ii. Processing Timelines<br />
    iii. Procedural Fairness<br />
    iv. General or Mixed Feedback on USCIS Processing<br />
    5. Combined Impacts on Individuals, Employers, the Economy, and <br />
Specific EAD Categories<br />
    i. Impacts on Aliens, Families, and Communities<br />
    a. General Hardship, Fairness, Educational Disruptions, and <br />
Family Impacts<br />
    b. Mental Health and Vulnerability, Including Risk of <br />
Exploitation<br />
    c. Identification, Driver's Licenses, and Access to Services<br />
    ii. Employment, Employers, and Economic Impacts<br />
    a. Employer Burdens, Business Continuity, and Sector Specific <br />
Concerns<br />
    b. Immigrant Contributions to the Economy and Macroeconomic and <br />
Local Economic Impacts of the Rule<br />
    iii. Relief for Specific Immigration Categories<br />
    a. Impact on Refugees, Asylees, Asylum Seekers, Unaccompanied <br />
Alien Children (UACs), and Other Humanitarian Categories<br />
    b. Impact on Employment-Based Nonimmigrants, Their Dependents, <br />
and Employment-Based Green Card Applicants<br />
    6. Clarification Request<br />
    7. Recommendations for the Automatic Extension and EAD Validity <br />
Period<br />
    i. Maintain the Automatic Extension, Including Various Lengths <br />
of the Extension Period<br />
    ii. Consecutive EAD Validity Periods<br />
    iii. Allowing Application Filing Earlier Than 180 days<br />
    iv. Enhanced Vetting<br />
    8. Processing Capacity and Timelines<br />
    i. Timely Processing of Renewals<br />
    ii. Increase Resources and Staffing<br />
    iii. Prioritize Initial EAD Reviews<br />
    9. Coordination, Guidance, and Outreach<br />
    i. Additional Guidance and Communication<br />
    ii. Accountability<br />
    10. Other Alternatives and Recommendations<br />
    11. Administrative Procedure Act<br />
    i. ``Good Cause'' for Bypassing the Notice and Comment Period<br />
    ii. ``Foreign Affairs'' Exception<br />
    iii. Reasoned Decision-Making Requirement<br />
    iv. Arbitrary and Capricious/Procedural Deficiencies That <br />
Violate the APA<br />
    v. Reliance Interests<br />
    vi. Failure To Consider Alternatives<br />
    vii. Comment Period<br />
    viii. Comment Submission Requirements<br />
    12. Regulatory Impact Analysis<br />
    i. Methodology<br />
    ii. Impact on Individuals<br />
    iii. Impact on the U.S. Economy, Employers, and Labor Force<br />
    iv. Other Comments on the RIA<br />
    13. Regulatory Flexibility Act<br />
    14. Paperwork Reduction Act<br />
    15. General Comments on Statutory and Regulatory Requirements<br />
    D. Additional Out of Scope Comments<br />
V. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements<br />
    A. Administrative Procedure Act: Delayed Effective Date<br />
    B. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), <br />
Executive Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), <br />
and 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation)<br />
    1. Affected Population<br />
    2. Economic Impacts of the Final Rule<br />
    Module A<br />
    Module B<br />
    Module C<br />
    C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)<br />
    D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)<br />
    E. Congressional Review Act (CRA)<br />
    F. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)<br />
    G. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)<br />
    H. Family Assessment<br />
    I. Executive Order 13175 (Indian Tribal Governments)<br />
    J. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)<br />
    K. Paperwork Reduction Act<br />
List of Subjects and Regulatory Amendments<br />
<br />
Table of Abbreviations<br />
<br />
    APA--Administrative Procedure Act<br />
    CBP--U.S. Customs and Border Protection<br />
    CDAO--Chief Data and Analytics Office<br />
    CFR--Code of Federal Regulations<br />
CRA--Congressional Review Act<br />
DHS--U.S. Department of Homeland Security<br />
EAD--employment authorization document<br />
E.O.--Executive Order<br />
Form I-765--Application for Employment Authorization<br />
FY--Fiscal Year<br />
HSA--Homeland Security Act of 2002<br />
ICE--U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement<br />
IFR--Interim final rule<br />
IIRIRA--Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act <br />
of 1996<br />
INA--Immigration and Nationality Act<br />
ISO--Immigration Service Officer<br />
<br />
[[Page 65307]]<br />
<br />
NEPA--National Environmental Policy Act<br />
OMB--Office of Management and Budget<br />
OPQ--Office of Performance and Quality<br />
PRA--Paperwork Reduction Act<br />
SBREFA--Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996<br />
Secretary--Secretary of Homeland Security<br />
TFR--Temporary final rule<br />
UMRA--Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995<br />
U.S.C.--United States Code<br />
USCIS--U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services<br />
<br />
I. Executive Summary<br />
<br />
A. Basis and Purpose<br />
<br />
    DHS's mission is to safeguard the American people, our homeland, <br />
and our values with honor and integrity. In service of that mission, <br />
DHS protects the United States from threats by terrorists, criminals, <br />
smugglers, transnational criminal organizations, failed-state actors, <br />
and unpredictable lone offenders that constitute present and future <br />
threats to public safety and national security.<br />
    USCIS issues EADs to certain classes of aliens. These documents are <br />
valid for a specified period. Aliens who intend to continue their <br />
employment beyond the date specified on their EAD must generally file <br />
an application to renew their employment authorization and/or EAD.<br />
    The automatic extension of the validity of an EAD grants the alien <br />
the benefit of extending his or her expired employment authorization <br />
and/or EAD merely by filing a timely renewal EAD application and <br />
without first completing adjudicative review and related vetting, <br />
including resolution of any derogatory information identified during <br />
the vetting process. That is, the automatic extension allows for the <br />
granting of the benefit without USCIS first performing the following <br />
actions: an eligibility determination, completing vetting and screening <br />
checks, resolving potential hits of derogatory information in <br />
connection with the alien, and a determination that the employment <br />
authorization should be granted in the exercise of discretion, if <br />
applicable.<br />
    On October 30, 2025, DHS issued an IFR titled, ``Removal of the <br />
Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documents,'' with a <br />
request for comment. See 90 FR 48799 (Oct. 30, 2025). The IFR amended <br />
DHS regulations to end the practice of automatically extending the <br />
validity of EADs for aliens in certain employment authorization <br />
categories who timely filed an application to renew their EAD. After <br />
careful consideration of the public comments submitted in connection <br />
with the IFR, DHS is reaffirming and finalizing the IFR without <br />
changes. The rationale and reasoning provided in the preamble for the <br />
IFR remains unchanged with respect to the regulatory amendments, and <br />
DHS, therefore, adopts such reasoning also to support this final rule.<br />
    In reaffirming and finalizing the changes made in the IFR, the <br />
purpose of this rule remains the same as articulated in the IFR: to <br />
prioritize the proper vetting and screening of aliens and ensure <br />
continued eligibility before granting a new period of employment <br />
authorization and/or a new EAD by ending the practice of automatically <br />
extending the validity of employment authorization and/or EADs for <br />
certain employment authorization categories.<br />
    Ending the practice of providing automatic extensions of EADs is <br />
consistent with Section 16 of President Trump's directive in Executive <br />
Order (E.O.) 14159, Protecting the American People Against Invasion, <br />
which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with <br />
the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to take all <br />
appropriate action to align any departmental activities with the <br />
policies set out by the President and to ensure, among others, ``that <br />
employment authorization is provided in a manner consistent with <br />
section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324a), <br />
and that employment authorization is not provided to any unauthorized <br />
alien in the United States.'' \1\ It is also consistent with Section 2 <br />
of E.O. 14161, Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and <br />
Other National Security and Public Safety Threats, which directs the <br />
Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland <br />
Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National <br />
Intelligence to ``identify all resources that may be used to ensure <br />
that all aliens seeking admission to the United States, or who are <br />
already in the United States, are vetted and screened to the maximum <br />
degree possible.'' \2\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \1\ See E.O. 14159, Protecting the American People Against <br />
Invasion (Jan. 20, 2025), 90 FR 8443, 8446 (Jan. 29, 2025).<br />
    \2\ See E.O. 14161, Protecting the United States from Foreign <br />
Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats <br />
(Jan. 20, 2025), 90 FR 8451, 8451 (Jan. 30, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
B. Legal Authority<br />
<br />
    The legal basis of this rulemaking is found in section 103(a) of <br />
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a), which <br />
authorizes the Secretary to administer and enforce the immigration and <br />
nationality laws and establish such regulations as the Secretary deems <br />
necessary for carrying out such authority, and section 101(b)(1)(F) of <br />
the Homeland Security Act (HSA), 6 U.S.C. 111(b)(1)(F), which <br />
establishes as a primary mission of DHS the duty to ``ensure that the <br />
overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by <br />
efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.''<br />
<br />
C. Summary of the Major Provisions of the Regulatory Action<br />
<br />
    This final rule adopts the IFR as final, without any changes, after <br />
careful consideration of the comments received. Accordingly, DHS is <br />
adopting as final the following changes that the IFR has made:<br />
     Revised the heading of 8 CFR 274a.13(d) to clearly <br />
indicate that the up-to-540-day automatic extension period only applies <br />
to renewal EAD applications filed before October 30, 2025.<br />
     Added new 8 CFR 274a.13(e). The new provision explains <br />
that, unless otherwise provided in 8 CFR 274a.13(d), by law, or through <br />
a Federal Register notice for Temporary Protected Status (TPS)-related <br />
employment documentation, the validity period of an expired or expiring <br />
Employment Authorization Document and/or employment authorization will <br />
not be automatically extended by a renewal EAD application filed on or <br />
after October 30, 2025.<br />
    DHS explained in the IFR that the IFR did not impact the validity <br />
of EADs that were automatically extended prior to October 30, 2025. It <br />
also explained that the IFR did not impact automatic extensions of EADs <br />
and/or employment authorization provided by law or Federal Register <br />
notices, such as those for TPS applicants pursuant to section 244 of <br />
the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254a, and 8 CFR part 244.\3\ This final rule <br />
similarly does not impact these provisions.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \3\ However, on July 4, 2025, Congress passed and the President <br />
signed into law sections 100003(c) and 100012(a) of the One Big <br />
Beautiful Bill Act, Public Law 119-21, 139 Stat.72 (July 4, 2025) <br />
(H.R 1), which limit the validity period of any employment <br />
authorization for aliens granted TPS under section 244 of the INA, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1254a, to a period of one year or for the duration of the <br />
designation of TPS, whichever is shorter.<br />
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<br />
D. Costs and Benefits<br />
<br />
    This final rule has been designated a ``significant regulatory <br />
action'' and economically significant as defined under section 3(f)(1) <br />
of E.O. 12866, because its annual effects on the economy may exceed <br />
$100 million in any year of the analysis. Accordingly, this rule has <br />
been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).<br />
<br />
[[Page 65308]]<br />
<br />
    This final rule reaffirms and finalizes changes made by the IFR to <br />
DHS regulations to end the practice of automatically extending the <br />
validity of employment authorization documents (Forms I-766 or EADs) <br />
for aliens who have timely filed an application to renew their EAD in <br />
certain employment authorization categories. The purpose of this change <br />
is to prioritize the proper vetting and screening of aliens and ensure <br />
continued eligibility before granting a new period of employment <br />
authorization and/or a new EAD. This final rule does not affect the <br />
validity of EADs that were automatically extended prior to the IFR. In <br />
previous rules providing for the automatic extension of EADs based on <br />
the timely filing of a renewal EAD application, DHS attempted to <br />
stabilize aliens' earnings and avoid labor turnover costs of employers. <br />
However, as explained in the IFR, the Department has shifted focus to <br />
prioritizing public safety and national security, and ensuring that <br />
aliens continue to be eligible and merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, as applicable, before being granted continued employment <br />
authorization. See 90 FR 48799, 48816 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
    DHS has prepared two types of quantified estimates of the impacts <br />
generated by this final rule. For a single 18-month window (starting in <br />
May 2027) from about 20,000 to 33,000 EADs are estimated to lapse, <br />
based on several assumptions. This rule may result in some EAD holders <br />
incurring a loss of earnings (``reduced earnings'') because of USCIS <br />
process delays for renewal EAD applications, as under this rule there <br />
could be disruption to their earnings due to a lapsed EAD. Such <br />
earnings loss to aliens could comprise beneficial transfers to other <br />
U.S. workers if the substitution of the latter for the former is <br />
relatively frictionless. Additionally, to the extent this rule affects <br />
EAD holders' jobs going unfilled, there will be impacts to tax <br />
transfers from businesses and employees to the Federal Government.\4\ <br />
This rule will also generate labor turnover costs to businesses that <br />
employ the affected-lapsed EAD holders, as under this rule there would <br />
be a disruption to the EAD holders' employment authorization and/or <br />
document validity. In conducting these estimates DHS emphasizes that <br />
variation in factors involved in the impact, including impact <br />
processing times, filing volumes, the timing of renewal filings, and <br />
underlying benefit requests, will cause variation in the impacts.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \4\ This rule could also result in a reduction in State and <br />
local tax revenue, but this impact is not quantified in this <br />
analysis due to variations in state and local tax laws and <br />
individual's tax scenarios.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Due to variation in future populations and process times, there is <br />
likely to be substantial variation in the impact estimates. For this <br />
reason, DHS develops wide ranges capturing a high and low bound for the <br />
estimates, in terms of the means (expected value). This rule is <br />
estimated to result in $138.1 million in lost productivity costs to <br />
employers that are not able to easily replace aliens with lapsed EADs, <br />
costs of $312.1 million to U.S. employers from potential labor <br />
turnover, transfers due to earnings changes worth $138.1 million from <br />
employment-authorized aliens to replacement workers and is expected to <br />
generate tax reduction impacts of $14.5 million over an 18-month <br />
period. Approximately 1,700 and 2,800 employers are estimated to be <br />
impacted.<br />
    Section V.B. provides an A-4 accounting statement supporting the <br />
analysis and the accompanying economic analysis details the data and <br />
methodology supporting the impact estimates.<br />
<br />
II. Background<br />
<br />
A. Legal Authority<br />
<br />
    The Secretary of Homeland Security's (Secretary) authority for the <br />
regulatory amendments made in this final rule are found in various <br />
sections of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and the HSA, Public Law <br />
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in part at 6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.).<br />
    General authority for issuing this rule is found in section 103(a) <br />
of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a), which authorizes the Secretary to <br />
administer and enforce the immigration and nationality laws and <br />
establish such regulations as the Secretary deems necessary for <br />
carrying out such authority, as well as section 102 of the HSA, 6 <br />
U.S.C. 112, which vests all of the functions of DHS in the Secretary <br />
and authorizes the Secretary to issue regulations.\5\ Further authority <br />
for this rule is found in:<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \5\ Although several provisions of the INA discussed in this <br />
final rule refer exclusively to the ``Attorney General,'' such <br />
provisions are now to be read as referring to the Secretary of <br />
Homeland Security by operation of the HSA. See 6 U.S.C. 202(3), 251, <br />
271(b), 542 note, 557; 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1) and (g), 1551 note; <br />
Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 n.2 (2019).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
     Section 208(d)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(2), which <br />
provides the Secretary with authority to grant employment <br />
authorization, in his or her discretion, to applicants for asylum if <br />
180 days have passed since filing an application for asylum;<br />
     Section 214 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1184, including section <br />
214(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1184(a)(1), which authorizes the <br />
Secretary to prescribe, by regulation, the time and conditions of the <br />
admission of nonimmigrants;<br />
     Section 244(a)(1)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(a)(1)(B), <br />
which states that the Secretary shall authorize employment and provide <br />
evidence of employment authorization for aliens who have been granted <br />
Temporary Protected Status;<br />
     Section 274A(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b), which <br />
provides for the employment verification system and outlines employment <br />
eligibility verification requirements;<br />
     Section 274A(h)(3)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3)(B), <br />
which recognizes the Secretary's authority to extend employment <br />
authorization to aliens in the United States; \6\ and<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \6\ Courts have acknowledged that Congress delegated authority <br />
to DHS to grant or extend employment authorization to certain <br />
classes of aliens. See, e.g., Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. DHS, 50 <br />
F.4th 164, 191-192 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (``What matters is that section <br />
1324a(h)(3) expressly acknowledges that employment authorization <br />
need not be specifically conferred by statute; it can also be <br />
granted by regulation.''). DHS is exercising this discretionary <br />
authority consistent with all applicable authorities, including the <br />
referenced authorities in the HSA, and sections 103, 208, 214, 244, <br />
and 274A(h)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, 1184, 1254a, and <br />
1324a(h)(3), as well as the Administrative Procedure Act at 5 U.S.C. <br />
553. See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2263 <br />
(2024) (``In a case involving an agency, of course, the statute's <br />
meaning may well be that the agency is authorized to exercise a <br />
degree of discretion. Congress has often enacted such statutes. For <br />
example, some statutes `expressly delegate' to an agency the <br />
authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term. Others <br />
empower an agency to prescribe rules to `fill up the details' of a <br />
statutory scheme, or to regulate subject to the limits imposed by a <br />
term or phrase that leaves agencies with flexibility, such as <br />
`appropriate' or `reasonable.' '') (internal citations omitted).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
     Sections 100003(c) and 100012(a) of the One Big Beautiful <br />
Bill Act, Public Law 119-21 (July 4, 2025), which limit the validity <br />
period of any employment authorization for aliens granted TPS under <br />
section 244 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1254a, to either a period of one year <br />
or for the duration of the designation of TPS, whichever is shorter.<br />
<br />
B. Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization and Documentation<br />
<br />
    Before November 2016, 8 CFR 274a.13(d) stated that USCIS would <br />
adjudicate an EAD application within 90 days of receipt. If USCIS did <br />
not adjudicate the EAD application within that timeframe, the alien was <br />
eligible to request an interim EAD with a validity period not to exceed <br />
240 days.\7\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \7\ See 8 CFR 274a.13(d) (2016).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    On November 18, 2016, as part of DHS's efforts to implement the <br />
American Competitiveness in the<br />
<br />
[[Page 65309]]<br />
<br />
Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 (AC21), DHS published a final rule <br />
that eliminated Interim EADs and replaced them with a maximum 180-day <br />
automatic extension period for certain renewal applicants.\8\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \8\ See 81 FR 82398 (Nov. 18, 2016) (AC21 Final Rule).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
C. Increasing the Automatic Extension Period From a Maximum of 180 Days <br />
to a Maximum of 540 Days<br />
<br />
    Since the promulgation of the final rule authorizing up to 180-day <br />
automatic extension period for certain renewal EAD applicants, USCIS' <br />
ability to process both initial and renewal EAD applications within <br />
USCIS' targeted processing times was adversely impacted by a variety of <br />
temporary circumstances.\9\ In May 2022 \10\ and April 2024,\11\ DHS <br />
temporarily increased the automatic extension from up to 180 days to up <br />
to 540 days. The May 2022 and April 2024 temporary final rules were <br />
intended to reduce the number of renewal EAD applicants eligible for an <br />
automatic extension of their EAD validity under 8 CFR 274a.13(d) <br />
experiencing lapses in their employment authorization and/or EAD <br />
validity because of USCIS processing delays.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \9\ See 87 FR 26614, 26617-26 (May 4, 2022) (identifying USCIS' <br />
precarious fiscal status, the COVID-19 public health emergency, and <br />
dramatic increases in Form I-765 filings); see also 89 FR 24628, <br />
24634-40 (Apr. 8, 2024) (identifying an increase in referrals to <br />
USCIS for Credible Fear Assessment and an increase in affirmative <br />
and defensive asylum filings as contributing factors to increased <br />
EAD processing times).<br />
    \10\ 87 FR 26614 (May 4, 2022) (temporarily increased the <br />
automatic extension period to up to 540 days).<br />
    \11\ 89 FR 24628 (Apr. 8, 2024) (temporarily increased the <br />
automatic extension period to up to 540 days).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS also issued a final rule in December 2024 \12\ that <br />
indefinitely increased the up to 540-day automatic extension for <br />
certain applications pending on May 4, 2022, or properly filed on or <br />
after May 4, 2022. That rule was intended to reduce the effects of <br />
unknown future circumstances that could significantly impact EAD <br />
renewal processing times.\13\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \12\ See 89 FR 101208 (Dec. 13, 2024) (permanently increased the <br />
automatic extension period to up to 540 days).<br />
    \13\ See 89 FR 101210 (``When unforeseen future circumstances <br />
cause processing times to extend beyond 180 days and result in large <br />
scale lapses in renewal EADs, this permanent adjustment of the <br />
automatic extension period to 540 days will result in benefits and <br />
cost savings, such as stabilized earnings and avoided labor turnover <br />
costs.'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
D. The 2025 Interim Final Rule Removed Automatic Extensions for Certain <br />
Employment Authorization Documents<br />
<br />
    The IFR amended DHS regulations to end the practice of <br />
automatically extending the validity of certain EADs. See 8 CFR <br />
274a.13(e). The IFR did not impact the automatic extensions already <br />
granted to renewal EAD applicants under 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1), if the <br />
renewal EAD application was filed before October 30, 2025. See 8 CFR <br />
274a.13(d). The IFR also did not impact automatic extensions otherwise <br />
provided by law or in an applicable Federal Register notice regarding <br />
procedures for renewing TPS-related employment documentation pursuant <br />
to section 244 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1254a, and 8 CFR part 244.\14\ See <br />
8 CFR 274a.13(e).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \14\ DHS notes, however, that sections 100003(c) and 100012(a) <br />
of H.R. 1, Public Law 119-21 (2025), 139 Stat. 221 (2025) (codified <br />
at 8 U.S.C. 1802-1815), limits the validity period of any employment <br />
authorization for aliens granted TPS under section 244 of the INA, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1254a, to a period of 1 year or for the duration of the <br />
designation of TPS, whichever is shorter.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The IFR made two changes to the regulations governing EAD, as <br />
discussed below.<br />
1. Added New 8 CFR 274a.13(e)<br />
    The IFR added a new paragraph (e) that went into effect immediately <br />
with the publication of the IFR on October 30, 2025. With 8 CFR <br />
274a.13(e), DHS eliminated the practice of providing automatic <br />
extension periods for employment authorization and/or EAD validity for <br />
up to 540 days for renewal applications filed on or after October 30, <br />
2025. Therefore, renewal EAD applicants no longer receive an up to 540-<br />
day automatic extension of their employment authorization and/or EAD <br />
validity if they file their application on or after October 30, 2025. <br />
See 8 CFR 274a.13(e).<br />
    Except as otherwise provided by law, in 8 CFR 274a.13(d), or in <br />
accordance with an applicable Federal Register notice regarding <br />
procedures for renewing TPS-related employment documentation, an <br />
alien's employment authorization and/or EAD validity will expire as <br />
explained in the following paragraphs:<br />
    For those aliens who are employment authorized incident to status <br />
under 8 CFR 274a.12(a), unless otherwise provided by law, their EAD <br />
will expire on the day after the end validity date stated on the face <br />
of the EAD. See 8 CFR 274a.13(e)(1). Because the alien's employment <br />
authorization is tied to the alien's status in the United States, the <br />
alien's employment authorization will not expire on the date indicated <br />
on the EAD. Instead, the alien's employment authorization will expire <br />
or terminate on the same date the alien's status in the United States <br />
expires or terminates.<br />
    For example, an alien in L-2 nonimmigrant status as the spouse of <br />
an L-1 nonimmigrant is employment authorized incident to status. See <br />
INA sec. 214(c)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. 1184(c)(2)(E). If the L-2 nonimmigrant <br />
chooses to apply for an EAD to evidence his or her employment <br />
authorization, the EAD will expire as of the date indicated on the face <br />
of the EAD. In some cases that may be the same date as the expiration <br />
of the L-2's nonimmigrant status. But in other cases, the L-2 status <br />
expiration date may be after the EAD expiration date, particularly if <br />
the L-2 nonimmigrant travelled outside of the United States after <br />
obtaining an EAD and, upon return to the United States, was provided a <br />
new status expiration date that will expire after the EAD expires.\15\ <br />
In that scenario, the L-2 nonimmigrant would remain employment <br />
authorized while in L-2 nonimmigrant status, even after the EAD <br />
expires, but the expired EAD would no longer be a valid document to <br />
evidence the L-2 nonimmigrant's employment authorization.\16\ Once the <br />
alien is no longer in L-2 status (for example, the L-2 nonimmigrant <br />
status expires), the alien would no longer be employment authorized as <br />
an L-2 nonimmigrant because such employment authorization is dependent <br />
on being in L-2 nonimmigrant status.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \15\ In this case, the new status expiration date is the date <br />
stated on the alien's Form I-94, Arrival Departure document.<br />
    \16\ An L-2 can still have other evidence of documentation of <br />
employment authorization, such as a Form I-94, Arrival/Departure <br />
Record, designated with the L-2S classification.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    For aliens who are not employment authorized incident to their <br />
immigration status and who instead must obtain employment authorization <br />
from USCIS, pursuant to 8 CFR 274a.12(c) before accepting employment in <br />
the United States, such as adjustment of status applicants or aliens <br />
with a pending asylum application, USCIS determines the length of the <br />
period of employment authorization in the exercise of its discretion <br />
and thereafter issues an EAD reflecting the validity period.\17\ <br />
Therefore, the EAD will expire and the employment authorization will <br />
terminate the day after the end validity<br />
<br />
[[Page 65310]]<br />
<br />
date stated on the face of the EAD based upon the situations outlined <br />
in 8 CFR 274a.14, or for aliens with employment authorization under 8 <br />
CFR 274a.12(c)(19) based on a pending TPS application, pursuant to <br />
section 244 of the Act and 8 CFR part 244 \18\ See 8 CFR 274a.13(e)(2).<br />
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<br />
    \17\ Employment authorization granted pursuant to 8 CFR <br />
274a.12(c) is generally granted in the discretion of the Secretary. <br />
See 8 CFR 274a.13(a)(1) (``The approval of applications filed under <br />
8 CFR 274a.12(c), except for 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(8), are within the <br />
discretion of USCIS.'').<br />
    \18\ For example, employment authorization may also end prior to <br />
the expiration date displayed on the EAD, in accordance with 8 CFR <br />
274a.14, if exclusion or deportation proceedings are instituted <br />
against the alien; if a condition upon which the EAD was granted has <br />
not been met or no longer exists; or upon a showing that the <br />
information contained in the request for an EAD was not true and <br />
correct.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    For example, an alien with a pending adjustment of status <br />
application (Form I-485) has an EAD that expires on May 30, 2026. The <br />
alien's adjustment of status application has not been adjudicated and <br />
continues to be pending. The alien is eligible to apply for a renewal <br />
EAD based on the pending adjustment of status application. The alien <br />
applies for a renewal of the EAD on February 4, 2026, which is after <br />
the October 30, 2025, effective date of the IFR. The alien will <br />
maintain continuous employment authorization if his or her renewal <br />
application is granted before his or her current employment <br />
authorization expires on May 30, 2026. If the renewal EAD application <br />
remains unadjudicated on May 31, 2026, the alien cannot continue to <br />
work for his or her employer on or after May 31, 2026, unless the alien <br />
is employment authorized on a separate basis. See 8 CFR 274a.13(e). If <br />
the renewal EAD application is subsequently approved, the alien would <br />
again be employment authorized and may resume employment during the <br />
validity period stated on the new EAD. The longer an alien waits to <br />
file a renewal EAD application, the more likely it is that he or she <br />
may experience a temporary lapse in his or her employment authorization <br />
and/or EAD validity.<br />
2. Modified the Heading of 8 CFR 274a.13(d)<br />
    On December 13, 2024, DHS published a final rule amending 8 CFR <br />
274a.13(d) to permanently increase the automatic extension period for <br />
certain employment authorization and/or EAD validity. The rule became <br />
effective on January 13, 2025.\19\ DHS is retaining the provision <br />
granting an automatic extension for those aliens who had timely filed a <br />
renewal EAD request before October 30, 2025, and who otherwise meet the <br />
requirements of 8 CFR 274a.13(d). The IFR amended 8 CFR 274a.13(d) by <br />
revising the paragraph's heading to reflect that the paragraph applies <br />
to renewal requests properly filed before October 30, 2025, to avoid <br />
confusion between the automatic extension period granted under 8 CFR <br />
274a.13(d) for those renewal EAD requests filed prior to October 30, <br />
2025, and those filed on the day of or after the publication of the <br />
IFR. With this final rule, DHS is adopting and finalizing the changes <br />
made by the IFR and not making any additional changes to the <br />
regulations.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \19\ See 89 FR 101208 (Dec. 13, 2024).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    This change to the heading of 8 CFR 274a.13(d) ensures that the IFR <br />
and this rule do not retroactively affect those aliens who have already <br />
timely and properly filed a renewal EAD application before October 30, <br />
2025. For these aliens, an EAD that appears on its face to be expired <br />
(``facially expired'') is considered unexpired under this rule for up <br />
to 540 days from the expiration date on the front of the EAD when <br />
combined with a Notice of Action (Form I-797C) indicating timely filing <br />
(that is, the receipt notice for the Form I-765 issued by USCIS has a <br />
receipt date that is before the expiration date on the EAD and before <br />
October 30, 2025) of the renewal application based on the same <br />
employment eligibility category as stated on the facially expired EAD <br />
(or in the case of an EAD and I-797C notice) that contains either an <br />
A12 or C19 category code, the category codes need not match). In those <br />
cases, the alien's facially expired EAD is considered unexpired for up <br />
to 540 days from the expiration date on the face of the EAD.\20\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \20\ If an adjustment of status applicant's (C09) EAD card is <br />
combined with the advance parole authorization, i.e., the applicant <br />
is issued a combo card (in this case, the EAD itself has an <br />
annotation ``SERVES AS I-512 ADVANCE PAROLE''), the up-to-540-day <br />
automatic extension under 8 CFR 274a.13(d) does not apply to the <br />
advance parole part of the applicant's combo card.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    USCIS updated the web page on the USCIS website with the <br />
appropriate information.\21\ USCIS also updated I-9 Central on the <br />
USCIS website and the Handbook for Employers, M-274, to provide <br />
employers and employees with additional guidance.\22\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \21\ The website entitled ``Automatic Employment Authorization <br />
Document (EAD) Extension'' has been archived in light of the IFR but <br />
the web page is still available for viewing at &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/archive/automatic-employment-authorization-document-ead-extension&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/archive/automatic-employment-authorization-document-ead-extension&lt;/a&gt; (last updated Oct. 29, 2025).<br />
    \22\ See DHS, USCIS, Handbook for Employers M-274, 5.0 Automatic <br />
Extensions of Employment Authorization and/or Employment <br />
Authorization Documents (EADs) in Certain Circumstances (last <br />
updated Oct. 30, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt;-central/form-i-9-<br />
resources/handbook-for-employers-m-274/50-automatic-extensions-of-<br />
employment-authorization-andor-employment-authorization-documents-<br />
eads-in.<br />
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<br />
E. Severability<br />
<br />
    In issuing this final rule, like the IFR, DHS continues to intend <br />
that the rule's various provisions be considered severable from one <br />
another to the greatest extent possible. For instance, if a court of <br />
competent jurisdiction were to hold that ending the practice of <br />
automatically extending the validity of employment authorization and/or <br />
EADs for aliens who have timely filed an application to renew their <br />
employment authorization and/or EAD in certain employment categories <br />
may only be applied to a particular category of renewal EAD applicants <br />
or in a particular circumstance, DHS would intend for the court to <br />
leave the remainder of the rule in place with respect to all other <br />
covered persons and circumstances. DHS's overarching goal is to <br />
militate against threats to national security and public safety and to <br />
ensure that employment authorization and/or EADs are provided only <br />
after USCIS conducts adequate vetting and determines that the alien <br />
continues to be eligible and merits a favorable exercise of discretion, <br />
if applicable.<br />
<br />
III. Changes in the Final Rule<br />
<br />
    This final rule adopts as final, without change, the amendments to <br />
8 CFR 274a.13(d) and (e) in the IFR, published on October 30, 2025, at <br />
90 FR 48799.<br />
<br />
IV. Response to Public Comments on the Interim Final Rule<br />
<br />
A. Summary of Comments<br />
<br />
    When issuing the IFR, DHS invited the public to participate in the <br />
rulemaking by submitting post-promulgation comments on every aspect of <br />
the rule. DHS provided a 33-day comment period following the <br />
publication of the IFR. DHS received 653 public comment submissions in <br />
the Federal eRulemaking Portal site under Docket ID Number USCIS-2025-<br />
0271 \23\ in response to the rulemaking.<br />
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<br />
    \23\ The comments can be viewed by visiting the docket for this <br />
rule on the Federal eRulemaking Portal site at &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.regulations.gov/document/USCIS-2025-0271-0001/comment&quot;&gt;https://www.regulations.gov/document/USCIS-2025-0271-0001/comment&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
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<br />
    Comments were submitted by a range of entities and individuals, <br />
including attorneys and legal service providers, applicants, individual <br />
commenters, professional organizations, unions, advocacy groups, <br />
religious organizations, research and community organizations, and <br />
State and local government agencies or elected officials. Some <br />
commenters expressed support for the rule or offered suggestions for <br />
improvement. Some expressed general opposition to the rule, and some <br />
offered alternatives. For some of the public<br />
<br />
[[Page 65311]]<br />
<br />
comments, DHS could not ascertain whether the commenter supported or <br />
opposed the IFR. Finally, some commenters addressed topics outside the <br />
scope of this rulemaking.<br />
    DHS carefully reviewed all the public comments received in response <br />
to the IFR and addresses relevant comments in this final rule, grouped <br />
by subject area.<br />
<br />
B. Comments in Support of the Rule<br />
<br />
    Comment: Several commenters supported the rule based on national <br />
security concerns, citing the need for proper vetting of nonimmigrant <br />
workers. Specifically, they stated that the rule would allow for <br />
thorough vetting of nonimmigrants before DHS extends their <br />
authorization to work in the United States. Commenters called the rule <br />
a ``critical'' measure to support the safety and security of the <br />
public. One commenter emphasized that working in the United States is a <br />
privilege, not a right, while another said that safety and national <br />
security should be government's highest priority.<br />
    Several commenters supported the rule based on concerns about fraud <br />
and abuse in the visa system, stating, for example, that it would help <br />
deter potential fraud and abuse by preventing aliens from remaining in <br />
the workforce for extended periods without final adjudication of their <br />
eligibility.<br />
    Multiple commenters supported the rule based on concerns about <br />
protecting job opportunities for American citizens. A commenter stated <br />
that automatic extensions keep nonimmigrant workers employed without <br />
timely reevaluation, allowing them to compete with American workers for <br />
positions while requiring renewed authorization before continuing <br />
employment ensures that only eligible aliens remain in the workforce.<br />
    Response: DHS agrees that this rule safeguards the process to fully <br />
evaluate the applicants in order to determine continued eligibility, <br />
identify national security and public safety concerns, and enhance <br />
fraud prevention through robust vetting and screening processes. This <br />
administration prioritizes the safety of the American people. Ensuring <br />
that employment authorization and/or EADs are provided only after USCIS <br />
conducts adequate vetting and determines that the alien continues to be <br />
eligible and merits a favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable, <br />
better protects national security, public safety, and the integrity of <br />
the immigration system. This rule is part of a larger DHS effort to <br />
reduce frivolous, fraudulent, and otherwise non-meritorious EAD filings <br />
and focus adjudicatory and other resources on ensuring national <br />
security and program integrity.<br />
<br />
C. Comments in Opposition to the Rule and Mixed Comments<br />
<br />
1. DHS Legal Authority<br />
i. DHS Statutory Authority and Congressional Intent<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters requested that the rule be withdrawn <br />
stating that the rule contradicts DHS's statutory mandate, including <br />
the mandate to ensure that ``the overall economic security of the <br />
United States is not diminished by efforts . . . aimed at securing the <br />
homeland'' under 6 U.S.C. 111(b)(1)(F). Many of these commenters stated <br />
that, consistent with this statutory mandate, DHS recently concluded <br />
that a 540-day automatic EAD extension was necessary to protect <br />
employers and workers from lapses in work authorization due to USCIS <br />
delays, and DHS previously found that even the 180-day extension <br />
established under the 2016 Final Rule was not enough time to avoid <br />
harmful gaps in work authorization.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees that this rule is inconsistent with DHS's <br />
statutory mandate, including the mandate under 6 U.S.C. 111(b)(1)(F). <br />
According to 6 U.S.C. 111(b), DHS's primary mission includes preventing <br />
terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the vulnerability <br />
of the United States to terrorism, minimizing the damage, and assisting <br />
in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that occur within the United <br />
States, and ensuring that the overall economic security of the United <br />
States is not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at <br />
securing the homeland. See 6 U.S.C. 111(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), and (F). <br />
While the provision does not specifically define ``economic security,'' <br />
another provision within 6 U.S.C. Chapter 1 (Homeland Security <br />
Organization), defines ``economic security'' as the ``condition of <br />
having secure and resilient domestic production capacity, combined with <br />
reliable access to the global resources necessary to maintain an <br />
acceptable standard of living and to protect core national values.'' <br />
See 6 U.S.C. 474(c)(2).\24\ In addition, DHS is charged with the <br />
implementation of section 274A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, preventing <br />
unlawful employment of aliens. This rule, which is part of an effort to <br />
secure the homeland, supports DHS's mission as provided by Congress in <br />
6 U.S.C. 111(b) and section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, ensures <br />
lawful employment, and supports the overall national and economic <br />
security of the United States.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \24\ See Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury of U.S., 475 U.S. 851, <br />
860 (1986) (``The normal rule of statutory construction assumes that <br />
identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended <br />
to have the same meaning.'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Ending the practice of providing automatic extension of employment <br />
authorization and/or EADs enhances the benefit integrity in <br />
adjudications of employment authorization requests and better protects <br />
public safety and national security by ensuring that aliens are <br />
properly vetted and determined to be eligible (and merit a favorable <br />
exercise of discretion, if applicable), for employment authorization <br />
before such authorization is provided to the alien. The automatic <br />
extension of an EAD grants the benefit of extending an alien's expired <br />
employment authorization and/or EAD merely by filing a timely renewal <br />
EAD application and without first completing adjudicative review and <br />
related vetting, including resolution of any derogatory information <br />
identified during the vetting process. That is, the benefit is granted <br />
without USCIS first performing the following actions: an eligibility <br />
determination, completing vetting and screening checks, resolving <br />
potential hits of derogatory information in connection with the alien, <br />
and a determination that the employment authorization should be renewed <br />
in the exercise of discretion, if applicable. Without the IFR and this <br />
final rule, aliens could still obtain an automatic extension despite <br />
derogatory information that could flag them as national security or <br />
public safety risks. Automatic extensions, therefore, pose a security <br />
risk.<br />
    DHS is charged with combating unauthorized employment in accordance <br />
with section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, which Congress <br />
implemented, among other reasons, because of the detrimental negative <br />
effect that unauthorized employment and illegal immigration has on the <br />
United States and the national economy.\25\ Sections 103 and 274A of<br />
<br />
[[Page 65312]]<br />
<br />
the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a) and 8 U.S.C. 1324a, among other provisions, <br />
provide DHS and USCIS with considerable flexibility to administer and <br />
enforce the INA, including granting employment authorization and the <br />
issuance of an EAD. There is no generally applicable statutory mandate <br />
that requires DHS to provide an automatic extension. As explained in <br />
the IFR, the automatic extension carries the risk that employers <br />
unwittingly continue to employ a worker whose employment authorization <br />
is in fact no longer valid. See 90 FR at 48810. This includes that <br />
aliens may no longer be entitled to employment authorization because <br />
they no longer have an underlying status which entitles them to work. <br />
Additionally, vetting every alien before granting an immigration <br />
benefit, including employment authorization, has been one of the key <br />
considerations of Congress.\26\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \25\ Section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324a was codified as <br />
part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Public Law <br />
99-603, for the purpose of controlling illegal immigration to the <br />
United States by, among other things, establishing penalties for <br />
employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens and prohibiting the <br />
employment of aliens who are unauthorized to work in the United <br />
States either because they entered the country illegally or are in <br />
an immigration status which does not permit employment. See H. Rep. <br />
No. 99-682, 46, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649-5650. The legislative <br />
history reflects that Congress considered, among other things, <br />
evidence of prior studies demonstrating the adverse impact of <br />
illegal immigration that warranted legislation to protect U.S. labor <br />
and the economy. See, e.g., H. Rep. 99-682, 46--52, 1986 <br />
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649-5656 [``The need for control is underscored <br />
by international demographics. Undocumented aliens tend to come from <br />
countries with high population growth and few employment <br />
opportunities. The United States is not in a position to redress <br />
this imbalance by absorbing these workers into our economy and our <br />
population. U.S. unemployment currently stands at 7%, and is much <br />
higher among the minority groups with whom undocumented workers <br />
compete for jobs most directly . . . Extensive investigative and <br />
legislative hearings on the problem of undocumented aliens were held <br />
during the 92d Congress beginning in 1971, by the House Judiciary <br />
Subcommittee with special jurisdiction over immigration matters, <br />
then under the chairmanship of Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr. <br />
Quoting from a 1975 House Judiciary Committee report, `The basic <br />
conclusion reached by the majority of the members of the <br />
subcommittee as a result of the hearings was that the adverse impact <br />
of illegal aliens was substantial, and warranted legislation both to <br />
protect U.S. labor and the economy, and to assure the orderly entry <br />
of immigrants into this country.' (H. Rept. 94-506, p. 3)''].<br />
    \26\ For example, the Congressional recommendation to establish <br />
an organization ``responsible for developing, implementing, <br />
directing, and overseeing the joint USCIS-Immigration and Customs <br />
Enforcement (ICE) anti-fraud initiative and conducting law <br />
enforcement/background checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and <br />
petitioner prior to granting immigration benefits.'' See Conference <br />
Report to accompany H.R. 4567 [Report 108-774], ``Making <br />
Appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the <br />
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' p. 74, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; [emphasis added]. <br />
In response to this recommendation, the Fraud and National Security <br />
Division (FDNS) was established at USCIS. See USCIS, DHS, ``Fraud <br />
Detection and Nat'l Security Directorate,'' &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/organization/directorates-and-program-offices/fraud-detection-and-national-security-directorate&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/organization/directorates-and-program-offices/fraud-detection-and-national-security-directorate&lt;/a&gt; (last updated Apr. 16, <br />
2026); USCIS, ``Fraud Detection and Nat'l Security Directorate <br />
(FDNS),'' May 2022, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/brochures/FDNS_Brochure_Web_V2_508.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/brochures/FDNS_Brochure_Web_V2_508.pdf&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The rule does not eliminate employment authorizations or prevent <br />
eligible aliens from obtaining EADs for employment purposes or proof of <br />
identity; or from seeking and maintaining authorized employment. The <br />
rule does not reduce economic security. To the contrary, the rule <br />
supports the condition of having secure and resilient domestic <br />
production capacity, and protects core national values, as directed by <br />
Congress, with U.S. workers who are legally authorized to work. <br />
Therefore, the IFR is consistent with DHS's statutory mandate, <br />
including the mandate at 6 U.S.C. 111(b)(1)(F), because it <br />
appropriately balances the need for security and vetting while <br />
maintaining overall EAD eligibility practices.<br />
    DHS is cognizant that prior rulemakings stated that DHS believed, <br />
at the time, that taking immediate action and providing automatic <br />
extensions of employment authorization supported USCIS' (as a component <br />
of DHS) statutory mission to administer employment authorization <br />
effectively, and as a measure to ensure that the overall economic <br />
security was not diminished by potentially harmful gaps in employment <br />
authorizations. See, e.g., 89 FR 101208, 101209 (Dec. 13, 2024); 89 FR <br />
24628, 24629 and 24651(Apr. 8, 2024). As explained in this response, <br />
and throughout this rule, DHS believes that the factual situation <br />
underlying prior rules, in particular the Dec. 13, 2024 rule, have <br />
significantly changed, including that DHS has taken significant steps <br />
to reduce the flood of filings of EADs that overwhelmed USCIS' <br />
adjudicative resources.\27\ Furthermore, the 2024 final rule made the <br />
automatic extension period permanent based on the presumption that <br />
harmful gaps would occur given the operational realities at the <br />
time.\28\ Even if the 2024 final rule had taken into account the <br />
security posture of the United States, it was unclear how the rule <br />
furthered the economic security given that the rule was based on <br />
potential harm to individual applicants and their employers, rather <br />
than the broader national economy. It is thus unclear how removing the <br />
automatic extension period, which improves the security posture of the <br />
United States and is consistent with immigration laws, would undermine <br />
the overall economic security of the United States.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \27\ See 90 FR 48799, 48809 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
    \28\ See 89 FR 101208, 101245 (noting ``the purpose of this <br />
final rule is to provide a long-term solution to mitigate the <br />
potential for unpredictable circumstances to significantly increase <br />
renewal EAD application processing times that would require future <br />
urgent action).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: A commenter asserted that removing the automatic extension <br />
of employment authorization without ensuring timely adjudication would <br />
strip lawfully authorized noncitizens \29\ of their ability to work due <br />
to USCIS processing delays, which, according to the commenter, <br />
contradicts the intent of the INA and the ``right'' to work in the <br />
United States. Another commenter stated that the IFR incorrectly states <br />
that the rule is consistent with section 274A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. <br />
1324a. Another commenter stated that it seems illegal to deny someone a <br />
renewal when they have followed the law and have filed the renewal <br />
application in a timely manner.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \29\ USCIS generally refers to ``aliens'' when discussing <br />
foreign nationals present in the United States. The term ``alien'' <br />
is a legal term defined in the INA that is used to describe any <br />
person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. See <br />
INA sec. 101(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(1). Some commenters <br />
used ``aliens'', but others may have used different terminology <br />
(such as person or individual). In general, when describing comments <br />
in this preamble, DHS has sought to mirror the language used in <br />
those comments, sometimes with quotation marks for clarity. <br />
Otherwise, DHS has used alien, or applicant, beneficiary, or <br />
requestor.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with these commenters' assertions. This <br />
final rule and the IFR are consistent with section 274A of the Act, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1324a, which, among other things, recognizes the Secretary's <br />
authority to grant employment authorization in his or her discretion. <br />
DHS disagrees with the commenter's assertion that aliens have a broadly <br />
applicable ``right'' to work in the United States. Rather, the INA <br />
makes clear that aliens, to lawfully work in the United States, must be <br />
so authorized by law or a grant of employment authorization by the <br />
Secretary. See INA 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)(3). Contrary to the <br />
commenters' assertions, this rule does not impact whether DHS will <br />
renew an alien's employment authorization; it only removes an <br />
intermediate automatic extension of the EAD period. If DHS determines <br />
that the alien is eligible for continued employment authorization and <br />
merits a favorable exercise of discretion, as applicable, DHS may grant <br />
the renewal of employment authorization. This final rule merely ends <br />
the practice of automatically granting the benefit of continued <br />
employment authorization without USCIS first performing the following <br />
actions: eligibility determination, completing vetting and screening <br />
checks, resolving potential hits of derogatory information in <br />
connection with the alien, and a determination that the employment <br />
authorization should be granted in the exercise of discretion, if <br />
applicable.<br />
    Comment: A commenter stated that, when providing the ability for <br />
asylum<br />
<br />
[[Page 65313]]<br />
<br />
seekers to obtain work authorization, Congress could not have intended <br />
the arbitrary and capricious impact, on both the alien authorized to <br />
work and the employer who has relied on that alien, of being without <br />
authorization for an indeterminate amount of time until USCIS <br />
adjudicates either the asylum application or a new EAD. A commenter <br />
stated, without pointing to specific provisions, that the IFR should be <br />
discontinued because its policy changes do not reflect the law or the <br />
intent of the law or even the will of the people who voted for <br />
candidates who would make immigration changes.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertion. Section <br />
208(d)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(2), expressly states that ``[a]n <br />
applicant for asylum is not entitled to employment authorization,'' <br />
though it also provides the Secretary with authority to grant <br />
employment authorization, in his or her discretion, to applicants for <br />
asylum if 180 days have passed since filing an application for asylum. <br />
The IFR, and this final rule, clearly outline the legal authority for <br />
this change, and are consistent with the Secretary's discretionary <br />
authority regarding the grant of employment authorization for asylum <br />
applicants and the duration of such authorization.<br />
ii. Constitutional Concerns<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters expressed that the IFR raises First <br />
Amendment concerns, because the IFR suggests that USCIS must evaluate <br />
whether renewal applicants ``bear hostile attitudes'' toward U.S. <br />
citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles. <br />
The commenters reasoned that employment authorization may not be <br />
conditioned on ideological conformity and that agency action on <br />
unconstitutional factors may not be sustained as it is constitutionally <br />
questionable and impermissible. Another commenter stated that an <br />
ideological screening regime for work authorization renewals would <br />
further entrench USCIS in DHS's ``troubling pattern'' of suppressing <br />
First Amendment rights in the name of national security and opens the <br />
door for USCIS to profile individuals.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters. Citizens and aliens <br />
may object to various statutes, regulations, and policies and express <br />
those objections publicly. This rule neither penalizes individuals for <br />
protected political beliefs or associations nor subjects them to <br />
activities such as ideological screenings or profiling. This rule does <br />
not abridge the freedom of speech, of the press, or of association or <br />
peaceful assembly. Rather, it ends the practice of automatically <br />
granting the benefit of continued employment authorization without <br />
USCIS concurrently performing the following actions: eligibility <br />
determination, completing vetting and screening checks, resolving <br />
potential hits of derogatory information in connection with the alien, <br />
or a determination that the employment authorization should be renewed <br />
in the exercise of discretion, if applicable.<br />
    DHS notes that freedom of speech for aliens is not absolute. See, <br />
e.g., INA sec. 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII) <br />
(stating that any alien who endorses or espouses terrorist activity, or <br />
persuades others to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or support a <br />
terrorist organization, is inadmissible), and INA sec. <br />
212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (stating that any alien <br />
who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself <br />
to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under <br />
Federal or State law is inadmissible). DHS has a compelling interest in <br />
vetting and screening aliens before granting a benefit request, <br />
particularly when such request is granted in USCIS' discretion, as <br />
applicable.<br />
    DHS also notes that a challenge to the First Amendment cannot lie <br />
unless an individual establishes that he or she faces a ``credible <br />
threat of prosecution'' specifically for his or her speech, ``under a <br />
statute [or rule] that appears to render the [individual]'s arguably <br />
protected speech illegal.'' See, e.g., Am. Library ***'n v. Barr, 956 <br />
F.2d 1178, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1992). As indicated above, that is not the <br />
case in this scenario as neither section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. <br />
1324a, nor the associated regulations, renders any form of speech <br />
illegal or attempts to directly or indirectly regulate or penalize <br />
speech. Rather, the IFR and this final rule subject all EAD renewal <br />
applicants to the same vetting and screening procedures used for <br />
initial applications or those applicants who were not previously <br />
eligible for an automatic extension of their renewal employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD.<br />
    Comment: Several commenters raised concerns related to due process. <br />
Referencing the Fifth Amendment, a commenter stated that the IFR <br />
undermines the right to due process and the right to seek asylum by <br />
eliminating automatic extensions, which will cause large numbers of <br />
asylum seekers and other immigrants to lose employment authorization <br />
through no fault of their own. Another commenter said the rule replaces <br />
due process with guilt by association and abandons any pretense of a <br />
fair and rational immigration system. Other commenters expressed <br />
concerns about due process related to the immediate effective date of <br />
the IFR, stating that implementation of the IFR appears to be designed <br />
to reflect and further the current administration's policies and <br />
efforts toward ``creating and enhancing chaos and dysfunction.''<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertions that the <br />
IFR, and this final rule by virtue of reaffirming and finalizing the <br />
IFR, undermine due process or the ability of aliens to request asylum, <br />
or that it will cause large numbers of asylum seekers or other aliens <br />
to lose employment authorization.<br />
    In general, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects <br />
due process rights to a government benefit if the alien has an <br />
entitlement to it, but a benefit is not a protected entitlement if <br />
government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion. See Town <br />
of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005). There <br />
is no generally applicable statutory mandate to grant automatic <br />
extensions of employment authorizations. DHS and USCIS have been <br />
provided with considerable flexibility and discretion under section 103 <br />
and 274A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a) and 8 U.S.C. 1324a, among other <br />
provisions, to administer and enforce the INA, including granting <br />
employment authorization. Therefore, there is generally no cognizable <br />
due process interest in matters related to automatic extensions of <br />
employment authorizations and/or EADs. Additionally, contrary to the <br />
commenter's assertion, the rule does not suggest guilt by association <br />
or that the immigration system is unfair or irrational. A fair and <br />
rational immigration system ensures that aliens are sufficiently <br />
vetted, and any background hits are resolved before a determination is <br />
made that the alien is eligible for an extension of his or her <br />
employment authorization and/or an EAD and merits a favorable exercise <br />
of discretion, as applicable. The examples provided in the IFR do not <br />
suggest guilt by association. Rather, those examples highlight the <br />
importance and urgency of ensuring that aliens are not granted <br />
employment authorization until appropriate adjudicative review has been <br />
completed, and the risks to the national security and public safety if <br />
such benefits are granted automatically.<br />
    DHS also disagrees with the assertion that immediate implementation <br />
of the IFR was designed or intended to create chaos or dysfunction. DHS <br />
explained in the IFR why it was implementing the<br />
<br />
[[Page 65314]]<br />
<br />
rule with immediate effect. DHS concluded that the good cause <br />
exceptions in 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) and (d)(3) apply to the IFR and that <br />
delaying the implementation of the IFR until the conclusion of notice <br />
and comment procedures and the delayed effective date would be <br />
impracticable and contrary to public interest. See 90 FR 48814 (Oct. <br />
30, 2025). DHS also explained that the IFR was issued with an immediate <br />
effective date because the rule clearly implicates the foreign affairs <br />
policy of the United States, and that notice and comment procedure as <br />
well as a 30-day delayed effective date would result in undesirable <br />
international consequences. See 90 FR 48816 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
iii. International Law and Refugee Protections<br />
    Comment: Several commenters stated that the IFR violates refugee <br />
protections, including the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of <br />
Refugees and the Refugee Act of 1980.\30\ One of these commenters said <br />
the Refugee Act of 1980 specifically enshrines the right of refugees to <br />
work, obtain documentation, and access education, and UNHCR Guidance <br />
makes clear that asylum seekers awaiting adjudication of their cases <br />
are to be afforded the right to work. The commenter said asylum seekers <br />
must obtain EADs to work while their cases are pending, and gaps in <br />
EADs restrict the enjoyment of these rights either by directly <br />
impacting the right to safe work, or because many services require <br />
documentation for which an EAD may be the only form of proof available.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \30\ In 1968, the U.S. acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to <br />
the Status of Refugees (``Protocol''), which adopted articles of the <br />
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (``Convention'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Another commenter stated that eliminating the automatic extension <br />
was contrary to Article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, because the <br />
resulting loss of employment and the bar of legal employment impede <br />
assimilation and naturalization of refugees. The commenter also said <br />
the IFR was contrary to Article 33's nonrefoulement, and the Refugee <br />
Convention's and Protocol's mandate to facilitate access to fair and <br />
efficient refugee status determination procedures that function as a <br />
safeguard against refoulement. The commenter reasoned that by <br />
undermining asylum seekers' ability to meet their basic needs through <br />
legal employment while their claims are pending, the rule obstructs <br />
access to a fair asylum procedure and risks forcing aliens to abandon <br />
their claims, potentially resulting in their return to the country of <br />
persecution.<br />
    A commenter stated that cutting off work authorization from people <br />
fleeing persecution contradicts our legal obligations and longstanding <br />
values.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees that ending the practice of granting <br />
automatic extensions for EAD renewals is inconsistent with the United <br />
States' international obligations related to refugee protections, <br />
including the Refugee Convention and its Protocol and the Refugee Act <br />
of 1980. Although the United States is party to the 1967 Protocol, <br />
which incorporates, among others, Articles 17, 33, and 34 of the 1951 <br />
Refugee Convention, the treaty is not self-executing and is not <br />
directly enforceable in U.S. law. It is the domestic implementing law <br />
that governs. The Supreme Court and other case law makes clear that the <br />
Protocol serves only as a useful guide in determining congressional <br />
intent in enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, because the Act sought to <br />
bring U.S. law into conformity with the Protocol. See, e.g., INS v. <br />
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984); Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, <br />
783 (9th Cir. 2009). The United States Congress implemented U.S. <br />
obligations with respect to certain provisions of the Refugee <br />
Convention in the Refugee Act of 1980, including in sections 208, 235, <br />
and 241 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1158, 1225 and 1231, and DHS regulations, <br />
including 8 CFR part 208 and 1208. Section 208(d)(2) of the INA, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1158(d)(2), provides the Secretary with authority to grant <br />
employment authorization, in his or her discretion, to applicants for <br />
asylum if 180 days have passed since filing an application for asylum.<br />
    The IFR is limited in scope, merely ending the practice of <br />
automatically extending the validity of employment authorization and/or <br />
EADs for aliens who have timely filed an application to renew their EAD <br />
in certain employment categories. There is no mandate under <br />
international or United States law that DHS provide an automatic <br />
extension of employment authorization and/or EAD validity for aliens <br />
filing renewal EAD applications, and certainly not without adequately <br />
being vetted for continued eligibility. Aliens with a pending asylum <br />
application are permitted to still apply for employment authorization <br />
as nothing in this rule restricts the ability to apply for an EAD.\31\ <br />
Rather, the IFR, and this final rule, are consistent with the <br />
Secretary's discretionary authority regarding the grant of employment <br />
authorization for asylum applicants and the duration of such <br />
authorization, and with international obligations, including the <br />
favorable treatment of those seeking refuge from persecution in their <br />
countries. DHS finally notes that asylees (but not those with pending <br />
asylum applications), refugees, and certain other aliens are <br />
``qualified aliens'' for purpose of receiving public benefits to cover <br />
basic needs under Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work <br />
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.\32\ Therefore, even if there <br />
are gaps in employment on account of adjudication delays, these aliens <br />
may be able to obtain public benefits.<br />
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<br />
    \31\ On December 4, 2025, USCIS changed the validity periods for <br />
certain other EAD categories, including pending asylum seeker <br />
(``C08'') to enhance screening and vetting efforts. See DHS, USCIS, <br />
Policy Alert, Subject: Updating Certain Employment Authorization <br />
Document Validity Periods (December 4, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20251204-EmploymentAuthorizationValidity.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20251204-EmploymentAuthorizationValidity.pdf&lt;/a&gt;. Therefore, C08 applicants now <br />
must seek renewal of their EAD more often than under the previous 5-<br />
year EAD validity period. DHS, however, cannot accurately predict <br />
whether this policy change will adversely affect EAD renewal <br />
processing times, as a likely increase in EAD renewals could be <br />
offset by other recent or future policy changes. For example, on <br />
February 23, 2026, DHS published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking <br />
proposing to modify filing and eligibility requirements for aliens <br />
requesting employment authorization based on a pending asylum <br />
application and an employment authorization document. See 91 FR 8616 <br />
(Feb. 23, 2026). As of the publication of this final rule, the NPRM <br />
has not been finalized. If finalized as proposed, changes to <br />
eligibility for C08 employment authorization could significantly <br />
reduce the number of initial C08 applications and, by extension, the <br />
longer-term number of renewal applications.<br />
    \32\ Public Law 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260 (1996), codified <br />
at 8 U.S.C. 1601-1646; see 8 U.S.C. 1641(b)(1) and (2) (defining <br />
asylees and refugees as ``qualified aliens'' eligible for federal <br />
public benefits); see also 8 U.S.C. 1611(a) (providing that an alien <br />
who is not defined as a ``qualified alien'' is not eligible for <br />
federal public benefits).<br />
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<br />
    Comment: A commenter referenced Article 17 of the Refugee <br />
Convention, which provides that refugees lawfully in the territory of <br />
the host state (which would include not only asylees and resettled <br />
refugees, but all aliens pursuing asylum claims who apply for renewal <br />
EADs), shall be the accorded the ``most favorable treatment accorded to <br />
nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances.'' The <br />
commenter stated that, because the rule does not end all automatic <br />
extensions of the validity period of EADs for those applying for <br />
renewal (for example, TPS-based EAD validity extensions through FRN), <br />
it provides refugees applying to renew their EADs less favorable <br />
treatment than other foreign nationals. The commenter concluded that <br />
the rule is therefore issued in violation of Article 17 of the Refugee <br />
Convention and should be withdrawn.<br />
<br />
[[Page 65315]]<br />
<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters. The United States <br />
implemented the ``Wage-earning and Employment'' provision of Article 17 <br />
of the 1951 Refugee Convention (as incorporated through the 1967 <br />
Protocol) through sections 207 and 208 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1157, 1158, <br />
and implementing regulations at 8 CFR 207, 208 and 274a. Refugees (and <br />
asylees) \33\ have the right to employment authorization upon arrival, <br />
with minimal restrictions and are provided a pathway to lawful <br />
permanent residency because their status in the United States is <br />
permanent. This approach aligns with Article 17's requirements and <br />
complies with the U.S. obligation including that these individuals are <br />
not subject to more restrictive conditions than other foreign nationals <br />
in similar circumstances. Even if Article 17 were imposing a binding <br />
obligation, nothing in Article 17 requires DHS to provide employment <br />
authorization to noncitizens seeking refugee status or asylum before <br />
DHS or an immigration judge has made a final determination that they <br />
meet requirements for asylum or refugee status and grant the alien's <br />
application.<br />
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<br />
    \33\ Asylees are aliens who are physically present in the United <br />
States or at a U.S. port of entry and who meets the definition of a <br />
refugee because he or she has a reasonable fear of persecution as <br />
defined in section 101(a)(42) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42). In <br />
contrast, a refugee is an alien located outside the United States <br />
who has been determined to have a fear of persecution. Asylees who <br />
meet the conditions of section 208 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1158 are <br />
afforded the same treatment as refugees in regard to the wage-<br />
earning and employment requirement of Article 17. Contrary to the <br />
commenter's assertion, applicants for asylum are not asylees or <br />
covered by Article 17. Even if they were, the United States <br />
implemented Article 17 through sections 207 and 208 of the INA, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1157, 1158.<br />
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<br />
    TPS applicants do not have the same protections and legal <br />
definition as refugees and asylees. Aliens granted TPS and TPS <br />
applicants are only temporarily in the United States on account of the <br />
Secretary's designation under section 244 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254a, <br />
and 8 CFR part 244. As part of the TPS statute, Congress provided <br />
employment authorization for purposes of the entire designation period. <br />
See INA sec. 244(a)(1)(B) and (2), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(a)(1)(B) and (2). To <br />
comply with the law enacted by Congress, DHS is typically extending <br />
employment authorization via a Federal Register notice. However, TPS <br />
applicants still must apply for the renewal employment authorization <br />
document as part of the redesignation to obtain evidence of employment. <br />
Additionally, TPS may be terminated, and TPS never leads to permanent <br />
residency. See INA sec. 244(b)(3)(B), (h), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(B), <br />
(h). Thus, upon termination of TPS, TPS beneficiaries and applicants <br />
may lose employment authorization in the United States. See 8 CFR <br />
244.12 and 13. Refugees (and asylees) once granted, do not typically <br />
lose their refugee status and thus, their right to employment and path <br />
to lawful permanent residency and eventually citizenship. Therefore, <br />
the implementation scheme and the termination of automatic extension is <br />
not contrary to the United States international obligations.<br />
2. DHS Justification and Need for the Rule<br />
i. Security Rationale for the Rule<br />
a. General Security Rationale Comments<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters said the IFR rests on a single <br />
asserted justification: the desire to complete vetting and security <br />
checks before approving an individual's \34\ work permit renewal, and <br />
DHS offers no other policy rationale for eliminating automatic <br />
extensions. Commenters stated the IFR is a reversal in policy without <br />
new evidence or a reasoned explanation and violates the APA. The <br />
commenters stated that DHS's sole rationale suffers from numerous <br />
problems and reveals a significant mismatch between the concern <br />
asserted and the real-world purpose and impact of automatic extensions.<br />
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<br />
    \34\ USCIS generally refers to ``aliens'' when discussing <br />
foreign nationals present in the United States. The term ``alien'' <br />
is a legal term defined in the INA that is used to describe any <br />
person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. See <br />
INA sec. 101(a)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(1). Some commenters <br />
used ``aliens'', but others may have used different terminology <br />
(such as person or individual). In general, when describing comments <br />
in this preamble, DHS has sought to mirror the language used in <br />
those comments, sometimes with quotation marks for clarity. <br />
Otherwise, DHS has used alien, or applicant, beneficiary, or <br />
requestor.<br />
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<br />
    Additional commenters stated that DHS's security rationale for the <br />
IFR contradicts findings in its own 2024 Final Rule, which did not <br />
identify any adverse impact of automatic extensions on USCIS' ability <br />
to conduct security checks. Commenters stated that DHS offers no <br />
credible rationale for this new finding. Some commenters also stated <br />
that this rule ignores that DHS narrowly tailored the prior automatic <br />
extensions to certain applicants who applied for EAD renewals, which <br />
``reasonably assured'' the agency that the individual remained eligible <br />
for employment authorization and protected the program from abuse.<br />
    Response: DHS does not agree that the IFR is a ``reversal of policy <br />
without new evidence or a reasoned explanation,'' that the <br />
justification for the rule is a ``mismatch between the concern asserted <br />
and the real-world purpose and impact of automatic extensions,'' or <br />
that DHS failed to consider important aspects of the program. DHS, in <br />
the IFR, explained that it is ending the practice of providing <br />
automatic extensions of employment authorization documents to enhance <br />
integrity in adjudications of employment authorization requests and <br />
better protect public safety and national security by ensuring that <br />
aliens are properly vetted and determined to continue to be eligible <br />
(and merit a favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable), for <br />
employment authorization before such authorization is provided to the <br />
alien. The Department also explained the permissibility of the change <br />
and specifically acknowledged and considered reliance interests that <br />
applicants could have engendered by the prior policy and explained why <br />
the policy considerations outweighed these interests. The IFR and this <br />
final rule reflect a continuation and refinement of DHS's longstanding <br />
focus on security, fraud prevention, and benefit integrity in the <br />
employment authorization context.<br />
    In 2016, DHS eliminated the interim EAD and replaced it with the <br />
180-day automatic extension of employment authorization and explained <br />
that it would support the Department's vital mission of securing the <br />
nation from the many threats it faces. Therefore, DHS determined that <br />
the elimination of both the 90-day EAD processing timeframe and the <br />
issuance of interim EADs was necessary.\35\ This change in 2016 <br />
reflected DHS's ``continued attention to security and commitment to <br />
improving adjudication processes, including technological advances in <br />
document production, to reduce fraud and address threats to national <br />
security.'' See 81 FR 82398 (Nov. 18, 2016) (AC21 Final Rule). DHS <br />
implemented the automatic extension of employment authorization to <br />
avoid gaps in employment without compromising national security and <br />
public safety given the context at the time. However, the automatic <br />
extension of employment authorization and/or EADs, whether 180 days or <br />
540 days, extends employment authorization based solely on the filing <br />
of a renewal EAD application, before USCIS has completed full vetting, <br />
resolved any derogatory information, and determined continuing <br />
eligibility for the benefit. Today, concerns regarding national<br />
<br />
[[Page 65316]]<br />
<br />
security, public safety, and integrity of immigration benefits are at a <br />
high point, and the President has directed DHS, through Executive <br />
Orders 14159 and 14161, to vet and screen aliens to the maximum extent <br />
possible and to ensure that employment authorization is not provided to <br />
unauthorized aliens.\36\ DHS notes there is no statutory requirement <br />
for USCIS to automatically extend EADs.<br />
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<br />
    \35\ On November 18, 2016, as part of DHS's efforts to implement <br />
the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-first Century Act of 2000 <br />
(AC21), DHS published a final regulation that eliminated interim <br />
EADs and provided for a 180-day automatic extension period. 81 FR <br />
82398 (Nov. 18, 2016).<br />
    \36\ See E.O. 14161, Protecting the United States from Foreign <br />
Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats <br />
(Jan. 20, 2025), 90 FR 8451, 8451 (Jan. 30, 2025); see E.O. 14159, <br />
Protecting the American People Against Invasion (Jan. 20, 2025), 90 <br />
FR 8443, 8446 (Jan. 29, 2025).<br />
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<br />
    DHS has provided a reasonable explanation for changing its policy, <br />
namely by giving greater weight to different policy considerations than <br />
in the past. DHS has concluded that, owing to current conditions and <br />
presidential directives, the security and program-integrity risks <br />
inherent in automatic extensions must be given greater weight than the <br />
benefits and different temporary circumstances that motivated prior <br />
rules. Given the inherent national security and public safety concerns <br />
that flow from granting immigration benefits (including EADs) to aliens <br />
before determining continued eligibility, DHS believes that rescinding <br />
the automatic extension of employment authorization and/or EADs is a <br />
necessary remedy. Ending the practice of providing automatic extensions <br />
of employment authorization and/or EADs enables DHS to better protect <br />
the public's safety and enhance benefit integrity.<br />
b. Lack of Evidence Supporting Security Rationale<br />
    Comment: Numerous commenters stated that DHS did not present <br />
evidence or data supporting the claim that automatic extensions pose <br />
security risks or that eliminating extensions would meaningfully <br />
enhance screening. Multiple commenters stated that the absence of any <br />
such evidence demonstrates that the purported problem does not exist. <br />
Several commenters wrote that for nearly 10 years, millions of workers <br />
have worked under automatic extensions, but the IFR provided no <br />
evidence showing that this system allowed security risks to persist or <br />
resulted in later security-based denials.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertions. DHS <br />
explained in its AC21 Final Rule nearly 10 years ago that it was <br />
prioritizing national security and fraud concerns by eliminating the <br />
interim EAD and the mandated EAD 90-day processing timeframe. <br />
Specifically, DHS noted that ``any reduction in the level of <br />
eligibility and security vetting before issuing evidence of employment <br />
authorization, whether on an interim basis or otherwise, would both be <br />
contrary to its core mission and undermine the security, quality, and <br />
integrity of the documents issued.'' \37\ Consistent with that <br />
rationale, and as explained in the IFR, DHS now believes that <br />
eliminating the automatic extension of employment authorization and/or <br />
EADs will ensure that all identity verification, public safety and <br />
security related checks are completed, and that a determination has <br />
been made that the applicant continues to be eligible and merits a <br />
favorable exercise of discretion, as applicable, before renewing <br />
employment authorization and/or an EAD. The IFR also clearly explained <br />
the relevance of the Boulder incident and its connection to the <br />
automatic extension,\38\ and why the measure was justified. Maintaining <br />
automatic extensions based upon the filing of an EAD renewal <br />
application would be inconsistent with DHS's stated benefit integrity, <br />
security and fraud-prevention objectives.<br />
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<br />
    \37\ See 81 FR 82398 (Nov. 18, 2016) (AC21 Final Rule).<br />
    \38\ See 90 FR 48799, 48808 (Oct. 30, 2025) (explaining that the <br />
need to fully vet applicants for renewal EADs became clear when an <br />
alien with an automatically extended EAD perpetrated a terrorist <br />
attack that injured many people in Boulder, Colorado on June 1, <br />
2025).<br />
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<br />
    Comment: Many commenters stated that DHS's reliance on a single <br />
anecdotal incident involving an individual in Boulder, Colorado, was <br />
insufficient evidence to justify a policy reversal negatively affecting <br />
hundreds of thousands of law-abiding workers and their employers. <br />
Commenters wrote that DHS did not demonstrate that the incident <br />
involved an automatic extension or how eliminating automatic extensions <br />
would have prevented this incident.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees that the IFR relied on insufficient <br />
evidence to justify the IFR's policy change as alleged by commenters. <br />
The concern addressed by the IFR and this final rule is that, under the <br />
automatic extension framework, an alien's employment authorization and/<br />
or EAD validity could be extended for up to 540 days based only on the <br />
filing of a renewal application and without having fully vetted the <br />
alien for eligibility, including background and security checks. When <br />
employment authorization is automatically extended before those checks <br />
are complete, aliens who may no longer qualify for the benefit, or who <br />
present public safety or national security concerns, are able to remain <br />
employment-authorized. This allows aliens who could be public safety or <br />
national security threats to use associated documentation to <br />
potentially obtain other credentials, such as driver's licenses, and <br />
use such document, in turn, to engage in nefarious activities. For <br />
example, an alien could rent a car by using the driver's license <br />
obtained with an automatically extended EAD as an identity document and <br />
subsequently use the car to perpetrate a terrorist attack or other <br />
criminal activity. As explained in the IFR and throughout this final <br />
rule, DHS has found that these public safety and national security <br />
concerns outweigh the interim impacts that may result from a temporary <br />
lapse in an individual aliens' employment authorization and/or <br />
documentation while USCIS completes refreshed vetting, evaluates any <br />
new derogatory information, and determines that the alien remains <br />
eligible and continues to merit a favorable exercise of discretion, if <br />
applicable.<br />
    The IFR references the attack by an alien against peaceful <br />
demonstrators in Boulder, Colorado, as a concrete example of an alien <br />
in possession of an automatic extension that highlighted the urgent <br />
need to mitigate additional public safety emergencies, as well as the <br />
importance of ensuring aliens are not granted employment authorization <br />
until adjudicative review has been completed. The alien responsible for <br />
the Boulder, Colorado, incident was the beneficiary of an automatic <br />
extension of his employment authorization, and is thus one example of <br />
an alien who remained employment authorized without having undergone <br />
full vetting for eligibility or security concerns. Attacks, such as the <br />
one in Boulder, Colorado, are tough to predict, but they may not be <br />
impossible to stop with proper and thorough vetting and intelligence <br />
sharing among government agencies each time an alien is seeking <br />
immigration benefits.\39\ DHS is prioritizing the completion of vetting<br />
<br />
[[Page 65317]]<br />
<br />
prior to granting an immigration benefit to ensure public safety and <br />
national security and to mitigate the immediate risks posed to <br />
Americans. Ending automatic extensions based on the filing of an EAD <br />
renewal application alone addresses that systemic vulnerability. It <br />
ensures that continued employment authorization and its documentation <br />
is conferred only after USCIS has completed refreshed vetting, <br />
evaluated any new derogatory information, and determined that the alien <br />
remains eligible and continues to merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, if applicable. As discussed in the Executive Summary, <br />
President Trump has directed DHS to ``vet and screen to the maximum <br />
degree possible'' all aliens within the United States and ensure that <br />
``employment authorization is not provided to any unauthorized alien.'' <br />
\40\ In line with presidential priorities, DHS is prioritizing program <br />
integrity, public safety, and national security and believes the <br />
benefits of eliminating automatic extensions of EADs outweigh the risks <br />
of potential temporary lapses in employment authorization.<br />
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<br />
    \39\ The public, including members from Congress, criticized <br />
immigration and law enforcement authorities, including DHS, for not <br />
detecting the alien's activities and not protecting the public. They <br />
emphasized the urgency to fix security vulnerabilities. See House of <br />
Representatives Homeland Security Committee, ``Chairman Pfluger, <br />
Green Request DHS Documents on Suspect in Boulder Terror Attack'' <br />
(June 4, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://homeland.house.gov/2025/06/04/chairmen-green-pfluger-request-dhs-documents-on-suspect-in-boulder-terror-attack&quot;&gt;https://homeland.house.gov/2025/06/04/chairmen-green-pfluger-request-dhs-documents-on-suspect-in-boulder-terror-attack&lt;/a&gt; (``This tragedy is indicative of a heightened terrorism <br />
threat on U.S. soil, signaling an urgent need for increased homeland <br />
security measures, particularly with respect to foreign nationals <br />
who are unlawfully present in the United States, as Soliman <br />
reportedly overstayed a nonimmigrant visa. Our nation has now faced <br />
several major acts of antisemitic terror this year alone, including <br />
the recent assassination of two Israeli embassy staffers in our <br />
nation's capital.'').<br />
    \40\ See E.O. 14161, Protecting the United States from Foreign <br />
Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats <br />
(Jan. 20, 2025), 90 FR 8451, 8451 (Jan. 30, 2025); see E.O. 14159, <br />
Protecting the American People Against Invasion (Jan. 20, 2025), 90 <br />
FR 8443, 8446 (Jan. 29, 2025).<br />
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<br />
c. Prior Vetting of Renewal Applicants and Existing Security Measures<br />
    Comment: One commenter stated that DHS ``offered no credible <br />
evidence of security risks associated with'' the automatic extension of <br />
employment authorization and/or EADs, and that the IFR therefore <br />
``lacks any substantive rationale.'' Other commenters claimed the <br />
security rationale for the rule is inadequate given that aliens <br />
applying for EAD renewals have already been vetted. Some commenters <br />
said many EAD holders are also likely to have other pending <br />
applications before USCIS with evidentiary submissions, background, and <br />
identity documents that allow for additional agency vetting.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees that the IFR lacks a rationale. DHS is <br />
prioritizing the completion of proper vetting before issuing <br />
immigration benefits and cannot continue to extend employment <br />
authorization or EADs without determining that the applicant continues <br />
to be eligible and, when applicable, merits a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, regardless of any prior vetting that may have been <br />
conducted in connection with past or pending benefit requests. DHS is <br />
not required by statute to provide an automatic extension of employment <br />
authorization and/or EADs. Rather, DHS is exercising its authority to <br />
structure employment authorization processes in a manner that ensures <br />
the integrity of the immigration benefit provided, and better advances <br />
national security, public safety, and program integrity.<br />
    Comment: Commenters wrote that the IFR misstates how security <br />
vetting works, stating that all relevant background check processes <br />
occur independently of whether a worker has an unexpired EAD. The <br />
commenter said many security flags require follow up investigation, <br />
interagency coordination, and a full review of classified or sensitive <br />
information that can take considerable time to evaluate, and these <br />
assessments occur within the structured adjudicative framework, not <br />
during the mechanical, threshold review of an EAD-renewal request.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the premise of these comments. While <br />
some background checks and security review processes may be ongoing, <br />
others are initiated when USCIS receives a request and are completed in <br />
connection with that adjudication. There are no statutory or other <br />
regulatory limitations on USCIS' authority to conduct background and <br />
security checks to determine eligibility for employment authorization. <br />
Additionally, background checks and vetting can be a lengthy process <br />
that may require additional time to resolve or to make an eligibility <br />
determination. For USCIS to renew an immigration benefit, the applicant <br />
must meet the relevant eligibility standards and merit a favorable <br />
exercise of discretion, if applicable. All individuals who apply for <br />
immigration benefits, including applications for employment <br />
authorization, are required to submit and sign the application <br />
authorizing the release of any information from their records that <br />
USCIS may need to determine eligibility for the benefit sought. By <br />
signing and submitting the form to USCIS, the applicant consents to <br />
verification by USCIS, as well as use of information to determine <br />
initial or continued benefit eligibility. Given the, at times, lengthy <br />
vetting process, the previous practice allowed automatic extension of <br />
EADs to aliens that would otherwise be found ineligible after USCIS <br />
initiates or resolves background check information.<br />
    The previous practice of automatically extending employment <br />
authorization for a period of up to 540 days prioritized EAD backlog <br />
management over program integrity, public safety and national security. <br />
Requiring completion of adjudicative review before extending employment <br />
authorization and/or EADs better aligns with DHS's vetting <br />
responsibilities and the policy priorities of enhancing program <br />
integrity, public safety, and national security.<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that USCIS remains free to <br />
conduct continuous vetting during the renewal process and deny the <br />
renewal application and terminate employment authorization immediately <br />
should it identify new information indicating a security concern.<br />
    Some commenters stated that DHS already has the capability to <br />
perform continuous screening and vetting, such as through ATLAS and the <br />
Continuous Immigration Vetting (CIV) program, which allow for ongoing <br />
information sharing and monitoring of individuals in the immigration <br />
system, stating these systems can identify security concerns at any <br />
time, not just during the renewal application process.<br />
    Response: DHS continues to implement various strategies to address <br />
public safety and national security concerns. These efforts include, <br />
but are not limited to, the use of continuous screening and vetting <br />
capabilities, interagency information-sharing, and enhancements to <br />
identity and security verification processes. However, these tools do <br />
not obviate the need to complete appropriate vetting and screening <br />
before extending employment authorization. Conducting background <br />
checks, whether continuously or at certain intervals (for example, when <br />
an alien again applies for an immigration benefit), is only one part of <br />
the overall vetting and screening process.<br />
    Furthermore, derogatory information identified during the <br />
background check process must still be reviewed and resolved.\41\ DHS <br />
believes that before any immigration benefit is granted, such as an <br />
extension of employment authorization and/or an EAD, USCIS should <br />
complete the vetting and screening process and determine that the alien <br />
continues to be eligible for the benefit and merits a favorable <br />
exercise of discretion, as applicable.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \41\ Thus, even with CIV, USCIS is required to manually resolve <br />
derogatory information, which needs time. See DHS/USCIS/PIA-076 <br />
Continuous Immigration Vetting, at 8, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsuscispia-076-continuous-immigration-vetting&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsuscispia-076-continuous-immigration-vetting&lt;/a&gt; (last <br />
updated March 31, 2023) (``Although automation assists with the <br />
identification of national security concerns, FDNS officers also <br />
manually review each hit to confirm the validity, relevancy, and <br />
accuracy of the information and to determine if the information is <br />
actionable, consistent with DHS authorities. If actionable, USCIS <br />
FDNS may perform administrative investigations to produce findings <br />
to sufficiently inform adjudications.'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: A commenter stated that the rule discounts the multiple <br />
layers of<br />
<br />
[[Page 65318]]<br />
<br />
vetting and monitoring tools that are already being conducted by <br />
employers to identify potential security threats, including Form I-9 <br />
verification, E-Verify participation, and criminal background checks.<br />
    Response: DHS will not delegate to employers its responsibility to <br />
enhance program integrity and better protect public safety and national <br />
security. The varying levels of vetting by different employers are not <br />
a substitute for the vetting that USCIS conducts. USCIS has <br />
information-sharing agreements with various agencies within the U.S. <br />
government and foreign partners. Therefore, vetting from an employer is <br />
typically not comparable to USCIS access and vetting. In addition, Form <br />
I-9 and E-Verify are not used for national security and public safety <br />
vetting. Form I-9 is required for all U.S. employers to document <br />
identity and employment authorization for every worker hired. E-Verify <br />
is a voluntary program that electronically compares the information on <br />
Form I-9 with SSA and DHS records to confirm employment <br />
eligibility.\42\ Criteria for security checks and vetting depend upon <br />
the immigration benefit sought as well as various other factors, and <br />
each benefit request has its own requirements and vulnerabilities. DHS <br />
does not believe that renewing employment authorization should be an <br />
exception to the stated policy objectives of better protecting public <br />
safety and national security and ensuring continued eligibility and <br />
that the applicant warrants a favorable exercise of discretion (as <br />
applicable) prior to issuing immigration benefits. USCIS is exercising <br />
its full authority to investigate immigration benefit requests filed by <br />
aliens who may pose risks to the national security and public safety of <br />
the United States while adhering to the provisions of the INA and <br />
applicable laws, as outlined in DHS Delegation of Authority 0150.1 and <br />
15006.\43\ The elimination of automatic extensions of employment <br />
authorization and/or an EAD based on the filing of a renewal <br />
application is one component of this broader effort to enhance program <br />
integrity and safeguard the United States.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \42\ See E-Verify, 1.1 Background and Overview, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.e-verify.gov/e-verify-user-manual-10-introduction/11-background-and-overview&quot;&gt;https://www.e-verify.gov/e-verify-user-manual-10-introduction/11-background-and-overview&lt;/a&gt; (last updated May 29, 2024).<br />
    \43\ See, e.g., DHS, Delegation to the Bureau of Citizenship and <br />
Immigration Services, Delegation No. 0150.1 (June 5, 2003), <br />
available at &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hsdl.org/c/view?docid=234775&quot;&gt;https://www.hsdl.org/c/view?docid=234775&lt;/a&gt;; DHS, USCIS, <br />
Delegation to Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration <br />
Services, to Order Expedited Removal and to Enforce Immigration <br />
Laws, Delegation No. 15006 (May 2, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/legal-docs/Delegation_to_USCIS_for_LE_Authorities_15006_1_1.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/legal-docs/Delegation_to_USCIS_for_LE_Authorities_15006_1_1.pdf&lt;/a&gt;. DHS Delegation <br />
Number 0150.1 is based on the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and <br />
delegates broad authority under the INA, to the Bureau of <br />
Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS), now USCIS, to <br />
administer the laws, process benefits, investigate potential fraud, <br />
make prosecution recommendations, and initiate removal proceedings. <br />
DHS Delegation Number 15006 grants the Director of USCIS the <br />
authority to issue warrants, order immediate removal of aliens, to <br />
detain or release aliens on bond, and the ability to investigate <br />
civil and criminal immigration law violations.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
d. Rule Would Not Strengthen Security<br />
    Comment: One commenter said justifying the rule under ``the guise <br />
of national security is ironic'' because the rule's likely consequence <br />
in derailing the livelihoods of aliens may push them to violate the law <br />
for survival. Another commenter stated that most of the public safety <br />
and national security risk created by malicious aliens stems from their <br />
presence in the United States rather than their ability to work and <br />
encouraged DHS to study how significant the risk associated with income <br />
generated through lawful employment is compared to the risk associated <br />
with presence on U.S. soil. A commenter stated that DHS implicitly <br />
assumes that unemployment is the antidote to potential crime when <br />
common sense and empirical evidence provides the opposite is true.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the comment that this rule will result <br />
in derailing the livelihoods of aliens and the insinuation that it may <br />
push individuals to become criminals to survive.<br />
    As explained in the IFR, DHS has taken significant steps to reduce <br />
the overall EAD filings that followed the unprecedented flood of <br />
illegal immigration into the United States during previous years.\44\ <br />
For example, DHS has narrowed the use of parole and better aligned TPS <br />
and related programs with statutory criteria. As a result, initial EAD <br />
applications have significantly declined since 2025. USCIS has also <br />
seen a decline in the number of filings in the largest EAD categories <br />
that were formerly eligible for automatic extensions based on the <br />
filing of a renewal EAD application, as shown in Table 1.<br />
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<br />
    \44\ See 90 FR 48799, 48809 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
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<br />
BILLING CODE 9111-97-P<br />
<br />
[[Page 65319]]<br />
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC26.000<br />
<br />
BILLING CODE 9111-97-C<br />
    The two largest categories of Form I-765 applicants are those with <br />
pending asylum applications (C08) and those with pending adjustment of <br />
status applications (C09). Together these categories made up <br />
approximately 80% of all I-765 applicants from January 2025 through the <br />
end of June 2026.\45\<br />
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<br />
    \45\ Though their numbers were much smaller, I-765 applications <br />
also declined in the A07, A08, A10, C16, C20, C24, and C31 <br />
categories. DHS, USCIS, OPQ, I-765 Application for Employment <br />
Authorization Receipts by Eligibility Category Code, Month, and EAD <br />
Type FY 2025-2026 (through Mar 05, 2026). CLAIMS3, ELIS, queried 03/<br />
2026, PAER0020648; DHS, USCIS, Chief Data and Analytics Office <br />
(CDAO), I-765 Application for Employment Authorization Receipts by <br />
Eligibility Category Code, Month, and EAD Type October 30, 2025-June <br />
30, 2026. CLAIMS3, ELIS, queried 07/2026, PAER0022044.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Table 1 shows how C08 and C09 filings have decreased since the <br />
start of the current administration in January 2025. USCIS received a <br />
total of 240,060 C08 filings in January 2025, which decreased to 32,472 <br />
in June 2026.\46\ Similarly, USCIS received a total of 64,106 C09 <br />
filings in January 2025, which decreased to 36,455 in June 2026. USCIS <br />
notes the decreased EAD filing rates support the point made in the IFR <br />
that the potential lapse, and in particular the duration of any lapse, <br />
is speculative and could be outweighed by the harm posed by automatic <br />
extensions.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \46\ DHS, USCIS, OPQ, I-765 Application for Employment <br />
Authorization Receipts by Eligibility Category Code, Month, and EAD <br />
Type FY 2025-2026 (through Mar 05, 2026). CLAIMS3, ELIS, queried 03/<br />
2026, PAER0020648; DHS, USCIS, Chief Data and Analytics Office <br />
(CDAO), I-765 Application for Employment Authorization Receipts by <br />
Eligibility Category Code, Month, and EAD Type October 30, 2025-June <br />
30, 2026. CLAIMS3, ELIS, queried 07/2026, PAER0022044.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Finally, DHS regularly publishes detailed statistics on its <br />
activities,\47\ but declines to perform a study of the additional risk <br />
to national security caused by income aliens generated through lawful <br />
employment for multiple reasons. For example, isolating and quantifying <br />
the incremental risk attributable solely to income derived from lawful <br />
employment--as distinct from the risk associated with presence, travel, <br />
associations, unauthorized employment, or other activities--would <br />
present significant methodological and data limitations. The relevant <br />
population would be small, sensitive national security information <br />
would constrain the availability and use of underlying case data, and <br />
it would be difficult to draw statistically meaningful conclusions.<br />
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<br />
    \47\ See Office of Homeland Security Statistics, &lt;a href=&quot;https://ohss.dhs.gov/&quot;&gt;https://ohss.dhs.gov&lt;/a&gt; (last visited Apr. 2, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    DHS acknowledges the commenter's view that the primary public <br />
safety and national security risk posed by malicious actors arises from <br />
their presence in the United States and not solely from their <br />
continuing ability to work. Even so, DHS considers it important and <br />
appropriate to use its authorities to reduce risks associated with both <br />
presence and employment. Access to lawful employment can provide <br />
malicious actors with financial resources, routine cover for their <br />
activities, and access to certain workplaces and facilities. Limiting <br />
the ability of aliens with potentially malicious intent to retain EADs <br />
and/or employment authorization, and to lawfully work and generate <br />
income, without full vetting is therefore a meaningful component of <br />
DHS's broader efforts to safeguard benefit integrity, national security <br />
and public safety.<br />
    For these reasons, DHS continues to view measures that reduce the <br />
likelihood that malicious actors can obtain or rely on employment <br />
authorization and related secure documentation as worthwhile.<br />
    Comment: Some commenters stated that, if the goal is to strengthen <br />
vetting integrity, the logical solution is to expedite case processing <br />
so that all<br />
<br />
[[Page 65320]]<br />
<br />
background checks and reviews are completed more quickly. One commenter <br />
also stated that workers should be able to maintain their employment <br />
authorization and support their families while vetting occurs.<br />
    Response: DHS undertakes every effort to complete case processing <br />
as expeditiously as possible while being conscious of the importance of <br />
vetting every benefit requestor thoroughly for eligibility, including <br />
vetting for criminal activity and other security risks. DHS believes <br />
screening, vetting, and determining continued eligibility before <br />
granting a renewal of employment authorization and/or documentation is <br />
essential to enhance program integrity and better protect public safety <br />
and national security. Such processes, however, especially given the <br />
volume of initial and renewal EAD applicants that USCIS encounters, <br />
necessarily take time. Note that expediting a case generally means that <br />
USCIS would move the benefit request to the front of the processing <br />
queue to the detriment of those who may have filed earlier but does not <br />
otherwise change the time needed to properly conduct screening and <br />
vetting and determine continued eligibility. To the extent that these <br />
commenters suggest that USCIS should expedite all EAD renewal <br />
applications and thus put renewal EAD applications in front of other <br />
applications in the processing queue, DHS maintains that this would not <br />
be a viable solution and would not enhance program integrity or better <br />
protect public safety and national security.<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that the security benefit of <br />
the rule is incremental because renewal applicants have already been <br />
robustly vetted and will not be re-vetted until the EAD renewal is <br />
adjudicated, stating that this second vetting by USCIS occurs even if <br />
EAD extensions are automatic.<br />
    Response: USCIS must ensure that all aliens who request immigration <br />
benefits from USCIS are eligible for the benefit sought, merit a <br />
favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable, and do not pose a <br />
threat to national security or public safety. It is necessary and <br />
within USCIS' authority to continue investigating immigration benefit <br />
requests and to assess whether an applicant has established ongoing <br />
eligibility and warrants favorable discretion, if applicable, and <br />
whether they pose a risk to the national security and public safety of <br />
the United States, before issuing immigration benefits. This includes <br />
renewal applications for employment authorization and/or EADs, which <br />
may reveal new derogatory information or changed circumstances that <br />
were not present at the time of the initial grant.<br />
    Comment: One commenter stated that the IFR would cause DHS <br />
resources to be spent on EAD processing while people remain in the <br />
United States without decisions on their ability to stay, stating that <br />
the rule ``punishes applicants, families, communities, and employers <br />
for USCIS' failure to timely process applications.'' Another commenter <br />
similarly stated that the rule ``does not meaningfully improve homeland <br />
security'' and would divert resources rather than supporting security <br />
or operational efficiency.<br />
    Response: DHS is dedicated to ensuring that all aliens who enter <br />
and remain in the United States do not present threats to national <br />
security or public safety. USCIS plays an instrumental role in <br />
preventing terrorists and other bad actors from harboring in the United <br />
States, and screening and vetting should be prioritized over purely <br />
expedient adjudications to that end. DHS will continue to work to <br />
reduce frivolous, fraudulent, and meritless EAD filings to free up <br />
adjudicatory and other resources to better ensure national security and <br />
program integrity. Therefore, DHS does not agree that focusing <br />
resources on careful EAD renewal adjudications ``diverts'' resources <br />
from security; rather, such adjudications are themselves a core <br />
security function of USCIS.<br />
e. Other Comments on Security Rationale<br />
    Comment: Some commenters expressed concern with DHS's rationale <br />
that bad actors could benefit from EADs being automatically extended <br />
and the income generated from working to support ``nefarious <br />
activities,'' stating that it is speculative, discriminatory, and <br />
perpetuates anti-immigrant rhetoric. A commenter said this is <br />
particularly dangerous language for Asian American communities who face <br />
a persistent narrative as the ``perpetual foreigner'' and will only <br />
contribute to that ``pernicious stereotype'' and support unfounded <br />
suspicions that Asians are agents of foreign governments.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertions. DHS ended <br />
the practice of providing automatic extension of employment <br />
authorization and/or EADs based on the filing of a renewal EAD <br />
application to ensure continued eligibility and prioritizing the proper <br />
vetting and screening of aliens in furtherance of its mission. This <br />
rule does not target Asian American communities or any other specific <br />
group of aliens. Instead, this rule, as written, applies to all aliens <br />
who were eligible for the automatic extension of their employment <br />
authorization and/or EADs under former 8 CFR 274a.13(d). As explained <br />
in the IFR and this final rule, DHS is prioritizing the completion of <br />
vetting prior to granting an immigration benefit to enhance program <br />
integrity and better protect public safety and national security. The <br />
examples provided in the IFR illustrated the broader concern that <br />
extending employment authorization before completing vetting can allow <br />
aliens who may present public safety or national security risks to <br />
retain employment authorization. Ending automatic extensions based on <br />
the filing of an EAD renewal application ensures that continued <br />
employment authorization is conferred only after USCIS has completed <br />
renewed vetting, evaluated any new derogatory information, and <br />
determined that the alien remains eligible and continues to merit a <br />
favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable. DHS believes that the <br />
program integrity, public safety, and national security benefits of <br />
eliminating automatic extensions of EADs outweigh the risks of <br />
potential temporary lapses in employment authorization.<br />
    Comment: Commenters stated that, while DHS repeatedly cites <br />
purported national security concerns as justification for the IFR, the <br />
``underemphasized yet explicit'' motivation for the IFR is a reduction <br />
in EAD filings overall. They stated that the rule is intended to <br />
generally deter immigration, specifically for asylum seekers, and that <br />
DHS ignores that asylees and refugees are authorized employment even if <br />
the expiration date on their EAD has passed. One commenter stated that, <br />
while DHS claims it is ending the practice of automatically renewing <br />
EADs for refugees and asylees to take a ``uniform approach'' and avoid <br />
``the potential for confusion'' of employers, it does not quantify the <br />
potential confusion or justify why it cannot at least provide automatic <br />
renewals for refugees and asylees, who are authorized to work incident <br />
to their status.<br />
    The commenters concluded that the IFR is meant to undermine and <br />
frustrate those with legal work authorization and will cause <br />
unnecessary lapses in work authorization creating unreasonable <br />
obstacles, citing DHS's referenced goal of providing a ``comprehensive <br />
policy solution'' and stating the rule is actually intended to <br />
unnecessarily confuse employers, frustrate immigrants' ability to work, <br />
and push more into ``dire straits.'' Another commenter questioned <br />
enhanced security as the true intent of<br />
<br />
[[Page 65321]]<br />
<br />
the rule, suggesting other motives such as intentionally causing aliens <br />
to fall out of status and lose their jobs.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters that the goal of this <br />
rule is to reduce EAD filings overall, generally deter immigration or <br />
to ``unnecessarily confuse employers'' and ``frustrate immigrants' <br />
ability to work.'' As previously stated, the purpose of this rule is to <br />
prioritize the proper vetting and screening of aliens, to ensure <br />
continued eligibility, and to confirm that applicants continue to merit <br />
favorable exercises of discretion, if applicable, before granting new <br />
periods of employment authorization and/or new EADs by ending the <br />
practice of automatically extending the validity of employment <br />
authorization and/or EADs.<br />
    DHS recognizes that aliens who are granted asylum or refugee status <br />
are authorized employment incident to their asylum or refugee status. <br />
As explained in the IFR, aliens who are authorized employment incident <br />
to their status \48\ and are maintaining their respective immigration <br />
status, such as asylees and refugees, will continue to be employment <br />
authorized while maintaining their immigration status, regardless of <br />
the expiration date on their EAD. Aliens who are authorized employment <br />
incident to status will continue to have the choice to file Form I-765 <br />
to obtain EADs for proof of identity. As stated in the IFR, DHS is <br />
taking a uniform approach for all aliens by ending the practice of <br />
providing automatic extensions of employment authorization and/or EADs.<br />
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<br />
    \48\ See 8 CFR 274a.12(a).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: One commenter said that eliminating automatic extensions <br />
does not serve E.O. 14159, Protecting the American People Against <br />
Invasion, which orders DHS and other agencies to ensure that employment <br />
authorization is not provided to any unauthorized alien in the United <br />
States. The commenter said eliminating automatic extensions has no <br />
impact on this mandate, as the purpose of such automatic extensions is <br />
to afford USCIS the time and resources to make a robust determination <br />
in compliance with its statutory and regulatory obligations in cases <br />
where aliens were already approved for employment authorization.<br />
    Response: DHS maintains that this rule accomplishes the mandate of <br />
E.O. 14159. This executive order directs the Secretary of Homeland <br />
Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Attorney <br />
General, in Section 16 to take all appropriate action to align any <br />
departmental activities with the policies set out by the President, to <br />
ensure that ``employment authorization is not provided to any <br />
unauthorized alien in the United States.'' As stated in the IFR and <br />
this rule, ending the practice of providing automatic extensions of <br />
EADs is consistent with this instruction in E.O. 14159 because a <br />
previous grant of employment authorization does not mean that an <br />
applicant remains indefinitely eligible for employment authorization, <br />
and it is necessary to review eligibility to ensure that an alien's <br />
circumstances have not changed such that the alien is no longer <br />
eligible. Granting automatic extensions of employment without proper <br />
vetting and full adjudication to ensure continued eligibility is not <br />
consistent with E.O. 14159 or with current priorities.<br />
ii. Consistency in USCIS Rationale and Reversal of Longstanding Policy<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters wrote that USCIS says it does not <br />
expect delays in processing EAD renewals in the future, but also says <br />
it must end automatic extensions on EADs now because it needs more time <br />
to finish security checks. Commenters said both cannot be true. <br />
Commenters also stated that, if DHS expects continued delays, then <br />
ending automatic extensions will push employees out of work <br />
authorization simply because the government cannot finish adjudicating <br />
these cases fast enough. These commenters said courts invalidate rules <br />
when an agency's reasoning is contradictory and the agency offers no <br />
adequate justification for the inconsistency, with some commenters <br />
citing F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.<br />
    Also referencing this purported inconsistency, multiple commenters <br />
stated that DHS's conclusion that EAD applications will decline and <br />
that more adjudicative resources will reduce EAD renewal processing <br />
times ignores that those same resources will be available at the <br />
initial stage to address any red flags. Thus, the commenter said DHS's <br />
purported need for fuller investigations at the renewal stage will be <br />
even less necessary moving forward. The commenter said the claim also <br />
cannot be reconciled with the Department's historic position that it <br />
can complete sufficient investigations promptly, given sufficient <br />
resources.<br />
    Multiple commenters said the IFR rejects and contradicts the <br />
policies of both the 2016 and the recent 2024 rules, the purpose of <br />
which was to mitigate the harm to workers and employers caused by <br />
interruptions in work authorization, without adequate explanation, <br />
justification, or alternative remedies. One commenter specified that <br />
the IFR cites no data showing sustained reductions in renewal <br />
processing times, no new performance metrics, and no analysis <br />
demonstrating that the long-recognized adjudication challenges <br />
identified in 2016 and again in 2024 have materially changed.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertion that the <br />
reasoning in the IFR, and this final rule, is contradictory or <br />
unjustified. DHS notes the IFR does not state that ``USCIS does not <br />
expect delays in processing EADs.'' Instead, DHS explained it has taken <br />
measures to address floods of filings from TPS beneficiaries and other <br />
applicants, and that DHS expects that overall filing rates for initial <br />
and renewal EADs are likely to substantially decline, freeing up <br />
adjudicative resources to reduce renewal EAD processing times.\49\<br />
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<br />
    \49\ See 90 FR 48799, 48809 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    USCIS routinely evaluates filing volumes relative to adjudicative <br />
resources and reallocates workloads to address priorities as <br />
appropriate and feasible, including between initial and renewal EAD <br />
filings. The IFR explains that, while USCIS continues to work to <br />
improve processing times and reduce backlogs, DHS has determined that <br />
automatic extensions are inconsistent with ensuring continued <br />
eligibility or with current security and vetting priorities. DHS <br />
believes that the reasoning provided in the IFR is appropriate and that <br />
the purpose of the IFR has been adequately justified. Ending automatic <br />
extensions based on the filing of an EAD renewal application ensures <br />
that continued employment authorization is conferred only after USCIS <br />
has completed renewed vetting, evaluated any new derogatory <br />
information, and determined that the alien remains eligible and <br />
continues to merit a favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable. <br />
DHS believes that the program integrity, public safety, and national <br />
security benefits of eliminating automatic extensions of EADs outweigh <br />
the risks of potential temporary lapses in employment authorization.<br />
    As discussed in greater detail in response to a previous comment in <br />
Section IV.C.2.i.a. of this preamble, the decision to end automatic <br />
extensions reflects a change in how DHS balances operational efficiency <br />
and continuity of employment against these security and benefit <br />
integrity concerns rather than an inconsistency in DHS's underlying <br />
commitment to timely adjudications.<br />
    DHS expects that overall, EAD filing rates will substantially <br />
decline and free up adjudicative resources to reduce<br />
<br />
[[Page 65322]]<br />
<br />
renewal EAD processing times. Decreasing processing times would result <br />
in a reduced need for aliens filing renewal EAD applications to rely on <br />
an automatic extension of their EAD to avoid potential lapses. Since <br />
the IFR became effective on October 30, 2025, USCIS has seen a steady <br />
decrease in overall EAD filings. See Table 1 in Section IV.C.2.i.d. of <br />
this preamble. USCIS notes that decreased EAD filing rates support the <br />
point made in the IFR: that the potential for an alien to have a lapse, <br />
and in particular the duration of any lapse, is speculative and could <br />
be outweighed by the harm posed by automatic extensions.<br />
iii. Lack of Acknowledgement of the Backlog and Other Operational <br />
Realities<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that the IFR ignores that <br />
backlogs persist today and provides no projections or plans to reduce <br />
the backlogs that necessitate automatic extension. Some of these <br />
commenters said the IFR incorrectly portrays backlogs as a future <br />
``scenario,'' but processing delays are significant. A commenter stated <br />
that external analyses reinforce the conclusion that long delays in EAD <br />
adjudication are a documented, ongoing reality and, despite this <br />
record, DHS offers no empirical data showing in the IFR that processing <br />
times have improved enough to make automatic extensions unnecessary. A <br />
commenter stated that external analyses reinforce the conclusion that <br />
long delays in EAD adjudication are a documented, ongoing reality and, <br />
despite this record, DHS offers no empirical data showing in the IFR <br />
that processing times have improved enough to make automatic extensions <br />
unnecessary. Some commenters referenced DHS backlog data in asserting <br />
the value of the automatic extension mechanism and the rule's lack of <br />
acknowledgement of the backlog. Another commenter stated that, while <br />
striving for timely adjudication is a worthy goal, it does not <br />
eliminate the need for automatic extensions, and USCIS should not <br />
eliminate the regulatory provision of automatic extensions in its <br />
entirety.<br />
    Response: DHS is ending the automatic extension of employment <br />
authorization and EADs not because USCIS has completed its backlog of <br />
pending cases, but rather because DHS is prioritizing ensuring <br />
continued eligibility and proper vetting. However, USCIS will continue <br />
to work through its backlog of cases without unnecessarily granting <br />
immigration benefits to those who may be ineligible or threaten the <br />
public safety and national security of the United States.<br />
    DHS acknowledged the EAD backlog in the IFR, stating that most of <br />
the backlog resulted from prior policy decisions that resulted in an <br />
overwhelming number of initial and subsequent renewal EAD filings.\50\ <br />
DHS discussed potential future backlog scenarios while also <br />
acknowledging the current backlogs in each of those rules. <br />
Specifically, DHS provided data in the 2024 TFR to project the impact <br />
of the asylum filing surges and backlogs to consider possible renewal <br />
EAD application filing behaviors and the impact throughout the <br />
effective period of the 2024 TFR. See 89 FR 24628 (Apr. 8, 2024). DHS <br />
discussed the same data in the 2024 Final Rule. See 89 FR 101208 (Dec. <br />
13, 2024). These rules attempted to mitigate the impact of potential <br />
future renewal EAD processing backlogs that could have been caused by a <br />
variety of circumstances, and DHS used those data projections to <br />
estimate the impact of codifying the automatic extension period <br />
increase from up to 180 days to up to 540 days. DHS has reassessed that <br />
conjectural approach and determined that, notwithstanding ongoing <br />
backlogs, automatic extensions are not an appropriate mechanism given <br />
the associated security and integrity risks.<br />
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<br />
    \50\ See 90 FR 48799, 48807 (Oct. 30, 2025) (discussing an <br />
influx of EAD applications that ``continues to bog down USCIS <br />
processing times and adjudicative resources,'' and ``was largely <br />
caused by the prior administration's policies that allowed a <br />
significant number of aliens to enter the country on parole and seek <br />
asylum and/or TPS, and alongside such applications, employment <br />
authorization'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    As discussed elsewhere in this preamble, DHS has taken significant <br />
steps to reduce the overall EAD filings that followed the unprecedented <br />
flood of illegal immigration into the United States during previous <br />
years.\51\ Significant declines in initial EAD applications since 2025 <br />
highlight the impact of these changes, which include a narrowed use of <br />
parole and a realignment of TPS and related programs with statutory <br />
criteria. Specifically, USCIS has also seen a decline in the number of <br />
filings in the largest EAD categories that were formerly eligible for <br />
automatic extensions based on the filing of a renewal EAD application, <br />
as shown in Table 1. See Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble. The two <br />
largest categories of Form I-765 applicants are those with pending <br />
asylum applications (C08) and those with pending adjustment of status <br />
applications (C09). Together these categories made up approximately 80% <br />
of all I-765 applicants from January 2025 through the end of June <br />
2026.\52\ Table 1 shows how C08 and C09 filings have decreased since <br />
the start of the current administration in January 2025. For example, <br />
USCIS received a total of 240,060 C08 filings in January 2025, which <br />
decreased to 32,472 in June 2026.\53\ Similarly, USCIS received a total <br />
of 64,104 C09 filings in January 2025, which decreased to 36,455 in <br />
June 2026.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \51\ See 90 FR 48799, 48809 (Oct. 30, 2025). See also USCIS, <br />
``DHS Strengthens Integrity in Nation's Immigration System, Returns <br />
to Commonsense Legal Immigration Levels,'' &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-strengthens-integrity-in-nations-immigration-system-returns-to-commonsense-legal-immigration&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-strengthens-integrity-in-nations-immigration-system-returns-to-commonsense-legal-immigration&lt;/a&gt; (Nov. <br />
13, 2025); Testimony of USCIS Director Joseph B. Edlow, Oversight of <br />
the Department of Homeland Security: ICE, CBP, and USCIS: Hearing <br />
Before the House Comm. on Homeland Security, &lt;a href=&quot;https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20260210/118916/HHRG-119-HM00-Wstate-EdlowJ-20260210.pdf&quot;&gt;https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20260210/118916/HHRG-119-HM00-Wstate-EdlowJ-20260210.pdf&lt;/a&gt;, at 6, (Feb. 10, 2026), (``These critical efforts have <br />
strengthened the integrity of our legal immigration system, <br />
reinforced accountability, and ensured that USCIS resources are <br />
directed toward lawful, properly filed cases.'').<br />
    \52\ Though their numbers were much smaller, I-765 applications <br />
also declined in the A07, A08, A10, C16, C20, C24, and C31 <br />
categories. DHS, USCIS, OPQ, I-765 Application for Employment <br />
Authorization Receipts by Eligibility Category Code, Month, and EAD <br />
Type FY 2025-2026 (through Mar. 05, 2026). CLAIMS3, ELIS, queried <br />
03/2026, PAER0020648; DHS, USCIS, Chief Data and Analytics Office <br />
(CDAO), I-765 Application for Employment Authorization Receipts by <br />
Eligibility Category Code, Month, and EAD Type October 30, 2025-June <br />
30, 2026. CLAIMS3, ELIS, queried 07/2026, PAER0022044.<br />
    \53\ DHS, USCIS, OPQ, I-765 Application for Employment <br />
Authorization Receipts by Eligibility Category Code, Month, and EAD <br />
Type FY 2025-2026 (through Mar. 05, 2026). CLAIMS3, ELIS, queried <br />
03/2026, PAER0020648; DHS, USCIS, Chief Data and Analytics Office <br />
(CDAO), I-765 Application for Employment Authorization Receipts by <br />
Eligibility Category Code, Month, and EAD Type October 30, 2025-June <br />
30, 2026. CLAIMS3, ELIS, queried 07/2026, PAER0022044.<br />
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<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters said the IFR ignores the reality of <br />
continued high demand for work authorization and that DHS is wrong to <br />
expect that EAD renewal filings will ``substantially decline'' because <br />
this Administration attempted to terminate the Cuban, Haitian, <br />
Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan (CHNV) parole program and several TPS <br />
designations. Many people who first came through CHNV and similar <br />
parole programs, or who previously had TPS, have now applied for asylum <br />
or other protections that still require EAD renewals. Additionally, the <br />
commenters said the termination of the CHNV parole program and the TPS <br />
designations have all been challenged in court with no final judgments <br />
issued; if terminations are reversed, parolees and TPS beneficiaries <br />
will continue applying for EAD renewals. The commenters<br />
<br />
[[Page 65323]]<br />
<br />
concluded that DHS must plan for continued high renewal volumes.<br />
    One commenter said the rule fails to account for the impact that <br />
halting asylum decisions will have on the backlog of renewal EAD <br />
applications. The commenter referenced the November 28, 2025, statement <br />
of the USCIS Director that ``USCIS has halted all asylum decisions <br />
until we can ensure that every alien is vetted and screened to the <br />
maximum degree possible.'' The commenter said halting asylum decisions <br />
means that asylum applications will remain pending longer, which means <br />
more asylum applicants' EADs will expire during the pendency of their <br />
asylum applications and result in the need to file additional requests <br />
to renew their EADs.<br />
    Response: DHS acknowledges that various policy changes outside of <br />
this rulemaking, such as significant changes to humanitarian parole <br />
programs,\54\ the termination of TPS designations,\55\ and changes made <br />
to the asylum program,\56\ have affected, and will continue to affect, <br />
the demand for employment authorization and/or EADs in the future. DHS <br />
also recognizes the continued high demand for employment authorization <br />
and/or EADs, and DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertion that the <br />
IFR ignored such demand. Rather, as the IFR and this final rule <br />
explain, DHS believes the program integrity, public safety, and <br />
national security benefits of eliminating automatic extensions of EADs <br />
outweigh the risks of potential temporary lapses in employment <br />
authorization.<br />
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<br />
    \54\ See, e.g., Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, <br />
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 FR 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025). <br />
This termination is the subject of ongoing legal challenges but <br />
remains in place. See Doe v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-10495-IT (D. Mass); <br />
Noem v. Doe, 145 S. Ct. 1525 (2025).<br />
    \55\ The TPS designations for numerous countries have been <br />
terminated in the past year, but there has been significant <br />
litigation over these terminations. See, e.g., Mullin v. Doe, No. <br />
25-2083 (argued Apr. 29, 2026). The latest status of TPS <br />
designations is available on the USCIS website. USCIS, Temporary <br />
Protected Status (Mar. 17, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
    \56\ See, e.g., Proclamation 10888, Guaranteeing the States <br />
Protection Against Invasion, 90 FR 8333 (Jan. 20, 2025) (suspending <br />
the entry of aliens who unlawfully enter the United States across <br />
the southern border and barring those aliens from asylum and other <br />
provisions of the INA). Litigation against the Proclamation is <br />
ongoing, but asylum remains barred for covered aliens as of the time <br />
of drafting this rule. See Refugee and Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. &amp;amp; <br />
Legal Servs. v. Mullin, No. 25-5243,--F.4th--, 2026 WL 1110616 (D.C. <br />
Cir. Apr. 24, 2026) (affirming the district court's decision with <br />
modifications to the definition of the certified class and enjoining <br />
the Departments from continuing to implement the Invasion <br />
Proclamation, including the Proclamation's restriction on asylum but <br />
staying the decision until after disposition of either a petition <br />
for rehearing or rehearing en banc).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    While DHS recognizes that the demand for employment authorization <br />
and/or EADs remains high, the various immigration-related initiatives <br />
implemented by this administration described previously in the IFR <br />
preamble have reduced EAD filings overall. See Table 1 in Section <br />
IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble.<br />
    Comment: Commenters stated that the IFR ignores the impact of DHS's <br />
recent and planned future reductions in the USCIS workforce. <br />
Specifically, in April, nearly 20,000 USCIS staff--about 80 percent of <br />
the workforce--received communications urging them to end their <br />
employment with USCIS. The commenter said the rule does not explain how <br />
ongoing or planned USCIS staffing cuts affect the adjudicative <br />
resources available to process renewal EAD applications or how it <br />
accounted for these cuts in its planning to reduce backlogs. Another <br />
commenter similarly said the IFR also ignores the effects of this <br />
administration's ``decimation'' of the federal workforce and the <br />
longest shutdown of government operations in history.<br />
    Response: The IFR and this final rule do not undercount or ignore <br />
the impact of processing times and resources needed for adjudicating <br />
EADs. As stated previously, DHS is prioritizing public safety, national <br />
security and benefit integrity.<br />
    DHS notes that USCIS is generally fee-funded and able to continue <br />
its adjudicatory work during government shutdowns. However, DHS notes <br />
that government shutdowns could impact our ability to work with federal <br />
law enforcement partners and other agencies that are more directly <br />
impacted.<br />
    Regarding the size of USCIS' workforce, DHS agrees that adequate <br />
staffing and efficient allocation of resources are important to <br />
reducing backlogs and minimizing the risk that a renewal EAD <br />
application will remain pending past the current card's expiration. <br />
USCIS continuously takes operational steps within existing budgetary <br />
and hiring authorities to further enhance processing efficiency, <br />
including hiring and reallocating personnel, refining workflows, <br />
investing in automation where appropriate,\57\ and implementing the fee <br />
\58\ and program changes directed by recent legislation and executive <br />
actions.\59\<br />
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<br />
    \57\ For example, USCIS has undertaken various efforts to <br />
incorporate AI to deliver immigration services to their customers <br />
more efficiently. See DHS United States Citizenship and Immigration <br />
Services--AI Use Cases, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/ai/use-case-inventory/uscis&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/ai/use-case-inventory/uscis&lt;/a&gt; (last updated Feb. 12, 2026).<br />
    \58\ See DHS, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee <br />
Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request <br />
Requirements, 89 FR 6194 (Jan. 31, 2024) (``These fee collections <br />
fund the cost of fairly and efficiently adjudicating immigration <br />
benefit requests, including those provided without charge to <br />
refugee, asylum, and certain other applicants or petitioners''). <br />
USCIS is primarily a fee-based agency. See sec. 286(m), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1356(m) that is generally not appropriated by Congress.<br />
    \59\ See, e.g., USCIS Immigration Fees and Related Procedures by <br />
H-R.1 Reconciliation Bill, 91 FR 22952 (Apr. 29, 2026).<br />
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<br />
iv. ``Proper Planning'' Rationale<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that DHS's assertion that <br />
renewal applicants' ``proper planning'' could avoid lapses in work <br />
authorization is false and ignores operational realities and backlogs, <br />
asserting that EAD renewal applicants cannot ``properly plan'' for <br />
every unforeseen circumstance that may affect USCIS processing times. <br />
Commenters stated that the 2016 and 2024 Final Rules were issued to <br />
address unforeseen circumstances that neither the agency nor applicants <br />
could reasonably anticipate.<br />
    Commenters cited processing backlog figures when stating that <br />
applicants who follow the agency's recommendation not to file more than <br />
180 days in advance face unavoidable employment gaps. Multiple <br />
commenters stated that many EAD applications, including renewals, took <br />
longer than 180 days to adjudicate.\60\<br />
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<br />
    \60\ See USCIS, Immigration and Citizenship Data, FY 22 <br />
Appropriations Reporting Requirement--Application Processing Data <br />
for September, 2025, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/immigration-and-citizenship-data&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/immigration-and-citizenship-data&lt;/a&gt; (last visited Feb. 13, <br />
2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Response: As previously discussed, DHS has determined that the <br />
potential impact that some aliens may experience a temporary lapse, of <br />
unpredictable duration, in the validity of their employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD is outweighed by the need to better protect <br />
the safety and security of the American people by ensuring that <br />
employment authorization and/or an EAD is not granted until USCIS has <br />
thoroughly vetted and screened the applicant, resolved any derogatory <br />
hits, and determined that the alien continues to be eligible for the <br />
immigration benefit and merits a favorable exercise of discretion, as <br />
applicable.<br />
    USCIS provides case processing times for select forms and locations <br />
to inform the public how long it generally takes to process benefit <br />
requests.\61\ USCIS updates case processing times on its website <br />
monthly with the latest available data. The processing times<br />
<br />
[[Page 65324]]<br />
<br />
fluctuate over time and are based on how long it took USCIS to complete <br />
(meaning issue an approval or denial notice) 80% of adjudicated cases <br />
over the six months prior to the posted processing times.\62\ Each case <br />
is unique, and some cases may take longer than others. Processing times <br />
should be used as a reference point, not an absolute measure of how a <br />
case will take to be completed. The fact that a particular form type <br />
and category shows a processing time slightly longer than 6 months at <br />
the 80th percentile does not mean that a particular application will <br />
take longer than 6 months to approve or deny. Processing times, because <br />
they represent a 6-month reporting period, are a lagging indicator as <br />
it pertains to more recent policy changes and related filing rates. <br />
Processing times are also based on the time it took USCIS to approve or <br />
deny applications, which can be skewed by the time needed to request <br />
additional evidence before an application is approved or denied.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \61\ See USCIS, Case Processing Times, &lt;a href=&quot;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times&quot;&gt;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times&lt;/a&gt; (last visited May 8, 2026).<br />
    \62\ See USCIS, Case Processing Times, &lt;a href=&quot;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/more-info&quot;&gt;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/more-info&lt;/a&gt; (last visited Apr. 22, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Although USCIS generally recommends that applicants not file <br />
requests to renew EADs more than 180 days before the expiration of <br />
their EADs, there is no prohibition on filing the form before a certain <br />
date ahead of expiration. Proper planning by applicants includes filing <br />
early, rather than close to the expiration of the EAD, and ensuring <br />
that all evidence needed for USCIS to determine eligibility has been <br />
submitted with the application at the time of filing. While proper <br />
planning might not avoid a temporary lapse in employment authorization <br />
and/or documentation in all cases, it should help to reduce the <br />
potential of a lapse and shorten the duration if a lapse were to occur.<br />
3. Rationale for Eliminating the Automatic Extension of EADs<br />
    Comment: A couple of commenters opposed the rule without providing <br />
their rationale. They supported automatic extension of employment <br />
authorization, and the provision of employment authorization documents, <br />
without vetting or reviewing aliens' applications. One called the <br />
regulatory change ``wrong'' and ``inhumane.''<br />
    Response: As discussed in greater detail in response to more <br />
specific comments elsewhere in this preamble, to the extent that some <br />
renewal applicants might face a temporary lapse in employment <br />
authorization and/or documentation, DHS believes this approach is <br />
nevertheless justified as it will enhance program integrity and better <br />
protect public safety and national security. Ending automatic <br />
extensions based on the filing of an EAD renewal application ensures <br />
that continued employment authorization is conferred only after USCIS <br />
has completed renewed vetting, evaluated any new derogatory <br />
information, and determined that the alien remains eligible and <br />
continues to merit a favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable. <br />
DHS believes that the program integrity, public safety, and national <br />
security benefits of eliminating automatic extensions of EADs outweigh <br />
the risks of potential temporary lapses in employment authorization and <br />
or EAD validity.<br />
    In addition to these independent reasons for promulgating this <br />
rule, DHS is acting in accord with presidential directives. As <br />
discussed in the Executive Summary, E.O. 14159 instructs the Secretary <br />
of Homeland Security, alongside the Secretary of State and Attorney <br />
General, to ensure that employment authorization is not provided to <br />
unauthorized aliens.\63\ Furthermore, removing automatic extensions of <br />
employment authorization and/or EADs aligns with Executive Order 14161, <br />
which requires DHS to vet and screen all aliens within the United <br />
States ``to the maximum degree possible,'' \64\ and Presidential <br />
Proclamation 10949, which orders DHS to ensure that aliens already <br />
within the United States do not support foreign terrorists or bear <br />
hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, <br />
institutions, or founding principles.\65\<br />
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<br />
    \63\ See Executive Order, Protecting the American People Against <br />
Invasion, 90 FR 8443, 8446 (Jan. 29, 2025).<br />
    \64\ See 90 FR 8451, 8451 (Jan. 31, 2025).<br />
    \65\ Proclamation 10949 (June 4, 2025), 90 FR 24497-98 (June 10, <br />
2025).<br />
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<br />
4. Impact on USCIS Processing<br />
i. Administrative Burden and Efficiency<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters asserted that the IFR would increase <br />
the administrative burden on the government and further slow the <br />
adjudication process and USCIS' ability to timely processes EAD <br />
renewals. A commenter stated that eliminating the automatic extension <br />
does not speed up adjudications, but simply ``creates a guaranteed <br />
administrative failure'' and will lead to increases in emergency <br />
service requests, inquiries, and appeals. Similarly, another commenter <br />
wrote that the IFR would create unnecessary administrative <br />
inefficiencies as USCIS would likely face an increase in prematurely <br />
filed renewal applications, multiple submissions from applicants <br />
fearing gaps in employment, and additional employer verification <br />
requests during pending periods. One commenter reasoned it would be <br />
less burdensome for USCIS to not implement the IFR than to implement <br />
it.<br />
    Other commenters stated that the Agency has been unable to timely <br />
adjudicate EAD renewals for several years and the IFR does not resolve <br />
the current operational reality to avoid gaps in employment <br />
authorization, because even when applicants file at the earliest <br />
possible date, their current EADs often expire long before adjudication <br />
concludes as USCIS processing times are sometimes 8 to 11 months. A <br />
commenter remarked that backlogs and resulting lapses in employment <br />
authorization are not the fault of EAD renewal applicants.<br />
    One commenter stated that the IFR does not account for the impact <br />
of other DHS rules, including the recent Duration of Status proposed <br />
rule,\66\ which would increase the adjudication workload on USCIS staff <br />
and jeopardize the Agency's ability to ensure extensions can be <br />
consistently processed within existing timeframes.<br />
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<br />
    \66\ DHS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Establishing a <br />
Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure <br />
for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and <br />
Representatives of Foreign Information Media, 90 FR 42070 (proposed <br />
Aug. 28, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Response: DHS acknowledges that backlogs and operational challenges <br />
were justifications for the 2022 and 2024 Temporary Final Rules and the <br />
2024 Final Rule. However, as DHS explained in the IFR, the automatic <br />
extension of the validity of an EAD grants the benefit of extending an <br />
alien's expired employment authorization and/or EAD merely by filing a <br />
timely renewal EAD application and without first completing <br />
adjudicative review and related vetting, including resolution of <br />
derogatory information identified during the vetting process. That is, <br />
the benefit is granted without USCIS first performing the following <br />
actions: an eligibility determination; completing vetting and screening <br />
checks; resolving potential hits of derogatory information in <br />
connection with the alien; and a determination that the employment <br />
authorization should be granted in the exercise of discretion, if <br />
applicable. The automatic extension, therefore, poses a security <br />
vulnerability that could allow bad actors to continue to work and <br />
generate income to potentially finance nefarious activities that pose <br />
an imminent threat to the American public. Granting benefits without <br />
proper vetting and full adjudication is contrary to the<br />
<br />
[[Page 65325]]<br />
<br />
mission of DHS and poses a threat to the safety and security of the <br />
American people.\67\ DHS believes that this concern outweighs concerns <br />
about potential backlogs and operational challenges that may result in <br />
temporary lapses of employment authorization and/or EAD validity.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \67\ See, e.g., Conference Report to accompany H.R. 4567 [Report <br />
108-774], ``Making Appropriations for the Department of Homeland <br />
Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' p. 74 <br />
(Oct. 9, 2004), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (recommending, among other things, the creation <br />
of an organization to conduct ``law enforcement/background checks on <br />
every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to granting <br />
immigration benefits.'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    As DHS stated in the IFR, it is the policy of the Administration <br />
``to faithfully execute the immigration laws against all inadmissible <br />
and removable aliens, particularly those aliens who threaten the safety <br />
or security of the American people.'' \68\ Pursuant to this policy, the <br />
Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the Secretary of <br />
State and the Attorney General, has been directed to ``rescind the <br />
policy decisions of the previous administration that led to the <br />
increased or continued presence of illegal aliens in the United States, <br />
and align any and all departmental activities with the policies set out <br />
by this order and the immigration laws'' including by ``ensuring that <br />
the parole authority under section 212(d)(5) of the INA (8 U.S.C. <br />
1182(d)(5)) is exercised on only a case-by-case basis in accordance <br />
with the plain language of the statute'' and by ``ensuring that <br />
designations of TPS are consistent with the provisions of section 244 <br />
of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1254a), and that such designations are <br />
appropriately limited in scope and made for only so long as may be <br />
necessary to fulfill the textual requirements of that statute.'' \69\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \68\ See 90 FR 8443, 8446.<br />
    \69\ See 90 FR 8443, 8446.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS has already taken a number of actions in support of the <br />
directives described in the preceding paragraph.\70\ Thus, in addition <br />
to the serious concerns relating to automatic EAD extensions discussed <br />
previously, DHS is taking steps independent of this rule, including <br />
narrowing the use of parole and to align TPS designations with <br />
statutory criteria, that are likely to result in lower EAD filing <br />
volumes and improve renewal EAD application processing times.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \70\ See, e.g., Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, <br />
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 FR 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025); <br />
Termination of the October 3, 2023 Designation of Venezuela for <br />
Temporary Protected Status, 90 FR 9040 (Feb. 5, 2025); Special <br />
Immigrant Juvenile Classification and Deferred Action, USCIS Policy <br />
Alert (June 6, 2025) &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policymanual-updates/20250606-SIJDeferredAction.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policymanual-updates/20250606-SIJDeferredAction.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (last <br />
visited June 13, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    With respect to the comment about the impact of other DHS rules <br />
that could impact the adjudication workload on USCIS and thus, the <br />
processing timeframe of EAD renewals: DHS published a final rule <br />
eliminating duration of status (D/S) on July 17, 2026.\71\ DHS agrees <br />
with commenters that there will be an increase in the filing volume of <br />
Forms I-539, Application for Extension of Stay/Change of Status, <br />
received by USCIS following September 15, 2026, the effective date of <br />
the final rule as those nonimmigrants who are required to file such <br />
forms begin to do so. The transition period described in 8 CFR <br />
214.1(m), however, provides for a 4-year transition period for F and J <br />
nonimmigrants currently in the United States for D/S to gradually shift <br />
to a fixed admission period.\72\ As explained in the final rule, these <br />
F and J nonimmigrants will continue to remain admitted for D/S until <br />
they depart, or until the program end date specified on designated <br />
forms or 4 years after the effective date of the rule, whichever comes <br />
first.\73\ This would allow time for DHS to shift resources as needed <br />
to ensure that the larger, increased volumes are integrated into <br />
existing workflows. USCIS will continue to monitor its resource <br />
allocations and adjust as appropriate.<br />
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<br />
    \71\ See 91 FR 44976.<br />
    \72\ See 91 FR 44976 (discussing 8 CFR 214.1(m)(1)).<br />
    \73\ See 91 FR 44976, 45017.<br />
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<br />
    On December 4, 2025, USCIS changed the validity periods for certain <br />
other EAD categories, including C08s, to enhance its screening and <br />
vetting efforts.\74\ Therefore, C08 applicants now must seek renewal of <br />
their EAD more often than under the previous 5-year EAD validity <br />
period. DHS, however, cannot accurately predict whether this policy <br />
change will adversely affect EAD renewal processing times, as a likely <br />
increase in EAD renewals could be offset by other recent or future <br />
policy changes. For example, on February 23, 2026, DHS published an <br />
NPRM proposing to modify filing and eligibility requirements for aliens <br />
with a pending asylum application requesting employment authorization <br />
and an employment authorization document (EAD). See 91 FR 8616 (Feb. <br />
23, 2026). As of the publication of this final rule, the NPRM has not <br />
been finalized. If finalized as proposed, changes to eligibility for <br />
C08 employment authorization could significantly reduce the number of <br />
initial C08 applications and, by extension, the longer-term number of <br />
renewal applications.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \74\ See DHS, USCIS, Policy Alert, Subject: Updating Certain <br />
Employment Authorization Document Validity Periods (December 4, <br />
2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20251204-EmploymentAuthorizationValidity.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20251204-EmploymentAuthorizationValidity.pdf&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
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<br />
ii. Processing Timelines<br />
    Comment: One commenter asserted that early filing routinely leads <br />
to rejections or denials, and that filing fees are not returned to the <br />
applicant if they are rejected for early filing. Another commenter <br />
reasoned that since USCIS' policy only allows service inquiries after <br />
365 days, this would limit employer and employee's options for <br />
addressing delays.<br />
    Response: Although USCIS generally recommends that applicants not <br />
file to renew their EAD more than 180 days before the expiration of <br />
their current EAD, USCIS will not reject or deny an otherwise eligible <br />
Form I-765 renewal solely because it was filed sooner. The USCIS <br />
Contact Center is an available resource and provides specific customer <br />
service options, including how to obtain assistance if a case is <br />
rejected or denied.\75\ Further, USCIS does not have a set rule that <br />
applicants must wait 365 days to submit a service inquiry. Rather, <br />
USCIS posts processing times on its Case Processing Times web page, <br />
which includes a tool to help determine whether an applicant can <br />
request an update on their case. Depending on the applicant's receipt <br />
date and other factors, USCIS provides an estimated date for when a <br />
case inquiry may be submitted or a link to submit a case inquiry.\76\<br />
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<br />
    \75\ See USCIS, Contact Us (last visited Feb. 3, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/contact-us&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/contact-us&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
    \76\ See Frequently Asked Questions About Processing Times, <br />
USCIS, &lt;a href=&quot;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/processing-times-faqs&quot;&gt;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/processing-times-faqs&lt;/a&gt; <br />
(last visited Mar. 23, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    DHS recognizes that an alien who is authorized employment incident <br />
to their status may still wish to obtain an EAD. Aliens who are <br />
authorized employment incident to status will continue to have the <br />
choice to file Form I-765 to obtain an EAD as proof of identity and <br />
employment authorization. DHS also recognizes that, in the absence of <br />
automatic extensions, some aliens may experience temporary lapses in <br />
employment authorization and/or EAD validity if their renewal <br />
applications are not adjudicated before their current EADs expire. <br />
However, DHS maintains that the security risks associated with <br />
automatically extending employment authorization and/or EADs without <br />
updated vetting and adjudication outweigh the benefits of using <br />
automatic<br />
<br />
[[Page 65326]]<br />
<br />
extensions to ensure that aliens have uninterrupted employment <br />
authorization and/or EADs. While DHS cannot guarantee that every <br />
renewal will be adjudicated before the existing EAD expires, DHS <br />
believes that proper planning by applicants, combined with reduced <br />
filing volumes and ongoing operational improvements, may lessen the <br />
likelihood and duration of lapses.<br />
iii. Procedural Fairness<br />
    Comment: Many commenters expressed concerns about the procedural <br />
fairness of applicants losing work authorization due to USCIS <br />
processing times. Specifically, some commenters said that the IFR would <br />
punish people who are following the law, complying with immigration <br />
procedures, or, more generally, ``have done everything right,'' losing <br />
status through ``no fault of their own.'' Likewise, several commenters <br />
remarked that the current automatic extension policy helps prevent <br />
nonimmigrants from being punished for delays beyond their control. A <br />
few commenters said that removing automatic extensions without <br />
addressing processing delays would be unjust.<br />
    A few other commenters remarked that the IFR would contradict <br />
administrative equity or fairness. Other commenters said that the rule <br />
would contradict DHS's own acknowledgement that interruptions in work <br />
authorization cause ``substantial and unnecessary harm.'' A couple of <br />
commenters said that the rule would penalize law abiding applicants due <br />
to an extreme individual case.<br />
    Response: DHS recognizes that many renewal applicants diligently <br />
comply with filing requirements and that delays in adjudication may not <br />
be within their control. DHS also acknowledges that prior rulemakings, <br />
including the 2016 and 2024 rules, sought to mitigate the impact of <br />
processing delays on workers and employers by providing automatic <br />
extensions of employment authorization and/or EADs.<br />
    However, as explained in the IFR, DHS has reassessed the balance <br />
between continuity of employment authorization and the need to ensure <br />
that immigration benefits are granted only after appropriate vetting <br />
and eligibility determinations. There is no statutory entitlement to an <br />
automatic extension of employment authorization. Employment <br />
authorization in the relevant categories is generally discretionary and <br />
time-limited, and renewal requires a new adjudication. The IFR and this <br />
final rule do not deny renewal to eligible applicants; they simply <br />
require that continued employment authorization be based on an approved <br />
renewal application rather than on the mere filing of that application.<br />
    DHS has determined that granting automatic extensions without <br />
updated vetting and adjudication is inconsistent with its mission and <br />
with E.O.s directing DHS to ensure that employment authorization is not <br />
provided to unauthorized aliens and that all aliens in the United <br />
States are vetted and screened to the maximum degree possible. While <br />
DHS is mindful of the hardships that may arise from temporary lapses in <br />
employment authorization, the need to protect national security and <br />
public safety, and to enhance the integrity of immigration benefits, <br />
justifies discontinuing automatic extensions.<br />
iv. General or Mixed Feedback on USCIS Processing<br />
    Comment: Several commenters asked questions about USCIS operational <br />
metrics, processing times, use of RFEs, and remedial actions for <br />
applicants who lose their jobs due to adjudication delays. A commenter <br />
agreed that a 540-day extension was too long because there should be <br />
thorough vetting before granting EADs and/or employment authorization.<br />
    Response: DHS acknowledges commenters' questions about the rule's <br />
impact. As discussed in the IFR and earlier in this preamble, the <br />
department has taken measures to address policies that resulted in the <br />
historic spike in EAD applications received during the previous <br />
administration. DHS anticipates a substantial decrease in both initial <br />
and renewal filings for EADs,\77\ which would allow for a reduction in <br />
processing times for renewal EADs.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \77\ See 90 FR 48814, footnote 157.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    USCIS has the discretion to deny benefit requests for lack of <br />
required initial evidence or for ineligibility, or to request that <br />
additional evidence is submitted within a specified period of time.\78\ <br />
The benefit requestor bears the burden of proof for establishing <br />
eligibility.\79\ A request for evidence (RFE), though it may add time <br />
to the adjudication of an application, is an opportunity for the <br />
applicant to provide additional evidence to USCIS in support of their <br />
application.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \78\ See 8 CFR 103.2(b)(8)(ii).<br />
    \79\ See INA sec. 291, 8 U.S.C 1361.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS will not be implementing remedial actions in case an alien's <br />
employment authorization lapses. DHS believes that careful planning by <br />
applicants includes filing early, rather than close to the expiration <br />
of the EAD, and ensuring that all evidence needed for USCIS to <br />
determine eligibility has been submitted with the application at the <br />
time of filing, may help to reduce the risk of a potential lapse in <br />
employment authorization. While proper planning might not avoid a <br />
temporary lapse in employment authorization and/or documentation in all <br />
cases, it should help to reduce the potential of a lapse and shorten <br />
the duration if a lapse were to occur. DHS also notes that an applicant <br />
may request that USCIS expedite the adjudication of an application that <br />
is under USCIS jurisdiction.\80\ USCIS considers all expedite requests <br />
on a case-by-case basis and generally requires documentation to support <br />
such requests.\81\ The decision to expedite is within the sole <br />
discretion of USCIS.\82\ Expediting a case generally means that USCIS <br />
would adjudicate a benefit ahead of others, including those who may <br />
have filed earlier, so USCIS carefully weighs the urgency and merit of <br />
each expedite request.\83\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \80\ See USCIS, Expedite Requests (last updated Sep. 8, 2026), <br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-guidance/expedite-requests&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-guidance/expedite-requests&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
    \81\ See id.<br />
    \82\ See id.<br />
    \83\ See id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Finally, DHS agrees with commenters' belief that the previous 540-<br />
day automatic extension was too long, as demonstrated by this rule's <br />
finalization of the IFR's removal of the automatic extension process.<br />
5. Combined Impacts on Individuals, Employers, the Economy, and <br />
Specific EAD Categories<br />
i. Impacts on Aliens, Families, and Communities<br />
a. General Hardship, Fairness, Educational Disruptions, and Family <br />
Impacts<br />
    Comment: Many commenters expressed concerns that the IFR would <br />
cause lapses in valid work authorization, causing job loss or <br />
interruptions of work, while undermining aliens' financial stability.<br />
    Commenters expressed that lapses in work authorization lead to job <br />
loss, income loss, housing/food insecurity, loss of health coverage, <br />
strain on community resources, educational disruption, and harm to <br />
families and children, and that this is unfair to individuals who have <br />
complied with all requirements. Many commenters expressed general <br />
concerns about the consequences of lost wages due to gaps in employment <br />
authorization. For example, commenters shared that lost wages could <br />
lead to housing and food<br />
<br />
[[Page 65327]]<br />
<br />
insecurity for nonimmigrants. Several commenters wrote that a lapse in <br />
employment could make nonimmigrants face the threat of eviction and <br />
other commenters shared concerns about increased risk of homelessness. <br />
Commenters remarked that many nonimmigrants may not have families or <br />
friends to lean on for temporary shelter, making this group <br />
particularly vulnerable to income shortages. One commenter remarked <br />
that in the current job market, it would be extremely difficult for <br />
them to find another job if they were to lose employment due to a lapse <br />
in work authorization.<br />
    Several commenters expressed concern about the negative impact that <br />
the IFR would have on families. Some commenters said that employment <br />
lapses would result in financial insecurity for households. Some <br />
commenters specifically expressed concern that the IFR would cause <br />
significant financial hardship for families, including those who depend <br />
on dual incomes to meet basic needs such as mortgage payments, rent, <br />
childcare, healthcare, food, transportation, and other living expenses. <br />
A commenter said that the IFR could force family separation. A <br />
commenter remarked that a lapse in employment authorization would <br />
affect nonimmigrants' ability to travel and visit or take care of sick <br />
family members. Another commenter wrote that work authorization gaps <br />
would disproportionately affect households where women care for <br />
children, elders, and disabled family members.<br />
    Several commenters expressed concern regarding the IFR's specific <br />
impact on children. For example, commenters shared that employment gaps <br />
would hinder their ability to provide care for their special needs <br />
children. A commenter remarked that families that continually face <br />
unmet needs endure stress that can impact the long-term health and <br />
development of children. Similarly, another commenter wrote that if <br />
household income is interrupted, children could lose their access to <br />
stable food, shelter, healthcare, and education ``overnight.'' The <br />
commenter reasoned that, as a result, children whose parents lack <br />
stable work authorization are more likely to suffer from poor overall <br />
health, and have a greater likelihood of hospitalization, school <br />
absenteeism, and disciplinary issues. Commenters remarked that food <br />
insecurity from disrupted wages would contribute to conditions such as <br />
hypertension and diabetes and said that children from poor families are <br />
four times as likely to be in ``less than very good health'' than <br />
children from wealthier families. Another commenter similarly remarked <br />
that they anticipate U.S. citizen children with an immigrant parent to <br />
be particularly impacted by the IFR.<br />
    A few commenters said that the IFR poses humanitarian difficulties <br />
and challenges aliens' rights to pursue dignified work, as well as the <br />
American Dream. Other commenters said that the IFR is inhumane and <br />
erodes trust in the immigration system, while others stated it sends <br />
the message that working aliens are dispensable.<br />
    One commenter stated that many EAD applicants are victims of <br />
disasters abroad and do not need to face further hardship. Similarly, <br />
multiple commenters stated that aliens come to the United States <br />
fleeing conflict or persecution and described automatic work <br />
authorization as ``a lifeline.'' Another commenter described the IFR's <br />
removal of automatic extensions of EAD validity periods as an unlawful <br />
form of coercion, stating that it will make life in the United States <br />
unbearable for aliens. A few commenters expressed concerns about the <br />
IFR causing potential discrimination in the hiring process. For <br />
example, a couple of commenters expressed concern that employers would <br />
not hire employees who are dependent on work authorization, due to <br />
potential disruptions from processing delays. One commenter remarked <br />
that the automatic extension policy helps level the hiring playing <br />
field against potential discrimination.<br />
    A couple of commenters remarked that many nonimmigrant families <br />
live on modest wages and may not have enough saved up to supplement a <br />
gap in income. One commenter added that, since asylum seekers are not <br />
eligible for federal benefits, this group would be left particularly <br />
vulnerable.<br />
    Some commenters also expressed concerns that nonimmigrants would <br />
lose benefits such as unemployment insurance and employer sponsored <br />
health coverage during employment authorization gaps. One commenter <br />
said that many nonimmigrants rely on EADs to demonstrate their <br />
eligibility to purchase healthcare on the Healthcare Marketplace. <br />
Multiple commenters added that, without health care coverage, aliens <br />
may be more likely to avoid treating health conditions and seeking <br />
preventive services. Commenters remarked that this would consequently <br />
increase use of emergency rooms and urgent care and expose nonimmigrant <br />
populations to medical debt. Additional commenters remarked that the <br />
2025 tax and budget law, Public Law 119-21, also known as the ``One Big <br />
Beautiful Bill Act,'' will further limit health coverage for aliens, <br />
and expressed concern for resulting health outcomes, citing several <br />
articles which demonstrated correlation between one's ability to afford <br />
health insurance and their health outcomes. One commenter also remarked <br />
that some medical insurance plans require minor children to have an <br />
unexpired EAD for coverage.<br />
    Many commenters expressed concerns about the impact that the IFR <br />
would have on public resources. Commenters reasoned that loss of income <br />
would have to be supplemented by increased reliance on public <br />
assistance programs, charity, and other community or humanitarian <br />
services. For example, commenters said that the IFR would increase <br />
demand for services like food pantries, emergency shelters, clothing or <br />
donation centers, and community health centers. A few commenters <br />
remarked that these resources are already strained, particularly after <br />
having absorbed the spillover from shrinking federal assistance <br />
programs. One commenter remarked that cities in Maine are already <br />
exceeding their general assistance funds and cannot afford additional <br />
strain on resources. The commenter added that alien workers fill vital <br />
roles at social service agencies, working as translators, interpreters, <br />
case managers, and cultural brokers. The commenter reasoned that loss <br />
of these workers would exacerbate the strain on these agencies, <br />
predicting that if the alien workers face a lapse in EAD validity, they <br />
may then turn to the social service agency for help. The commenter <br />
added that local support services such as food banks have already seen <br />
an uptick in demand over the past year.<br />
    Several commenters expressed concern that nonprofit legal providers <br />
would see an overwhelming increase in demand for services. Similarly, <br />
some commenters said that crisis-driven requests require timely <br />
responses and cannot be integrated into existing caseloads without <br />
sacrificing key legal services, and that shouldering more of these <br />
cases would cause stress to their organization and divert attention <br />
away from humanitarian case preparation.<br />
    Response: DHS recognizes that lapses in employment authorization <br />
can create real hardship for affected aliens, their families, their <br />
employers and the communities in which they live. Commenters described <br />
risks such as job loss, reduced income, housing and food insecurity, <br />
loss of health coverage, strain on community resources, educational <br />
disruption, and negative impacts on children and family stability, <br />
particularly for households<br />
<br />
[[Page 65328]]<br />
<br />
relying on dual incomes or modest wages. DHS is also mindful of other <br />
disruptions that a temporary lapse in employment authorization of an <br />
alien may bring, including for those who may rely on an automatic <br />
extension to obtain REAL ID-compliant driver's licenses and other forms <br />
of identification.<br />
    DHS considered these concerns before issuing the IFR \84\ and again <br />
in finalizing this rule. However, DHS has concluded that the need to <br />
ensure proper vetting and screening, and continued eligibility, before <br />
granting renewed employment authorization and issuing secure evidence <br />
of that authorization outweighs the risk that some applicants might <br />
experience a temporary lapse in employment authorization and/or EAD <br />
validity. DHS also determined that extending this benefit without <br />
updated adjudication and screening is inconsistent with its mission and <br />
with E.O.s \85\ directing DHS to ensure that employment authorization <br />
is not provided to unauthorized aliens and that aliens in the United <br />
States are vetted and screened to the maximum degree possible.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \84\ See 90 FR 48799, 48809 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
    \85\ See E.O. 14159, Protecting the American People Against <br />
Invasion (Jan. 20, 2025), 90 FR 8443, 8446 (Jan. 29, 2025) and E.O. <br />
14161, Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and <br />
Other National Security and Public Safety Threats (Jan. 20, 2025), <br />
90 FR 8451, 8451 (Jan. 30, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Nevertheless, DHS emphasizes that this rule does not eliminate <br />
eligibility for employment authorization or prevent eligible aliens <br />
from obtaining initial or renewal EADs. Rather, it ends the practice of <br />
automatically extending employment authorization and/or EAD validity <br />
for up to 540 days based solely on the filing of a renewal application, <br />
without completion of adjudicative review and related vetting, <br />
including resolution of any derogatory information. Continued <br />
employment authorization will now depend on USCIS' approval of a <br />
renewal application, after USCIS has determined that the alien <br />
continues to be eligible and continues to merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, if applicable.<br />
    This rule also does not change underlying eligibility standards for <br />
immigration benefits, public benefits, or educational programs, and it <br />
does not restrict aliens from seeking assistance for which they are <br />
otherwise eligible under Federal or State law. Certain categories of <br />
aliens, such as refugees and asylees, remain ``qualified aliens'' for <br />
specified public benefits under existing statutes, and those <br />
authorities are unchanged by this rule. Likewise, this rule does not <br />
alter the ability of States, localities, or private organizations to <br />
provide charitable or humanitarian assistance.<br />
    DHS also notes that, independent of this rule, it has taken steps <br />
to reduce the extraordinary EAD filing volumes driven by prior <br />
policies, including narrowing the use of parole and aligning TPS <br />
designations with statutory criteria. DHS expects that overall EAD <br />
filing rates (initial and renewal) will substantially decline because <br />
of those actions, freeing adjudicative resources to reduce renewal EAD <br />
application processing times. For example, initial and renewal EAD <br />
applications for the largest EAD categories that were formerly eligible <br />
for automatic extensions have significantly reduced since the start of <br />
2025. See Table 1 in Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble.<br />
    Accordingly, the decreased EAD filing rates support the point made <br />
in the IFR that any claims about an increase in the number and duration <br />
of employment authorization and/or EAD lapses are speculative and <br />
outweighed by the harm posed by automatic extensions.<br />
    USCIS also publishes current case processing time information on <br />
its website.\86\ Proper planning by applicants, such as monitoring EAD <br />
expiration dates, consulting posted processing times, and filing <br />
renewal applications as soon as permitted by regulation and form <br />
instructions, can further mitigate the risk and duration of any lapses <br />
in employment authorization.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \86\ See USCIS, Case Processing Times, &lt;a href=&quot;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/more-info&quot;&gt;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/more-info&lt;/a&gt; (last visited Apr. 22, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Overall, DHS recognizes the seriousness of the hardships described <br />
by commenters but concludes that, on balance, the national security, <br />
public safety, and benefit integrity interests served by ending <br />
automatic EAD extensions outweigh the potential adverse impacts <br />
associated with temporary lapses in employment authorization and/or EAD <br />
validity.<br />
b. Mental Health and Vulnerability, Including Risk of Exploitation<br />
    Comment: Commenters asserted that employment gaps due to the lack <br />
of automatic extensions and processing delays will exacerbate stress, <br />
trauma, and anxiety, and may push some aliens into unauthorized or <br />
exploitative employment or unsafe living conditions.<br />
    Multiple commenters remarked that the IFR would instill fear, <br />
stress, depression, and anxiety, among other mental health concerns. <br />
One commenter asserted that some of the immigrant population is already <br />
experiencing significant levels of trauma and stress from immigration <br />
enforcement activity, and that the IFR would only exacerbate such <br />
feelings.<br />
    Many commenters shared concerns about nonimmigrants' increased <br />
level of vulnerability to exploitation by employers and landlords, as <br />
well as human trafficking, sexual harm, and abuse owing to the IFR's <br />
elimination of automatic extensions. For example, multiple commenters <br />
said that loss of employment authorization makes nonimmigrants <br />
vulnerable to exploitative working conditions. Some commenters remarked <br />
that if aliens lose their ability to work legally, they may seek under <br />
the table work or unlawful employment. Commenters warned that this <br />
leaves such individuals vulnerable to exploitation, explaining that <br />
these jobs often have lower wages, minimal labor protections, and <br />
abusive conditions which they may be afraid to report due to unlawful <br />
status. They also indicated that 84.9 percent of unauthorized <br />
immigrants reported not being paid time and a half for overtime labor, <br />
and 37.1 percent reported being victims of minimum wage violations. The <br />
commenter added that many employers of unauthorized workers do not <br />
carry workers compensation insurance, meaning that employees may be <br />
responsible for covering their own medical costs in the case of work-<br />
related injury. The commenter added that since USCIS recently ended a <br />
program that protected whistleblowers, unauthorized employees are now <br />
less likely to report various types of abuse. A different commenter <br />
added that forcing applicants into unlawful employment may also impact <br />
their eligibility for future immigration benefits, putting them in a <br />
long-term position of vulnerability.<br />
    Response: DHS recognizes that uncertainty about employment <br />
authorization and potential lapses in income can contribute to stress, <br />
anxiety, and other mental health challenges, particularly for <br />
individuals who may already have experienced trauma or instability. DHS <br />
also recognizes that economic insecurity and lack of lawful employment <br />
opportunities can increase vulnerability to exploitation by <br />
unscrupulous employers, landlords, or others, and may heighten risks of <br />
trafficking, abuse, or other harm.<br />
    The IFR and this final rule do not deny eligible aliens access to <br />
employment authorization or to the underlying immigration benefits for <br />
which they qualify. Rather the IFR, affirmed by this final rule, <br />
removes only the automatic extension mechanism that previously allowed <br />
aliens to remain employment authorized for up to 540<br />
<br />
[[Page 65329]]<br />
<br />
days based solely on a pending renewal application, without completion <br />
of updated vetting and adjudication. As described throughout this <br />
preamble, DHS has determined that such automatic extensions present an <br />
unacceptable security and program integrity risk because they confer <br />
significant benefits before USCIS has completed vetting and screening, <br />
resolved any derogatory information, determined continued eligibility <br />
and that the applicant merits a favorable exercise of discretion, if <br />
applicable.<br />
    DHS cannot structure its regulatory framework on the assumption <br />
that aliens and/or employers will respond to temporary lapses in <br />
employment authorization by engaging in unauthorized employment or <br />
other unlawful conduct. The INA prohibits the knowing employment of <br />
unauthorized aliens and establishes consequences for both employers and <br />
aliens who violate those provisions. While DHS recognizes that some <br />
aliens may face difficult choices if a lapse occurs, DHS does not <br />
condone unauthorized employment or believe that it is an appropriate <br />
response to a temporary lapse in employment authorization.<br />
    DHS shares commenters' concerns about exploitation and abuse. DHS, <br />
including through components such as ICE and USCIS' fraud detection and <br />
victim protection programs, will continue to enforce laws related to <br />
human trafficking, forced labor, and other forms of exploitation, and <br />
to coordinate with the Department of Labor and other agencies on <br />
enforcement. Existing protections for victims of trafficking, crime, <br />
and abuse (including T and U nonimmigrant classifications and VAWA) are <br />
unaffected by this rule. Nothing in this rule diminishes DHS's <br />
commitment to identify and assist victims or to support the <br />
investigation and prosecution of traffickers and other offenders.<br />
    DHS recognizes that some aliens may experience heightened stress or <br />
vulnerability if their employment authorization temporarily lapses. <br />
However, DHS has concluded that the need to ensure that employment <br />
authorization is extended only after appropriate vetting and <br />
adjudication, consistent with current national security and public <br />
safety priorities, justifies ending automatic extensions. DHS also <br />
expects that reductions in overall EAD filing volumes may help limit <br />
the frequency and length of lapses and that timely filing and planning <br />
by applicants can further reduce uncertainty. For reduced filing <br />
volumes, see Table 1 in Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble.<br />
c. Identification, Driver's Licenses, and Access to Services<br />
    Comment: Several commenters expressed concerns that lapses in <br />
employment authorization and the associated use of employment <br />
authorization documents would hinder nonimmigrants' abilities to obtain <br />
or renew their driver's licenses, open and access bank accounts, obtain <br />
or renew health insurance, enroll in educational programs and training, <br />
and interact with law enforcement. Commenters remarked that lack of a <br />
driver's license could interfere with critical daily activities for <br />
nonimmigrants, such as taking children to school, commuting to work, or <br />
attending doctors' appointments or immigration hearings. A few <br />
commenters shared that in many cases, nonimmigrants require driver's <br />
licenses to perform their job duties and that, without a valid driver's <br />
license, nonimmigrants may be pushed to drive without a license, <br />
compromising road safety.<br />
    Response: DHS acknowledges that EADs are commonly used by aliens as <br />
identity and, in some contexts, status documents for State-issued <br />
driver's licenses and identification cards, financial services, and <br />
other purposes. Under the prior automatic extension framework, an EAD <br />
that was facially expired could be treated as unexpired for certain <br />
purposes if accompanied by a Form I-797C receipt notice, including <br />
obtaining a driver's license. As explained in the IFR, DHS determined <br />
that continuing that practice and the use of automatically extended <br />
EADs is no longer appropriate.<br />
    This rule does not change State authority to determine which <br />
documents are acceptable for issuance of driver's licenses or other <br />
State identification, nor does it amend the Department's REAL ID <br />
regulations for issuance of driver's licenses or identification cards <br />
acceptable for federal official purposes defined in the REAL ID Act. It <br />
does, however, make clear that, for renewal applications filed on or <br />
after October 30, 2025, a pending Form I-765 and associated receipt <br />
notice will no longer operate to automatically extend EAD validity <br />
under DHS regulations. An EAD that is facially expired will not be <br />
treated as unexpired for employment or immigration purposes unless it <br />
qualifies for an automatic extension under 8 CFR 274a.13(d) based on a <br />
renewal application filed before October 30, 2025, or is otherwise <br />
extended by law or an applicable Federal Register notice (for example, <br />
certain TPS-related documents).<br />
    The rule does not prevent eligible aliens from seeking or renewing <br />
EADs, nor does it prohibit States or other entities from accepting <br />
alternative forms of identification or documentation where permitted by <br />
law.<br />
    DHS also expects that, as overall EAD filing volumes decline and <br />
renewal processing times improve, the risk and duration of lapses will <br />
be reduced. USCIS has already seen a decline in filing rates for the <br />
main EAD categories that were eligible for automatic extensions. See <br />
Table 1 in Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble.<br />
    DHS concludes that the security and benefit integrity gains from <br />
ensuring that EADs used as evidence of identity and work authorization <br />
reflect a recent adjudication and completed vetting outweigh the <br />
potential risks associated with discontinuing automatic extensions.<br />
ii. Employment, Employers, and Economic Impacts<br />
a. Employer Burdens, Business Continuity, and Sector Specific Concerns<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters argued that loss of automatic <br />
extensions will increase Form I-9 compliance complexity, cause turnover <br />
and productivity losses, exacerbate existing shortages in health care, <br />
education, agriculture, manufacturing, etc., and impose particular <br />
burdens on small employers.<br />
    Commenters expressed opposition to removing automatic extensions, <br />
stating that such a change would cause significant disruption to <br />
employers, including operational inefficiencies (loss of productivity <br />
and delays), administrative burdens, staffing gaps, human capital costs <br />
and retention, civil penalties, and compliance burdens as employees <br />
await renewal decisions without work authorization. A few commenters <br />
stated that employers could violate Form I-9 compliance rules due to <br />
unclear authorization statuses.<br />
    Multiple commenters asserted that the IFR would exacerbate existing <br />
labor shortages and projected a continued decrease in labor force <br />
participation rates through at least 2030, cautioning that the IFR <br />
could worsen such shortages by preventing asylum seekers from working <br />
during EAD processing and removing vetted workers. One commenter stated <br />
that labor shortages would negatively impact the U.S. economy, hinder <br />
growth and contribute to inflationary pressures. Another commenter <br />
stated that a decline of 2 million immigrant workers between 2019 and <br />
2021 contributed to labor<br />
<br />
[[Page 65330]]<br />
<br />
shortages across sectors, including a labor shortage in the <br />
construction industry valued at $10.8 billion, reasoning that the IFR <br />
would replicate such labor shortages across every industry. A commenter <br />
stated that until public and private sector efforts could fully meet <br />
industry demand, the United States would need additional workers to <br />
fill jobs left vacant by the domestic workforce, expressing concern <br />
that ending the EAD extension could further disrupt workforce stability <br />
and business continuity for manufacturers. Many commenters stated that <br />
the removal of automatic extensions would negatively impact critical <br />
industries and sectors of the U.S. economy that rely on foreign <br />
workers, including agriculture, technology, energy, manufacturing, <br />
logistics, transportation, hospitality, education, and construction. <br />
Several commenters expressed concern about the impact on healthcare and <br />
healthcare workers, noting that even a brief lapse in employment <br />
authorization disrupts patient care, clinic operations, and community <br />
health access. One commenter remarked about how the IFR will adversely <br />
affect teaching hospitals and academic health systems that employ EAD <br />
workers.<br />
    Other commenters expressed concerns that the IFR would undermine <br />
labor unions, collective bargaining, and workforce stability by <br />
disrupting bargaining units that include immigrant workers with EADs, <br />
stating that increased risk of sudden job loss among workers would <br />
strain unions' ability to enforce workplace standards, forcing them to <br />
devote more resources to protecting vulnerable workers and addressing <br />
instability caused by the IFR.<br />
    Multiple commenters expressed the importance of automatic <br />
extensions for business continuity amid persistent government <br />
processing delays and stated that the IFR would impose unnecessary <br />
burdens and costs, especially on smaller companies without in-house <br />
legal departments. Some commenters stated that the rule would force <br />
employers to conduct extensive contingency planning and workforce <br />
audits to prepare for potential lapses in work authorization. <br />
Specifically, a commenter stated that groups such as asylees, who are <br />
authorized to work incident to status, may still be asked to show an <br />
EAD to their employer, and further reasoned that the IFR could still <br />
cause employer confusion and job loss among these groups. Other <br />
commenters stated that eliminating automatic EAD extensions would cause <br />
businesses to lose workers and cited to a USCIS analysis establishing <br />
that EAD extensions previously saved U.S. employers an estimated $3.5 <br />
billion by avoiding labor turnover.<br />
    Numerous commenters expressed concern that employers would be <br />
forced to terminate employees due to administrative delays in <br />
processing EAD renewals. Commenters stated that previous sudden <br />
reversals of work permit rules have created confusion for employers and <br />
caused them to make rash decisions based on misinformation about <br />
changing Federal regulations, leading to erroneous layoffs where <br />
workers with valid EADs were dismissed because employers did not <br />
understand how to comply with current rules. A commenter said that such <br />
impacts would exacerbate the ongoing teacher shortage crisis.<br />
    Response: DHS recognizes that some sectors, including healthcare, <br />
education, manufacturing, agriculture, hospitality, and technology, and <br />
unionized workplaces may be particularly sensitive to interruptions in <br />
workforce continuity.<br />
    This rule does not change employers' underlying obligations under <br />
section 274A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, and 8 CFR part 274a to hire <br />
only individuals who are authorized to work in the United States, to <br />
verify employment eligibility, and to reverify employment authorization <br />
when existing documentation expires.<br />
    By ending automatic extensions for renewal applications filed on or <br />
after October 30, 2025, this rule ensures that employment authorization <br />
will be evidenced by a secure, unexpired document issued following <br />
adjudication. This reduces the risk that employers will rely on <br />
outdated or invalid documentation, and it aligns with DHS's <br />
responsibility to ensure that employment authorization and/or an EAD is <br />
provided only after USCIS has completed appropriate vetting and <br />
determined continued eligibility.<br />
    To ensure that workplaces and businesses have a clear understanding <br />
of the requirements of the IFR, DHS has updated the Handbook for <br />
Employers (M-274) and related guidance to assist employers in <br />
understanding these changes and properly completing Form I-9. Employers <br />
are responsible for ensuring I-9 compliance for all of their employees, <br />
including updates to the I-9 verification process.\87\<br />
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<br />
    \87\ See DHS, USCIS, Handbook for Employers M-274, 5.0 Automatic <br />
Extensions of Employment Authorization and/or Employment <br />
Authorization Documents (EADs) in Certain Circumstances (last <br />
updated Oct. 30, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt;-central/form-i-9-<br />
resources/handbook-for-employers-m-274/50-automatic-extensions-of-<br />
employment-authorization-andor-employment-authorization-documents-<br />
eads-in.<br />
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<br />
    DHS acknowledges that, where renewal adjudications are not <br />
completed before current EADs expire, some employers may face temporary <br />
staffing gaps and associated costs. These can include lost <br />
productivity, overtime for remaining staff, recruitment and training <br />
for temporary or replacement workers, and internal administrative costs <br />
associated with planning, auditing, and compliance. DHS discussed these <br />
categories of impacts in the IFR and in the economic analysis <br />
accompanying this rule and recognizes there may be negative impacts for <br />
some employers.\88\ DHS outlined the difficulties in estimating the <br />
number of EADs that would lapse in the Section V.B.1. of this preamble. <br />
However, in this final rule DHS has made estimates of economic impacts <br />
and emphasizes that there is likely to be variation in the impacts, due <br />
to factors such as dynamic process times, filing volumes, and filing <br />
behavior. For this reason, DHS provides a wide range for the estimates.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \88\ See 90 FR 48799, 48817 (Oct. 30, 2025). See also Section V <br />
of this preamble.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS has determined that these operational burdens are outweighed by <br />
the national security, public safety, and benefit integrity concerns <br />
associated with automatic EAD extensions. Automatic EAD extensions <br />
allow employment authorization and/or EAD validity to continue for up <br />
to 540 days based solely on a pending renewal application, before USCIS <br />
has completed updated background checks and adjudication. Considering <br />
current security priorities and E.O.s directing enhanced vetting of <br />
aliens already present in the United States, DHS has concluded that <br />
continued reliance on automatic extensions is not an acceptable means <br />
of managing adjudication backlogs.<br />
    Independent of this rule, DHS has taken steps expected to reduce <br />
initial and renewal EAD filing volumes by narrowing the use of parole <br />
and aligning TPS and related policies with statutory text. As discussed <br />
previously in response to comments, DHS anticipates that overall EAD <br />
filings will decline and that adjudicative capacity can increasingly be <br />
focused on timely renewal adjudications.<br />
    DHS notes that an applicant may request that USCIS expedite the <br />
adjudication of an application that is under USCIS jurisdiction.\89\ <br />
USCIS considers all expedite requests on a case-by-case basis and <br />
generally requires documentation to support such<br />
<br />
[[Page 65331]]<br />
<br />
requests.\90\ The decision to expedite is within the sole discretion of <br />
USCIS.\91\ Expediting a case generally means that USCIS would <br />
adjudicate a benefit ahead of others, including those who may have <br />
filed earlier, so USCIS carefully weighs the urgency and merit of each <br />
expedite request.\92\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \89\ See USCIS, Expedite Requests, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-guidance/expedite-requests&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-guidance/expedite-requests&lt;/a&gt; (last updated Sep. 8, 2026).<br />
    \90\ See id.<br />
    \91\ See id.<br />
    \92\ See id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS recognizes the concerns raised by employers, unions, and <br />
industry groups and will continue to monitor implementation and <br />
processing times. Nonetheless, DHS concludes that ensuring that renewed <br />
employment authorization is granted only after complete vetting and <br />
adjudication is necessary to better protect national security and <br />
public safety and to enhance the integrity of the employment <br />
verification system. Adhering to a system that prioritizes national <br />
security, public safety, and benefit integrity outweighs the potential <br />
risks and additional burdens that applicants and their employers may <br />
face by a potential temporary lapse in employment authorization.<br />
b. Immigrant Contributions to the Economy and Macroeconomic and Local <br />
Economic Impacts of the Rule<br />
    Comment: Numerous commenters stated that the IFR ignores the vital <br />
economic contributions of immigrants, and operational realities that <br />
the work authorization is a critical tool to successfully integrate <br />
aliens into the United States and contribute to the economy. Commenters <br />
also stated that the IFR is disrupting businesses that employ these <br />
aliens and thereby losing the economic contribution of immigrants. For <br />
example, commenters discussed the positive impacts that asylees and <br />
refugees make to the U.S. economy and stated that this population <br />
contributed more revenue than they cost in expenditures to the U.S. <br />
government. Another commenter said that in 2023, New York State's <br />
immigrant population represented about 23 percent of the total <br />
population and paid $74.8 billion in taxes, thus demonstrating that <br />
immigrants are productive members of the workforce. The commenter also <br />
stated that a lapse in employment authorization could mean that they <br />
would lose their homes, face hunger, contribute less taxes to state and <br />
the federal government or would otherwise become vulnerable (such as <br />
incurring negative health effects). Another commenter said that <br />
immigrant workers are a key driver of New York City's economy, making <br />
up 36 percent of the population; accounting for 37 percent of total <br />
wage, salary, and business income; and in 2021, contributed tens to <br />
hundreds of billions of dollars in taxes and spending to the city and <br />
state. An additional commenter identified in-migration of workers, <br />
including asylum seekers and other immigrants, as one of the few <br />
positive trends offsetting the rapid exit of older workers and <br />
emphasized that many economic development strategies depend on <br />
immigrants' continuous access to work authorization. Other commenters <br />
highlighted potential impacts on the economy, pointing out that asylum <br />
seekers and refugees work in sectors that face shortages and pay <br />
billions in taxes, and that immigrants will add $7 trillion to the <br />
economy over the next decade.<br />
    Commenters raised concerns about the macroeconomic impacts of <br />
eliminating automatic extensions of EADs, such as undermining U.S. <br />
economic competitiveness, innovation capacity, and national interests <br />
by forcing workers into temporary unemployment. Other commenters <br />
predicted that the IFR would lead to negative economic impacts, <br />
including reduced tax revenue, costs to taxpayers, supply chain <br />
disruptions, reduced consumer spending, the risk of a recession, and <br />
job losses. Some commenters expressed general concern that the IFR will <br />
reduce economic productivity and destabilize the workforce and the <br />
economy, considering that one in five U.S. workers is an immigrant who <br />
relies on EADs.<br />
    Commenters said that the IFR would significantly increase States' <br />
healthcare costs by driving up the uninsured rate among immigrants, who <br />
already face limited access to Medicaid and Affordable Care Act <br />
coverage. The commenters remarked that with lapses in work <br />
authorization eliminating employer-sponsored insurance, States could <br />
bear nearly $280 billion in uncompensated care costs. The commenters <br />
also stated that the IFR would adversely impact the States' ability to <br />
enforce their laws, reasoning that legal workers with lapses in work <br />
authorization would increasingly enter the underground economy and <br />
become less likely to report labor and civil rights violations and <br />
discussed how this would interfere with the States' ability to enforce <br />
their labor and civil rights laws, because effective enforcement relies <br />
on employees' ability and willingness to report violations.<br />
    A commenter said the IFR would have significant negative <br />
consequences on the federal budget and federal agencies such as the <br />
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Department of Labor (DOL) because <br />
the IFR would reduce the amount of taxable income reported to the IRS <br />
when applicants face prolonged lapses in employment authorization, <br />
diminishing federal revenue and complicating federal fiscal <br />
projections. The commenter further asserted that cutting off work <br />
authorization for aliens awaiting renewal would push thousands of <br />
workers into unauthorized employment or out of the workforce entirely <br />
and consequently increase DOL's investigatory burdens.<br />
    Furthermore, commenters highlighted a range of potential negative <br />
impacts on the local and state economy, such as disrupting the <br />
workforce and hindering an alien's ability to maintain consistent <br />
employment, which, in turn, could directly affect essential community <br />
services, including infrastructure projects, healthcare, and public <br />
safety. A commenter highlighted that immigrants play a major role in <br />
entrepreneurship. Another commenter remarked that Maine stands to lose <br />
an economic boom they are currently experiencing if immigrant workers <br />
lose work authorization.<br />
    While expressing concerns about the impacts the IFR's regulatory <br />
changes would have on the economy, multiple commenters requested a <br />
return to previous practices allowing automatic extension of EAD <br />
validity periods.<br />
    Response: DHS agrees that immigrants, including aliens who were <br />
eligible for the automatic extension of their employment authorization <br />
and/or EAD for up to 540 days, make important contributions to the <br />
national and local economies through their labor, entrepreneurship, tax <br />
payments, and consumer spending; and that continuity of lawful <br />
employment can benefit workers, employers, and communities. DHS also <br />
acknowledges the many cited studies, data points, and experiences to <br />
support their claims about these contributions.<br />
    As the commenters noted, prior DHS rulemakings, including the 2022 <br />
and 2024 temporary final rules and the 2024 final rule, emphasized the <br />
economic and operational benefits of automatic extensions as a tool to <br />
mitigate the effects of EAD processing delays. Those rules estimated <br />
that automatic extensions could reduce wage losses for affected <br />
workers, avoid turnover costs for employers, and maintain tax <br />
contributions that might otherwise be impacted by lapses in employment <br />
authorization. In adopting those measures, DHS gave significant weight <br />
to the economic and labor market<br />
<br />
[[Page 65332]]<br />
<br />
advantages of continuity of employment.<br />
    The IFR and this final rule in contrast reflect a reassessment of <br />
that policy and how to balance those economic considerations against <br />
DHS's core responsibilities for national security, public safety, and <br />
benefit integrity. DHS has determined that continued use of automatic <br />
extensions, which allow employment authorization and the related use of <br />
secure documentation to continue for up to 540 days based solely on the <br />
filing of a renewal application, before USCIS has completed updated <br />
vetting, resolved any derogatory information, and determined that the <br />
alien remains eligible and continues to merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, if applicable, is not consistent with DHS's current policy <br />
priorities reflected in, among others, E.O. 14159 \93\ and 14161.\94\ <br />
Those E.O.s direct DHS to vet and screen aliens already present in the <br />
United States to the maximum degree possible, to ensure that employment <br />
authorization is not provided to unauthorized aliens, and to identify <br />
all resources that may be used to ensure that all aliens who are <br />
already in the United States, are vetted and screened to the maximum <br />
degree possible.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \93\ See Executive Order 14159 ``Protecting the American People <br />
Against Invasion,'' 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 29, 2025)<br />
    \94\ See Executive Order 14161, ``Protecting the United States <br />
from Terrorist and Other National Security and Public Safety <br />
Threats,'' 90 FR 8451 (Jan. 31, 2025). See also Presidential <br />
Proclamation 10949, ``Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To <br />
Protect the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National <br />
Security and Public Safety Threats,'' 90 FR 24497 (June 10, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Accordingly, ending the practice of providing automatic extension <br />
of employment authorization documents enhances the benefit integrity in <br />
adjudications of employment authorization requests and better protects <br />
public safety and national security by ensuring that aliens are <br />
properly vetted and determined to continue to be eligible (and merit a <br />
favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable) for employment <br />
authorization before such authorization is provided to the alien. DHS <br />
emphasizes that it is charged with combating unauthorized employment in <br />
accordance with section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, which Congress <br />
implemented, among other reasons, because of the detrimental negative <br />
effect that unauthorized employment and illegal immigration has on the <br />
United States and the economy.\95\ In light of these directives, DHS is <br />
now placing greater weight on security and benefit integrity <br />
considerations.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \95\ Section 274A of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1324a was codified as <br />
part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Public Law <br />
99-603, for the purpose of controlling illegal immigration to the <br />
United States by, among other things, establishing penalties for <br />
employers who knowingly hire undocumented aliens, and prohibit the <br />
employment of aliens who are unauthorized to work in the United <br />
States either because they entered the country illegally or are in <br />
an immigration status which does not permit employment. See H.R. <br />
REP. 99-682, 46, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649-5650. The legislative <br />
history reflects that Congress considered, among other things, <br />
evidence of prior studies demonstrating the adverse impact of <br />
illegal immigration that warranted legislation to protect U.S. labor <br />
and the economy. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 99-682, 46-52, 1986 <br />
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649-5656.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS recognizes that ending automatic extensions may result in <br />
temporary lapses in employment authorization and/or EAD validity for <br />
some renewal applicants if the adjudication of their renewal EAD <br />
application is not completed before their current EAD expires. Those <br />
lapses can lead to lost wages for affected workers, lost output and <br />
turnover costs for employers, and associated reductions in payroll and <br />
income tax contributions for the duration of the lapse. DHS also <br />
acknowledges that such impacts may be more pronounced in certain <br />
localities, sectors, or communities where EAD holders represent a <br />
substantial share of the workforce, and that employers and governments <br />
may face transitional challenges as they adjust to this change.<br />
    While DHS faces uncertainty in projecting the size of any future <br />
affected population and the magnitude of resulting macroeconomic <br />
impacts, under several assumptions DHS has estimated the impacted <br />
population and cost-impacts for a specific window of time. As explained <br />
in the IFR and earlier in this preamble, EAD processing times have <br />
fluctuated over recent years due to changes in application volumes, <br />
programmatic policies, resource levels, and court orders. DHS has also <br />
undertaken significant policy changes, such as narrowing the use of <br />
parole and better aligning TPS and related programs with statutory <br />
criteria, that are expected to materially reduce initial and renewal <br />
EAD filings over time. Given this evolving environment, DHS estimates <br />
of the number of renewal applicants who might experience lapses in the <br />
absence of automatic extensions population, and the resultant impact <br />
estimates, likely face significant variation. For this reason, we <br />
clearly articulate the assumptions and inputs relied upon to make the <br />
estimates and provide ranges for them.<br />
    With respect to commenters' concerns about reduced tax revenues and <br />
increased uncompensated care, DHS acknowledges that lower earned income <br />
during periods when some workers are not employed could reduce certain <br />
tax payments and contributions toward employer-sponsored health <br />
coverage for those individuals. At the same time, total tax receipts <br />
and healthcare costs depend on numerous factors across the broader <br />
economy, and DHS cannot attribute or forecast such aggregate effects <br />
with sufficient precision to support a quantitative estimate specific <br />
to this rule.<br />
    DHS also does not agree that ending automatic extensions will <br />
necessitate or require a shift of large numbers of workers into <br />
unauthorized employment.\96\ While DHS acknowledges that unauthorized <br />
work can create an underground labor market where exploitation is more <br />
likely and enforcement more difficult, this rule does not require or <br />
condone unauthorized employment. The INA prohibits the knowing <br />
employment of unauthorized aliens and establishes consequences for both <br />
employers and aliens who engage in such conduct. See INA sec. 274A, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1324a; 8 CFR part 274a. DHS will continue to enforce those <br />
provisions, as well as coordinate with the Department of Labor and <br />
other agencies on labor-rights enforcement and protection of workers, <br />
regardless of immigration status. Nothing in this rule alters existing <br />
worker-protection authorities or the ability of Federal, State, or <br />
local entities to investigate and remedy labor law violations.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \96\ The final rule making the up to 540-day automatic extension <br />
period permanent was based on speculative assumptions given the <br />
operational realities at USCIS at the time. See 89 FR 101208, 101245 <br />
(noting ``the purpose of this final rule is to provide a long-term <br />
solution to mitigate the potential for unpredictable circumstances <br />
to significantly increase renewal EAD application processing times <br />
that would require future urgent action'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS further notes that this rule does not change underlying <br />
eligibility criteria for employment authorization or prevent renewal <br />
applicants from obtaining employment authorization and/or an EAD. <br />
Eligible aliens remain able to apply for and receive renewed EADs, and, <br />
once those renewals are approved, continue contributing economically <br />
through lawful employment. DHS expects that other policy changes that <br />
DHS has made will reduce EAD filing volumes, and when combined with <br />
ongoing process improvements and careful resource allocation within <br />
USCIS, will lessen the frequency and duration of any future lapses in <br />
employment authorization and/or EADs.\97\ DHS has seen falling<br />
<br />
[[Page 65333]]<br />
<br />
numbers of I-765 applications since October 2025. See Table 1 in <br />
Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \97\ See Table 1 in Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble for <br />
numbers of I-765 applicants from the largest eligibility categories, <br />
the C08 and C09, from January 2025 to June 2026.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Renewal applicants can further reduce their risk of a temporary <br />
lapse in employment authorization by filing as early as permitted under <br />
applicable regulations and form instructions, ensuring that their <br />
application includes all evidence needed to establish continued <br />
eligibility so that processing is not delayed by a Request for <br />
Evidence, and by keeping informed of current processing-time <br />
information posted by USCIS.\98\ Proper planning by applicants, <br />
together with anticipated reductions in overall EAD demand, may help <br />
mitigate the extent of any temporary disruptions.<br />
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<br />
    \98\ USCIS publishes case processing times on &lt;a href=&quot;http://uscis.gov/&quot;&gt;USCIS.gov&lt;/a&gt; that are <br />
regularly updated. See USCIS, Case Processing Times, &lt;a href=&quot;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times&quot;&gt;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times&lt;/a&gt; (last visited May 8, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    As discussed above, DHS believes the public safety, national <br />
security and benefit-integrity benefits of eliminating automatic <br />
extensions outweigh the potential macroeconomic and local economic <br />
costs identified by commenters. Ending the practice of providing <br />
automatic extension of employment authorization documents enhances the <br />
benefit integrity in adjudications of employment authorization requests <br />
and better protects public safety and national security by ensuring <br />
that aliens are properly vetted and determined to continue to be <br />
eligible (and merit a favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable) <br />
for employment authorization before such authorization is provided to <br />
the alien.<br />
iii. Relief for Specific Immigration Categories<br />
a. Impact on Refugees, Asylees, Asylum Seekers, Unaccompanied Alien <br />
Children (UACs), and Other Humanitarian Categories<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that refugees, asylees, TPS <br />
beneficiaries, VAWA self-petitioners, and unaccompanied children will <br />
be disproportionately harmed by gaps in work authorization because of <br />
their vulnerability, limited access to public benefits, which makes <br />
work authorization crucial to their wellbeing, and reliance on work to <br />
support themselves, safety, and integration. A commenter indicated that <br />
the IFR would not only destabilize the workforce, but would inflict <br />
unconscionable distress and cause lasting harm to refugees, asylees <br />
(including those with pending claims) and other humanitarian entrants <br />
and their families, solely on account of the government's processing <br />
delay and the impact of lapses in employment on this population.<br />
    Some commenters expressed concern that asylum seekers of specific <br />
nationalities including Haitians, Ukrainians, Asian Americans and <br />
Pacific Islanders, and Afghans were disproportionally affected by the <br />
IFR. Additionally, some of these commenters indicated that these aliens <br />
did not enter through an unknown or informal process but known, vetted <br />
and humanitarian programs, and are law-abiding and productive <br />
individuals that benefited the government and the economy. For that <br />
reason--while at the same time acknowledging the Department's interest <br />
in benefit integrity, security vetting, and aligning policies with <br />
recent executive directives emphasizing enforcement and careful <br />
screening, a commenter advocated for a narrow, risk-sensitive approach <br />
that preserves the core logic of the interim final rule while avoiding <br />
an ``all or nothing'' outcome for the vetted humanitarian population.<br />
    Another commenter remarked that the removal of the automatic <br />
extension of EADs would have severe consequences for those obtaining <br />
status through the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in particular <br />
Asian American and Pacific Islander women, who are particularly <br />
vulnerable to these harms, as work interruptions can force them into <br />
unsafe situations or dependence on abusive partners. Others indicated <br />
that access to employment authorization offers safety, stability, and a <br />
better quality of life for survivors of gender-based violence. One <br />
commenter explained that abusers commonly misuse the immigration <br />
system, for example, by threatening to withhold, withdraw, or sabotage <br />
immigration filings, as a means of control and intimidation, and <br />
predicted the rule would exacerbate this problem. This submission <br />
called attention to backlogs in adjudicating EAD renewal applications <br />
and predicted hardships for survivors and families due to lapses in <br />
employment.<br />
    A commenter expressed concern that unaccompanied children and youth <br />
would be negatively impacted. The commenter said that young protection <br />
seekers, even those not yet eligible to work, often rely on EADs as a <br />
form of government identification to access essential social services <br />
and care such as psychological, education, and housing services. The <br />
commenter also said that EADs ``facilitate critical access to jobs and <br />
training opportunities for older youth.''<br />
    Response: DHS understands that refugees, asylees, asylum <br />
applicants, TPS beneficiaries, VAWA self-petitioners, unaccompanied <br />
children, and other humanitarian populations may be particularly <br />
vulnerable to hardship if they experience lapses in employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD validity. As recognized in the IFR for <br />
purposes of all applicants, including those in humanitarian programs, <br />
DHS is cognizant that a lapse in employment authorization and/or EAD <br />
validity may impact individual aliens, and their families. Many <br />
applicants in the United States may have fled persecution, violence, or <br />
disaster, may have limited access to public benefits, and often rely <br />
heavily on employment authorization to support themselves and their <br />
families and to integrate into their communities.<br />
    This rule does not eliminate access to employment authorization for <br />
any of these categories. Refugees and asylees (not including asylum <br />
applicants) remain employment authorized incident to their status under <br />
8 CFR 274a.12(a); they may continue to work so long as they maintain <br />
that status, regardless of the expiration date on any EAD issued as <br />
evidence of that authorization. Similarly, aliens with a pending asylum <br />
application may apply for employment authorization in accordance with <br />
the regulations provided at 8 CFR part 208 and 8 CFR part 274a. TPS <br />
beneficiaries likewise receive employment authorization consistent with <br />
section 244 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254a, and its implementing <br />
regulations at 8 CFR 244, and TPS-related extensions of documentation <br />
may continue to be provided by law or Federal Register notice. This <br />
rule does not change those underlying eligibility frameworks.<br />
    The IFR and this final rule simply end the practice of <br />
automatically extending the validity of EADs and, for categories not <br />
authorized incident to status, attendant employment authorization based <br />
solely on the filing of a renewal application on or after October 30, <br />
2025, except where extensions are provided by law or Federal Register <br />
notice (such as certain TPS-related documents). DHS has determined that <br />
automatic extensions of employment authorization and/or EADs, even for <br />
vulnerable populations, present the same underlying concern: they allow <br />
continued employment authorization and use of secure documentation for <br />
up to 540 days based solely on a pending renewal application, before <br />
USCIS has determined continued eligibility and that the applicant <br />
merits a favorable exercise of discretion (if applicable) in<br />
<br />
[[Page 65334]]<br />
<br />
light of any new information, including potential criminal or other <br />
derogatory information.<br />
    Consistent with Executive Orders \99\ and the Department's mission, <br />
DHS does not believe that it is reasonable to maintain a separate <br />
automatic extension regime for particular categories of applicants, <br />
while at the same time addressing this core security and benefit <br />
integrity issue. Even a risk-based approach for humanitarian programs, <br />
as a commenter suggested, would fail to address the core concern that <br />
some aliens could continue employment authorization, and potentially <br />
use associated documents to obtain other benefits, without updated <br />
vetting and adjudication. The Department has instead chosen a uniform <br />
approach that applies the same principle across affected categories.<br />
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<br />
    \99\ See Executive Order 14159 ``Protecting the American People <br />
Against Invasion,'' 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 29, 2025); Executive Order <br />
14161, ``Protecting the United States from Terrorist and Other <br />
National Security and Public Safety Threats,'' 90 FR 8451 (Jan. 31, <br />
2025); Presidential Proclamation 10949, ``Restricting the Entry of <br />
Foreign Nationals To Protect the United States From Foreign <br />
Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,'' <br />
90 FR 24497 (June 10, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS acknowledges that some asylum applicants and other humanitarian <br />
applicants may experience temporary lapses in employment authorization <br />
if renewal adjudications are not completed before their current EADs <br />
expire. Asylum applicants, in particular, may have limited access to <br />
public benefits under existing statutes, and gaps in income may be <br />
difficult to absorb. DHS considered these factors but concluded that <br />
they did not outweigh the need to ensure that each renewal of <br />
employment authorization and/or an EAD is granted only after USCIS has <br />
completed appropriate vetting and determined that the applicant <br />
continues to be eligible and continues to merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, if applicable.<br />
    DHS notes that, separate from this rule, asylum and refugee status <br />
confers or may lead to eligibility for certain public benefits under <br />
existing law, and certain other vulnerable groups may be eligible for <br />
specialized support programs.\100\ Those frameworks are not altered by <br />
this rule.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \100\ See, e.g., U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, <br />
Domestic Violence Fact Sheet (discussing access to HHS funded <br />
services for immigrant survivors of domestic violence), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/special-topics/national-origin/domestic-violence/index.html&quot;&gt;https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/special-topics/national-origin/domestic-violence/index.html&lt;/a&gt; (last revised Aug. 22, 2012).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    In addition, DHS has taken steps to reduce incentives for frivolous <br />
or non-meritorious filings that might delay adjudications for bona fide <br />
humanitarian applicants, thereby seeking to improve processing for <br />
those with meritorious claims. For example, in the past four years, <br />
USCIS has seen alarming new filing trends, including a 360% overall <br />
increase in VAWA self-petition filings.\101\ When unqualified aliens <br />
misuse the VAWA program, it causes significant processing delays, <br />
harming survivors with legitimate claims.\102\ On December 22, 2025, <br />
USCIS took steps to address these issues by updating guidance in the <br />
USCIS Policy Manual to streamline and clarify the expectations of <br />
submitted evidence and reduce the need for Requests for Evidence and <br />
Notices of Intent to Deny, among other clarifying changes.\103\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \101\ See USCIS, USCIS Restores Integrity to the VAWA Domestic <br />
Abuse Program After Finding Rampant Fraud, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/uscis-restores-integrity-to-the-vawa-domestic-abuse-program-after-finding-rampant-fraud&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/alerts/uscis-restores-integrity-to-the-vawa-domestic-abuse-program-after-finding-rampant-fraud&lt;/a&gt; (last updated Dec. 22, 2025).<br />
    \102\ Id.<br />
    \103\ See USCIS, USCIS Policy Alert: Violence Against Women Act, <br />
PA-2025-33 (last updated Dec. 22, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    With respect to unaccompanied children and youth, this rule does <br />
not change any statutory protections or procedural safeguards <br />
applicable to that population.\104\ To the extent that employment-<br />
eligible unaccompanied children and youth seek EADs to participate in <br />
job training opportunities for valid employment purposes, they remain <br />
eligible to apply and, if approved, to work consistent with existing <br />
regulations. The IFR and this final rule do not impact or prevent the <br />
use of valid EADs as identity documents; they simply end the practice <br />
of automatically extending the validity of employment authorization <br />
documents for aliens who have timely filed an application to renew <br />
their EAD in certain employment authorization categories filed on or <br />
after October 30, 2025.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \104\ See, e.g., William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims <br />
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law 110-457 (Dec. 23, <br />
2008).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS recognizes the heightened vulnerability of humanitarian <br />
populations and will continue to administer those programs consistent <br />
with statutory protections and humanitarian objectives. However, DHS <br />
concludes that the core principle underlying this rule, namely that <br />
renewed employment authorization should not be automatically extended <br />
without fully completing the adjudicative review and the related <br />
vetting, including resolution of any derogatory information identified <br />
during the vetting process--must be applied consistently across <br />
affected categories to fulfill DHS's national security, public safety, <br />
and benefit integrity responsibilities. As explained in detail in the <br />
IFR, granting benefits without fully completing the adjudicative <br />
review, which includes proper vetting, is contrary to the statutory <br />
mission of DHS and poses a threat to the safety and security of the <br />
American people.\105\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \105\ See, e.g., Conference Report to accompany H.R. 4567 <br />
[Report 108-774], ``Making Appropriations for the Department of <br />
Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' <br />
p. 74 (Oct. 9, 2004), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (recommending, among other things, the <br />
creation of an organization to conduct ``law enforcement/background <br />
checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to <br />
granting immigration benefits.'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
b. Impact on Employment-Based Nonimmigrants, Their Dependents, and <br />
Employment-Based Green Card Applicants<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters expressed concern about the removal of <br />
automatic extensions of EADs for H-4 dependent spouses. Some commenters <br />
said that eliminating automatic EAD renewal disproportionately harms <br />
women, who make up most H-4 EAD holders. Multiple commenters raised <br />
concerns that H-4 nonimmigrants are dependent on their spouses' H-1B <br />
status, creating vulnerabilities.<br />
    A number of commenters remarked that current processing times for <br />
H-4 EAD applications frequently exceed the recommended filing time of <br />
180 days prior to the current EAD's expiration and argued the removal <br />
of automatic extensions would result in many aliens losing employment <br />
authorization and facing unavoidable work gaps. Commenters said that <br />
delays in H-1B processing, from either the Department of Labor or DHS, <br />
could adversely affect an H-4 nonimmigrant's status and application for <br />
an EAD, complicating timely filing.<br />
    Other commenters suggested that removing the automatic extension <br />
would significantly reduce the employability of H-4 nonimmigrants and <br />
will cause adverse effects including family income and savings <br />
disruption, termination of health insurance for spouses and children, <br />
possible eviction or inability to meet mortgage obligations, <br />
psychological stress and medical hardship, administrative burden on <br />
employers managing I-9 reverifications, and work interruptions.<br />
    Other commenters said that H-4 EAD holders contribute significantly <br />
to the economy through their specialized work and through taxes; have <br />
been thoroughly vetted by USCIS; and are actively contributing to their<br />
<br />
[[Page 65335]]<br />
<br />
communities. The commenters indicated that the lack of a reasonable <br />
extension period for a fully vetted and documented population of legal <br />
residents is counterproductive to the goals of a stable immigration <br />
system. Therefore, one commenter urged DHS to reconsider this IFR, or <br />
revert to the previous duration of the automatic extension or extend it <br />
to at least 240 days, to align with the current USCIS processing <br />
timelines or exempt certain categories like C26 and other legal <br />
resident categories who are already vetted multiple times.<br />
    Other commenters highlighted the effects of the IFR on business as <br />
they are relying on a stable and authorized workforce to meet client <br />
commitments, drive innovation, and support U.S. economic growth. This <br />
commenter concluded that the IFR would primarily affect H-4 and L-2 <br />
dependents whose EAD renewals already face significant processing <br />
delays, which in turn disrupts projects, increases administrative <br />
burdens and cause significant financial and emotional distress to the <br />
employees and their families. Many also believed that they could lose <br />
their authorization to work, impacting them and the U.S. citizens they <br />
employ. Many urged USCIS to retain the automatic extensions to reduce <br />
backlogs and improve adjudication, reduce disruptions to businesses, <br />
including small-businesses, and increase America's global <br />
competitiveness.<br />
    Response: This rule does not change the underlying eligibility of <br />
H-4, L-2, or other employment-based dependents to apply for employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD. This final rule also does not alter the <br />
eligibility of employment-based adjustment applicants to seek EADs <br />
while their Form I-485 applications are pending. For nonimmigrants <br />
whose employment authorization is incident to status and not <br />
necessarily evidenced by an EAD (for example, certain L-2 spouses with <br />
appropriate notation on their Form I-94), that authorization continues <br />
for so long as the underlying nonimmigrant status remains valid, <br />
irrespective of any separate EAD. For those whose employment <br />
authorization is granted under 8 CFR 274a.12(c), renewal of that <br />
authorization remains discretionary and time limited.<br />
    As is the case for all nonimmigrant classifications who were <br />
eligible to receive an automatic extension of the validity of <br />
employment authorization documents prior to the IFR, this rule <br />
eliminates only the practice of providing an automatic extension of the <br />
EAD validity and, where applicable, attendant employment authorization <br />
based solely on a timely filed renewal EAD application on or after <br />
October 30, 2025. DHS acknowledges that, given current and historical <br />
processing times for some dependent and employment-based EAD <br />
categories, as well as the steps needed to fully adjudicate and vet an <br />
application, there may be a risk that USCIS may not complete <br />
adjudication of every renewal application before the prior card <br />
expires. In such cases, affected dependents and adjustment applicants <br />
may experience temporary lapses in employment authorization and <br />
associated impacts on income, benefits, and career continuity. <br />
Employers may also face disruptions if they are unable to retain those <br />
employees pending renewal.<br />
    DHS has carefully weighed these impacts against its responsibility <br />
to ensure that renewed employment authorization is granted only after <br />
USCIS has completed appropriate vetting and determined that the <br />
applicant continues to be eligible and merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, if applicable. Automatic extensions for H-4, L-2, and <br />
employment-based adjustment applicants present the same underlying <br />
security and program integrity concerns as automatic extensions for <br />
other categories: they allow continued employment authorization and use <br />
of facially expired secure documentation for up to 540 days based <br />
solely on a pending application, before USCIS has determined continued <br />
eligibility in light of any new information, including potential <br />
ineligibility for employment authorization or potential criminal or <br />
other derogatory information.<br />
    For these reasons, DHS declines to preserve automatic extensions of <br />
any length for any subset of renewal EAD applicants, including <br />
employment-based- dependents or adjustment applicants.\106\ Providing <br />
carve outs would perpetuate the core concern that some aliens could <br />
continue employment authorization, and potentially use associated <br />
documents to obtain other benefits, without updated vetting and <br />
adjudication. The Department has instead chosen a uniform approach that <br />
applies the same principle across affected categories.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \106\ See 90 FR 48799, 48810 (discussing DHS consideration of <br />
alternatives, such as shorter automatic extensions of EADs and <br />
outlining the security and eligibility concerns underlying rejection <br />
of alternatives).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS notes that many employment-based EADs are linked to other <br />
benefit requests (for example, principal nonimmigrant extensions or <br />
adjustment applications) and that USCIS is engaged in efforts to <br />
streamline and coordinate processing where operationally feasible. <br />
USCIS will continue to explore process improvements to further reduce <br />
the potential for future backlogs, including the potential for expanded <br />
use of premium processing or other tools where authorized by statute, <br />
while ensuring that security and integrity are not compromised.<br />
    DHS recognizes the important economic and personal contributions of <br />
employment-based nonimmigrants, their families, and adjustment <br />
applicants, and the disruption that lapses in employment authorization <br />
may cause for these aliens, their employers, or to the businesses that <br />
these aliens may have opened and operated based on their EAD. <br />
Nevertheless, DHS concludes that the need to ensure that renewed <br />
employment authorization is extended only after full adjudicative <br />
review for continued eligibility (including whether the applicant <br />
merits a favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable) and vetting, <br />
consistent with current national security and public safety priorities, <br />
justifies ending automatic extensions for these categories as well and <br />
outweighs the potential impacts of temporary lapses in employment <br />
authorization.<br />
6. Clarification Request<br />
    Comment: A commenter requested that USCIS confirm that the filing <br />
date governs eligibility for automatic extensions. Specifically, the <br />
commenter sought to confirm that all timely filers before October 30, <br />
2025, would receive automatic extensions, regardless of when their <br />
current EAD expired.<br />
    Response: The IFR,\107\ and this final rule, do not impact the <br />
validity of EADs that were automatically extended prior to October 30, <br />
2025, or which are otherwise automatically extended by law or Federal <br />
Register notice. To have received an automatic extension under the <br />
regulation in effect prior to October 30, 2025, an eligible renewal <br />
application must have met the following conditions:<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \107\ See 90 FR 48799, 48799 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
     The alien must have timely filed an application to renew <br />
the employment authorization and/or EAD before the EAD expires. See 8 <br />
CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(i); \108\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \108\ TPS beneficiaries must have filed during the re-<br />
registration period in the Applicable Federal Register notice; see <br />
81 FR 82398, 82455 (Nov. 18, 2016).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
     The alien's application to renew the employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD must have been properly filed before<br />
<br />
[[Page 65336]]<br />
<br />
October 30, 2025,\109\ irrespective of when the EAD expired;<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \109\ To have been properly filed before October 30, 2025, the <br />
alien must have submitted their application so that USCIS actually <br />
received the properly signed application, with required fees, on or <br />
before October 29, 2025. See 8 CFR 103.2(a)(7)(i). Accordingly, an <br />
alien whose application was submitted but not yet received before <br />
October 30, 2025, is ineligible for the automatic extension.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
     The renewal EAD application is based on the same <br />
employment authorization category shown on the front of the expiring <br />
EAD or, for an alien approved for TPS, whose EAD was issued pursuant to <br />
either 8 CFR 274a.12(a)(12) or (c)(19); and<br />
     The alien's eligibility to apply for employment <br />
authorization continued notwithstanding the expiration of the EAD and <br />
was based on an employment authorization category that does not require <br />
the adjudication of an underlying application or petition before the <br />
adjudication of the renewal application, as may have been announced on <br />
the USCIS website.\110\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \110\ The website entitled ``Automatic Employment Authorization <br />
Document (EAD) Extension'' has since been archived in light of the <br />
IFR but the web page is still available for viewing at &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/archive/automatic-employment-authorization-document-ead-extension&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/archive/automatic-employment-authorization-document-ead-extension&lt;/a&gt; (last updated Oct. 29, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    For aliens who meet these requirements, an EAD that appears on its <br />
face to be expired (``facially expired'') is considered unexpired for <br />
up to 540 days from the expiration date on the front of the EAD when <br />
combined with a Notice of Action (Form I-797C) that USCIS mails to an <br />
applicant, indicating a timely filing (i.e., the receipt notice for the <br />
Form I-765 issued by USCIS has a receipt date that is prior to the <br />
expiration date on the EAD and before October 30, 2025) of the renewal <br />
application based on the same employment eligibility category as stated <br />
on the facially expired EAD (or in case of an EAD and I-797C notice <br />
that contains either A12 or C19 category code--the category code need <br />
not match for these categories. In those cases, the alien's facially <br />
expired EAD is considered unexpired for up to 540 days from the date of <br />
the EAD, even if the EAD expires on or after October 30, 2025.<br />
7. Recommendations for the Automatic Extension and EAD Validity Period<br />
    Several commenters encouraged DHS to explore alternative solutions <br />
that better balance national security, economic stability, and human <br />
dignity.<br />
i. Maintain the Automatic Extension, Including Various Lengths of the <br />
Extension Period<br />
    Comment: Many commenters urged DHS to withdraw the IFR and instead <br />
maintain the automatic extension policy. Some commenters stated that <br />
keeping the automatic extension policy is necessary to protect workers <br />
and their families from losing continuity of employment caused by <br />
processing delays and protecting the economic and strategic interests <br />
of the United States. Multiple commenters reasoned that the automatic <br />
extension should be retained until reliable EAD renewal processing <br />
benchmarks (for example, less than 90 days) are consistently met.<br />
    Numerous commenters said DHS should at a minimum restore the up-to-<br />
180-day automatic extension period. Other commenters recommended <br />
various extension periods, including up to 120 days, up to 180 days, or <br />
up to 240 days, rather than removing extension periods entirely to <br />
better align with the current USCIS processing timelines and ensure <br />
minimal workforce disruption.<br />
    Response: DHS declines to adopt the commenters' suggestions. <br />
Keeping a reduced automatic extension period would conflict with DHS's <br />
overriding concern that granting employment authorization benefits to <br />
aliens without those aliens being properly vetted and determined to <br />
continue to be eligible (and merit a favorable exercise of discretion, <br />
if applicable) based on a complete adjudicative review is contrary to <br />
the DHS mission to enhance benefit integrity and protect public safety <br />
and national security.\111\ As explained in the IFR,\112\ if DHS <br />
pursued these options, aliens with derogatory information flagged <br />
during the background check process would nevertheless still obtain an <br />
automatic extension of some lengths (such as 180 or 240 days). These <br />
extensions pose a security vulnerability and undermine benefit <br />
integrity. As with the up to 540-day automatic extension, any automatic <br />
extension duration would not eliminate the risk that an alien who <br />
wished to fund nefarious activities could continue to work lawfully and <br />
generate money. These same aliens could use their automatically <br />
extended employment authorization and/or EADs to obtain valid identity <br />
documents, which would make it easier to commit conduct detrimental to <br />
the United States.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \111\ See, e.g., Conference Report to accompany H.R. 4567 <br />
[Report 108-774], ``Making Appropriations for the Department of <br />
Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' <br />
p. 74 (Oct. 9, 2004), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (recommending, among other things, the <br />
creation of an organization to conduct ``law enforcement/background <br />
checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to <br />
granting immigration benefits.'').<br />
    \112\ See 90 FR 48810.<br />
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<br />
ii. Consecutive EAD Validity Periods<br />
    Comment: Numerous commenters recommended implementing consecutive <br />
EAD validity periods so that applicants could file early without losing <br />
work authorization, time, and money. Commenters reasoned that under the <br />
current system, when aliens file well in advance of expiration, USCIS <br />
routinely issues overlapping validity periods rather than starting the <br />
new approval period at the end of the existing authorization period <br />
resulting in early filers losing usable work authorization time. Some <br />
commenters concluded that consecutive EAD validity periods would allow <br />
aliens to apply far in advance, provide USCIS with a longer <br />
adjudication window, and preserve the full period of authorized <br />
employment.<br />
    Similarly, another commenter reasoned that EADs should be issued <br />
for longer validity periods to reduce the frequency of renewals, <br />
stating that a 1-year EAD is, in practice, effective for only 6 months <br />
as renewal adjudication typically requires approximately 6 months. The <br />
commenter wrote that the IFR ignores the operational realities, that, <br />
although USCIS may accept EAD renewals filed more than 180 days before <br />
expiration, the agency issues overlapping--not consecutive--validity <br />
periods, effectively cutting into the card's usable time and forcing <br />
applicants into an ever earlier renewal cycle.<br />
    Response: DHS considered the alternatives suggested by the <br />
commenters but will not adopt them. DHS's top priority is the robust <br />
vetting of all aliens in our country to better protect the safety of <br />
American workers and the public at large. The IFR, and this final rule, <br />
will enhance public safety by ensuring proper vetting before issuing <br />
renewal EADs, which are important benefits, and improve program <br />
integrity. DHS is enhancing its vetting and screening efforts, <br />
increasing its ability to detect aliens with potentially harmful <br />
intent, deter fraud, and place removable aliens into proceedings. USCIS <br />
uses all provisions under the law, to the extent permissible under the <br />
law, to deny benefits to those who are a risk to public safety and <br />
national security. This includes more frequent vetting of aliens, <br />
including more frequent determinations that an alien granted an EAD <br />
continues to remain eligible for employment<br />
<br />
[[Page 65337]]<br />
<br />
authorization and, as applicable, continues to merit a favorable <br />
exercise of discretion. DHS believes that it would be inconsistent with <br />
these policy goals for USCIS to issue, concurrently or in close <br />
proximity, multiple EADs to the same alien with consecutive validity <br />
periods or to issue EADs with longer validity periods, as the <br />
commenters suggest. Consecutive EADs based on the filing of multiple <br />
renewal applications, concurrently or in close proximity, would be <br />
tantamount to one EAD with a longer validity period. The result of <br />
these alternatives would be less frequent vetting and eligibility <br />
determinations, which would be directly contrary to DHS's stated policy <br />
goal of the IFR and this final rule.<br />
iii. Allowing Application Filing Earlier Than 180 days<br />
    Comment: Some commenters recommended extending the filing window <br />
for EAD renewals beyond the current 180 days prior to expiration to <br />
mitigate processing risks. A few commenters said USCIS should allow EAD <br />
renewals to be filed 12 months prior to expiration.<br />
    Response: Although USCIS generally recommends that applicants not <br />
file requests to renew EADs more than 180 days before the expiration of <br />
their EADs, there is no prohibition on filing the form before a certain <br />
date ahead of expiration. However, USCIS does not postdate the renewal <br />
EAD in relation to an applicant's current EAD's validity period. <br />
Therefore, applicants who file and have their EAD applications <br />
adjudicated further ahead of the expiration of their current EADs may <br />
have less of a risk of incurring gaps in their employment authorization <br />
but may also have a shorter combined employment authorization validity <br />
period.<br />
    USCIS is committed to continuing to explore processing <br />
efficiencies, including possible expansion of premium processing for <br />
some or all affected populations.<br />
iv. Enhanced Vetting<br />
    Comment: Some commenters said DHS should implement enhanced <br />
vetting, such as ongoing security checks for applicants, without <br />
eliminating automatic extension of EADs. Other commenters recommended <br />
DHS maintain the automatic extension of EADs for up to 540 days while <br />
renewal applications are adjudicated, but conduct vetting on a <br />
``particularized basis,'' noting that USCIS can use its discretionary <br />
authority to cancel an extension in individual cases when and if <br />
derogatory information or other concerns arise.<br />
    Response: In service of the DHS mission, and to ensure that DHS <br />
grants benefits only after having thoroughly vetted in the context of <br />
the renewal application and full adjudicative review for continued <br />
eligibility (including, as applicable, whether the applicant merits a <br />
favorable exercise of discretion), DHS declines to adopt these <br />
recommendations. DHS has determined that automatic extensions are not <br />
compatible with its current security and benefit integrity priorities, <br />
even in an environment where enhanced vetting tools are used. DHS will <br />
grant renewed employment authorization only after USCIS has reviewed a <br />
completed application, conducted the appropriate checks, resolved any <br />
derogatory information, and determined that the applicant continues to <br />
be eligible and continues to merit a favorable exercise of discretion, <br />
if applicable. Even if DHS were to cancel the extension in individual <br />
cases, as the commenter suggests, the alien would still have had the <br />
benefit of a renewed EAD, even if for a short time, without proper <br />
vetting and a full eligibility adjudication, which is contrary to the <br />
DHS mission to enhance benefit integrity and better protect public <br />
safety and national security. Any automatic extension of employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD validity based solely on the filing of a <br />
renewal application, even if subsequently cancelled or terminated, <br />
would not eliminate the risk that an alien who wished to fund nefarious <br />
activities could continue to work lawfully and generate money, even <br />
though the alien may not be eligible for the renewal EAD in the first <br />
place. Thus, DHS believes granting a benefit without completely and <br />
fully finishing the adjudicatory process (including vetting) would make <br />
it easier for aliens engaged in nefarious activity to commit conduct <br />
detrimental to the United States and will not adopt the commenter's <br />
suggestion.<br />
8. Processing Capacity and Timelines<br />
i. Timely Processing of Renewals<br />
    Comment: A few commenters stated support for the IFR but urged <br />
USCIS to ensure timely processing of renewals, so workers and employers <br />
do not experience unintended lapses in employment authorization. A <br />
commenter added that if the process cannot be completed within 180 days <br />
of application, then the IFR is ``very unfair.'' Many commenters said <br />
USCIS should be required to adjudicate and process all EAD applications <br />
more quickly. Multiple commenters recommended a specific timeframe (for <br />
example, under 90 days or under 6 months/180 days) be set for renewals <br />
to ensure timely processing. A commenter stated that efficient, timely <br />
processing is the only measure that genuinely improves both security <br />
and economic stability.<br />
    Response: DHS remains committed to timely processing applications <br />
without lowering security and vetting standards or benefit integrity. <br />
DHS understands the importance of timely processing and strives to <br />
adjudicate applications as efficiently as possible. However, a variety <br />
of factors can affect processing times, such as security vetting <br />
requirements and the total number of applications pending review. USCIS <br />
continually monitors its resource allocations and makes adjustments, as <br />
appropriate and feasible to ensure customer service. However, DHS <br />
cannot commit to a maximum processing time in all cases given the need <br />
for thorough review of each application to ensure that USCIS only <br />
grants employment authorization after full vetting and screening of the <br />
applicant, including resolution of any derogatory information, and <br />
determining that the alien continues to be eligible for employment <br />
authorization and/or an EAD and to merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, if applicable.<br />
    DHS notes that we expect overall EAD filing rates (initials and <br />
renewals) are likely to substantially decline given actions DHS has <br />
taken to align policy with statutory text. DHS anticipates that this <br />
decline will free up adjudicative resources to reduce renewal EAD <br />
processing times and the need for renewal EAD applicants in the longer <br />
term to rely on an automatic extension of their EAD to avoid lapses in <br />
employment authorization and/or EAD validity due to processing <br />
delays.\113\<br />
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<br />
    \113\ See section IV(C)(2)(i)(c), supra.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Therefore, aliens seeking renewal of their employment authorization <br />
and/or EADs may not be likely to experience lapses in employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD validity.<br />
ii. Increase Resources and Staffing<br />
    Comment: Numerous commenters urged USCIS to focus on reducing <br />
backlogs, improving processing capacity, and modernizing processing <br />
systems. Some commenters discussed how the IFR offers no alternative <br />
solutions or proposed improvements to processing times. A commenter <br />
urged DHS to work with Congress to approve appropriations to strengthen <br />
USCIS' capacity to consistently facilitate adjudications in a timely <br />
manner. Some<br />
<br />
[[Page 65338]]<br />
<br />
commenters said it was crucial for USCIS to enhance staffing and <br />
resource allocation to ensure that approvals are completed before <br />
expiration of EADs. A commenter stated that USCIS should consider <br />
redoubling resources and staffing to reduce backlogs and minimize <br />
harmful impacts.<br />
    Response: DHS agrees that reducing backlogs, improving processing <br />
capacity, and modernizing case-processing systems, as well as ensuring <br />
sufficient staffing, are important objectives, and USCIS is pursuing <br />
such efforts as permissible within its existing statutory fee authority <br />
and broader initiatives.<br />
    For example, USCIS continuously takes steps within existing <br />
budgetary and hiring authorities to further enhance processing <br />
efficiency, hire new staff,\114\ reallocate personnel, refine <br />
workflows, invest in automation,\115\ and implement the fee \116\ and <br />
program changes directed by recent legislation and executive <br />
actions.\117\<br />
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<br />
    \114\ See, e.g., USICS, ``USCIS Received 35,000 Applications for <br />
Homeland Defenders, Most for Any Job in Agency History,'' &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/uscis-received-35000-applications-for-homeland-defenders-most-for-any-job-in-agency-history&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/uscis-received-35000-applications-for-homeland-defenders-most-for-any-job-in-agency-history&lt;/a&gt; (Nov. 6, 2025).<br />
    \115\ For example, USCIS has undertaken various efforts to <br />
incorporate AI to deliver immigration services to their customers <br />
more efficiently. See DHS United States Citizenship and Immigration <br />
Services--AI Use Cases, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/ai/use-case-inventory/uscis&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/ai/use-case-inventory/uscis&lt;/a&gt; (Last updated Feb. 12, 2026).<br />
    \116\ See DHS, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee <br />
Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request <br />
Requirements, 89 FR 6194 (Jan. 31, 2024) (``These fee collections <br />
fund the cost of fairly and efficiently adjudicating immigration <br />
benefit requests, including those provided without charge to <br />
refugee, asylum, and certain other applicants or petitioners''). <br />
USCIS is primarily a fee-based agency. See sec. 286(m), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1356(m) that is generally not appropriated by Congress.<br />
    \117\ See, e.g., USCIS Immigration Fees and Related Procedures <br />
by H-R.1 Reconciliation Bill, 91 FR 22952 (Apr. 29, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    As discussed elsewhere in this preamble, DHS has taken significant <br />
steps to reduce the overall EAD filings that followed the unprecedented <br />
flood of illegal immigration into the United States during previous <br />
years.\118\ As such, DHS also expects that overall EAD filing rates <br />
(both initials and renewals) will decline over time due to other <br />
actions taken by USCIS, such as narrowing the use of parole and better <br />
aligning TPS and related programs with statutory criteria. In fact, <br />
USCIS has already seen a reduction in EAD filings since January 2025 as <br />
evidenced by Table 1 in Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble above. <br />
USCIS notes the decreased EAD filing rates support the point made in <br />
the IFR, that the potential lapse, and in particular the duration of <br />
any lapse, is speculative and could be outweighed by the harm posed by <br />
automatic extensions. DHS expects that this reduction in volume will <br />
free adjudicative resources, and USCIS will continue to monitor its <br />
workloads and adjust staffing and resource allocations as appropriate.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \118\ See 90 FR 48799, 48809 (Oct. 30, 2025). See also USCIS, <br />
``DHS Strengthens Integrity in Nation's Immigration System, Returns <br />
to Commonsense Legal Immigration Levels,'' &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-strengthens-integrity-in-nations-immigration-system-returns-to-commonsense-legal-immigration&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-strengthens-integrity-in-nations-immigration-system-returns-to-commonsense-legal-immigration&lt;/a&gt; (Nov. <br />
13, 2025); Testimony of USCIS Director Joseph B. Edlow, Oversight of <br />
the Department of Homeland Security: ICE, CBP, and USCIS: Hearing <br />
Before the House Comm. on Homeland Security, &lt;a href=&quot;https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20260210/118916/HHRG-119-HM00-Wstate-EdlowJ-20260210.pdf&quot;&gt;https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20260210/118916/HHRG-119-HM00-Wstate-EdlowJ-20260210.pdf&lt;/a&gt;, at 6, (Feb. 10, 2026), (``These critical efforts have <br />
strengthened the integrity of our legal immigration system, <br />
reinforced accountability, and ensured that USCIS resources are <br />
directed toward lawful, properly filed cases.'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    This final rule, however, is not a backlog-management measure. It <br />
addresses the fundamental concern that automatic extensions allow <br />
employment authorization and/or EAD validity to continue for up to 540 <br />
days based solely on the filing of a renewal application, before USCIS <br />
has fully completed vetting, resolved any derogatory information, and <br />
determined that the alien remains eligible and continues to merit a <br />
favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable. Even if additional <br />
resources were to further improve processing times, they would not <br />
eliminate the core security and program-integrity risk inherent in <br />
granting automatic extensions without a full adjudication of the <br />
application.<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters suggested implementing premium <br />
processing options for EAD renewals. A commenter stated that since many <br />
applications take more than 6 months, premium processing should be an <br />
option before ending the automatic extension. Some commenters noted <br />
that this alternative allows employers and/or employees to determine <br />
for themselves if the additional cost of premium processing is <br />
reasonable and necessary for their business or individual needs. Other <br />
commenters said DHS should focus on allowing concurrent premium <br />
processing for H-1B, H-4, and H-4 EAD applications to provide <br />
predictability for dependent applicants and their employers.<br />
    Response: USCIS will continue to explore expanding premium <br />
processing for Form I-765 for affected populations.\119\ USCIS will <br />
alert the public through the website if it expands premium processing <br />
services to include additional classes of applicants for employment <br />
authorization and, if so, which categories will have premium <br />
processing.\120\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \119\ The statutory authority for premium processing is found at <br />
section 286(u) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1356(u).<br />
    \120\ See DHS, USCIS, How Do I Request Premium Processing? (last <br />
updated Mar. 23, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/all-forms/how-do-i-request-premium-processing&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/all-forms/how-do-i-request-premium-processing&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    USCIS reminds the public that, in the absence of premium <br />
processing, an applicant may request that USCIS expedite the <br />
adjudication of an application, including for employment authorization, <br />
that is under USCIS jurisdiction.\121\ USCIS considers all expedite <br />
requests on a case-by-case basis and generally requires documentation <br />
to support such requests.\122\ The decision to expedite is within the <br />
sole discretion of USCIS.\123\ Expediting a case generally means that <br />
USCIS would adjudicate a benefit ahead of others, including those who <br />
may have filed earlier, so USCIS carefully weighs the urgency and merit <br />
of each expedite request.\124\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \121\ See DHS, USCIS, Expedite Requests (last updated Sep. 8, <br />
2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-guidance/expedite-requests&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-guidance/expedite-requests&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
    \122\ See id.<br />
    \123\ See id.<br />
    \124\ See id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Note that EADs for H-4 nonimmigrants who timely filed renewal EAD <br />
applications before October 30, 2025, were automatically extended if <br />
they had an unexpired Form I-94, Arrival Departure Record, showing <br />
valid H-4 nonimmigrant status. See 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii); 90 FR at <br />
48804. Even under the rules prior to the IFR, however, an H-4 <br />
nonimmigrant spouse eligible for employment authorization under 8 CFR <br />
274a.12(c)(26) was not eligible for an automatic extension of <br />
employment authorization if their renewal application was dependent <br />
upon the adjudication of an application to extend their H-4 <br />
nonimmigrant status. See 8 CFR 274a.13(d)(1)(iii) (Jan. 1, 2025). USCIS <br />
is engaged in efforts to streamline and coordinate processing where <br />
operationally feasible. USCIS will continue to explore process <br />
improvements to further reduce the potential for future backlogs, <br />
including the potential for expanded use of premium processing or other <br />
tools where authorized by statute, while ensuring that security and <br />
integrity are not compromised.<br />
iii. Prioritize Initial EAD Reviews<br />
    Comment: A commenter reasoned that DHS resources should prioritize <br />
initial EAD screenings, where new entrants are evaluated, rather than <br />
duplicating<br />
<br />
[[Page 65339]]<br />
<br />
review efforts for previously cleared renewal applicants.<br />
    Response: Although renewal EAD applicants will already have been <br />
vetted during the adjudication of their initial EAD applications, DHS <br />
disagrees that review at subsequent stages, including upon the filing <br />
of a renewal EAD application, is duplicative. Aliens may engage in <br />
criminal activity after entry, for example, and new derogatory <br />
information, including that which is newly obtained despite having <br />
occurred previously, may appear at any stage. DHS will continue to <br />
prioritize vetting with the filing of every benefit request, and DHS <br />
will proceed with finalizing this rule to end the practice of <br />
automatically extending employment authorization and/or EADs to ensure <br />
that applicants do not receive benefits without full and complete <br />
vetting in conjunction with the application and a determination that <br />
they continue to be eligible.<br />
9. Coordination, Guidance, and Outreach<br />
i. Additional Guidance and Communication<br />
    Comment: A commenter said USCIS should provide clear communication <br />
and documentation outlining the impacts of the IFR and information on <br />
how professionals in similar situations can navigate the change <br />
effectively. Similarly, other commenters recommended:<br />
     Clear employer guidance (such as updated I-9 instructions <br />
and outreach);<br />
     SAVE-based verification so that employers are less <br />
dependent on self-reported information;<br />
     An electronic notification system for renewal filing <br />
receipt and adjudication status that employers can rely upon for <br />
reverification purposes; and<br />
     Health-sector-specific guidance recognizing the unique <br />
staffing obligations of hospitals, laboratories, and emergency care <br />
providers.<br />
    Response: On October 30, 2025, USCIS published an update to section <br />
5 of the Handbook for Employers M-274, which contains guidance for <br />
employers regarding Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification. The <br />
update highlighted October 30, 2025, as the relevant date to determine <br />
whether an alien qualifies for the automatic extension announced in the <br />
2024 Final Rule.\125\ USCIS further updated the Handbook at Section 5.1 <br />
to spell out the categories and sources of evidence for those aliens <br />
who qualified for the automatic extension.\126\ USCIS updates the M-274 <br />
periodically, and in addition offers guidance for employers on the <br />
agency website, hosts several monthly webinars for employers and <br />
employees on the I-9, and maintains a Form I-9 Contact Center with a <br />
phone number and email address.\127\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \125\ See USCIS, Handbook for Employers M-274, 5.0 Automatic <br />
Extensions of Employment Authorization and/or Employment <br />
Authorization Documents (EADs) in Certain Circumstances (last <br />
updated Oct. 30, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt;-central/form-i-9-<br />
resources/handbook-for-employers-m-274/50-automatic-extensions-of-<br />
employment-authorization-andor-employment-authorization-documents-<br />
eads-in.<br />
    \126\ See DHS, USCIS, Handbook for Employers M-274, 5.1 <br />
Automatic Extensions Based on a Timely Filed Application to Renew <br />
Employment Authorization and/or Employment Authorization Document <br />
Before Oct. 30, 2025 (last updated Oct. 30, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt;-central/form-i-9-resources/handbook-for-employers-<br />
m-274/50-automatic-extensions-of-employment-authorization-andor-<br />
employment-authorization-documents-eads-in/51-automatic-extensions-<br />
based-on-a-timely-filed-application-to-renew-employment-<br />
authorization.<br />
    \127\ See USCIS, I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, <br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt; (last updated April 2, 2025) (explaining <br />
the relation of the M-274 to the I-9); see also USCIS, I-9 Central, <br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt;-central (last visited May 6, 2026) (a <br />
central website with a number of updated links on I-9 topics); <br />
USCIS, Employment Eligibility Webinars, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt;-<br />
central/form-i-9-resources/employment-eligibility-webinars (last <br />
visited May 6, 2026); USCIS, Form I-9 Contact Us, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt;-central/form-i-9-contact-us (last updated April <br />
15, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    SAVE is an online service administered by USCIS that provides point <br />
in time immigration status and U.S. citizenship information to federal, <br />
state, territorial, tribal, and local agencies.\128\ SAVE is limited to <br />
its statutory purposes \129\ and, accordingly, does not provide <br />
employment eligibility verification to private employers. E-Verify, <br />
which is also administered by USCIS, does provide a service that allows <br />
employers to electronically confirm employment eligibility of newly <br />
hired workers.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \128\ USCIS, SAVE (last visited Apr. 23, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/save&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/save&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
    \129\ See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, <br />
Public Law 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, 3396 (Nov. 6, 1986) (mandating <br />
creation of an electronic system for verifying the immigration <br />
status of alien applicants for, and recipients of, certain types of <br />
federally funded benefits and requiring that the system be made <br />
available to federal, state, and local agencies administering these <br />
benefits); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity <br />
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Public Law 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (Aug. <br />
22, 1996) (restricting immigrant eligibility for public benefits, <br />
expanding the need for benefit-granting agencies to verify <br />
immigration status); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant <br />
Responsibility Act of 1996, Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 <br />
(Sept. 30, 1996) (requiring the former Immigration and <br />
Naturalization Service, and now DHS as its successor, to respond to <br />
inquiries from federal, state, and local agencies seeking to verify <br />
or determine the citizenship or immigration status of any individual <br />
within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by <br />
law); REAL ID Act of 2005, Public Law 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, <br />
2005) (requiring state motor vehicle administrations to verify the <br />
immigration status of alien applicants for a REAL ID driver's <br />
license or identification card); Patient Protection and Affordable <br />
Care Act of 2010, Public Law 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23, 2010) <br />
(provided for a variety of healthcare reforms, including health <br />
insurance benefits and subsidies for qualified aliens lawfully <br />
present in the United States, to be verified by health and human <br />
services agencies using SAVE); The Federal Aviation Administration <br />
Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (FAA Act), Public Law <br />
114-190, 130 Stat. 615 (Jul. 15, 2016) (directing DHS to authorize <br />
SAVE access for airport operators to determine the eligibility of <br />
individuals seeking unescorted access to any security identification <br />
display area of an airport).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS will not adopt the suggestion to provide an electronic <br />
notification system that employers can access to see information about <br />
the status of pending applications. Employment authorization <br />
applications may contain sensitive information. Under the Privacy Act <br />
of 1974,\130\ Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),\131\ and other <br />
applicable laws, regulations and policies,\132\ USCIS and other <br />
immigration agencies are legally obligated to safeguard a petitioner's <br />
and applicant's information and limit information sharing. Third party <br />
access to information relating to pending application information may <br />
result in accidental disclosure of information that is protected by <br />
law.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \130\ Public Law, 88 Stat. 1896, 93-579 (Dec. 31, 1974), <br />
codified at 5 U.S.C. 552a (specifically 5 U.S.C. 52a(b) (providing <br />
that no agency shall disclose any records which is contained in a <br />
system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to <br />
another agency, except pursuant to a written request by or with the <br />
prior written consent of the individuals to whom the record <br />
pertains).<br />
    \131\ Public Law 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (September 6, 1966) <br />
codified at 5 U.S.C. 552 (see specifically 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(C), <br />
exempting from FOIA release materials that could reasonably be <br />
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy) <br />
and DHS's implementing regulations at 6 CFR part 5 (Disclosure of <br />
Records and Information).<br />
    \132\ See, e.g., 8 CFR part 103, specifically 8 CFR 103.2(a)(3) <br />
and 8 CFR 103.2(b)(19)(i) and (ii) (when read together, articulating <br />
that notification is provided only to applicants, petitioners, and <br />
representatives).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    However, for aliens alleging that they qualify for an automatic <br />
extension of their employment authorization under previous rules, an <br />
employer may use the Form I-797C, Notice of Action, that an alien <br />
supplies for employment verification purposes, to check the status of <br />
the underlying benefit request by going to the USCIS Case Status Online <br />
web page \133\ and entering the receipt number on the Form I-797C.<br />
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<br />
    \133\ See DHS, USCIS, Case Status Online, &lt;a href=&quot;https://egov.uscis.gov/&quot;&gt;https://egov.uscis.gov&lt;/a&gt; <br />
(last visited May 26, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    As for health-sector-specific guidance, DHS appreciates the unique <br />
staffing obligations of hospitals, laboratories, and emergency care <br />
providers. However, the comment does not suggest the type of guidance <br />
that would be<br />
<br />
[[Page 65340]]<br />
<br />
uniquely useful to this population, and DHS believes the IFR, this <br />
final rule, and USCIS web page updates that followed the IFR and will <br />
accompany this final rule are sufficient guidance for all affected <br />
aliens and their employers.<br />
ii. Accountability<br />
    Comment: A commenter suggested requiring accountability on renewal <br />
processing times so workers and employers can plan realistically. <br />
Another commenter recommended quarterly performance reports by <br />
category.<br />
    Response: DHS understands the importance of timely processing and <br />
strives to adjudicate applications as efficiently as possible. However, <br />
as discussed above in Section IV.C.8.i. of this preamble, processing <br />
times can be affected by a variety of factors, including security <br />
vetting requirements, and the need for thorough review to enhance <br />
program integrity and better protect public safety and national <br />
security. USCIS will continue to monitor its resource allocations and <br />
adjust, as appropriate. DHS will not commit to periodic reports at this <br />
time beyond the processing times available on the USCIS website.\134\<br />
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<br />
    \134\ See DHS, USCIS, Case Processing Times, &lt;a href=&quot;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times&quot;&gt;https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times&lt;/a&gt; (last visited May 8, 2026).<br />
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<br />
10. Other Alternatives and Recommendations<br />
    Comment: A commenter discussed Continuous Immigration Vetting (CIV) <br />
as a more effective timely identification of national security and <br />
public safety risks than point-in-time screening and vetting that <br />
occurs only upon application submissions. Multiple commenters asked why <br />
DHS cannot utilize ``concurrent vetting,'' an apparent reference to <br />
CIV, as an alternative to the procedures implemented by the IFR. <br />
Commenters noted that DHS currently employs CIV in some contexts. <br />
Specifically, commenters noted that, ``DHS already has a system that <br />
protects security while letting people keep working, and it has not <br />
explained why it cannot keep using it.''<br />
    Response: DHS appreciates the commenters' focus on the role of CIV <br />
and other automated screening tools in enhancing national security and <br />
public safety. CIV is an event-based vetting tool that automates and <br />
streamlines the process of notifying USCIS of potential derogatory <br />
information in Government databases that may relate to individuals in <br />
USCIS systems, as new information is discovered.\135\ DHS agrees that <br />
continuous screening and vetting capabilities (including systems such <br />
as CIV and ATLAS, along with interagency information sharing) are <br />
important components of DHS's security efforts.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \135\ DHS, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Continuous <br />
Immigration Vetting, (Feb. 14, 2019), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsuscispia-076-continuous-immigration-vetting&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsuscispia-076-continuous-immigration-vetting&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    However, these tools are not a substitute for the full adjudicative <br />
process that occurs when USCIS considers a new application for an <br />
immigration benefit, including a renewal of employment authorization. <br />
Continuous vetting may identify new information or trigger further <br />
review, but it does not, by itself, resolve questions of eligibility <br />
(including whether the alien warrants a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, if applicable), assess all relevant evidence, or provide <br />
the structured context in which USCIS officers make determinations <br />
about continued eligibility and the exercise of discretion, if <br />
applicable. Eligibility determinations are complex and require an <br />
officer to examine all the facts and evidence of a case prior to a <br />
finding. Vetting, like CIV, is one part of the overall process.<br />
    A core concern addressed by the IFR and this final rule is that <br />
automatic extensions of EADs allow employment authorization to continue <br />
for up to 540 days based solely on the filing of a renewal application, <br />
without USCIS first completing adjudicative review and the related <br />
vetting, including the resolution of any derogatory information. That <br />
is, the benefit is granted without USCIS first performing the following <br />
actions: an eligibility determination, completing vetting and screening <br />
checks, resolving potential hits of derogatory information in <br />
connection with the alien, and a determination that the employment <br />
authorization should be granted in the exercise of discretion, if <br />
applicable. Even with continuous vetting in place, an alien could <br />
remain work authorized under an automatic extension and use that <br />
authorization to obtain or maintain other documents, such as driver's <br />
licenses, including REAL ID compliant driver's licenses in some <br />
jurisdictions, during a period when USCIS has not yet reevaluated <br />
eligibility in light of any new information or changed circumstances.<br />
    Accordingly, DHS has determined that automatic extensions are not <br />
compatible with its current security and benefit integrity priorities, <br />
even in an environment where CIV and other continuous vetting tools are <br />
used. Those tools complement but do not replace the requirement that <br />
renewed employment authorization be granted only after USCIS has <br />
completed the actions discussed above. Therefore, DHS declines to rely <br />
on CIV as a basis for retaining automatic extensions of EADs.<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters requested that USCIS withdraw or delay <br />
the implementation of the IFR until DHS could guarantee timely EAD <br />
processing for all categories.<br />
    Several commenters requested a grace period or transitional period <br />
to mitigate the abrupt impacts of the IFR. Some commenters reasoned <br />
that the IFR provided no grace period for applicants who relied on the <br />
prior policy at the time of filing, imposing undue hardship on <br />
individuals and families who would face employment gaps threatening <br />
their livelihoods and financial security.<br />
    Some commenters requested specific transitional measures, <br />
including:<br />
     Granting the automatic extension to all applicants whose <br />
renewal applications were postmarked before the effective date of the <br />
rule, even if received later;<br />
     Delaying the effective date of the IFR by at least 90 <br />
days;<br />
     Providing a transition period of at least 12 months for <br />
employers and employees to adjust workforce planning and compliance <br />
systems;<br />
     A phased transition to prevent work authorization gaps <br />
during EAD adjudication; and<br />
     Coordinating with the Department of Health and Human <br />
Services, the Health Resources and Services Administration, the <br />
Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Centers for Medicare &amp;amp; Medicaid <br />
Services to assess workforce impacts prior to full implementation.<br />
    A few commenters urged DHS to delay implementation and open a full <br />
notice and comment period.<br />
    Response: DHS understands that the IFR and this final rule, and any <br />
resulting gaps in continued employment authorization, may have adverse <br />
impacts on employers and applicants to the extent that individuals <br />
experience disruptions in employment. However, as stated earlier in the <br />
preamble DHS expects that overall EAD filing rates will substantially <br />
decline and free up adjudicative resources to reduce renewal EAD <br />
processing times. Decreasing processing times would result in a reduced <br />
need for aliens filing renewal EAD applications to rely on an automatic <br />
extension of their EAD to avoid potential lapses. DHS notes that USCIS <br />
has, as expected, seen a steady decrease in overall EAD filings since<br />
<br />
[[Page 65341]]<br />
<br />
January 2025. See Table 1 in Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble.<br />
    In addition, as discussed in Section IV.C.2.iv. of the preamble, <br />
proper planning by an alien may allow the alien to timely file a <br />
renewal EAD application thus mitigating the risk of experiencing <br />
prolonged lapses in their employment authorization and/or EAD validity. <br />
Ultimately, granting benefits without proper vetting and full <br />
adjudication is contrary to the DHS mission to enhance benefit <br />
integrity and better protect public safety and national security.\136\ <br />
DHS believes that these policy goals outweigh concerns about potential <br />
backlogs and operational challenges that may result in a temporary <br />
lapse of employment authorization and/or EAD validity. Therefore, DHS <br />
declines to adopt the commenters' suggested transitional measures or <br />
otherwise delay implementation of this rule.<br />
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<br />
    \136\ See, e.g., Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4567 <br />
[Report 108-774], ``Making Appropriations for the Department of <br />
Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' <br />
p. 74 (Oct. 9, 2004), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (recommending, among other things, the <br />
creation of an organization to conduct ``law enforcement/background <br />
checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to <br />
granting immigration benefits.'') (last visited May 26, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: A commenter reasoned that an alternative to ending the <br />
policy of automatic extensions would be a more concerted effort to <br />
explain the 540-day automatic extension to employers who may be <br />
confused. The commenter suggested ``(1) conducting outreach and public <br />
engagements with employers, unions, and associations of human resources <br />
staff to explain the extensions; (2) posting about the extensions on <br />
its websites or social media platforms; and (3) creating fact sheets, <br />
FAQs, and other materials that explain the extensions in accessible <br />
language.''<br />
    Response: DHS conducted most, if not all, of the outreach the <br />
commenter suggested following publication of the 2024 TFR and 2024 <br />
final rule.\137\ However, additional outreach would not resolve <br />
concerns with the automatic extension framework. For example, employers <br />
are required to use an applicant's unsecure Form I-797, Notice of <br />
Action, with separate web pages and tools to determine whether, and for <br />
how long, an alien employee remains in an automatically extended period <br />
of employment authorization. Further, additional outreach would not <br />
address the fact that employers do not receive direct notice if their <br />
alien employees' pending EAD renewal applications have been denied, <br />
which creates a risk that employers could unwittingly engage in <br />
unauthorized employment and provide income to aliens with potentially <br />
nefarious motives.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \137\ 89 FR 24628 (Apr. 8, 2024) (temporarily increased the <br />
automatic extension period to up to 540 days); 89 FR 101208 (Dec. <br />
13, 2024) (permanently increased the automatic extension period to <br />
up to 540 days).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    After considering these concerns, DHS determined that continued <br />
reliance on the 540-day automatic extension, even with expanded <br />
outreach and educational materials, would not sufficiently address <br />
these compliance and program integrity risks. DHS will continue to <br />
provide clear, accessible information about employment authorization <br />
validity through its public-facing resources.<br />
    DHS notes that the justification for the IFR and this final rule is <br />
to enhance benefit integrity and better protect public safety and <br />
national security. While employer confusion is relevant to the <br />
integrity of the EAD program, conducting more outreach to employers to <br />
eliminate potential confusion would not address the primary concerns <br />
addressed by the IFR and this final rule. Therefore, DHS declines to <br />
adopt this suggestion.<br />
    Comment: Additional alternatives and recommendations included <br />
suggestions of specific remedies for applicants:<br />
     Implementing 90-day Service Level Agreements (SLAs) with <br />
fee refunds for delays.<br />
     Allowing automatic extensions for applicants who file <br />
their EAD applications at least nine months before their current EADs <br />
expire and committing to adjudicating those applications within nine <br />
months.<br />
     Enabling interim I-9 verification during card production.<br />
     Allowing automatic extensions for certain EAD categories <br />
for which vetting may take longer than others.<br />
    Response: DHS has considered the alternatives noted above as well <br />
as a return to previous practices. USCIS generally does not refund fees <br />
to applicants for immigration benefits. See 8 CFR 103.2(a). While DHS <br />
continues to focus on ways to improve processes, DHS will not commit to <br />
allowing automatic extensions or interim verification for certain EAD <br />
application categories because the time it takes to vet an applicant is <br />
entirely dependent on the applicant and his or her case history and <br />
vetting is just one part of the overall adjudicative review to <br />
determine continued eligibility and that the applicant continues to <br />
merit a favorable exercise of discretion, if applicable. DHS is also <br />
not enabling interim I-9 verification during EAD production because <br />
approval notices are not secure documents establishing proof of current <br />
work authorization. USCIS notices can only be used in the very limited <br />
circumstances where DHS has expressly authorized a specific combination <br />
for I-9 purposes in the M-274 Handbook for Employers.\138\<br />
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<br />
    \138\ See DHS, USCIS, Handbook for Employers M-274 (last updated <br />
July 7, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/i-9&lt;/a&gt;-central/form-i-9-resources/<br />
handbook-for-employers-m-274. For example, a USCIS approval notice <br />
that extends an H-1B worker's nonimmigrant status, together with the <br />
attached Form I-94, may serve as evidence of that worker's continued <br />
employment authorization.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS is not enacting the suggested alternatives because it is <br />
prioritizing national security and public safety and is determined to <br />
cease any provision of employment authorization documents to ineligible <br />
aliens.\139\<br />
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<br />
    \139\ See E.O. 14161, Protecting the United States from Foreign <br />
Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats <br />
(Jan. 20, 2025), 90 FR 8451, 8451 (Jan. 30, 2025); see E.O. 14159, <br />
Protecting the American People Against Invasion (Jan. 20, 2025), 90 <br />
FR 8443, 8446 (Jan. 29, 2025).<br />
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<br />
11. Administrative Procedure Act<br />
i. ``Good Cause'' for Bypassing the Notice and Comment Period<br />
    Comment: Numerous commenters stated that DHS failed to demonstrate <br />
valid ``good cause'' to bypass the standard notice and comment process. <br />
Commenters said that immediate implementation without notice and <br />
comment rulemaking represents a ``significant procedural failure.'' Two <br />
commenters requested that USCIS reconsider the decision to immediately <br />
implement the IFR and that fair advance notice should be given in the <br />
future.<br />
    Other commenters stated that the described ``security vulnerability <br />
that could allow bad actors to continue to work and generate income to <br />
potentially finance nefarious activities that pose an imminent threat <br />
to the American public'' had no causal connection to the automatic <br />
extension, was speculative, unsupported by any reliable evidence, and <br />
at any rate that a single example of potential adverse consequence is <br />
insufficient to establish the meticulous and demanding good cause <br />
standard. Commenters indicated that the analysis was devoid of specific <br />
factual allegations of harm or threat to public safety.<br />
    Commenters also indicated that the IFR failed to explain how the <br />
incident in Boulder was related to the automatic work authorization <br />
extension provision or why this one incident, even if related, would <br />
justify the impact the termination of this rule would have on hundreds <br />
of thousands of workers and their U.S. employers.<br />
<br />
[[Page 65342]]<br />
<br />
    Many commenters stated that DHS's claim that providing a notice and <br />
comment period would cause noncitizens to ``rush'' to file EAD renewal <br />
applications was unfounded. One commenter said that this ``rush'' is <br />
unlikely given that USCIS instructs applicants not to file more than <br />
180 days before their current EAD expires, and because the high renewal <br />
fees make rapid, unplanned filings less feasible.<br />
    Multiple commenters said that to properly invoke the ``good cause'' <br />
exemption, the claimed harm must be ``demonstrable and immediate--like <br />
war, health crisis, or economic collapse.'' The commenters noted that <br />
DHS recognizes that ``good cause'' has been limited to quantifiable <br />
threats, such as in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks or hurricanes, <br />
and that one anecdote is insufficient evidence of ``demonstrable and <br />
immediate'' harm at the scale of economic collapse. They also asserted <br />
that DHS failed to establish that the attack would not have occurred in <br />
the absence of automatic renewals, or that it would have been detected <br />
or prevented with additional vetting. Finally, these commenters also <br />
indicated that there was no good cause because DHS failed to overcome <br />
indisputable evidence that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes <br />
than native-born citizens.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters that DHS failed to meet <br />
the good cause standard under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) or that DHS did not <br />
provide sufficient factual evidence of a public security risks to <br />
justify bypassing notice and comment procedures. DHS maintains that, <br />
under the totality of the circumstances, bypassing notice and comment <br />
procedures under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) was justified to act swiftly and <br />
expeditiously, as notice and comment procedures would have been <br />
impracticable or contrary to public interest.<br />
    DHS also disagrees that the IFR was devoid of specific factual <br />
allegations of harm or threat to public safety, that the harm was <br />
speculative, and that the solution of the IFR was not rationally <br />
connected to the need for immediate action. The IFR clearly explained <br />
the relevance of the Boulder incident and its connection to the <br />
automatic extension,\140\ and why the measure was justified, <br />
notwithstanding the impact of the automatic extension's termination on <br />
aliens and employers. DHS notes that it has now considered all comments <br />
received on the IFR and responded to them in this preamble, thereby <br />
providing the notice and comment process sought by commenters.\141\<br />
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<br />
    \140\ See 90 FR 48799, 48808 (Oct. 30, 2025) (explaining that <br />
the need to fully vet applicants for renewal EADs became clear when <br />
an alien with an automatically extended EAD perpetrated a heinous <br />
attack that injured many people in Boulder, Colorado on June 1, <br />
2025).<br />
    \141\ Cf. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home <br />
v. Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. 657, 683-84 (2020) (holding that an <br />
agency's IFR complied with the APA's procedural requirements under 5 <br />
U.S.C. 553(b)(2)-(3)).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS believes that commenters may have misunderstood the risks <br />
associated with granting automatic extensions of an alien's expired <br />
employment authorization and/or EAD that is merely based on the timely <br />
filing of a renewal EAD application but not on fully vetting an <br />
applicant's eligibility or background. As explained in the IFR, aliens <br />
could obtain an automatic extension even if they no longer qualified <br />
for employment authorization and/or an EAD. Examples include if the <br />
alien no longer possessed the underlying status, had derogatory <br />
information that would render them ineligible for employment <br />
authorization, or would not merit a favorable exercise of discretion, <br />
if applicable. These aliens could properly file a timely renewal <br />
application to obtain the benefit of continued employment authorization <br />
and/or an EAD for up to 540 days. This would allow aliens who could be <br />
public safety or national security threats to use associated <br />
documentation to potentially obtain other credentials, such as driver's <br />
licenses, and use it to engage in nefarious activities.<br />
    Unfortunately, aliens committing harmful acts and those engaging in <br />
nefarious activities do not operate on a schedule that aligns neatly <br />
with them seeking benefits applications. They may or may not engage in <br />
harmful activity post-approval of an application granting immigration <br />
status. Attacks, such as the one in Boulder, Colorado, are tough to <br />
predict, but they may not be impossible to stop with proper and <br />
thorough vetting and intelligence sharing among government agencies <br />
each time an alien is seeking immigration benefits.\142\ Congress has <br />
long emphasized the importance of vetting each and every applicant <br />
before an immigration benefit is granted.\143\ Fully vetting each <br />
applicant during every USCIS encounter helps identify patterns, flags <br />
activities, alerts officials to potential threats, and protects U.S. <br />
residents from harm. The attack in Boulder, Colorado--committed by an <br />
alien in possession of an EAD that was automatically extended--provided <br />
clear evidence of the ongoing public emergency, exposed the security <br />
vulnerability of the automatic extension, and demonstrated that every <br />
time USCIS is granting a benefit without fully vetting an applicant, an <br />
opportunity is lost to detect bad actors and protect the public. The <br />
public's response to the Boulder event underscored the urgency to act <br />
to safeguard public safety,\144\ and DHS acted accordingly.<br />
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<br />
    \142\ It is DHS's mandate, among others, to prevent terrorist <br />
attacks and administer immigration laws, including administering the <br />
laws pertaining to employment authorization. For purposes of grating <br />
employment authorizations to aliens, the authority is delegated to <br />
USCIS. DHS acknowledges the commenters reference to statistics <br />
indicating that aliens may commit less crimes than native born <br />
citizens. This rule deals exclusively with aliens. Therefore, the <br />
information as well as the comparison is irrelevant to the matter at <br />
hand.<br />
    \143\ See Conference Report to accompany H.R. 4567 [Report 108-<br />
774], ``Making Appropriations for the Department of Homeland <br />
Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' p. 74, <br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (last visited May 26, 2026).<br />
    \144\ The public, including members from Congress, criticized <br />
immigration and law enforcement authorities, including DHS, for not <br />
detecting the alien's activities and not protecting the public. They <br />
emphasized the urgency to fix security vulnerabilities. See <br />
``Chairman Pfluger, Green Request DHS Documents on Suspect in <br />
Boulder Terror Attack'' (June 4, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://homeland.house.gov/2025/06/04/chairmen-green-pfluger-request-dhs-documents-on-suspect-in-boulder-terror-attack&quot;&gt;https://homeland.house.gov/2025/06/04/chairmen-green-pfluger-request-dhs-documents-on-suspect-in-boulder-terror-attack&lt;/a&gt; (``This tragedy is indicative of a <br />
heightened terrorism threat on U.S. soil, signaling an urgent need <br />
for increased homeland security measures, particularly with respect <br />
to foreign nationals who are unlawfully present in the United <br />
States, as Soliman reportedly overstayed a nonimmigrant visa. Our <br />
nation has now faced several major acts of antisemitic terror this <br />
year alone, including the recent assassination of two Israeli <br />
embassy staffers in our nation's capital.''); see &lt;a href=&quot;http://cpr.org/&quot;&gt;CPR.org&lt;/a&gt;, <br />
``Colorado notified feds after failed gun purchase by accused <br />
Boulder firebomber, months before the attack'' (June 6, 2025), <br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cpr.org/2025/06/10/cbi-notified-homeland-security-after-attempted-gun-purchase-by-boulder-attacker&quot;&gt;https://www.cpr.org/2025/06/10/cbi-notified-homeland-security-after-attempted-gun-purchase-by-boulder-attacker&lt;/a&gt; (questioning how DHS's <br />
failure to probe Soliman's attempted purchase or how, more broadly, <br />
they approach immigration enforcement investigations through the <br />
National Instant Criminal Background Check System, which tracks and <br />
notifies authorities when people without legal status attempt to buy <br />
guns).<br />
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<br />
    If DHS had announced the change, and followed the standard <br />
rulemaking procedures, the automatic extension process would have <br />
continued during the time spent developing this final rule. During that <br />
period, aliens with unresolved derogatory information could have <br />
obtained an automatically extended EAD. Even if USCIS had ultimately <br />
denied the actual application, the documents related to the <br />
automatically extended EAD would remain in possession of the affected <br />
alien, even if they were engaging in nefarious activity. Indeed, the <br />
automatically extended EAD may have given the attacker the very thing <br />
that enabled him to follow through with the attack in the first place. <br />
This demonstrates that the threat of attacks, as shown by the events in <br />
Boulder,<br />
<br />
[[Page 65343]]<br />
<br />
Colorado, is real, immediate, and ongoing.<br />
    If DHS had announced the rulemaking, DHS believes that aliens would <br />
have rushed to file renewal EAD applications to obtain automatic <br />
extensions before the rule's effective date. DHS does not believe that <br />
USCIS' instructions to renewal applicants to file 180 days before the <br />
expiration of their authorization would have helped in this regard as <br />
it would have been unclear how quickly a final rule would be issued by <br />
DHS.<br />
    Similarly, DHS does not agree that renewal fees necessarily make <br />
rapid, unplanned filings less feasible. Historically, increased filing <br />
fees have not depressed the number of individuals seeking immigration <br />
benefits, and fee waivers are still available for some applicants.\145\<br />
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<br />
    \145\ See, e.g., 89 FR 6194, 6355 (Jan. 31, 2024) (``DHS saw no <br />
or limited decreases in the number of benefit requests submitted <br />
after its fee adjustments in 2010, 2016, and 2020 and has no data <br />
that would indicate that the fees for family-based benefit requests, <br />
lawful permanent residence, and naturalization in this final rule <br />
would prevent applicants from filing.'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    For these reasons, allowing automatic extension to continue for the <br />
duration of the notice and comment period would have been irresponsible <br />
given the high threat level.\146\ It would also have been contrary to <br />
the public interest, impeding DHS's ability to fully execute its <br />
functions--to vet every EAD applicant with each application to prevent <br />
terrorist attacks and grant immigration benefits only to eligible <br />
aliens.<br />
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<br />
    \146\ See E.O. 14159, 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 29, 2025); see also, <br />
e.g., Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat <br />
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (March 2025), at 5, <br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.intelligence.gov/annual-threat-assessment&quot;&gt;https://www.intelligence.gov/annual-threat-assessment&lt;/a&gt; (last visited <br />
Sep. 9, 2026), (``Transnational criminals, terrorists, and other <br />
nonstate actors are threatening and impacting the lives of U.S. <br />
citizens, the security and prosperity of the Homeland, and U.S. <br />
strength at home and abroad. Some transnational criminal <br />
organizations (TCOs) are producing and trafficking large amounts of <br />
illicit drugs that are imperiling American lives and livelihoods. <br />
They are conducting other illegal activities that challenge U.S. <br />
security, such as human trafficking, cyber operations, money <br />
laundering, and inciting violence. U.S. citizens--at home and <br />
abroad--are also facing more diverse, complex, and decentralized <br />
terrorist threats. Actors, ranging from designated Foreign Terrorist <br />
Organizations--including the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham <br />
(ISIS), al-Qa`ida, other Islamist terrorist groups, and some drug <br />
cartels--to terrorists acting alone or in small cells, are likely to <br />
pursue, enable, or inspire attacks. Finally, large-scale illegal <br />
immigration has strained local and national infrastructure and <br />
resources and enabled known or suspected terrorists to cross into <br />
the United States.''). For additional information and updated <br />
information on the national security risks and threat assessments, <br />
see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat <br />
Assessment of the U.S., &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.intelligence.gov/annual-threat-assessment&quot;&gt;https://www.intelligence.gov/annual-threat-assessment&lt;/a&gt; (last visited Sep. 9, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    Finally, DHS is not aware of any case law--and the commenters did <br />
not cite to any--requiring that good cause can only be demonstrated if <br />
there has been more than one incident that causes an emergency or that <br />
the demonstrable and immediate harm must be of the scale of an <br />
``economic collapse'' or a 9/11-type of event. Similarly, the <br />
government is not required to prove that the Boulder, Colorado attack <br />
would not have occurred in the absence of automatic extension renewals. <br />
The applicable APA standard is whether ``notice and public procedure <br />
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public <br />
interest.'' \147\ This standard is met when, inter alia, there is an <br />
emergency; when delay caused by the APA's notice and comment procedures <br />
would result in serious harm to life, property or an immediate threat <br />
to the public safety; or when announcing the rule would have hurt the <br />
public interest.\148\ DHS has met the standard.<br />
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<br />
    \147\ 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).<br />
    \148\ See 90 FR 48812-14.<br />
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<br />
    Immediately ending the practice and acting expeditiously given the <br />
security posture was a reasonable measure. As is noted throughout this <br />
rulemaking, this rule does not remove the alien's ability to seek and <br />
obtain employment authorization in accordance with current laws and <br />
regulations. To address the prior flood of EAD applications, as <br />
discussed earlier, this administration has taken significant actions <br />
that are expected to result in fewer EAD applications and shorter <br />
renewal EAD processing times.\149\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \149\ See 90 FR 48799, 48809 (Oct. 30, 2025). See also USCIS, <br />
``DHS Strengthens Integrity in Nation's Immigration System, Returns <br />
to Commonsense Legal Immigration Levels,'' &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-strengthens-integrity-in-nations-immigration-system-returns-to-commonsense-legal-immigration&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-strengthens-integrity-in-nations-immigration-system-returns-to-commonsense-legal-immigration&lt;/a&gt; (last <br />
updated Nov. 13, 2025); Testimony of USCIS Director Joseph B. Edlow, <br />
Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: ICE, CBP, and <br />
USCIS: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Homeland Security, &lt;a href=&quot;https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20260210/118916/HHRG-119-HM00-Wstate-EdlowJ-20260210.pdf&quot;&gt;https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM00/20260210/118916/HHRG-119-HM00-Wstate-EdlowJ-20260210.pdf&lt;/a&gt;, at 6, (Feb. 10, 2026), (``These critical <br />
efforts have strengthened the integrity of our legal immigration <br />
system, reinforced accountability, and ensured that USCIS resources <br />
are directed toward lawful, properly filed cases.'') (last visited <br />
May 26, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    Additionally, the issuance of employment authorization and/or an <br />
EAD depends largely on the applicant timely filing a renewal EAD <br />
application with sufficient evidence to establish eligibility. Thus, <br />
early and timely filing of a renewal application may allow the alien to <br />
mitigate or reduce the risk for the alien, the alien's family, and the <br />
alien's employer. DHS does not anticipate, nor have commenters provided <br />
evidence, that the IFR will adversely impact hundreds of thousands of <br />
workers and their U.S. employers. This assessment considers efforts to <br />
reduce the number of filings through policy and operational measures, <br />
as well as expected improvements in processing resulting from the <br />
overall reduction in filings. While DHS cannot rule out the potential <br />
for temporary lapses in employment authorization, DHS believes that the <br />
program integrity, public safety, and national security benefits of <br />
eliminating automatic extensions of EADs outweigh the risks of <br />
potential temporary lapses in employment authorization.<br />
    Immediately ending the practice of providing automatic extensions <br />
resulted in continued improvement in program integrity by ensuring that <br />
employment authorization is provided in a manner consistent with the <br />
laws of the United States, allowed the agency to properly perform its <br />
adjudicative function, and immediately closed the gap in the security <br />
vulnerability that the automatic extension created.<br />
ii. ``Foreign Affairs'' Exception<br />
    Comment: Many commenters stated that DHS improperly relied on the <br />
exception for to a pre-promulgation notice-and-comment for rules <br />
involving the ``foreign affairs function of the United States.'' <br />
Commenters stated that this exception has a ``high bar'' and courts <br />
have warned against ``[t]he dangers of an expansive reading of the <br />
foreign affairs exception'' in the immigration context, where <br />
inevitable ``incidental foreign affairs effects'' would effectively <br />
``eliminate[ ] public participation in this entire area of <br />
administrative law.'' Other commenters said that DHS does not explain <br />
how, or cite anything to substantiate its allegation that, the comment <br />
period would disrupt foreign affairs, other than reiterate the national <br />
security crisis as demonstrated by the recent events in Boulder, <br />
Colorado. The commenters stated that these speculative and vague claims <br />
cannot support a ``foreign affairs'' exception.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees that it did not explain how, or cite <br />
anything to substantiate, its explanation that the rulemaking involves <br />
a ``foreign affairs function of the United States.'' \150\ DHS further <br />
explained that the comment period would disrupt a foreign affairs <br />
function because the practice of granting automatic extensions involves <br />
the status of people and the transfer of goods across the border, and <br />
ending the practice of granting automatic extensions directly <br />
implicates foreign<br />
<br />
[[Page 65344]]<br />
<br />
affairs because of the significance a decline in remittances can have <br />
on many countries. Eliminating the practice of providing automatic <br />
extensions based on the filing of a renewal EAD application is also <br />
part of the implementation of the President's foreign policy <br />
directives, thus further implicating a foreign affairs function.\151\ <br />
Engaging in notice and comment procedure also would have resulted in <br />
undesirable international consequences, as outlined in the IFR.\152\<br />
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<br />
    \150\ 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1).<br />
    \151\ See 90 FR 48814 and footnote 139. DHS is addressing the <br />
comments related to the application of Secretary Rubio's foreign <br />
affair determination in response to the next comment.<br />
    \152\ See 90 FR 48814-15.<br />
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<br />
    Specifically, DHS explained in detail why ending the practice of <br />
providing employment authorization based on the filing of an EAD <br />
renewal application will also impact foreign remittances sent abroad, <br />
to the extent that such remittances include money earned through <br />
employment based on automatically extended employment authorization <br />
cards and EADs. Reductions in remittances, including those stemming <br />
from changes in U.S. immigration policies have been viewed unfavorably <br />
by other countries.\153\ DHS also established how remittances may pose <br />
international money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Thus, <br />
ending the practice of providing unvetted employment authorization and/<br />
or documents, and fully vetting these aliens, particularly those coming <br />
from regions or nations with identified security risks, as well as <br />
economic impacts on other countries on account of the U.S. immigration <br />
policies, involves more cautious and sensitive considerations of those <br />
matters as they could easily impact foreign nations.\154\<br />
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<br />
    \153\ Id.<br />
    \154\ 90 FR 48815.<br />
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<br />
    Further, as also indicated in the IFR, having to engage in notice <br />
and comment rulemaking on such matters may lead to the disclosure of <br />
sensitive intelligence related to the reasons why the administration is <br />
taking this step in the first place.<br />
    Overall, these consequences were neither speculative nor vague.<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that DHS's justifications for <br />
invoking the foreign affairs function exception were both unsupported <br />
and overbroad, relying on a recent notice from the Secretary of State <br />
claiming that virtually all border-related activities constitute <br />
``foreign affairs.'' One commenter added that this notice has no legal <br />
effect, as agencies cannot define the scope of the APA or its <br />
exceptions. Another commenter stated that the IFR regulates domestic <br />
employment authorization, not foreign affairs. The commenter said that <br />
courts apply the foreign affairs function exception only when an agency <br />
action clearly implicates foreign relations or when notice and comment <br />
would provoke ``undesirable international consequences,'' neither of <br />
which are justified in the IFR.<br />
    Response: Nothing in the law prevents the Secretary from adopting <br />
the foreign affairs determination made by Secretary Rubio for <br />
rulemaking purposes.<br />
    As outlined in the IFR, the Secretary has broad general authority <br />
under section 103(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1103(a) to administer and <br />
enforce ``this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration <br />
and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such <br />
laws relate to the powers, functions, and duties conferred upon the <br />
President, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the officers <br />
of the Department of State, or diplomatic or consular officers . . . <br />
.'' See INA sec. 103(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1).<br />
    The Department of State is the agency that is leading interagency <br />
coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy and foreign <br />
affairs matters. Correspondingly, DOS and DHS are called upon to <br />
coordinate often, including in numerous Presidential actions reflecting <br />
the President's top foreign policy priorities, such as E.O. 14161 upon <br />
which this action is based. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the <br />
Secretary of State both derive their authority from the law and the <br />
powers granted to the executive. Thus, it is appropriate for the <br />
Secretary of Homeland Security, in fulfilling the Secretary's <br />
responsibilities under the APA and this rulemaking, to refer to <br />
Secretary Rubio's determination. This approach ensures also that the <br />
government presents a unified position on issues related to entry, <br />
status, immigration and the removal of aliens, in alignment with the <br />
President's foreign policy determination and objectives.\155\ <br />
Correspondingly, DHS continues to find that EADs and employment <br />
authorizations, including automatic extensions under former 8 CFR <br />
274a.13(d), are directly connected to the alien's status or authorized <br />
period of stay, because eligibility for employment authorization and/or <br />
documentation is dependent on the alien's status or circumstances. <br />
Because the grant of employment authorization and/or EADs is integral <br />
to the control of aliens, and affects the transfer and movements of <br />
goods, including money across the U.S. border, these actions fall <br />
within the Secretary's foreign affairs determination and within the <br />
President's foreign policy directives, thereby clearly involving and <br />
implicating the foreign affairs functions.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \155\ See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 <br />
(2012) (recognizing that decision on removability requires a <br />
determination whether it is appropriate to allow a foreign national <br />
to continue living in the United States. Decisions of this nature <br />
touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
iii. Reasoned Decision-Making Requirement<br />
    Comment: Many commenters, including organizations and a form letter <br />
campaign, said that, not even a year ago, DHS determined that a 540-day <br />
automatic extension of employment authorization was necessary to meet a <br />
Congressional mandate. However, the IFR eliminates automatic extensions <br />
entirely without any new evidence or a coherent rationale to justify <br />
such a reversal. The commenters reasoned that the IFR fails to satisfy <br />
the ``reasoned decision-making'' requirement of the APA and cited FCC <br />
v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009).<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertion that the IFR <br />
did not provide a reasoned justification for the rulemaking. The IFR <br />
discussed the prior rulemakings pertaining to EAD automatic extensions <br />
and then explained that this administration's priority is the robust <br />
vetting of all aliens in our country to better protect the safety of <br />
American workers and the public at large. 90 FR 48799, 48808 (Oct. 30, <br />
2025). The IFR also explained that this rulemaking will enhance public <br />
safety by ensuring proper vetting before issuing renewal EADs, which <br />
are important benefits, and improve program integrity. See 90 FR 48799, <br />
48804 (Oct. 30, 2025). DHS is enhancing its vetting and screening <br />
efforts, increasing its ability to detect aliens with potentially <br />
harmful intent, deter fraud, and place removable aliens into <br />
proceedings. DHS uses all applicable provisions under the law to help <br />
protect the United States from those who pose a risk to public safety <br />
and national security.<br />
    The IFR, and this final rule, ends the practice of automatically <br />
extending the validity of employment authorization documents, so that <br />
DHS can take appropriate action before an immigration benefit is again <br />
provided to an alien. The IFR discussed specific examples of the harm <br />
that could result from continuing to automatically extend an alien's <br />
expired employment authorization and/or EAD merely by filing a timely <br />
renewal EAD<br />
<br />
[[Page 65345]]<br />
<br />
application.\156\ The IFR also explained that such automatic extensions <br />
grant the benefit without USCIS first performing the following actions: <br />
an eligibility determination, completing vetting and screening checks, <br />
resolving potential hits of derogatory information, and a determination <br />
that the employment authorization should be granted in the exercise of <br />
discretion, if applicable.\157\ Without the IFR, and this final rule, <br />
aliens could still obtain an automatic extension despite derogatory <br />
information that could flag them as a national security or public <br />
safety risk. As described above, vetting and screening might not be <br />
completed and derogatory information reviewed and resolved before the <br />
alien's EAD expires. The automatic extension, therefore, poses a <br />
security vulnerability that could allow bad actors to continue to work <br />
and generate income to potentially finance nefarious activities that <br />
pose an imminent threat to the American public. Granting benefits <br />
without proper vetting and full adjudication is contrary to the DHS <br />
mission to enhance benefit integrity and better protect public safety <br />
and national security.\158\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \156\ See 90 FR at 48807-48808.<br />
    \157\ See 90 FR at 48808.<br />
    \158\ See, e.g., Conference Report to accompany H.R. 4567 <br />
[Report 108-774], ``Making Appropriations for the Department of <br />
Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' <br />
p. 74 (Oct. 9, 2004), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (recommending, among other things, the <br />
creation of an organization to conduct ``law enforcement/background <br />
checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to <br />
granting immigration benefits.'') (last visited May 26, 2026).<br />
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<br />
iv. Arbitrary and Capricious/Procedural Deficiencies That Violate the <br />
APA<br />
    Comment: A few commenters said that the rule was arbitrary and <br />
capricious under the APA since the rule neither adequately analyzed the <br />
impacts on employers and the economy nor proposed mitigation <br />
strategies. One commenter said that the IFR is arbitrary and capricious <br />
because it provides no economic analysis of the IFR's impact, <br />
disregards evidence of persistent backlogs and ongoing demand for work <br />
permits, relies on speculative or unsupported assertions, and ignores <br />
serious reliance interests. The commenter said that the IFR is <br />
arbitrary and capricious under the APA because the agency failed to <br />
``examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation <br />
for its action including a rational connection between the facts found <br />
and the choice made.''<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertions. The IFR <br />
acknowledged and analyzed the potential impacts of the IFR but <br />
explained that due to factors contributing to a high degree of <br />
uncertainty, DHS cannot estimate the number of renewal EAD applicants <br />
who will be affected by this rule. See 90 FR 48816. The analysis <br />
included a discussion of the potential impacts on U.S. employers of <br />
aliens with EADs. See 90 FR 48817. As explained in the IFR and in <br />
Section V.B.1. of this preamble, given the large amount of uncertainty <br />
pertaining to EAD filing rates and processing efficiencies, including <br />
those stemming from recent and future policy changes that may affect <br />
EAD eligibility, DHS was unable to produce a tenable population <br />
estimate for the future population that could be affected by the IFR <br />
and this final rule. See 90 FR 48817.<br />
    DHS recognizes, despite limitations on the ability to quantify <br />
future impacts of this rulemaking, that some aliens may experience a <br />
temporary lapse in their employment authorization and/or EAD validity <br />
in the absence of an automatic extension, and that this could impact <br />
the alien and their U.S. employer. As explained earlier in this <br />
preamble, DHS has determined that the program integrity, public safety, <br />
and national security benefits of eliminating automatic extensions of <br />
EADs outweigh the risks of potential temporary lapses in employment <br />
authorization.<br />
    Comment: A commenter said that DHS provides no estimate of how many <br />
unionized workers are likely to lose employment authorization because <br />
of adjudication delays, an omission that is particularly glaring given <br />
the size of the affected workforce. The commenter added that DHS also <br />
does not analyze how sudden, government-caused employment interruptions <br />
could weaken labor unions or destabilize labor management planning <br />
across sectors that depend heavily on immigrant workers. The commenter <br />
stated that the IFR's silence on these issues underscores its arbitrary <br />
and capricious nature, which is in violation of the APA.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertions. The IFR <br />
acknowledged and analyzed the potential impacts of the IFR but <br />
explained that due to factors contributing to a high degree of <br />
uncertainty, DHS cannot estimate the number of renewal EAD applicants <br />
who will be affected by this rule. See 90 FR48816. As explained in the <br />
IFR, given the large amount of uncertainty pertaining to EAD filing <br />
rates and processing efficiencies, including those stemming from recent <br />
and future policy changes that may affect EAD eligibility, DHS is <br />
unable to produce a tenable population estimate for the future <br />
population that may be affected by the IFR and this final rule. See 90 <br />
FR 48799, 48816 (Oct. 30, 2025). The degree of uncertainty is not <br />
exclusive to non-unionized workers who might be potentially affected by <br />
the IFR and this final rule if faced with a temporary lapse in their <br />
employment authorization and/or EAD validity. Given the high degree of <br />
uncertainty, DHS cannot estimate the number of unionized renewal EAD <br />
applicants who will be affected by this rule and the impacts, if any, <br />
that might flow to labor unions.<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters requested that DHS withdraw the IFR in <br />
its entirety because it violates the APA and/or is arbitrary and <br />
capricious. One commenter said that DHS did not establish why the <br />
current vetting is insufficient and that upending work authorization <br />
for millions without sufficient factual data in support violates the <br />
APA. Another commenter said that the rule violates the APA because <br />
USCIS is removing the guardrails it acknowledged needing, without any <br />
facts or proof that would indicate improved adjudication times.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters' assertions that the <br />
IFR violates the APA, or that DHS did not provide sufficient <br />
justification for the rule. DHS will not withdraw the IFR. DHS is <br />
adopting the IFR as final following careful consideration of the <br />
comments received.<br />
    The IFR and this final rule end the practice of automatically <br />
extending the validity of employment authorization documents so that <br />
DHS can take appropriate action before an immigration benefit is <br />
provided to an alien. The IFR discussed specific examples of the harm <br />
that could result from continuing to automatically extend an alien's <br />
expired employment authorization and/or EAD merely by filing a timely <br />
renewal EAD application and without first completing adjudicative <br />
review and related vetting, including resolution of derogatory <br />
information identified during the vetting process.\159\ The IFR also <br />
explained that such automatic extensions grant the benefit without <br />
benefit is granted without USCIS first performing the following <br />
actions: an eligibility determination, completing vetting and screening <br />
checks, resolving potential hits of derogatory information in <br />
connection with the alien; and, a determination that the employment <br />
authorization should be granted in the<br />
<br />
[[Page 65346]]<br />
<br />
exercise of discretion, if applicable.\160\ Without the IFR, and this <br />
final rule, aliens could still obtain an automatic extension despite <br />
derogatory information that could flag them as a national security or <br />
public safety risk. As described previously, vetting and screening <br />
might not be completed and derogatory information reviewed and resolved <br />
before the alien's EAD expires. The automatic extension, therefore, <br />
poses a security vulnerability that could allow bad actors to continue <br />
to work and generate income to potentially finance nefarious activities <br />
that pose an imminent threat to the American public. Granting benefits <br />
without proper vetting and full adjudication is contrary to the DHS <br />
mission to enhance benefit integrity and better protect public safety <br />
and national security.\161\<br />
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<br />
    \159\ 90 FR 48799 48807-48808 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
    \160\ 90 FR 48799, 48808 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
    \161\ See, e.g., Conference Report to accompany H.R. 4567 <br />
[Report 108-774], ``Making Appropriations for the Department of <br />
Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' <br />
p. 74 (Oct. 9, 2004), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (recommending, among other things, the <br />
creation of an organization to conduct ``law enforcement/background <br />
checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to <br />
granting immigration benefits.'') (last visited May 26, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS has determined that the potential impact that some aliens may <br />
experience a temporary lapse in the validity of their employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD is outweighed by the need to better protect <br />
the safety and security of the American people by ensuring that <br />
employment authorization and/or an EAD is not granted until USCIS has <br />
thoroughly vetted and screened the applicant, resolved any derogatory <br />
hits, and determined that the alien continues to be eligible for the <br />
immigration benefit and merits a favorable exercise of discretion, as <br />
applicable.<br />
v. Reliance Interests<br />
    Comment: Many commenters stated that the IFR disregarded <br />
significant reliance interests that DHS itself reaffirmed when it <br />
issued a permanent 540-day automatic extension less than one year <br />
before the IFR. Commenters said the 2025 IFR eliminates extensions <br />
entirely, imposing consequences DHS recently deemed economically <br />
harmful and operationally unworkable. Several commenters added that <br />
this reversal in policy, without new evidence or a reasoned <br />
explanation, violates the APA.<br />
    Several commenters stated that for nearly a decade, USCIS has <br />
automatically provided an extension of some length to some groups of <br />
workers with expiring EADs. The commenters said that employers and <br />
workers structured hiring, staffing, payroll planning, and employee <br />
retention around that assurance, and now, DHS cannot abruptly withdraw <br />
the permanent 540-day automatic extension without addressing these <br />
significant reliance interests. The commenters said that doing so <br />
violates core administrative law principles, because Dep't of Homeland <br />
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 30 (2020), concluded <br />
that agencies must meaningfully consider reliance interests when <br />
abandoning prior policy.<br />
    Several commenters stated that the IFR failed to consider the <br />
reliance interests of broader stakeholders, including state and local <br />
governments, service providers, regional economies, and federal <br />
agencies, all of whom depend on stable workforces. A commenter stated <br />
that in Maine, automatic extensions are especially critical for the <br />
thousands of immigrants who rely on regulatory stability and plan their <br />
lives around this expectation, and DHS's actions failed to properly <br />
consider these significant reliance interests and have ``pulled the rug <br />
out from under them without explanation.''<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the assertion that the IFR did not <br />
sufficiently consider the reliance interests of the regulated public on <br />
the prior rules that provided for automatic extension of EADs and/or <br />
employment authorization based on a timely filed renewal application. <br />
The IFR specifically discussed and acknowledged reliance interests and <br />
explained why DHS has determined that any reliance interests are <br />
outweighed by the removal of automatic extensions for aliens in certain <br />
employment authorization categories. See 90 FR 48809-10. In preparing <br />
this final rule, DHS further considered all comments that articulated <br />
specific reliance interests.<br />
    DHS believes that the benefits of this rule to the United States <br />
outweigh any reliance interests held by the alien, his or her family, <br />
the employer or the public at-large in the automatic extensions of EADs <br />
to avoid temporary lapses in employment authorization and/or EAD <br />
validity. The Federal Government has a duty to protect U.S. national <br />
security, public safety, and the integrity of immigration benefits, and <br />
in the context of the IFR and this final rule, to better ensure that <br />
employment authorization is provided in a manner consistent with <br />
prohibiting the unlawful employment of aliens. Any reliance interest in <br />
the prior regulatory framework and policy does not outweigh the need to <br />
protect public safety and the integrity of immigration benefits and <br />
employment authorization.<br />
vi. Failure To Consider Alternatives<br />
    Comment: A commenter argued that DHS's rejection of two <br />
alternatives ((1) returning to a 180-day automatic work permit <br />
extension period and (2) issuing interim EAD cards) without substantive <br />
analysis and based upon unsubstantiated risks to national security does <br />
not satisfy the APA's requirement of ``meaningful consideration of <br />
alternatives.''<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenter's assertion that it did <br />
not meaningfully consider reasonable alternatives. These were <br />
reasonable alternatives for DHS to consider since they are prior DHS <br />
policies. As DHS explained in the IFR, and reiterates in this final <br />
rule, these and the other sub regulatory alternatives mentioned above <br />
suffer the same flaws as the up-to-540-day automatic extension. The <br />
automatic extension of an EAD, whether for 180 days, 540 days, or <br />
through the issuance of an interim EAD, grants the benefit of extending <br />
an alien's expired employment authorization and/or EAD merely by filing <br />
a timely renewal EAD application. That is, the benefit is granted <br />
without USCIS first performing the following actions: an eligibility <br />
determination, completing vetting and screening checks, resolving <br />
potential hits of derogatory information in connection with the aliens, <br />
and a determination that the employment authorization should be granted <br />
in the exercise of discretion, if applicable. If DHS pursued these <br />
options, aliens with derogatory information flagged during the <br />
background check process would nevertheless still obtain an automatic <br />
extension of 180 days, or an interim EAD, even if derogatory <br />
information cannot be reviewed and resolved, and their application <br />
denied, before the alien's EAD expires. These automatic extensions <br />
therefore pose a security vulnerability that could allow bad actors to <br />
continue to work and generate income to potentially finance nefarious <br />
activities that pose an imminent threat to the American public.<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters stated that the IFR failed to consider <br />
reasonable alternatives to eliminating automatic extensions entirely, <br />
which violates the standards of ``rational decision-making'' required <br />
under the APA. A commenter said DHS did not articulate any <br />
consideration of alternative, sub-regulatory means to achieve increased <br />
security for the American public, such as providing direction to staff <br />
to prioritize the vetting of EAD renewal applications, which<br />
<br />
[[Page 65347]]<br />
<br />
would be appropriate and a better option to meet the agency's security <br />
goals than the rule's termination of the post-2024 practice of <br />
providing automatic extensions of employment authorization and/or EADs <br />
for 540 days for eligible aliens who timely filed. A commenter stated <br />
that DHS ignores the straightforward solution of printing extension <br />
confirmations on secure paper or commonsense alternatives such as <br />
issuing multiple EADs with consecutive validity periods or improving <br />
USCIS data systems to identify and expedite renewal applications for <br />
applicants whose EAD will imminently expired, and that rejecting a <br />
simple administrative fix in favor of a rule that foreseeably creates <br />
widespread employment interruptions reflects precisely the sort of <br />
arbitrary and capricious decision-making the APA prohibits.<br />
    Another commenter said that DHS's failure to address consecutive <br />
EAD validity periods underscores the inadequacy of its ``proper <br />
planning'' rationale and confirms that the agency did not meaningfully <br />
consider reasonable, less disruptive alternatives, which is in <br />
violation of the APA.<br />
    Response: DHS considered the alternatives suggested by the <br />
commenters but declined to adopt them. This administration's priority <br />
is the robust vetting of all aliens in our country to better protect <br />
the safety of American workers and the public at large. The IFR, and <br />
this final rule, will enhance public safety by ensuring proper vetting <br />
before issuing renewal EADs, which are important benefits, and improve <br />
program integrity. DHS is enhancing its vetting and screening efforts, <br />
increasing its ability to detect aliens with potentially harmful <br />
intent, deter fraud, and place removable aliens into proceedings. DHS <br />
uses all applicable provisions under the law, to protect the United <br />
States from those who are a risk to public safety and national <br />
security. This includes more frequent vetting of aliens, including more <br />
frequent determinations that an alien granted an EAD continues to <br />
remain eligible for employment authorization, and continues to merit a <br />
favorable exercise of discretion, as applicable. DHS believes that it <br />
would be inconsistent with these policy goals for USCIS to issue, <br />
concurrently or in close proximity, multiple EADs to the same alien <br />
with consecutive validity periods. Essentially, this would allow an <br />
alien to submit multiple EAD applications at or around the same time, <br />
and consecutive EADs would be tantamount to one EAD with a longer <br />
validity period. The result of this alternative would be less frequent <br />
vetting and eligibility determinations, which would be directly <br />
contrary to DHS's stated policy goal of the IFR and this final rule.<br />
    DHS does not agree that identifying and expediting renewal <br />
applications for applicants whose EAD will imminently expire is a <br />
reasonable alternative. Such an approach, even if operationally <br />
feasible, would simply encourage and incentivize applicants to wait <br />
until the last minute before filing the EAD renewal application. <br />
Expediting the applications of those who wait to file would have the <br />
unintended consequence of delaying the adjudication of those who filed <br />
six months in advance of their EAD expiration. DHS does not believe it <br />
is reasonable to reward applicants who wait until the last minute to <br />
file their renewal EAD application by moving those applications to the <br />
front of the processing queue to the disadvantage of other applicants <br />
who filed months in advance.<br />
    Furthermore, DHS does not agree that a reasonable alternative is to <br />
issue evidence of an automatic extension of employment authorization on <br />
secure paper, as that would not further the policy goal of more <br />
frequently vetting, screening, and adjudicating continued eligibility <br />
and that the alien continues to merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, as applicable. Secure paper would also not resolve the <br />
issue DHS noted in the IFR \162\ pertaining to the risks associated <br />
with automatic extension of employment authorization and the potential <br />
for employer confusion as to when the automatic extension of employment <br />
authorization ends. The potential confusion stems from the fact that <br />
the alien, not their employer, is the party to the renewal application <br />
and is the one notified if the renewal application is denied. Their <br />
employer is not separately notified and is dependent on notification <br />
from the alien that their renewal application has been denied and they <br />
are no longer employment authorized. If the alien does not immediately <br />
notify their employer, the employer could unknowingly employ an alien <br />
who is no longer authorized to work in the United States. The use of <br />
secure paper to print evidence of the automatic extension would have no <br />
effect on this issue, or the need to ensure more frequent vetting and <br />
screening and that the alien continues to be eligible for employment <br />
authorization and merits a favorable exercise of discretion, as <br />
applicable.<br />
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<br />
    \162\ See 90 FR 48799, 48808-48809 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
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<br />
vii. Comment Period<br />
    Comment: Several commenters requested that DHS extend the comment <br />
period beyond the December 1, 2025 deadline. An individual commenter <br />
requested that DHS extend the comment period to 60 days beyond December <br />
1, 2025. Additional commenters requested that DHS rescind the IFR's <br />
implementation and provide a full 90-day comment period. One commenter <br />
requested that DHS reopen the comment period for at least 60 days.<br />
    Response: DHS believes that the 33-day comment period from October <br />
30, 2025, to December 1, 2025, was sufficient and reasonable, given the <br />
straightforward purpose of the IFR, as evidenced by the quality of <br />
comments that DHS carefully considered in the promulgation of this <br />
final rule.<br />
    The APA does not specify a minimum comment period. On January 20, <br />
2025, the President issued E.O. 14159, Protecting the American People <br />
Against Invasion (Jan. 20, 2025), 90 FR 8443, 8446 (Jan. 29, 2025), <br />
which put the public on notice that it was the President's priority to <br />
take all appropriate action to alien any departmental activities with <br />
the policies set out by the President and to ensure, among others, <br />
``that employment authorization is provided in a manner consistent with <br />
section 274A of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324a, and that employment <br />
authorization is not provided to any unauthorized alien in the United <br />
States.''<br />
    Additionally, on Jan. 20, 2025, the President also issued E.O. <br />
14161, Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and other <br />
National Security and Public Safety Threats, which directs the <br />
coordination among the departments to identify all resources that may <br />
be used to ensure that all aliens seeking admission to the United <br />
States, or who are already in the United States, are vetted and <br />
screened to the maximum degree possible. On October 29, 2025, the IFR <br />
was published for public inspection, which allowed individuals to <br />
familiarize themselves with the rule. On October 30, 2025, the comment <br />
period opened with the publication of the rule in the Federal Register <br />
and commenters had 33 days, that is to December 1, 2025, to provide <br />
comments. DHS believes that the 33-day period is sufficient given the <br />
straightforward purpose of the IFR.<br />
    Comment: Commenters stated that the post-promulgation comment <br />
period offered by DHS was insufficient to bypass the APA's notice and <br />
comment procedures. Courts have repeatedly held that such after-the-<br />
fact opportunities<br />
<br />
[[Page 65348]]<br />
<br />
cannot substitute for prior notice and comment. Once a rule takes <br />
effect, the ability to influence the agency's decision-making is, as a <br />
practical matter, diminished. The commenters added that pre-<br />
promulgation notice and comment are not optional--they are statutory <br />
prerequisites for a legislative rule to be valid, especially in this <br />
instance where the IFR will have far reaching effects. A commenter said <br />
they were not afforded the customary notice and comment period to <br />
conduct a full, data-driven economic or labor market impact analysis <br />
prior to implementation, which undermines their ability to provide DHS <br />
with the comprehensive, evidence-based assessment that this rule <br />
warrants. A different commenter similarly stated that with more time <br />
and a comment period that accounts for stakeholder input prior to <br />
implementation, they would have submitted more feedback directly <br />
relevant to the IFR. A few commenters requested that DHS conduct a full <br />
notice and comment process to consider stakeholder input.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the commenters that allowing for post-<br />
promulgation comments when issuing the IFR may be insufficient for <br />
purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and that the rule <br />
may be invalid or otherwise procedurally deficient. Unless a statutory <br />
exception to notice and comment rulemaking applies, the APA requires <br />
agencies to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal <br />
Register before the rule has legal effect. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b). The APA <br />
requires that the notice of proposed rulemaking contain reference to <br />
the legal authority under which the rule is proposed and either the <br />
terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the <br />
subjects and issues involved. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(2)-(3). DHS has <br />
complied with the requirements under the APA. The IFR explained the <br />
relevant issues and the Department's rationale why it was ending the <br />
automatic extensions of employment authorizations and/or EADs under 8 <br />
CFR 274a.13. DHS also demonstrated that it had good cause to bypass <br />
standard notice and comment procedures under the APA. With the issuance <br />
of the IFR, DHS invited the public to participate in the rulemaking, <br />
thus giving stakeholders an opportunity to provide comments on every <br />
aspect of this rule, including potential modifications. DHS is now <br />
considering all comments received on the IFR and responded to them in <br />
this preamble, thereby providing the notice and comment process sought <br />
by commenters. DHS thus has met every statutory requisite for the IFR <br />
and this final rule to be a properly issued legislative rule under the <br />
APA.\163\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \163\ Cf. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home <br />
v. Pennsylvania, 591 U.S. 657, 683-84 (2020) (finding that an IFR <br />
satisfied the APA's notice requirements).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: Several commenters expressed that the issuance of the rule <br />
as an IFR with immediate effect that same day deprived stakeholders of <br />
any meaningful opportunity to review, comment, or prepare for <br />
compliance.<br />
    Response: As stated in the IFR, DHS issued the IFR without prior <br />
notice or public procedures because DHS was invoking the ``good cause'' <br />
exception under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). For the same reason, DHS <br />
found that a delayed effective date of 30-days was not required. See 5 <br />
U.S.C. 553(d)(3). Both provisions allow an agency to publish a measure <br />
immediately if acting expeditiously is warranted. DHS further explained <br />
in the IFR why it was necessary for the agency to move so expeditiously <br />
in promulgating and implementing this rule. With the issuance of the <br />
IFR, however, DHS invited the public to participate in the rulemaking, <br />
thus giving stakeholders an opportunity to provide comments on every <br />
aspect of this rule, including potential modifications. DHS has now <br />
considered all comments received on the IFR and responded to them in <br />
this preamble, thereby providing the notice and comment process sought <br />
by commenters. Furthermore, DHS also explained in the IFR that the <br />
regulatory amendment involves a foreign affairs function under 5 U.S.C. <br />
553(a)(1) and that therefore, the agency may forego notice and comment <br />
rulemaking and a delayed effective date. Therefore, the IFR and this <br />
final rule complied with the process required under the APA for rules <br />
that are excepted from notice and comment.<br />
viii. Comment Submission Requirements<br />
    Comment: A couple of commenters stated that DHS's requirement that <br />
comments be submitted in English deprived many asylum seekers and other <br />
immigrants of their right to comment on the IFR and to provide input <br />
grounded in their own lived experiences. The commenter stated that many <br />
asylum seekers come from countries where English is not the primary <br />
language and may not have the ability and resources to prepare comments <br />
in English.<br />
    Response: DHS does not agree that the requirement that comments be <br />
submitted in English, or accompanied by an English translation, <br />
deprived aliens of the opportunity to comment on the IFR.<br />
    As stated in the IFR, comments ``must be submitted in English, or <br />
an English translation must be provided.'' \164\ That requirement is <br />
consistent with longstanding USCIS practice and with E.O. 14224, <br />
Designating English as the Official Language of the United States, 90 <br />
FR 11363 (Mar. 1, 2025). This requirement does not limit who may submit <br />
comments. It only specifies the language in which comments must appear <br />
in the rulemaking record so that they can be reviewed and considered on <br />
a consistent basis as part of the administrative process.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \164\ 90 FR 48799-800.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Nothing in the IFR prevented non-English-speaking individuals, <br />
including asylum seekers and other immigrants, from participating in <br />
this rulemaking. Individuals and organizations were free to submit <br />
comments translated into English, whether prepared by the commenter or <br />
with the assistance of online translation tools or counsel, community <br />
organizations, or other representatives. Many of the comments DHS <br />
received came from advocacy and legal-services organizations that <br />
described, in detail, the lived experiences and concerns of asylum <br />
seekers and other non-English-speaking communities.<br />
    The English-language requirement for comments in this rulemaking <br />
does not restrict who may have their views considered in the <br />
development of this final rule.<br />
    Comment: A commenter said that the FRN states that the comments <br />
must include the agency and docket number, but that requirement is <br />
arbitrary and capricious with respect to online submissions. Online <br />
submissions are linked to the specific FRN so there is no ambiguity as <br />
to which FRN is at issue. The commenter said that any decision to <br />
exclude comments from consideration because of these administrative <br />
barriers violates the APA and the whole purpose of soliciting comments <br />
from the public. Another commenter asked why comments must have USCIS <br />
Docket No. USCIS-2025-0271 for DHS to consider them.<br />
    One commenter stated that comments should be restricted to U.S. <br />
citizens.<br />
    Response: DHS considered all comments received in the docket. <br />
Accordingly, commenters' concerns about DHS's requirements for labeling <br />
comments are moot.<br />
    Finally, the APA requires that a rule be published in the Federal <br />
Register<br />
<br />
[[Page 65349]]<br />
<br />
and, unless an exception to the notice and comment procedures applies, <br />
to give interested people an opportunity to participate in the <br />
rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b). The APA does not restrict public <br />
participation in rules to U.S. citizens, and DHS would not have a legal <br />
basis to do so.<br />
12. Regulatory Impact Analysis<br />
i. Methodology<br />
    Comment: Many commenters stated that the IFR fails to provide any <br />
substantive economic impact analysis of eliminating automatic EAD <br />
extensions and did not reconcile its position with DHS's recent finding <br />
that automatic extensions yield substantial economic benefits.<br />
    Multiple commenters stated that the IFR failed to meet the <br />
standards required by E.O. 12866 for economically significant rules. <br />
They stated that such rules must be supported by a clear statement of <br />
need, a thorough examination of alternative approaches, and a detailed <br />
benefit-cost analysis.<br />
    Several commenters remarked that USCIS relies on ``conjectural <br />
concerns'' such as a remittance-based theory that are inconsistent with <br />
DHS's own statistics.<br />
    One commenter stated that the rule declined to quantify <br />
productivity losses or turnover costs, elements that were addressed in <br />
the 2024 rule with detailed estimates of economic impact. The commenter <br />
noted that DHS speculated that renewal filings would decrease but did <br />
not account for the number of current EAD holders who would need to <br />
renew or the implications of shortened validity periods, which might <br />
require more frequent renewals.<br />
    One commenter provided a conservative scenario analysis to <br />
demonstrate that the economic impact would exceed the $100 million <br />
threshold for economically significant rules under Executive Order <br />
12866.<br />
    Multiple commenters expressed concern that eliminating automatic <br />
extensions would disrupt a significant portion of the U.S. labor force. <br />
They cited DHS's acknowledgment that foreign-born workers constitute <br />
roughly 20% of the U.S. civilian workforce and argued that eliminating <br />
automatic extensions would not simply affect individual households or <br />
hypothetical outflows abroad but would disrupt up to one-fifth of the <br />
U.S. labor force and the U.S. employers, tax revenues, and economic <br />
activity tied to that workforce.<br />
    One commenter specifically noted that the impact would be <br />
significantly more severe in New York City, where the foreign-born <br />
workforce comprises approximately 1.8 million people, about 44.3 <br />
percent of the city's total labor force.<br />
    Another commenter stated that California alone is home to over 10.5 <br />
million immigrants, comprising 27.3 percent of the state's population, <br />
and that in California, immigrants have contributed $168.1 billion in <br />
taxes and have $404.4 billion in spending power. The commenter stated <br />
that California relies on the contribution of working immigrants to <br />
stimulate the economy.<br />
    Response: DHS believes it conducted an analysis in full compliance <br />
with E.O. 12866, and DHS described that this rule would affect those <br />
aliens who would no longer receive an automatic EAD extension. DHS did <br />
designate the IFR as a ``significant regulatory action'' and <br />
economically significant as defined under section 3(f)(1) of E.O. <br />
12866, because its annual effects on the economy may exceed $100 <br />
million in any year of the analysis. Although there is likely to be <br />
variation and uncertainty in populations and filing behavior, DHS <br />
estimated in this final rule the number of EADs that are expected to <br />
lapse, and the estimated duration of the lapse, for a specific 18-month <br />
window based on some specific assumptions. See Section V.B.1 of this <br />
preamble for more information.<br />
    In previous rules, DHS attempted to stabilize aliens' earnings and <br />
avoid labor turnover costs of employers. DHS also continues to work to <br />
improve processing times and reduce backlogs. However, the Department <br />
has shifted focus to prioritizing public safety, national security and <br />
benefit integrity. Due to this shift, DHS acknowledges that there will <br />
be impacts to EAD renewal applicants for the classes covered in the <br />
previous extension actions and their employers. DHS disagrees with the <br />
comment that this rule would destabilize up to one-fifth of the <br />
national labor force and the employers, tax revenues, and economic <br />
activity that depend on that workforce or that the discussion about <br />
remittances in the IFR is inconsistent with DHS statistics. The <br />
reference in the IFR to the total percentage of foreign-born workers in <br />
the United States was in the context of the foreign affairs exception <br />
and a broader discussion about the significance of remittances, <br />
including by aliens affected by this rule, on foreign affairs. This <br />
rule applies directly to certain categories of renewal applications <br />
that were previously provided automatic extensions and not, as the <br />
commenter suggests, to every foreign-born worker in the U.S. economy.<br />
ii. Impact on Individuals<br />
    Comment: One commenter remarked that the IFR would severely harm <br />
Colorado's economy and businesses and that the automatic extension that <br />
come from the temporary final rules of 2022 and 2024 resulted in wage <br />
stabilization worth $10 billion to employment authorized aliens and <br />
average cost savings of $3.5 billion to U.S. employers over that <br />
period.<br />
    Another commenter stated that recent and proposed immigration <br />
policies will raise the cost of goods and services for U.S. families.<br />
    Response: In previous rules providing for the automatic extension <br />
of employment authorization and/or EADs based on the timely filing of a <br />
renewal EAD application, DHS attempted to stabilize aliens' earnings <br />
and avoid labor turnover costs of employers; however, the Department <br />
has shifted focus to prioritizing public safety, national security and <br />
benefit integrity. Due to this shift, DHS acknowledges that there will <br />
be impacts on a portion of the U.S. labor force. DHS disagrees that <br />
this specific immigration policy alone is going to be the sole reason <br />
for the costs of goods and services to increase.<br />
iii. Impact on the U.S. Economy, Employers, and Labor Force<br />
    Comment: Multiple commenters provided input on the RIA's assessment <br />
of impacts on the economy. One submission expressed concern that USCIS <br />
recognized the negative impacts of removing the automatic extension <br />
period on aliens and employers but declined to conduct any economic <br />
analysis during the rulemaking. The commenter said that such an <br />
approach disregarded an estimated $4 billion in turnover costs and <br />
additional burdens on employers and Form I-9 vendors to update systems <br />
and policies. By omitting quantification of significant costs, the <br />
commenter reasoned that DHS cannot credibly claim it weighed the IFR's <br />
benefits against its costs, as the IFR provided no numeric estimates <br />
despite prior rules showing costs in the billions of dollars. <br />
Furthermore, the commenter said that the immediate effect of the IFR <br />
would place significant burdens on employers and vendors. The commenter <br />
concluded that DHS's justification for immediate implementation--to <br />
prevent a surge in renewal applications--would not outweigh the <br />
operational and economic strain imposed on employers and industry.<br />
    Likewise, another commenter expressed concern that the IFR offered<br />
<br />
[[Page 65350]]<br />
<br />
no new economic analysis and did not reconcile its approach with DHS's <br />
recent determination that automatic extensions provide substantial <br />
economic benefits. The commenter said that although DHS conducted <br />
detailed modeling less than a year earlier, the IFR stated the agency <br />
could not quantify the impact of eliminating extensions while bypassing <br />
notice and comment procedures. The commenter remarked that DHS <br />
previously found extensions stabilize billions in earnings, reduce <br />
turnover costs, and increase tax revenue, yet the IFR relied on <br />
speculative concerns instead of updated data. Moreover, the commenter <br />
said DHS's own figures, removing extensions could destabilize up to <br />
one-fifth of the labor force, creating systemic risks to employers, tax <br />
revenues, and economic activity that the 2024 Final Rule had <br />
acknowledged but the IFR failed to address.<br />
    Similarly, one commenter stated that DHS had not estimated or <br />
considered the economic value and workforce impact of EADs in the IFR. <br />
The commenter remarked that existing research had shown that work <br />
authorization allowed migrants with temporary protections to make <br />
significant economic contributions. For example, when the TPS <br />
population was about 354,000 in 2021, estimates indicated billions in <br />
tax contributions and spending power, and other studies suggested large <br />
contributions to GDP. Similar findings were reported for DACA <br />
recipients, including tax payments, household spending power, and wage <br />
increases after receiving EADs. Additional research has shown that EADs <br />
were associated with higher employment rates and wage gains for TPS <br />
holders and asylum seekers. The commenter said that such studies <br />
suggested that work authorization had positive effects on earnings, job <br />
quality, and economic stability. The commenter concluded that if DHS <br />
had conducted an economic analysis, it could have accounted for these <br />
impacts before finalizing the rule.<br />
    One commenter said that DHS's own figures indicated that <br />
eliminating automatic EAD extensions could disrupt a significant <br />
portion of the U.S. workforce and impose substantial economic costs. <br />
The commenter reasoned that such figures underscore the need for DHS to <br />
complete a thorough economic analysis before finalizing the IFR. <br />
Therefore, the commenter requested that DHS provide a comprehensive <br />
economic analysis.<br />
    A commenter stated that DHS's prior analysis projected 293,000-<br />
449,000 timely EAD renewal applicants would face work authorization <br />
lapses, and USCIS data showed backlogs were already increasing before <br />
the IFR, making lapses inevitable. The commenter further stated even <br />
short lapses could cause thousands of dollars in lost wages per worker <br />
and major operational disruptions. Lastly, the commenter stated that <br />
DHS acknowledged the IFR would cause lost wages, productivity, payroll <br />
tax contributions, as well as turnover costs, but failed to quantify <br />
the aggregate impact.<br />
    Response: DHS agrees that this rule reverses some of the impacts <br />
described in the prior automatic extension rules. As DHS acknowledged <br />
in the IFR, temporary lapses in employment authorization and/or EAD <br />
validity could result in cost and transfer impacts such as lost <br />
compensation to workers, transfers between workers losing their <br />
employment authorizations to replacement workers, employers' lost <br />
productivity when they are not able to quickly replace employees with <br />
lapses, and turnover costs for employers to find replacement employees.<br />
    DHS's 2024 final rule analysis projected that automatic extensions <br />
would prevent a significant number of future lapses, but anticipated <br />
that lapses would generally cease beginning in April 2026, even without <br />
the 540-day extension.\165\ DHS acknowledges that the December 2025 <br />
reduction in EAD validity periods may lead to more frequent renewal <br />
applications, potentially affecting this projection.\166\ However, <br />
recent declines in the affected population and changes in filing <br />
behavior make it nearly impossible to reliably estimate the number and <br />
duration of lapses.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \165\ See 89 FR 101251 (Dec. 13, 2024), Table 12 (Population <br />
Projections by Month, Rounded to Thousands).<br />
    \166\ The 2024 final rule analysis projection starting in April <br />
2026 was based on the 5-year validity period in place at the time of <br />
the 2024 final rule. In December 2025, USCIS shortened the validity <br />
period to maximum of 18 months for certain categories. The reduced <br />
validity period could impact the frequency of future renewal filings <br />
See &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/news-alerts/reduced-validity-periods-for-newly-issued-employment-authorization-documents&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/news-alerts/reduced-validity-periods-for-newly-issued-employment-authorization-documents&lt;/a&gt; (last updated Jan. 12, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    DHS has concluded that the need to ensure proper vetting and <br />
screening, and continued eligibility, before granting renewed <br />
employment authorization and issuing secure evidence of that <br />
authorization outweighs the risk that some applicants might experience <br />
a temporary lapse in employment authorization and/or EAD validity. The <br />
prior automatic extension framework allowed aliens to continue working <br />
for up to 540 days based solely on a pending renewal application, <br />
during which time USCIS might identify, but not yet resolve, derogatory <br />
information bearing on eligibility or security concerns. DHS has <br />
determined that extending this benefit without updated adjudication and <br />
screening is inconsistent with its mission and with E.O.s directing DHS <br />
to ensure that employment authorization is not provided to unauthorized <br />
aliens and that aliens in the United States are vetted and screened to <br />
the maximum degree possible.\167\ DHS disagrees with the comment that <br />
this rule would destabilize up to one-fifth of the national labor force <br />
and the employers, tax revenues, and economic activity that depend on <br />
that workforce. This rule applies directly to certain categories of <br />
renewal applications that were previously eligible for automatic <br />
extensions.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \167\ See E.O. 14159, Protecting the American People Against <br />
Invasion 90 FR 8443, 8446 (Jan. 20, 2025); E.O. 14161, Protecting <br />
the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National <br />
Security and Public Safety Threats, 90 FR 8451, 8451 (Jan. 20, <br />
2025).<br />
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<br />
iv. Other Comments on the RIA<br />
    Comment: A commenter asked that USCIS suspend further action with <br />
the rule until it prepares and publishes a full RIA, an Initial <br />
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, and reopen the comment period for 60 <br />
days following the publishing of those materials.<br />
    Response: DHS published an RIA in the IFR providing a qualitative <br />
assessment of benefits, transfers, and costs. In that analysis, DHS <br />
acknowledged the possibility that some renewal applicants could <br />
experience EAD lapses. However, due to factors such as population <br />
changes, reduced filings, shorter validity periods for certain EADs, <br />
DHS determined that the conditions are too uncertain to accurately <br />
estimate the number or duration of lapses. Additionally, lower filing <br />
volumes may allow DHS to address the backlog more rapidly.<br />
    While many renewal applicants covered by the two TFRs who received <br />
automatic extensions may have eventually obtained five-year EADs, <br />
projecting how many new and renewal EADs will be subject to the 18-<br />
month validity period is highly speculative. As a result, DHS cannot <br />
reliably estimate processing times, which are essential for calculating <br />
lapses and their duration.<br />
    Within the IFR, DHS referenced prior analyses from the TFRs and <br />
2024 final rule to demonstrate that it is aware of the past situations <br />
of large lapses, but could not use prior historical data to<br />
<br />
[[Page 65351]]<br />
<br />
forecast the IFR's impact. Assuming prior spikes in EAD filings would <br />
continue is inconsistent with recent data. See Table 1 in Section <br />
IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble. Therefore, at the time of the IFR and the <br />
issuance of this final rule, DHS could not reliably estimate the number <br />
or duration of lapsed EADs.<br />
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) <br />
requires agencies to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis <br />
when issuing a notice and comment rulemaking. DHS disagrees with the <br />
claims that a proper regulatory flexibility analysis was not conducted. <br />
The RFA's regulatory flexibility analysis requirements apply only to <br />
those rules for which an agency is required to publish a general notice <br />
of proposed rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law. DHS <br />
did not issue a notice of proposed rulemaking for this action. <br />
Accordingly, DHS is not required to either certify that this IFR would <br />
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small <br />
entities nor conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis. DHS <br />
acknowledged that this interim final rule directly regulates <br />
individuals, and individuals are not defined as ``small entities'' by <br />
the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The rule indirectly impacts certain <br />
employers if, in the future, processing times exceed the expiration <br />
dates of EADs.<br />
    DHS used the IFR, in part, to address prior policy decisions that <br />
resulted in the filing of an overwhelming and unmanageable number of <br />
EAD applications making it more important than ever to conduct complete <br />
and thorough vetting of applicants, including those filing for renewal <br />
EADs, to mitigate potential risks to public safety and national <br />
security. DHS understands that the IFR and this final rule, and any <br />
resulting gaps in continued employment authorization, may have adverse <br />
impacts on employers and applicants. However, as DHS noted in the IFR, <br />
DHS expects that overall EAD filing rates (initials and renewals) are <br />
likely to substantially decline given actions DHS has taken in support <br />
of presidential directives, freeing up adjudicative resources to reduce <br />
renewal EAD processing times and the need for renewal EAD applicants in <br />
the longer term to rely on an automatic extension of their EAD to avoid <br />
lapses in employment authorization and/or EAD validity due to <br />
processing delays.<br />
    In addition, proper planning by an applicant, and monitoring of EAD <br />
processing times, may allow the alien to mitigate the risk for the <br />
alien, the alien's family, as well as the alien's employer that the <br />
alien will experience prolonged lapses in their employment <br />
authorization and/or EAD validity. Proper planning may ameliorate the <br />
risk of losing valid employment authorization, as well as the <br />
disruption and associated instability with business continuity or other <br />
financial harm for employers and the community. Ultimately, granting <br />
benefits without proper vetting and full adjudication is contrary to <br />
the DHS mission to enhance benefit integrity and better protect public <br />
safety and national security.\168\ DHS believes that this concern <br />
justifies potential backlogs and operational challenges that may result <br />
in a temporary lapse in employment authorization and/or EAD validity.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \168\ See, e.g., Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4567 <br />
[Report 108-774], ``Making Appropriations for the Department of <br />
Homeland Security for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2005,'' <br />
p. 74 (Oct. 9, 2004), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-108hrpt774/pdf/CRPT-108hrpt774.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (recommending, among other things, the <br />
creation of an organization to conduct ``law enforcement/background <br />
checks on every applicant, beneficiary, and petitioner prior to <br />
granting immigration benefits.'') (last visited May 26, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    As explained, DHS has complied with the requirements of the APA and <br />
RFA. Therefore, DHS will not adopt the commenters' suggestions to <br />
withdraw the IFR, delay the implementation of the IFR or this final <br />
rule, and provide an additional comment period.<br />
13. Regulatory Flexibility Act<br />
    Comment: A few commenters remarked that small businesses may be <br />
unfairly burdened with additional costs associated with administering a <br />
more complex I-9 program in their workplace or may be burdened by <br />
disruptions caused by lapses in employment authorization. Another <br />
commenter said that the IFR will have a chilling effect on the hiring <br />
of otherwise eligible non-citizen workers.<br />
    Commenters called for USCIS to conduct a complete RFA assessment. A <br />
commenter said the RFA requires an Initial Regulatory Flexibility <br />
Analysis unless the head of the agency certifies that the rule will not <br />
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small <br />
entities (5 U.S.C. 603-605), and an adequate certification must be <br />
supported by a factual basis. The commenter went on to detail impacts <br />
to small entities. The commenter stated that, if DHS has certified no <br />
significant impact without disaggregated data by sector and firm size, <br />
empirical estimates of affected headcount, and a monetized impact <br />
range, the certification is unsupported and unlawful. The commenter <br />
concluded that DHS must publish an IRFA, evaluate alternatives that <br />
minimize small-entity impacts, and seek small-entity input before <br />
proceeding.<br />
    Response: DHS disagrees with the claims that a proper regulatory <br />
flexibility analysis was not conducted. The RFA's regulatory <br />
flexibility analysis requirements apply only to those rules for which <br />
an agency is required to publish a general notice of proposed <br />
rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law.\169\ DHS did not <br />
issue a notice of proposed rulemaking for this action. Accordingly, DHS <br />
is not required to either certify that this IFR would not have a <br />
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities <br />
nor conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis. DHS acknowledged that <br />
this interim final rule directly regulates individuals, and individuals <br />
are not defined as ``small entities'' by the Regulatory Flexibility <br />
Act.\170\ The rule indirectly impacts certain employers if, in the <br />
future, processing times exceed the expiration dates of EADs.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \169\ See 5 U.S.C. 604(a).<br />
    \170\ See 5 U.S.C. 604(a).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    USCIS does take actions to address reducing burden and complexity <br />
for employers. As DHS discussed previously, USCIS periodically updates <br />
the M-274, offers guidance on the agency website, hosts several monthly <br />
I-9 webinars, and has a Form I-9 Contact Center. Further, E-Verify is a <br />
service that allows employers to electronically confirm employment <br />
eligibility of newly hired workers.<br />
    As DHS stated in the IFR, it is the policy of the Administration <br />
``to faithfully execute the immigration laws against all inadmissible <br />
and removable aliens, particularly those aliens who threaten the safety <br />
or security of the American people.'' \171\ Pursuant to this policy, <br />
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in collaboration with the Secretary <br />
of State and the Attorney General, has been directed to ``rescind the <br />
policy decisions of the previous administration that led to the <br />
increased or continued presence of illegal aliens in the United States, <br />
and align any and all departmental activities with the policies set out <br />
by this order and the immigration laws.'' \172\<br />
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<br />
    \171\ See 90 FR 8443, 8446.<br />
    \172\ Id.<br />
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<br />
    DHS has already taken a number of actions in support of the <br />
directives described earlier in this final rule.\173\<br />
<br />
[[Page 65352]]<br />
<br />
Thus, in addition to the serious concerns relating to automatic EAD <br />
extensions discussed previously, DHS is taking steps independent of <br />
this rule, including narrowing the use of parole and to align TPS <br />
designations with statutory criteria, that are likely to result in <br />
lower EAD filing volumes and improve renewal EAD application processing <br />
times. DHS anticipates that these may reduce processing time and <br />
lapses. However, DHS cautions that various factors make it difficult to <br />
estimate the number of lapses and when they will occur. Applicants may <br />
also apply earlier to reduce the chances of lapses.<br />
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<br />
    \173\ See, e.g., Termination of Parole Processes for Cubans, <br />
Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans, 90 FR 13611 (Mar. 25, 2025); <br />
Termination of the October 3, 2023 Designation of Venezuela for <br />
Temporary Protected Status, 90 FR 9040 (Feb. 5, 2025); Special <br />
Immigrant Juvenile Classification and Deferred Action, USCIS Policy <br />
Alert (June 6, 2025) &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policymanual-updates/20250606-SIJDeferredAction.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policymanual-updates/20250606-SIJDeferredAction.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (last <br />
visited June 13, 2025).<br />
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<br />
14. Paperwork Reduction Act<br />
    Comment: A commenter said that eliminating the automatic extension <br />
directly affects two OMB-approved information collections: Form I-9 <br />
Employment Eligibility Verification (OMB Control No. 1615-0047) and <br />
Form I-765 Application for Employment Authorization (OMB Control No. <br />
1615-0040/0016). The commenter said the rule does not appear to include <br />
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) notices proposing revisions to these <br />
collections or revised burden estimates and DHS must either (a) publish <br />
PRA notices with revised burden and cost estimates aligned to the <br />
rule's effects, or (b) explain why no change occurs and provide data <br />
supporting that assertion. Proceeding without PRA compliance is a <br />
defect.<br />
    Response: DHS has considered the comment asserting that this rule <br />
triggers new information collection requirements under the PRA for Form <br />
I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification (OMB Control No. 1615-0047), <br />
and Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization (OMB Control <br />
No. 1615-0040).<br />
    Under the PRA, an agency must obtain OMB approval when it seeks to <br />
``collect information'' from 10 or more persons, or when it revises an <br />
existing collection in a way that changes the information requested, <br />
who must respond, how often they must respond, or the estimated burden <br />
of responding. This rule does none of those things.<br />
    The rule does not change the Form I-765 itself, the data elements <br />
on the form, the categories of individuals who file it, or the <br />
circumstances under which it must be filed. Aliens who seek initial or <br />
renewal employment authorization and/or EAD in the affected categories <br />
will continue to use the same form, with the same instructions, to <br />
request the same benefit. The rule changes only the regulatory <br />
consequence that previously flowed automatically from the filing of <br />
certain renewal applications, not the information collected on Form I-<br />
765 or the obligation to file the form in the first place.<br />
    This rule also does not amend the requirements that govern <br />
employers' use of Form I-9. Employers are required under section 274A <br />
of the INA and 8 CFR 274a.2 to complete Form I-9 for each new hire and <br />
to reverify employment authorization when previously presented <br />
documentation expires. Those obligations exist independent of this <br />
rule. While the elimination of automatic extensions may result in some <br />
employers conducting reverification at different times than they would <br />
have under the prior automatic-extension framework, the scope and <br />
content of the information collected on Form I-9 are unchanged. The <br />
rule does not add any new fields to Form I-9, does not create a new <br />
reverification requirement, and does not expand the universe of <br />
employers subject to the Form I-9 provisions. Accordingly, it does not <br />
revise the underlying information collection approved under OMB Control <br />
No. 1615-0047.<br />
    This rule does not require DHS or employers to collect new <br />
categories of information, does not increase the frequency with which <br />
individuals must submit information to DHS beyond what is already <br />
required to seek or renew an EAD, and does not impose new recordkeeping <br />
or reporting requirements on employers beyond existing Form I-9 <br />
obligations.<br />
    Consistent with the IFR's PRA discussion and the PRA section of <br />
this final rule, DHS concludes that this rule does not introduce a new <br />
collection of information or revise an existing collection within the <br />
meaning of the PRA and that no new or amended OMB approval is required.<br />
15. General Comments on Statutory and Regulatory Requirements<br />
    Comment: A commenter stated that DHS must provide more evidence for <br />
why the rule's implementation is needed despite its likely negative <br />
impact on families and must include a Family Policymaking Assessment as <br />
required by Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government <br />
Appropriations Act of 1999, 5 U.S.C. 601. The commenter said DHS's <br />
rationale does not comprehensively consider how the loss of <br />
discretionary income will impact families and fails to consider that <br />
EADs are strongly tied to obtaining forms of identification. Without <br />
the ability to drive, many families may be limited or prevented from <br />
attending church, medical appointments, buying groceries, or taking <br />
children to school. They may also have more difficulty accessing <br />
utilities and their bank accounts. The commenter said the rule cannot <br />
move forward without an adequate rationale that properly considers <br />
these dynamics, which DHS failed to consider.<br />
    Another commenter stated that USCIS should prepare and publish a <br />
written statement as required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of <br />
1995 (UMRA) to assess the effects of Federal regulatory actions on <br />
State, local, and Tribal governments and the private sector. The <br />
commenter said even conservative scenarios imply private sector costs <br />
approaching or exceeding the threshold for a required UMRA analysis <br />
based on lost wages, productivity, and turnover.<br />
    A commenter that supports the rule said DHS should add a <br />
categorical exclusion to its NEPA procedures to strengthen its position <br />
that this rule does not require a NEPA analysis. The commenter stated <br />
that, in this IFR, DHS's NEPA implementation process was lacking though <br />
the commenter agreed that this rule does not have a significant <br />
environmental impact. The commenter went on to expand on DHS's <br />
conclusion that the rule is ``strictly administrative and procedural'' <br />
and the appropriate use of categorical exclusion A3. The commenter <br />
recommended that DHS strengthen the final version of this rule by <br />
adopting NEPA procedures that draw a distinction between rules that <br />
increase immigration (and therefore do have environmental impacts) and <br />
rules that do not (and where the invocation of such categorical <br />
exclusions are appropriate).<br />
    Response: DHS recognizes that this rule has the potential to impact <br />
families, as described above and in the Interim Final Rule.\174\ DHS is <br />
charged with protecting the national security and public safety of the <br />
American people, and so is finalizing this regulation to enhance <br />
benefit integrity and better protect public safety and national <br />
security by prioritizing the proper vetting and screening of aliens and <br />
ensuring continued eligibility before granting a new period of <br />
employment authorization and/or a new EAD. DHS urges eligible aliens to <br />
timely file renewal EAD applications to mitigate the risk that the <br />
applicant may experience a temporary lapse in<br />
<br />
[[Page 65353]]<br />
<br />
employment authorization and/or EAD validity. Regarding the commenters' <br />
concern that the rule inadequately considered impacts on aliens' <br />
ability to obtain driver's licenses or other identification cards, DHS <br />
emphasizes that the IFR explicitly explained that security concerns <br />
outweigh granting automatic extensions of EADs in this context.\175\ <br />
Nevertheless, this rule does not prevent the use of properly issued <br />
EADs for identification.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \174\ See 90 FR 48818-19.<br />
    \175\ 87 FR 48809. See 90 FR 48809, footnote 112.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) is intended, among <br />
other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal <br />
mandates on State, local, and Tribal governments.\176\ Title I of UMRA <br />
provides certain exceptions to its requirements and definitions. For <br />
example, UMRA does not apply to rules issued with no notice of proposed <br />
rulemaking, such as the IFR and this final rule.\177\ Further, this <br />
rule does not impose an enforceable duty on EAD renewal applicants or <br />
their employers and is thus not a federal mandate. Accordingly, there <br />
is nothing further required for DHS to comply with UMRA.<br />
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<br />
    \176\ The term ``Federal mandate'' means a Federal <br />
intergovernmental mandate or a Federal private sector mandate. See 2 <br />
U.S.C. 1502(1) and 658(5) and (6).<br />
    \177\ See 2 U.S.C. 1532(a).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS appreciates the recommendation to reconsider how it approaches <br />
NEPA and its categorical exclusions, specifically by differentiating <br />
between regulations that would increase immigration or not. However, <br />
this suggestion of adding an additional appropriate CATEX goes beyond <br />
the scope of this rule.<br />
    Please see Section V.J. below for our discussion of this rule's <br />
implementation and NEPA. As stated in the IFR, and below in this final <br />
rule, DHS finds that this action falls strictly within CATEX A3 of the <br />
DHS Instructions Manual 023-01-001-1, relating to the promulgation of <br />
rules, issuance of rulings or interpretations, and the development and <br />
publication of policies, orders, directives and notices procedures, <br />
manuals and advisory circulars and other guidance documents that are <br />
administrative or procedural in nature, and that interpret or amend and <br />
existing regulation without changing its environmental effect. See DHS <br />
Instructions Manual 023-01-001-1, CATEX A3.<br />
    Comment: A commenter stated that the rule was not listed on the <br />
Unified Agenda or the regulatory information dashboard until October <br />
30, 2025. According to &lt;a href=&quot;http://reginfo.gov/&quot;&gt;RegInfo.gov&lt;/a&gt;, the IFR was submitted to the OMB's <br />
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) on October 29 and <br />
posted for public inspection the same day. The commenter stated that <br />
this timeline not only deprived the regulated public of both notice and <br />
an opportunity to comment, but it also marked a ``radical departure'' <br />
from the traditional process of careful OIRA review and deliberation. <br />
The commenter stated that it is impossible to envision meaningful OIRA <br />
review, a step that is not only conceptually essential but required <br />
under Executive Order 12866, in a single day.<br />
    Response: First, Executive Order 12866 establishes procedures for <br />
OIRA review of significant regulatory actions, but ``does not create <br />
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or <br />
equity by a party against the United States'' or an agency.\178\ <br />
Accordingly while commenters are correct that there was not advance <br />
notice of the rule's consideration at OIRA prior to publication of the <br />
rule, and that commenters accordingly did not have an opportunity for a <br />
listening session before OIRA prior to publication, DHS followed all <br />
legally required procedures for publication of the rule. Further, DHS <br />
emphasizes that commenters had the opportunity to comment under the APA <br />
on the IFR, as explained above in previous responses addressing notice <br />
and comment procedures.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \178\ See E.O. 12866 at sec. 10; 58 FR 51384.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Second, the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory <br />
Actions, issued under E.O. 12866, is a planning tool published <br />
semiannually to inform the public about upcoming regulatory actions. <br />
See, generally, Section 4 of E.O. 12866 (Planning Mechanism); see also <br />
OIRA, OMB, ``About the Unified Agenda.'' There is not a legal <br />
requirement that agencies announce rules in the Unified Agenda prior to <br />
publication in the Federal Register or taking effect. Accordingly, the <br />
omission of a rule in the United Agenda does not invalidate or <br />
otherwise render procedurally defective a rule properly promulgated in <br />
accordance with applicable law and the APA. Instead, the APA requires <br />
agencies to provide notice of a rulemaking via the Federal Register. <br />
See 5 U.S.C. 553(b).\179\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \179\ Alternatively, the APA also allows for the provision of <br />
notice in other ways if the people subject to the rule ``are named <br />
and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice''. 5 <br />
U.S.C. 553(b).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Finally, the procedures for review by OIRA at the OMB are not <br />
within the purview of DHS. Accordingly, comments regarding actions <br />
taken by OIRA during their review are outside the scope of this <br />
rulemaking.<br />
<br />
D. Additional Out of Scope Comments<br />
<br />
    Comment: Commenters asked to end other classifications, such as: L-<br />
1, H-1B, and H-4 nonimmigrant classifications. Other commenters <br />
advocated for: allowing aliens to maintain their legal status under the <br />
H-1B visa program; deporting or ending employment authorization for <br />
aliens; expanded worksite auditing, particularly for employment-based <br />
nonimmigrant visa categories; protecting newcomers; granting immigrant <br />
aliens green cards; the creation of a startup visa; and enabling <br />
employment authorization for the accompanying spouse incident to <br />
dependent status.<br />
    One commenter argued that aliens in T nonimmigrant status should be <br />
allowed automatic extension of EADs. Another commenter said that they <br />
were displeased with the current administration.<br />
    Response: This rule addresses processes for the extension of EADs <br />
and employment authorization in certain circumstances. The comments <br />
above addressed topics or EAD categories outside the scope of this rule <br />
and will not be addressed in this final rule.\180\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \180\ T nonimmigrants were not among the classes of aliens who <br />
received automatic extensions of their employment authorization, and <br />
they are therefore not impacted by either the IFR or this final <br />
rule.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
V. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements<br />
<br />
A. Administrative Procedure Act: Delayed Effective Date<br />
<br />
    This final rule is exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act <br />
(APA)'s delayed effective date requirement under 5 U.S.C. 553(d) <br />
because DHS has for good cause found that it is unnecessary to delay <br />
implementation of this final rule.<br />
    Although the good cause exception for the 30-day effective date in <br />
5 U.S.C. 553(d) mirrors the ``good cause'' language of 5 U.S.C. 553(b), <br />
the good cause exception from the 30-day effective date requirement is <br />
easier to meet because these provisions have different purposes. See <br />
Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1992); <br />
see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 289-90 (7th Cir. 1979) <br />
(good cause more easily found as to 30-day waiting period). Unlike the <br />
notice-and-comment requirement, which is designed to ensure public <br />
participation in rulemaking, the 30-day waiting period is intended to <br />
give affected parties time to<br />
<br />
[[Page 65354]]<br />
<br />
adjust their behavior before the final rule takes effect. See Riverbend <br />
Farms, 958 F.2d at 1485.<br />
    It is unnecessary to delay this final rule's effective date because <br />
in this final rule, DHS is addressing public comments solicited as part <br />
of the IFR that has been in effect since October 30, 2025. In this <br />
final rule, DHS is not making any substantive or non-substantive <br />
changes to the IFR published in October 2025. There is no need to give <br />
affected parties additional time to adjust their behavior before this <br />
final rule takes effect. Therefore, a delayed effective date serves no <br />
purpose, and this final rule is effective immediately.<br />
<br />
B. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), Executive <br />
Order 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review), and 14192 <br />
(Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation)<br />
<br />
    E.O.s 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the costs and <br />
benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is <br />
necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. <br />
E.O. 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying costs and benefits, <br />
reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and promoting flexibility. E.O. <br />
14192 directs agencies to significantly reduce the private expenditures <br />
required to comply with Federal regulations and provides that ``any new <br />
incremental costs associated with the new regulations shall, to the <br />
extent permitted by law be offset by the elimination of existing costs <br />
associated with at least 10 prior regulations.''<br />
    This final rule has been designated a ``significant regulatory <br />
action'' and economically significant as defined under section 3(f)(1) <br />
of E.O. 12866, because its annual effects on the economy may exceed <br />
$100 million in any year of the analysis. Accordingly, this rule has <br />
been reviewed by the OMB.<br />
    This final rule is not an E.O. 14192 regulatory action because it <br />
is being issued with respect to an immigration-related function of the <br />
United States. The rule's primary direct purpose is to implement or <br />
interpret the immigration laws of the United States (as described in <br />
INA sec. 101(a)(17), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) or any other function <br />
performed by the U.S. Federal Government with respect to aliens. See <br />
OMB Memorandum M-25-20, ``Guidance Implementing Section 3 of E.O. <br />
14192, titled `Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation' '' (Mar. 26, <br />
2025).<br />
    This final rule reaffirms and finalizes changes made by the IFR to <br />
DHS regulations to end the practice of automatically extending the <br />
validity of employment authorization documents (Forms I-766 or EADs) <br />
for aliens who have timely filed an application to renew their EAD in <br />
certain employment authorization categories. The purpose of this change <br />
is to prioritize the proper vetting and screening of aliens and ensure <br />
continued eligibility before granting a new period of employment <br />
authorization and/or a new EAD. This final rule does not affect the <br />
validity of EADs that were automatically extended prior to the IFR. In <br />
previous rules providing for the automatic extension of EADs based on <br />
the timely filing of a renewal EAD application, DHS attempted to <br />
stabilize aliens' earnings and avoid labor turnover costs of employers. <br />
However, as explained in the IFR, the Department has shifted focus to <br />
prioritizing public safety and national security, and ensuring that <br />
aliens continue to be eligible and merit a favorable exercise of <br />
discretion, as applicable, before being granted continued employment <br />
authorization. See 90 FR 48799, 48816 (Oct. 30, 2025).<br />
    DHS has prepared two types of quantified estimates of the impacts <br />
that could be generated by this final rule. For a single 18-month <br />
window (starting in May 2027) from about 20,000 and 33,000 EADs are <br />
estimated to lapse, based on several assumptions. This rule may result <br />
in some EAD holders incurring a loss of earnings (``reduced earnings'') <br />
because of USCIS process delays for renewal EAD applications, as under <br />
this rule there could be disruption to their earnings due to a lapsed <br />
EAD. Such earnings loss to aliens could comprise beneficial transfers <br />
to other U.S. workers if the substitution of the latter for the former <br />
is relatively frictionless. Additionally, to the extent this rule <br />
affects EAD holders' jobs going unfilled, there will be impacts to tax <br />
transfers from businesses and employees to the Federal Government.\181\ <br />
This rule will also generate labor turnover costs to businesses that <br />
employ the affected-lapsed EAD holders, as under this rule there would <br />
be a disruption to the EAD holders' employment authorization and/or <br />
document validity. In conducting these estimates DHS emphasizes that <br />
variation in factors involved in the impact, including impact <br />
processing times, filing volumes, the timing of renewal filings, and <br />
underlying benefit requests, will cause variation in the impacts.<br />
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<br />
    \181\ This rule could also result in a reduction in State and <br />
local tax revenue, but this impact is not quantified in this <br />
analysis due to variations in state and local tax laws and <br />
individual's tax scenarios.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Due to variation in future populations and process times, there is <br />
likely to be substantial variation in the impact estimates. For this <br />
reason, DHS develops wide ranges capturing a high and low bound for the <br />
estimates, in terms of the means (expected value). This rule is <br />
estimated to result in $138.1 million in lost productivity costs to <br />
employers that are not able to easily replace aliens with lapsed EADs, <br />
costs of $312.1 million to U.S. employers from potential labor <br />
turnover, transfers due to earnings changes worth $138.1 million from <br />
employment-authorized aliens to replacement workers and is expected to <br />
generate tax reduction impacts of $14.5 million over an 18-month <br />
period. Approximately 1,700 and 2,800 employers are estimated to be <br />
impacted.<br />
    Consistent with OMB Circular A-4, Table 2 presents the prepared A-4 <br />
accounting statement showing the costs and transfers associated with <br />
this rule.<br />
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BILLING CODE 9111-97-C<br />
    Details concerning the impacts are developed in the following <br />
analysis.<br />
1. Affected Population<br />
    Due to factors contributing to uncertainty and changing trends, it <br />
is not possible to make a precise estimate of the population who will <br />
be affected by this rule. Since previous extension actions were meant <br />
to prevent lapses, an expected impact of this final rule will be<br />
<br />
[[Page 65356]]<br />
<br />
that some EADs will lapse while the renewal EAD application is pending <br />
with USCIS. Therefore, DHS will focus on estimating this impacted <br />
population (aliens with pending renewal EAD applications in categories <br />
previously eligible for automatic extension who may experience a lapse <br />
in their employment authorization and/or documentation), which will <br />
also factor into the estimation of labor turnover costs. A complicating <br />
factor is that the impacted population is likely to change over time, <br />
due to a number of factors related to processing times, backlogs, <br />
filing behavior, and resources. DHS cannot take dynamic effects into <br />
account and therefore focuses on a static, 18-month window, chosen to <br />
capture the time in which the initial impacts will first be realized, <br />
which will be May 2027 (the time in which the initials filed after the <br />
end of 540-day extension \182\ would come up for renewal).<br />
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<br />
    \182\ See DHS, USCIS, Policy Alert, Subject: Updating Certain <br />
Employment Authorization Document Validity Periods (December 4, <br />
2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20251204-EmploymentAuthorizationValidity.pdf&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-manual-updates/20251204-EmploymentAuthorizationValidity.pdf&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
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<br />
    In order to ascertain the primary-impact population, DHS utilized <br />
initial receipt volumes applicable to the C8 and C9 EADs (Table 1), <br />
extended through June 2026. These categories are the largest categories <br />
affected by the rule. DHS forecasted monthly values and summed them for <br />
the period December 2025 through May 2027 (thereby incorporating eleven <br />
forecasted months), and DHS applies a range of 25% to account for <br />
variation.\183\ The forecasted monthly time series point value estimate <br />
aggregated over 18 months and ranges are shown in Table 3, along with <br />
other relevant population components. To account for the non-C8 and C9 <br />
populations affected by the rule, DHS added a 22% factor to the broad <br />
population.<br />
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<br />
    \183\ DHS utilized the SAS JMP PRO 17 software. The ``State <br />
Space Smoothing'' suite utilizes machine learning algorithms to <br />
offer the best model information criterion to assess fit and <br />
forecasting technique for queued time series data, given dozens of <br />
potential model specifications. Based on the Akaike Information <br />
Criterion (AIC) DHS forecasted the data via a multiplicative error-<br />
multiplicative (undamped) trend, non-seasonal component (MMN) setup. <br />
The MMN model fits five parameters, but these are not reported here <br />
since the goal is limited to forecasting and not hypothesis testing. <br />
The fit results are very good according to the diagnostics: R-<br />
squared = .932, AIC = 405.6, and the residuals display no <br />
discernable pattern and are purged of serial correlation (at any <br />
lag, as all p-values of the Ljung-Box statistic are far greater than <br />
.05). In principal DHS could rely on each prediction interval around <br />
a monthly forecast to develop an aggregate range. In practice, the <br />
intervals applicable to the data are not plausible, for the <br />
following reasons. The standard error is large to begin with due to <br />
some sharp movements in the underlying data; and with a downward <br />
trending time series, the standard error takes on increasing <br />
relative weigh as the forecast values decline. The result is a <br />
``division by zero'' issue in which the lower bound is pulled <br />
towards zero. But the increased relative weight of standard error <br />
does not discriminate between the upper and lower bounds, and it <br />
therefore enacts a proportional effect to the upper level, causing <br />
it to diverge on an unstable path. For this reason, the forecast <br />
prediction interval at a 95% confidence level is not reliable.<br />
<br />
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<br />
[[Page 65357]]<br />
<br />
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC26.002<br />
<br />
    Table 3 employs a stepwise procedure for thoroughness and <br />
transparency, starting with initial receipts (c8 and c9, A) which are <br />
scaled for the other categories and the generalized approval rate for <br />
initial filings to yield a broad initial approval population (C); after <br />
which the scaling proceeds downward such that shares are applied to the <br />
immediately preceding population level (not the broad population). <br />
Population (F) is designated as the ``baseline'' since it is the <br />
largest population component that could sustain the impact. Population <br />
G depends on the timeframe--from when the renewal is filed to the end <br />
of the existent EAD validity period--based on a recommended renewal <br />
filing date. DHS currently benchmarks the time to 90 days, which is <br />
important because a different level will change the population. The <br />
final row (H) constitutes the population of interest--filers that are <br />
estimated to incur a lapse. As is reported in Table 3, based on <br />
imposition of 90 days as the recommended filing time, between about <br />
20,000 and 33,000 EADs are estimated to lapse, with a midpoint estimate <br />
of about 27,000. It is noted that Pop. H is not the entire population <br />
that<br />
<br />
[[Page 65358]]<br />
<br />
would lapse; DHS makes impacts estimates on individuals filing their <br />
renewal within a recommended amount of time, which is 90 days.<br />
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<br />
    \184\ The approval rate for initials and renewals was obtained <br />
from filing data for Form I-765 C8 and C9 for the period FY 2012 <br />
through FY 2016. This period was chosen as it is the more recent <br />
period in which automatic extension was generally not in place. The <br />
percentages shown are averages for both forms taken together (a <br />
weighted average) and display very little variation. The renewal <br />
(filing) rate was conceptually and practically more difficult. The <br />
average renewal filing rate over the same period was high for the C8 <br />
(77.6%) but low for the C9 (13.1%). The existence of a large <br />
difference in filing rates is not problematic per se, but the <br />
composition of the two filings has changed substantially over time, <br />
meaning that relying on the past averages in inadequate. For <br />
example, in the period of analysis the C8 comprised 15.2% of the two <br />
forms in terms of approvals. But, due to a surge in C8 filings, one <br />
can glean from the data in Table 1 that that form has taken on a <br />
much larger share. Therefore, DHS proceeded by developing a weighted <br />
average based on what is possible in the near future. Specifically, <br />
workflow projections estimated by OPQ place the shares of the two <br />
forms at 41.9 percent and 58.1 percent, in order, for FY 2026 <br />
through FY 2028. Multiplying these shares by the afore reported <br />
renewal rates yields weight factors of .325 and .076, in order, <br />
which sum to the relied upon 40.1 percent. Table populations in rows <br />
E-H were derived from DHS analysis of forensic data applicable to a <br />
3,000 randomly sampled initial renewal filings for the same period. <br />
in addition to the data reported in Figure 3, some other key <br />
findings of the analysis are as follows. Of the 3,000-record random <br />
sample, DHS was able to extract 2,638 viable records on approved <br />
renewals. The median filing time for the renewal was 64 days prior <br />
to the initial EAD expiration date. To put into perspective on the <br />
filing behavior, DHS observed 20.2 percent filed within 30 days, and <br />
46.9 percent filed within 60 days of the initial EAD expiration.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
2. Economic Impacts of the Final Rule<br />
    This section is divided into three modules. Module A is a <br />
discussion of certain aspects of the related rulemakings and factors <br />
involved in the future trends are provided. Module B provides mainly a <br />
descriptive assessment of the impacts. Module C is the self-contained <br />
quantitative section that estimates and monetizes a primary impact <br />
(also reported in the A-4 statement, Table 2).<br />
Module A<br />
    When DHS adjudicates and approves renewal EAD applications before <br />
the applicant's current EAD expiration date, this final rule results in <br />
no quantifiable impacts to aliens and their employers. DHS anticipates <br />
that due to other DHS actions affecting populations that might <br />
otherwise have applied for EADs, the number of initial and renewal EAD <br />
applications will be lower than in recent years.\185\ For more <br />
information on these actions, see Section IV. B. of the IFR. DHS <br />
assumes this reduced workload on USCIS could potentially eliminate the <br />
EAD backlog. Accordingly, under this scenario, this final rule would be <br />
less likely to result in lapses in employment authorization and/or EAD <br />
validity. If USCIS continues to have a backlog and is unable to <br />
adjudicate renewal EAD applications before an applicant's current EAD <br />
expires, then this final rule, by ending automatic extensions for <br />
certain EAD categories based on timely renewal filings, would result in <br />
temporary lapses in employment authorization and/or EAD validity.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \185\ As an example of the potential reduction in the number of <br />
EAD applications from external DHS actions, DHS estimated that <br />
approximately 532,000 Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans <br />
that were part of the Parole Processes are no longer eligible for <br />
employment authorization. Many of these aliens may have applied for <br />
an EAD, but will no longer be eligible, alleviating demands on USCIS <br />
EAD adjudication resources. See 90 FR 13611 (March 25, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Precisely determining the population that is expected to experience <br />
a lapse in employment authorization and/or an EAD as a result of this <br />
final rule is extremely difficult. A key factor is the backlog and <br />
whether recent external actions do not eliminate the backlog. In the <br />
following analysis DHS will provide analysis of potential lapses based <br />
on granular data. In this section DHS describes the impacted EAD <br />
renewal population that would have been subject to automatic extensions <br />
from prior, recent backlogs. As detailed earlier in the preamble,\186\ <br />
DHS has previously published two temporary final rules (2022, 2024) and <br />
a final rule (2024). DHS previously estimated a population that would <br />
have lapsed in the hypothetical absence of the 2024 final rule and the <br />
two temporary final rules. In the 2024 final rule, DHS projected that <br />
between July 2023 and March 2026, 293,000 to 449,000 pending renewal <br />
EAD applicants in the categories eligible for automatic extension would <br />
have experienced a lapse in employment.\187\ Additionally, in the 2024 <br />
final rule, DHS anticipated that starting around April 2026 through <br />
March 2027, fewer than 500 EADs would lapse each month, even without <br />
the up to 540-day extension.\188\ This projection was based on the <br />
five-year EAD validity period in effect at that time and the pre-<br />
existing up to 180-day extension.<br />
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<br />
    \186\ See Section III.C. Background &amp;amp; Purpose: Automatic <br />
Extension of Employment Authorization and Documentation.<br />
    \187\ See Table 8 (Summary of Impacts), 89 FR 101246 (Dec. 13, <br />
2024).<br />
    \188\ See Table 12 (Population Projections by Month, Rounded to <br />
Thousands), 89 FR 101251 (Dec. 13, 2024).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    In December 2025, USCIS reduced the validity period to a maximum of <br />
18 months for certain EAD categories, which could increase the <br />
frequency of renewal filings.\189\ The IFR also eliminated the up to <br />
180-day automatic extension, which was factored into the 2024 final <br />
rule Table 12 projection. Both recent changes may lead to more renewal <br />
filings; however, as stated in the IFR and in this preamble, other <br />
external factors have contributed to decreased filings.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \189\ See &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/news-alerts/reduced-validity-periods-for-newly-issued-employment-authorization-documents&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/news-alerts/reduced-validity-periods-for-newly-issued-employment-authorization-documents&lt;/a&gt; (last updated Jan. 12, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS noted uncertainty in the 2024 final rule projections, <br />
cautioning that various factors make it difficult to accurately <br />
estimate the impact of the up to 540-day extension.\190\ While more <br />
reliable estimates were possible for the 2022 and 2024 temporary final <br />
rules, uncertainty regarding the number and duration of EAD lapses has <br />
increased since the 2024 final rule and IFR.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \190\ See Summary of Costs and Benefits, 89 FR 101208, 101210 <br />
(Dec. 13, 2024).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS observes that the population affected by the IFR and this rule <br />
may have declined, as EAD filings began decreasing before the IFR was <br />
issued. See Table 1 in Section IV.C.2.i.d. of this preamble. At the <br />
same time, shorter EAD validity periods could increase renewal filings. <br />
These opposing trends complicate estimates of lapses and their duration <br />
but do not preclude DHS from making estimates.<br />
    DHS reviewed recently available EAD renewal data. DHS queried data <br />
on EAD automatic extension category expirations from October 30, 2025, <br />
through June 28, 2026.\191\ The number of EAD renewal applicants in <br />
categories previously eligible for the automatic extension who did not <br />
receive an automatic extension was 1,541 from February, through June <br />
2026. The number of EAD renewal applicants in categories previously <br />
eligible for the automatic extension who did receive an automatic <br />
extension based on a timely-filed renewal EAD application (before <br />
October 30, 2025), and who would have experienced a lapse in the <br />
absence of the automatic extension was 12,547 for the same timeframe. <br />
DHS emphasizes that these figures do not represent the likely <br />
population that could lapse starting in May 2027.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \191\ This data was until June 28, 2026, the most recent data <br />
available at the time of the query.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Additionally, it is difficult to accurately project future <br />
processing times. As stated in the 2024 final rule, processing times <br />
for EAD applications have fluctuated over the years. DHS cannot predict <br />
future fluctuations because they are dependent on variables that may <br />
change or are unanticipated, such as changes in application filing <br />
rates and processing efficiencies.\192\ However, to evaluate recent <br />
data, DHS retrieved data on the median processing times for EAD <br />
categories previously eligible for automatic extensions renewals. The <br />
processing time slightly increased from November 2025 through March <br />
2026, ranging from a median of 3.7 to 4.4 months.\193\ This median data <br />
presented here differs from the 80th percentile estimates posted on the <br />
USCIS website. This data also shows a per month median rather than an <br />
80th percentile estimate over a 6-month timeframe. Processing times <br />
also depend on available adjudicative resources, and while USCIS aims <br />
to minimize backlogs, it must ensure thorough review of applications. <br />
DHS understands that there are evolving circumstances and unknown <br />
factors that contribute to backlogs. Given recent data limitations, <br />
shifting trends, and external policy effects, the population estimated <br />
for this final rule is likely to vary in level and across time.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \192\ See Preamble, Section III.D. for reasons the processing <br />
times and backlogs have increased resulting in the 2024 TFR and 2024 <br />
Final rules.<br />
    \193\ Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and <br />
Immigration Services, CDAO (formerly called Office of Performance <br />
and Quality), CLAIMS3 &amp;amp; ELIS, queried 04/2026, PAER0021133.<br />
<br />
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<br />
[[Page 65359]]<br />
<br />
Module B<br />
    The purpose of this rulemaking is to prioritize benefits integrity <br />
and the proper vetting and screening of aliens before granting a new <br />
period of employment authorization and/or a new EAD by ending the <br />
practice of automatically extending the validity of employment <br />
authorization and/or EADs for aliens who have timely filed an <br />
application to renew their EAD in certain employment authorization <br />
categories. While prior automatic extensions reduced the risk of <br />
employers employing aliens with lapsed employment authorization and/or <br />
EAD validity, this final rule will also reduce the risk that affected <br />
employers will continue to employ an alien who is no longer authorized <br />
to work. For example, within their automatic extension period, an <br />
alien's application could have been adjudicated and denied. The <br />
obligation is on the alien employee to notify his or her employer that <br />
he or she is no longer work authorized, which puts employers at risk of <br />
unknowingly employing an unauthorized alien. Absent the IFR and this <br />
final rule, employers assess the applicability of the automatic <br />
extension based in part on a non-secure document (such as Form I-797C, <br />
Notice of Action, which is printed on plain paper). With this final <br />
rule ending the practice of providing automatic extensions based on the <br />
timely filing of a renewal EAD application, DHS is reducing the <br />
potential for fraud and instances where employers unknowingly employ <br />
aliens beyond their employment authorization and/or EAD validity.<br />
    This rule reverses some of the impacts described in the prior <br />
automatic extension rules. Employment lapses could result in cost and <br />
transfer impacts such as lost compensation to workers, transfers <br />
between workers losing their employment authorizations to replacement <br />
workers, employers' lost productivity when they are not able to quickly <br />
replace employees with lapses, and turnover costs for employers to find <br />
replacement employees. In the following section, DHS discusses impacts <br />
but cannot reliably quantify these impacts due to uncertainty.<br />
    As was described earlier in the Affected Population section, DHS <br />
determined that an expected impact of this final rule is that some EADs <br />
will lapse while the alien's renewal EAD application is pending with <br />
USCIS. In this section, the estimated lapse is developed into a <br />
quantified impact, which will constitute an earnings change to aliens. <br />
The employment lapse impacts, a loss of income to aliens, could result <br />
in either transfers of compensation to other workers or costs to <br />
employers, depending on employers' ability to replace workers with <br />
lapsed employment authorization and/or EAD validity. In cases where, in <br />
the absence of an automatic extension period, businesses would have <br />
been able to easily find reasonable labor substitutes for aliens with a <br />
lapsed employment authorization and/or EAD validity, this rule results <br />
in transfers of the earnings of affected aliens to others, who might <br />
fill in for or replace the renewal EAD applicants during their earnings <br />
lapse. In cases where, absent the automatic extension period, <br />
businesses may not easily find reasonable labor substitutes, employers <br />
may incur lost productivity and turnover costs or other disruptions. <br />
This could result in losses to native-owned businesses and their native <br />
employees. DHS assumes the value of lost productivity is at least as <br />
high as the compensation the employer would have paid the affected <br />
alien.<br />
    The employer turnover cost is generally reported as a share of <br />
annual wages.\194\ DHS would calculate the turnover costs by <br />
multiplying the number of impacted lapsed employees by the hourly wage <br />
rate, hours worked per year, and the share of annual wages.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \194\ In the 2024 Automatic Extension Temporary Final Rule, DHS <br />
estimated the turnover costs as a percentage of annual wages, using <br />
a mean of 23 percent (Table 11). Temporary Increase of the Automatic <br />
Extension Period of Employment Authorization and Documentation for <br />
Certain Employment Authorization Document Renewal Applicants, 89 FR <br />
24669 (April 8, 2024).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Finally, if employers are unable to replace affected workers, there <br />
could be changes in transfers from taxes that would have been paid by <br />
affected aliens and their employers. It is challenging to quantify <br />
Federal and State income tax impacts of employment lapses because <br />
individual and household tax situations vary widely as do the various <br />
State income tax rates. To calculate the potential transfers impact on <br />
employment taxes, DHS would estimate the decrease in Medicare and <br />
Social Security taxes, which have a combined tax rate of 7.65 percent <br />
(6.2 percent and 1.45 percent, respectively).\195\<br />
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<br />
    \195\ The various employment taxes are discussed in more detail, <br />
see Internal Revenue Service, ``Understanding Employment Taxes,'' <br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/understanding-employment-taxes&quot;&gt;https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/understanding-employment-taxes&lt;/a&gt; (last updated May 7, 2025). See <br />
Internal Revenue Service ``Publication 15, (Circular E), Employer's <br />
Tax Guide'' (June 7, 2024), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.irs.gov/publications/p15&quot;&gt;https://www.irs.gov/publications/p15&lt;/a&gt; <br />
(for specific information on employment tax rates. Relevant <br />
calculation: (6.2 percent Social Security + 1.45 percent Medicare) x <br />
2 employee and employer losses = 15.3 percent total estimated public <br />
tax impact) (last visited on May 26, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS acknowledges that the impact of this final rule is an increased <br />
risk of a temporary loss of employment authorization for aliens and <br />
employers. To the extent that aliens can file their renewals earlier <br />
and DHS is able to reduce the backlog, reductions in this uncertainty <br />
are expected.<br />
    DHS is aware of the importance of employment authorization and <br />
evidence of employment authorization for applicants' and their <br />
families' livelihoods, as well as their U.S. employers' continuity of <br />
operations and financial health. DHS also is cognizant of the potential <br />
detrimental impact that gaps in employment authorization may have on an <br />
applicant's eligibility for future immigration benefits should the <br />
applicant engage in unauthorized employment during the gap,\196\ and on <br />
their U.S. employers who must examine unexpired documents that evidence <br />
their employees' employment eligibility and attest that their employees <br />
are authorized to work in the United States.\197\ DHS also acknowledges <br />
that backlogs and prolonged processing times for renewal EAD <br />
applications are not the fault of applicants, but nonetheless could <br />
have significant adverse consequences for applicants, their families, <br />
and their employers. DHS will continue to work to reduce frivolous, <br />
fraudulent or otherwise non-meritorious EAD filings to free up <br />
adjudicatory and other resources to better ensure national security and <br />
program integrity.<br />
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<br />
    \196\ With certain exceptions, if an alien continues to engage <br />
in or accepts unauthorized employment, the individual may be barred <br />
from adjusting status to that of a lawful permanent resident under <br />
INA 245. See INA secs. 245(c)(2) and (8), 8 U.S.C. 1255(c)(2) and <br />
(8).<br />
    \197\ See, e.g., INA sec. 274A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(b)(1); 8 <br />
CFR 274a.2(a)(3).<br />
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<br />
    DHS acknowledges there is potential for detrimental impacts to <br />
applicants but recognizes the important benefits in ensuring only those <br />
eligible and suitable for renewed work authorization are allowed to <br />
work.<br />
Module C<br />
    This module prepares a thorough and transparent quantitative setup <br />
incorporating population information from Table 3, factors discussed on <br />
Module 2 above, DHS analysis of EAD renewal data, and labor market <br />
data. Since the impetus for the previous automatic extensions was to <br />
stabilize earrings, it is logical to consider the primary economic <br />
impact of this final rule as changes to earnings, which will comprise <br />
lost earnings to aliens, but potentially beneficial transfers to others <br />
authorized to work in the United States.<br />
    Due to uncertainty in future processing times and other factors, <br />
DHS<br />
<br />
[[Page 65360]]<br />
<br />
will utilize the population range (H, Table 3) but notes that variation <br />
in all of the variables is likely.\198\ The primary impact is earnings <br />
change, which is measured in valued work hour-units. The data <br />
supporting the lapse share was described in the Population section, for <br />
which DHS also fit a distribution to the lapse durations, with a mean <br />
of 40.1 days. The mean lapse duration of 40.1 days is lower than DHS <br />
estimated in the 2022 and 2024 TFRs, at 52 and 271 days, respectively. <br />
There were various reasons and time-specific conditions that led to <br />
estimates of higher average lapse duration, primarily historic spikes <br />
in pending asylum applications (C08) initial and renewal EAD <br />
applications. In the 2024 TFR, DHS acknowledged the significant <br />
contributing factor to the severe backlog and increased processing <br />
times for renewal EAD applications was the substantial increase in the <br />
number of initial C08 EAD applications that began in March 2023. <br />
Because USCIS was required to prioritize certain initial EAD <br />
applications over other applications renewal EAD processing times <br />
increased substantially. However, DHS anticipates a substantial <br />
decrease in both initial and renewal filings for EADs, which would <br />
allow for a reduction in renewal EAD processing times and consequently <br />
lapse durations. Therefore, DHS finds an estimate of 40 days for the <br />
average lapse duration is reasonable for this analysis.\199\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \198\ Two inputs that are especially subject to variation are <br />
the renewal rate and the lapse rate, because they are influenced <br />
directly by actions being taken outside the scope of this rule, and <br />
indirectly through process times. For example, DHS has only included <br />
the C8 and C9 in the population, which may understate the <br />
population, but this factor may be mitigated if the C9 renewals fall <br />
even farther from their historically low pace. If the process time <br />
for the underlying adjustment of status claim declines, the C9 <br />
renewal rate may approach zero in the future. In addition, the <br />
decision of when to file a C8--i.e., a shift in behavior--could be <br />
driven by declines in the process time of the underlying asylum <br />
benefit claim, the EAD, or both.<br />
    \199\ The mean of 40.1 days applies to the population estimated <br />
to lapse that filed before their initial EAD expiration. The <br />
impacted population (Table 3) applies to those that filed more than <br />
90 days prior to the expiration. DHS believes it is appropriate to <br />
expand the batch for estimating the lapse duration to ensure we are <br />
capturing a broader range of lapses, due to uncertainty. In the 2022 <br />
TFR, DHS estimated a mean of 52.5 days for the average lapse <br />
duration. See 87 FR 26643 (May 4, 2022). In the 2024 TFR, DHS <br />
estimated a mean of 271 days. See Table 10 and footnote 311, 89 FR <br />
24665, 24671 (April 8, 2024). In FY 2023, USCIS received about 3.49 <br />
million total EAD applications, a 50 percent increase from FY 2022, <br />
including about 2.37 million initial applications, a 77 percent <br />
increase, and 1.12 million renewal applications, a 13 percent <br />
increase. See 89 FR 24635 (April 8, 2024).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The earnings impact is estimated as an equation incorporating <br />
population, wages, lapse durations, and adjustments for labor market <br />
indicators, the latter of which makes the estimates more realistic. DHS <br />
relies on the uniform distribution bounded at the 10th percentile wage <br />
across all occupations ($15.00) and upper bound of $46.07, the latter <br />
of which updates the figure from the 2024 TFR.\200\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \200\ See 89 FR 101208, Table 13 and incumbent footnotes for <br />
details on the upper bound, based on USCIS analysis of E-Verify <br />
data. In this final rule there is only one difference compared to <br />
the TFR. The BLS is not reporting an updated wage for NAICS code <br />
518200, for the industry, Internet Service providers, Web Search <br />
Portals, &amp;amp; Data Processing. Instead, it encapsulates that industry <br />
now into subsector 518, Computing infrastructure providers, data <br />
processing, web hosting, and related services.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Further, DHS accounts for worker benefits when estimating the <br />
opportunity cost of time by calculating a benefits-to-wage multiplier <br />
(BEN) using the most recent Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) report <br />
detailing average total employee compensation for all civilian U.S. <br />
workers.\201\ Using the BEN of 1.46, the total rate of compensation for <br />
individuals at the low end of the range as $21.90 and high end as <br />
$67.26 per hour.\202\<br />
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<br />
    \201\ Table 4 includes source information.<br />
    \202\ Low end is calculated based on $15 x 1.46 = $21.90 and <br />
high end is $46.07 x 1.46 = $67.26.<br />
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC26.003<br />
<br />
<br />
[[Page 65361]]<br />
<br />
<br />
    This yields a SCL value of 6.85 hours of wages earned per day per <br />
member of the workforce.\203\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \203\ 6.85 = 1.46 x (1-0.042) x (34.3/7).<br />
    \204\ The Maximum-Extreme distribution is the fit recommend by <br />
OCB based on the ranking of the Anderson-Darling goodness of fit <br />
test for all continuous distributions. This distribution fits two <br />
parameters and is highly positively skewed, being similar to the <br />
Lognormal and Exponential distributions. While it is continuous in <br />
both tails, DHS truncated the bounds to [1, 551] to capture the <br />
actual maximum and minimum in the data.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Next, DHS calculates the income component (INC), a measure of range <br />
in the wage impacts based on the range of lapsed population and lapse <br />
durations. The earnings metric (ERN) integrates the labor market <br />
intensity and income components through the product of their ranged <br />
values. The tax impact (TAX) is calculated as earnings multiplied by <br />
the tax rate, 15.3 percent, and then divided by the benefits factor <br />
(BEN), as DHS quantifies tax impacts on unloaded wages. Working with a <br />
single value to incorporate realistic labor factors is beneficial <br />
because it is not necessary to adjust the variables--such as the <br />
benefits burden to wages and the approval rate to the population--<br />
sequentially or even directly; all the inputs interact multiplicatively <br />
and can therefore be nested as a single dimensional system.<br />
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC26.004<br />
<br />
<br />
[[Page 65362]]<br />
<br />
<br />
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC26.005<br />
<br />
Labor Turnover Cost Impacts<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \205\ See 89 FR 101208, Table 13 and incumbent footnotes for <br />
details on the upper bound, based on USCIS analysis of E-Verify <br />
data. In this final rule there is only one difference compared to <br />
the TFR. The BLS is not reporting an updated wage for NAICS code <br />
518200, for the industry, Internet Service providers, Web Search <br />
Portals, &amp;amp; Data Processing. Instead, it encapsulates that industry <br />
now into subsector 518, Computing infrastructure providers, data <br />
processing, web hosting, and related services.<br />
    \206\ The earnings change range reflects a 95% certainty level, <br />
which is distribution-specific set of forecast values lying between <br />
the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile. Since the range is very wide, DHS <br />
also provides a 95% confidence interval for the mean (expected <br />
value), obtained from the BC-a (Bias-Corrected and accelerated) <br />
bootstrapping procedure.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    This final rule is expected to generate labor turnover costs to <br />
some employers of affected EAD holders. DHS bases the assessment of <br />
these impacts on the assumption that the estimated population of aliens <br />
with lapsed EADs because of this final rule would involuntarily <br />
separate from an employer, or otherwise cease employment, and that the <br />
separation or cessation would not be due to other factors.<br />
    Employment separations or cessation can generate labor turnover <br />
costs to employers. First are the direct or ``hard'' costs that involve <br />
separation and replacement costs. These include exit interviews, <br />
severance pay, and costs of temporarily covering the employee's duties <br />
and functions with other employees, which may require overtime or <br />
temporary staffing. The replacement costs typically include expenses of <br />
advertising positions, search and agency fees, screening applicants, <br />
interviews, background verification, employment testing, hiring <br />
bonuses, and travel and relocation costs. Once hired, employers face <br />
additional training, orientation, and assessment costs.<br />
    Second, direct costs involve loss of productivity and possibly <br />
profitability due to operational disruptions, which can include errors <br />
from employees that may temporally fill the position. A third cost <br />
segment is a type of indirect cost that encompasses loss of <br />
institutional knowledge, networking, and impacts to work-culture, <br />
morale, and interpersonal relationships. This last type of cost is <br />
almost impossible to measure quantitatively.\207\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \207\ For additional descriptions of the components of labor <br />
turnover costs, see Ghase Charba, ``Employee retention: The Real <br />
Cost of Losing an Employee,'' PeopleKeep, (updated February 2, <br />
2023), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.peoplekeep.com/blog/employee-retention-the-real-cost-of-losing-an-employee&quot;&gt;https://www.peoplekeep.com/blog/employee-retention-the-real-cost-of-losing-an-employee&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    There are studies and reports concerning labor turnover costs <br />
available from Human Resource entities that are cited across <br />
correspondent literature, and turnover cost can be measured in slightly <br />
different ways. The turnover cost is generally reported as a share of <br />
annual earnings or an actual cost per employee. Usually, these reports <br />
measure the more direct, or hard costs associated with turnover and not <br />
intangible effects such as worker morale or lost productivity. Many <br />
reports cite a 2012 Center for American Progress (CAP) report that <br />
surveyed more than 30 studies that considered both direct (e.g., <br />
separation and replacement) and indirect (e.g., loss of institutional <br />
knowledge) costs.<br />
    The CAP and other reports confirm three central aspects of turnover <br />
cost: (1) that they vary substantially across industries and jobs; (2) <br />
that they tend to grow (in absolute and percentage terms) according to <br />
skill level and earnings; and (3) that they are higher for salaried <br />
workers compared to hourly wage earners.\208\ The report notes that <br />
specialized technical jobs and highly paid jobs in line with senior or <br />
executive levels, which involve high levels of education, credentials, <br />
and stringent hiring criteria, can generate disproportionately high <br />
replacement costs that can reach more than 100 percent of the salary--<br />
compared to jobs with low educational and technical requirements.\209\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \208\ See Heather Boushey and Sarah Jane Glynn, ``There Are <br />
Significant Business Costs to Replacing Employees,'' Center for <br />
American Progress, (Nov. 16, 2012), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2012/11/16/44464/there-are-significant-business-costs-to-replacing-employees/&quot;&gt;https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2012/11/16/44464/there-are-significant-business-costs-to-replacing-employees/&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
    \209\ See Shane Mcfeely and Ben Wigert, ``This Fixable Problem <br />
Costs U.S. Businesses $1 Trillion,'' Workplace, (Mar. 13, 2019), <br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gallup.com/workplace/247391/fixable-problem-costs-businesses-trillion.aspx&quot;&gt;https://www.gallup.com/workplace/247391/fixable-problem-costs-businesses-trillion.aspx&lt;/a&gt;. See also Kate Heinz, ``The True Costs of <br />
Employee Turnover,'' Built In, &lt;a href=&quot;https://builtin.com/recruiting/cost-of-turnover&quot;&gt;https://builtin.com/recruiting/cost-of-turnover&lt;/a&gt; (last updated June 23, 2023).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS examined a 2020 report by the Washington Center for Equitable <br />
Growth, which updated the earlier CAP study results to provide <br />
information on about thirty-five studies on turnover costs.\210\ We <br />
selected data points that captured both the annual earnings salary <br />
(which the study benchmarked to 2019 levels) and turnover costs. We <br />
then culled the data applicable to salary levels more than the maximum <br />
in our earnings bound. We note before making any adjustments, <br />
multiplying the maximum wage ($41.07) by 2,080 average annual full-time <br />
hours yields a maximum annual earnings figure of $95,825.6. To obtain <br />
the annual salary we multiply the (non-burdened) wage bounds ($15.00 <br />
and $46.07) by 2,080 average annual full-time hours but make the <br />
adjustment to account for average<br />
<br />
[[Page 65363]]<br />
<br />
work hours per week \211\ and employment by scaling by 0.858 and 0.958, <br />
in order, as was introduced above.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \210\ See Kate Bahn and Carmen Sanchez Cumming, ``Improving U.S. <br />
Labor Standards and the Quality of Jobs to Reduce the Costs of <br />
Employee Turnover to U.S. Companies,'' Washington Center for <br />
Equitable Growth, (December 2020), &lt;a href=&quot;https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/122120-turnover-costs-ib.pdf&quot;&gt;https://equitablegrowth.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/122120-turnover-costs-ib.pdf&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
    \211\ Work hours per week were 34.3, divided by 40 hours gives a <br />
0.858 adjustment.<br />
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC26.006<br />
<br />
    We calibrated the lognormal distribution for the parameters <br />
produced and calibrated the estimation program according to the below <br />
input values. The lognormal distribution is infinite in the upper tail, <br />
and we truncated the cost percentage to 68.7 percent, the highest value <br />
in the underlying data. The core inputs are the lapse population, <br />
turnover cost percentage, and the wage (unburdened). All the inputs can <br />
be abridged into a single equation and nested compactly as a ``one-<br />
step'' routine in the software program. The correlation between cost <br />
and earnings is tuned to 0.421. Imputing the correlation essentially <br />
means that if a randomly chosen earnings value is high, there is a <br />
higher probability that a high turnover cost percentage will be <br />
selected as well and vice versa for lower cost percentages. See Table 5 <br />
for estimation of turnover cost impacts.<br />
    Table 6 presents a summary of the impacts estimated.<br />
<br />
[[Page 65364]]<br />
<br />
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC26.007<br />
<br />
    As is shown in Table 6B, DHS estimates that a maximum of about <br />
2,800 employers could incur turnover costs. This estimate draws on the <br />
2024 TFR in which analysis of E-Verify data revealed that on average, <br />
each business employed twelve EAD holders. DHS has no reason to believe <br />
that there has been a substantive change to this figure.<br />
    Some of the impacts of this rule will depend on whether businesses <br />
will be able to find replacement labor for the positions the affected <br />
renewal EAD applicants are expected to lose if they experience a lapse <br />
in employment authorization and/or employment authorization <br />
documentation due to this rule. If businesses can find replacement <br />
labor from the pool of the unemployed, the only monetized costs of this <br />
rule to society is for costs resulting from labor<br />
<br />
[[Page 65365]]<br />
<br />
turnover. If businesses cannot find replacement labor, the monetized <br />
costs of the rule would also include lost productivity due to a lack of <br />
available labor.<br />
    DHS estimates that reduced earnings to renewal EAD applicants <br />
ranges from $17.1 million to $900.8 million with a primary estimate of <br />
$276.2 million depending on the wages and other compensation the <br />
renewal EAD applicants earn, the number of renewal EAD applicants <br />
affected, and the duration of the lapse in employment authorization <br />
and/or employment authorization documentation that may occur because of <br />
this rule.\212\ DHS uses estimates of the earnings as a measure of <br />
either: (1) transfers of this compensation from the affected population <br />
to others in the labor market, but are not already employed; or (2) a <br />
proxy for businesses' costs from lost productivity, depending on <br />
whether businesses would be able to find replacement labor for affected <br />
renewal EAD applicants due to this rule.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \212\ Lapse-duration accounted for approximately 86.9 percent of <br />
this range, wages accounted for 11.9 percent, and the lapse rate <br />
(population) 1.2 percent.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS does not know what the next best labor alternative would be for <br />
businesses when lapses occur due to this rule. Accordingly, DHS does <br />
not know the portion of the overall effects of this rule that are <br />
transfers or costs. To begin, DHS describes the two extreme scenarios, <br />
which provide the bounds for the range of effects.<br />
    Scenario 1: If, under the effect of this rule with potential lapsed <br />
EADs, all businesses would have been able to immediately find <br />
reasonable labor substitutes for the positions the renewal EAD <br />
applicants lost, businesses lose little or no productivity. <br />
Accordingly, this rule could result in $276.2 million (primary <br />
estimate, undiscounted) being transferred from affected renewal EAD <br />
applicants to workers currently in the labor force (whom are not <br />
presently employed full time) or induced back into the labor force and <br />
this rule would result in $0 costs to businesses for prevented <br />
productivity losses.<br />
    Scenario 2: Conversely, if all businesses would be unable to, <br />
within the period of analysis, find reasonable labor substitutes for <br />
the position the EAD holder filled, then businesses would lose <br />
productivity. Accordingly, $276.2 million is the estimated monetized <br />
costs from this rule for productivity losses and this rule will result <br />
in $0 being transferred from affected renewal EAD applicants to <br />
replacement labor. Because under this scenario businesses would not <br />
have been able to find replacement labor, the rule may also result in <br />
additional costs to employers for profit losses; and may result in a <br />
reduction in tax transfer payments from businesses and employees to the <br />
government. DHS has not estimated all potential tax effects but notes <br />
that earnings of $276.2 million would result in employment tax losses <br />
to the Federal Government (i.e., Medicare and Social Security) of $29.0 <br />
million.<br />
    In both scenarios, whether without this rule employers would have <br />
been able to find replacement labor or not, DHS assumes that businesses <br />
would have incurred labor turnover costs for having to search for a <br />
replacement for affected renewal EAD applicants. Accordingly, DHS <br />
estimates the rule will also result in additional labor turnover costs <br />
to businesses of $312.1 million.<br />
    Table 7 below summarizes these two scenarios and the primary <br />
estimate of this rule. Because DHS does not know the overall proportion <br />
of businesses that would have been able to easily find replacement <br />
labor in the absence of this rule, for DHS's primary estimate we assume <br />
that replacement labor would have been immediately found for half of <br />
all renewal EAD applicants and not found for the other half (i.e., an <br />
average of the two extreme scenarios described above). The June 2026 <br />
unemployment and job openings data indicate there are as many jobs <br />
available as there are people looking for jobs.\213\ Accordingly, we <br />
believe the impacts of this rule will likely skew towards Scenario 1, <br />
with the rule resulting in mostly transfers of compensation from <br />
renewal EAD applicants to other workers and turnover costs for <br />
employers.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \213\ Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that, as of June <br />
2026, there were 1.0 unemployed persons per job opening. See U.S. <br />
Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, ``Number of <br />
unemployed persons per job opening, seasonally adjusted,'' &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bls.gov/charts/job-openings-and-labor-turnover/unemp-per-job-opening.htm&quot;&gt;https://www.bls.gov/charts/job-openings-and-labor-turnover/unemp-per-job-opening.htm&lt;/a&gt; (last visited Aug. 19, 2026).<br />
<br />
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<br />
[[Page 65366]]<br />
<br />
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC26.008<br />
<br />
C. Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)<br />
<br />
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), as <br />
amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of <br />
1996, requires Federal agencies to consider the potential impact of <br />
regulations on small businesses, small governmental jurisdictions, and <br />
small organizations during the development of their rules. The term <br />
``small entities'' comprises small businesses, nonprofit organizations <br />
that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their <br />
fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than <br />
50,000. The RFA's regulatory flexibility analysis requirements apply <br />
only to those rules for which an agency is required to publish a <br />
general notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 or any <br />
other law.\214\ DHS did not issue a notice of proposed rulemaking for <br />
this action. Accordingly, DHS is not required to certify either that <br />
this final rule would not have a significant economic impact on a <br />
substantial number of small entities nor conduct a regulatory <br />
flexibility analysis.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \214\ See 5 U.S.C. 604(a).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Further, this final rule directly regulates individuals, and <br />
individuals are not defined as ``small entities'' by the Regulatory <br />
Flexibility Act. The rule indirectly impacts certain employers if, in <br />
the future, processing times exceed the expiration dates of EADs.<br />
    DHS is unsure what backlogs may continue in the future; however, <br />
DHS anticipates that, due to other DHS actions described in Section <br />
IV.C. of this final rule, it is possible that the backlog may end. If <br />
the backlogs are eliminated outside of this rule, employers will no <br />
longer be indirectly impacted by this final rule.<br />
    In the alternate scenario of a backlog in renewal EAD processing, <br />
some employers could experience indirect costs or transfer effects. The <br />
transfers would be in the form of lost compensation (wages and <br />
benefits). A portion of this lost compensation might be transferred <br />
from renewal EAD applicants to others who are currently in the U.S. <br />
labor force. A portion of the effects of this rule would also be borne <br />
by companies that would have continued to employ renewal EAD applicants <br />
had they been in the labor market longer; however, they were unable to <br />
find available replacement labor. These companies may incur an indirect <br />
cost, as they will be losing the productivity and potential profits the <br />
EAD applicant would have provided. Companies may also incur opportunity <br />
costs by having to choose the next best alternative to the immediate <br />
labor the applicant would have provided and by having to pay workers to <br />
work overtime hours. DHS does not know what this next best alternative <br />
may be for those companies. If companies can find reasonable labor <br />
substitutes for the positions the alien occupied, they will bear little <br />
or no costs. Conversely, if companies are unable to find reasonable <br />
labor substitutes for the position the applicant would have maintained <br />
then there would be no transfers and companies may experience turnover <br />
costs or other disruptions.<br />
<br />
[[Page 65367]]<br />
<br />
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)<br />
<br />
    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) is intended, among <br />
other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal <br />
mandates on State, local, and Tribal governments.\215\ Title I of UMRA <br />
provides certain exceptions to its requirements and definitions. UMRA <br />
does not apply to rules from independent regulatory agencies or rules <br />
issued with no notice of proposed rulemaking. UMRA exempts legislative <br />
provisions and rules relating to individual constitutional rights, <br />
discrimination, emergency assistance, grant accounting and auditing <br />
procedures, national security, treaty obligations, and elements of <br />
Social Security legislation.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \215\ The term ``Federal mandate'' means a Federal <br />
intergovernmental mandate or a Federal private sector mandate. See 2 <br />
U.S.C. 1502(1) and 658(5) and (6).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Title II of UMRA requires each Federal agency to prepare a written <br />
statement assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed <br />
rule, or final rule for which USCIS published a proposed rule, which <br />
includes any Federal mandate that may result in a $100 million or more <br />
expenditure (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year by State, <br />
local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private <br />
sector. See 2 U.S.C. 1532(a). This rule is exempt from the written <br />
statement requirement because DHS did not publish a notice of proposed <br />
rulemaking for this rule. This final rule does not contain a federal <br />
mandate as the term is defined under UMRA.\216\ Therefore, the <br />
requirements of Title II of UMRA do not apply, thus DHS has not <br />
prepared a statement under UMRA.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \216\ See 2 U.S.C. 1502(1), 658(6).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
E. Congressional Review Act (CRA)<br />
<br />
    The Congressional Review Act (CRA) was included as part of the <br />
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA) by <br />
subtitle E of SBREFA, Public Law 104-121, tit. II, 110 Stat. 847, 868, <br />
et seq. This final rule meets the criteria set forth in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) <br />
because it is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of <br />
$100 million or more. See 5 U.S.C. 804(2)(A). DHS has complied with the <br />
CRA's reporting requirements and has sent this rule to Congress and to <br />
the Comptroller General as required by 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1). The CRA <br />
generally provides a 60-day delayed effective date for rules that meet <br />
the 5 U.S.C. 804(2) criteria. See 5 U.S.C.801(a)(3). Because this rule <br />
makes permanent the October 2025 IFR that would otherwise continue to <br />
apply for months before this final rule has practical effect, DHS has <br />
for good cause found that the 60-day delay typically required under 5 <br />
U.S.C. 801(a)(3)(A) is unnecessary. Therefore, this rule is effective <br />
immediately upon publication consistent with 5 U.S.C. 808(2).<br />
<br />
F. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)<br />
<br />
    This final rule will not have substantial direct effects on the <br />
States, on the relationship between the National Government and the <br />
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the <br />
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with section 6 <br />
of E.O. 13132, Federalism, 64 FR 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999), it is determined <br />
that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications <br />
to warrant the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement.<br />
<br />
G. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)<br />
<br />
    This final rule was drafted and reviewed in accordance with E.O. <br />
12988, Civil Justice Reform. This final rule was written to provide <br />
clear legal standards for affected conduct and was reviewed carefully <br />
to eliminate drafting errors and ambiguities, as to minimize litigation <br />
and undue burden on the Federal court system. DHS has determined that <br />
this final rule meets the applicable standards set forth in sections <br />
3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988.<br />
<br />
H. Family Assessment<br />
<br />
    DHS has reviewed this rule in line with the requirements of section <br />
654 of the Treasury and General Appropriations Act, 1999,\217\ enacted <br />
as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental <br />
Appropriations Act, 1999.\218\ DHS has systematically reviewed the <br />
criteria specified in section 654(c) of the Treasury and General <br />
Appropriations Act by evaluating whether this regulatory action: (1) <br />
impacts the stability or safety of the family, particularly in terms of <br />
marital commitment; (2) impacts the authority of parents in the <br />
education, nurture, and supervision of their children; (3) helps the <br />
family perform its functions or substitutes governmental activity for <br />
the function; (4) affects disposable income or poverty of families and <br />
children; (5) only financially impacts families, if at all, to the <br />
extent such impacts are justified; (6) may be carried out by State or <br />
local government or by the family; or (7) establishes a policy <br />
concerning the relationship between the behavior and personal <br />
responsibility of youth and the norms of society. If the agency <br />
determines a regulation may negatively affect family wellbeing, then <br />
the agency must provide an adequate rationale for its implementation.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \217\ See 5 U.S.C. 601 note.<br />
    \218\ See Public Law 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    As articulated in the IFR and this final rule, DHS is discontinuing <br />
the practice of providing an automatic extension of the EAD or <br />
employment authorization upon the filing of a renewal EAD application <br />
because it grants a benefit without an eligibility determination, <br />
without completing vetting and screening checks and without resolving <br />
the potential hits and derogatory information. DHS has determined that <br />
the implementation of this regulation may potentially negatively affect <br />
family wellbeing as outlined in section 654 of the Treasury General <br />
Appropriations Act, 1999. Specifically, the IFR and this final rule has <br />
the potential to affect disposable income of families and children, and <br />
therefore, also impacts the family financially. However, DHS believes <br />
that it has an adequate rationale for its implementation. DHS believes <br />
that the consequences of the IFR and this final rule, the possibility <br />
that an alien is not authorized to work during the pendency of the <br />
alien's renewal EAD application and thus, that families have less <br />
disposable income, are justified in light of the national security and <br />
public safety risk that automatically issuing immigration benefits, <br />
such as an automatic extension of an EAD, poses to the public. <br />
Additionally, DHS is not removing the alien's ability to obtain a <br />
renewal of their employment authorization and/or EAD. DHS is also not <br />
preventing eligible aliens from obtaining an EAD for purposes such as <br />
proof of identity. The issuance of a renewal EAD depends in large part <br />
on the applicant's timely application for a renewal EAD. The proper <br />
planning by the alien, and monitoring of EAD processing times, allows <br />
the alien to timely file a renewal EAD application far enough in <br />
advance of their EAD expiration date, which may mitigate the risk that <br />
the alien could experience a lapse in their employment authorization <br />
and/or EAD validity and have to temporarily stop working. For these <br />
reasons, DHS believes that the benefit this rule provides by improving <br />
the security posture as it relates to the issuance of automatic <br />
extensions outweighs the impact, if any, on families and their <br />
children. Better<br />
<br />
[[Page 65368]]<br />
<br />
protecting public safety and national security before providing <br />
immigration benefits, such as automatic extensions of employment <br />
authorizations based on the filing of a renewal EAD application, is <br />
paramount.<br />
<br />
I. Executive Order 13175 (Indian Tribal Governments)<br />
<br />
    This final rule would not have Tribal implications under E.O. <br />
13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, <br />
because it would not have a substantial direct effect on one or more <br />
Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and <br />
Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities <br />
between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.<br />
<br />
J. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)<br />
<br />
    DHS and its components analyze proposed regulatory actions to <br />
determine whether the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 <br />
U.S.C. 4321, et seq., applies and, if so, what degree of analysis is <br />
required. DHS Directive 023-01 Rev. 01 ``Implementing the National <br />
Environmental Policy Act'' (Dir. 023-01 Rev. 01) and Instruction Manual <br />
023-01-001-01 Rev. 01 (Instruction Manual) \219\ establish the policies <br />
and procedures that DHS and its components use to comply with NEPA.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \219\ The Instruction Manual contains DHS's procedures for <br />
implementing NEPA and was issued on November 6, 2014, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/ocrso/eed/epb/nepa&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/ocrso/eed/epb/nepa&lt;/a&gt; (last updated July 29, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    NEPA allows Federal agencies to establish, in their NEPA <br />
implementing procedures, categories of actions (``categorical <br />
exclusions'') that experience has shown do not, individually or <br />
cumulatively, have a significant effect on the human environment and, <br />
therefore, do not require an environmental assessment or environmental <br />
impact statement.\220\ The Instruction Manual, Appendix A lists the DHS <br />
Categorical Exclusions.\221\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \220\ See 42 U.S.C. 4336(a)(2), 4336e(1).<br />
    \221\ See Instruction Manual, Appendix A, Table 1.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Under DHS NEPA implementing procedures, for an action to be <br />
categorically excluded, it must satisfy each of the following three <br />
conditions: (1) The entire action clearly fits within one or more of <br />
the categorical exclusions; (2) the action is not a piece of a larger <br />
action; and (3) no extraordinary circumstances exist that create the <br />
potential for a significant environmental effect.\222\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \222\ See Instruction Manual at V.B(2)(a) through (c).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    This final rule responds to public comments provided in response to <br />
the IFR and adopts the IFR as final without change. This final rule <br />
therefore retains the changes made to the DHS regulations by the IFR, <br />
discontinuing the practice of providing an automatic extension of <br />
employment authorization and/or EAD validity upon the filing of a <br />
renewal EAD application. Through the IFR, and now this final rule, DHS <br />
is ending the practice of providing automatic extensions of EADs to <br />
prioritize the completion of vetting and eligibility screening of <br />
aliens before granting a new period of employment authorization and/or <br />
a new EAD.<br />
    This final rule is strictly administrative and procedural. DHS has <br />
reviewed this final rule and finds that no significant impact on the <br />
environment, or any change in environmental effect will result from the <br />
amendments being promulgated in this final rule.<br />
    Accordingly, DHS finds that the promulgation of this final rule's <br />
amendments to current regulations clearly fits within categorical <br />
exclusion A3 established in DHS's NEPA implementing procedures as an <br />
administrative change with no change in environmental effect, is not <br />
part of a larger Federal action, and does not present extraordinary <br />
circumstances that create the potential for a significant environmental <br />
effect. Therefore, regulatory amendments are categorically excluded <br />
from further NEPA review.<br />
<br />
K. Paperwork Reduction Act<br />
<br />
    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13, all <br />
agencies are required to submit to OMB, for review and approval, any <br />
reporting requirements inherent in a rule. This rule does not impose <br />
any new reporting or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork <br />
Reduction Act.<br />
    However, this rule requires the use of USCIS Form I-765. This form <br />
has previously been approved by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act. <br />
The OMB control number(s) for this information collection is 1615-0040.<br />
<br />
List of Subjects in 8 CFR Part 274a<br />
<br />
    Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Cultural exchange <br />
program, Employment, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping <br />
requirements, Students.<br />
<br />
PART 274a--CONTROL OF EMPLOYMENT OF ALIENS<br />
<br />
    Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, the <br />
Secretary of Homeland Security adopts the amendments to 8 CFR Part 274a <br />
as published on October 30, 2025, at 90 FR 48799 as final.<br />
<br />
Markwayne Mullin,<br />
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.<br />
[FR Doc. 2026-20955 Filed 10-13-26; 8:45 am]<br />
BILLING CODE 9111-97-P<br />
<br />
&lt;/pre&gt;]]></content:encoded>
			<category domain="https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news">News</category>
			<dc:creator>ImmigrationDaily</dc:creator>
			<guid isPermaLink="true">https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645235-news-dhs-finalizes-rule-ending-automatic-ead-extensions</guid>
		</item>
		<item>
			<title>News: DHS Finalizes Rule on Immigration Civil Penalties</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645234-news-dhs-finalizes-rule-on-immigration-civil-penalties</link>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 08:49:35 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;pre&gt;[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 197 (Wednesday, October 14, 2026)] 
[Rules and Regulations] 
[Pages 65390-65432] 
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.gpo.gov/&quot;&gt;www.gpo.gov&lt;/a&gt;] 
[FR Doc...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;pre&gt;[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 197 (Wednesday, October 14, 2026)]<br />
[Rules and Regulations]<br />
[Pages 65390-65432]<br />
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.gpo.gov/&quot;&gt;www.gpo.gov&lt;/a&gt;]<br />
[FR Doc No: 2026-21024]<br />
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Vol. 91<br />
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Wednesday,<br />
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No. 197<br />
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October 14, 2026<br />
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Part IV<br />
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8 CFR Parts 281, 1003, and 1280<br />
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<br />
Imposition and Collection of Civil Penalties for Certain Immigration-<br />
Related Violations; Final Rule<br />
<br />
Federal Register / Vol. 91, No. 197 / Wednesday, October 14, 2026 / <br />
Rules and Regulations<br />
<br />
[[Page 65390]]<br />
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY<br />
<br />
8 CFR Part 281<br />
<br />
[Docket No: ICEB-2025-0034]<br />
RIN 1653-AA96<br />
<br />
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE<br />
<br />
Executive Office for Immigration Review<br />
<br />
8 CFR Parts 1003 and 1280<br />
<br />
[Dir. Order No. 11-2026]<br />
RIN 1125-AB36<br />
<br />
<br />
Imposition and Collection of Civil Penalties for Certain <br />
Immigration-Related Violations<br />
<br />
AGENCY: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (``ICE''), Department <br />
of Homeland Security (``DHS''); Executive Office for Immigration Review <br />
(``EOIR''), Department of Justice (``DOJ'').<br />
<br />
ACTION: Final rule.<br />
<br />
-----------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
SUMMARY: On June 27, 2025, the Departments issued an interim final rule <br />
(``IFR'') to streamline assessment of civil penalties under the <br />
Immigration and Nationality Act (``INA'') for aliens who fail to depart <br />
during a voluntary departure period, willfully fail or refuse to depart <br />
after a final removal order and certain other proscribed activities, or <br />
are apprehended while improperly entering or attempting to enter the <br />
United States. This final rule addresses comments and finalizes the IFR <br />
with one change: it permits acceptance of a late-filed appeal based on <br />
documented mail delivery delays that ICE finds were beyond the alien's <br />
control.<br />
<br />
DATES: The effective date of this final rule is October 14, 2026.<br />
<br />
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: <br />
    For DHS: Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, Regulatory Affairs <br />
Unit, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland <br />
Security, 500 12th Street SW, Washington, DC 20536; telephone (202) <br />
732-6960.<br />
    For DOJ: Jamee E. Comans, Assistant Director, Office of Policy, <br />
Executive Office for Immigration Review, 5107 Leesburg Pike, Suite <br />
2500, Falls Church, VA 22041; telephone (703) 305-0289.<br />
<br />
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:<br />
<br />
I. Background<br />
<br />
A. Basis and Purpose of the IFR<br />
<br />
    On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order <br />
(``E.O.'') 14159, Protecting the American People Against Invasion. E.O. <br />
14159, 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 29, 2025). In Section 2 of that E.O., President <br />
Trump directed that it is ``the policy of the United States to <br />
faithfully execute the immigration laws against all inadmissible and <br />
removable aliens'' and ``to achieve the total and efficient enforcement <br />
of those laws, including through lawful incentives and detention <br />
capabilities.'' 90 FR 8443. Section 8 of E.O. 14159 directs the <br />
Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of <br />
the Treasury, to ``take all appropriate action to ensure the assessment <br />
and collection of all fines and penalties that the Secretary of <br />
Homeland Security is authorized by law to assess and collect from <br />
aliens unlawfully present in the United States, including aliens who <br />
unlawfully entered or unlawfully attempted to enter the United <br />
States.'' 90 FR 8444-45. Section 12 of E.O. 14159 directs the Secretary <br />
of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State and <br />
the Attorney General, ``to take all appropriate action . . . to adopt <br />
policies and procedures to encourage aliens unlawfully in the United <br />
States to voluntarily depart as soon as possible, including through <br />
enhanced usage of the provisions of section 240B of the INA (8 U.S.C. <br />
1229c), international agreements or assistance, or any other measures <br />
that encourage aliens unlawfully in the United States to depart as <br />
promptly as possible''. 90 FR 8445. In Section 2 of E.O. 14165, <br />
Securing Our Borders, President Trump directed the Departments to <br />
``take all appropriate action to secure the borders of our Nation,'' <br />
including by ``[d]eterring and preventing the entry of illegal aliens <br />
into the United States'' and by ``[o]btaining complete operational <br />
control of the borders of the United States.'' E.O. 14165, 90 FR 8467 <br />
(Jan. 30, 2025). In Proclamation 10935, President Trump established <br />
Project Homecoming to ``present illegal aliens with a choice: either <br />
leave the United States voluntarily, with the support and financial <br />
assistance of the Federal-government, or face the consequences.'' <br />
Establishing Project Homecoming, 90 FR 20357 (May 14, 2025).<br />
    On June 27, 2025, the Departments issued an IFR, effective on the <br />
same date, to streamline how DHS assesses certain civil monetary <br />
penalties that Congress has long authorized under the INA. See <br />
Imposition and Collection of Civil Penalties for Certain Immigration-<br />
Related Violations, 90 FR 27439 (June 27, 2025). The IFR applies to <br />
three categories of illegal aliens: (1) aliens who willfully fail or <br />
refuse to depart the United States pursuant to a final order of removal <br />
or take certain actions to thwart their departure or removal, INA <br />
274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1); (2) aliens who voluntarily fail to <br />
depart the United States within the time period specified pursuant to a <br />
voluntary departure order, INA 240B(d)(1)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1229c(d)(1)(A)-(B); \1\ and (3) aliens apprehended while entering (or <br />
attempting to enter) the United States unlawfully, INA 275(b)(1), 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1325(b)(1). See also 8 CFR 281.1(a) (scope of the IFR). The IFR <br />
revised the Departments' civil monetary penalty procedures for these <br />
categories of aliens so that DHS can more efficiently and effectively <br />
promote compliance with Immigration Court orders and support border <br />
security. See 90 FR 27442. The IFR partially implements Section 8 of <br />
E.O. 14159 and supports DHS's efforts, as directed by the President, to <br />
faithfully execute the immigration laws, to achieve total and efficient <br />
enforcement of those laws, and to secure the borders of the United <br />
States. See 90 FR 27446-47. The IFR also advances the purpose of <br />
Proclamation 10935, Establishing Project Homecoming, by reinforcing <br />
that aliens must either voluntarily depart the United States, with <br />
Federal support as applicable, or face statutorily authorized <br />
consequences for failing to comply with removal or departure orders.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \1\ For ease of reading, this preamble in some instances uses <br />
the phrase ``failure to depart civil monetary penalties'' to refer <br />
collectively to both (1) the civil monetary penalties under section <br />
274D(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1), for willful failure or <br />
refusal to depart following a removal order; and (2) civil monetary <br />
penalties under section 240B(d)(1)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. <br />
1229c(d)(1)(A), for failure to voluntarily depart within the time <br />
period specified in a voluntary departure order.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    As the IFR explains, the revised procedures are needed to <br />
complement DHS's efforts to address the large number of aliens who <br />
remain in the United States despite having final removal or voluntary <br />
departure orders. See 90 FR 27446. Prior to the issuance of the IFR, <br />
there were approximately 1.5 million aliens on ICE's non-detained <br />
docket with final orders of removal, including those who failed to <br />
depart after being granted voluntary departure pursuant to INA 240B, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1229c. For example, as discussed in the IFR, in FY 2024 alone, <br />
EOIR issued more than 282,000 final removal orders, but DHS data <br />
indicate that only about 10 percent of those orders were executed. 90 <br />
FR 27445. In the same year, EOIR granted approximately 8,800 voluntary <br />
departure orders, yet only about 50 percent of those aliens confirmed <br />
their departure. Id. Moreover, as a result of the prior <br />
Administration's policies, including its border policies, the<br />
<br />
[[Page 65391]]<br />
<br />
Immigration Court caseload has dramatically increased in recent <br />
years.\2\ In the third quarter of FY 2026, there were over 3.4 million <br />
pending Immigration Court cases, a large percentage of which, if <br />
consistent with previous years, will result in removal or voluntary <br />
departure orders once adjudicated.\3\ Thus, without the IFR's <br />
intervention, the number of aliens who remain in the United States <br />
despite final removal and voluntary departure orders would have been <br />
likely to increase in the coming years. Id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \2\ However, although EOIR's pending caseload continues to be <br />
over 3.4 million, this number is trending downwards for the first <br />
time since its dramatic increase between 2021 and 2024. This <br />
downward trend has resulted from corrective action taken by the <br />
current Administration to address the crisis at the border, supra at <br />
Section I.A of this preamble; as well as corrective action taken by <br />
EOIR to improve the efficiency of EOIR operations, which promoted a <br />
record number of case completions in FY 2025; and a dramatic drop in <br />
the number of cases before EOIR initiated by DHS in FY 2025. EOIR <br />
Workload &amp;amp; Adjudication Statistics, Pending Cases, New Cases, and <br />
Total Completions (July 24, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline&quot;&gt;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/B2AW-2QYD&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/B2AW-2QYD&lt;/a&gt;].<br />
    \3\ See EOIR Workload &amp;amp; Adjudication Statistics, Pending Cases, <br />
New Cases, and Total Completions (July 24, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline&quot;&gt;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/B2AW-2QYD&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/B2AW-2QYD&lt;/a&gt;].<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    An Immigration Court's order of an alien's removal, unless reversed <br />
or vacated on appeal, is binding on all parties, including aliens. See <br />
8 CFR 1240.1(a)(1)(i), 1240.41, 1241.1. Aliens subject to final <br />
executable orders of removal \4\ remain legally obligated to comply <br />
with Immigration Court orders to depart the United States, regardless <br />
of prior DHS policies that did not prioritize all such aliens for <br />
apprehension, detention, and removal. The large number of unexecuted <br />
removal orders and the growth of DHS's non-detained docket demonstrate, <br />
however, that many aliens do not comply with this obligation.\5\ This <br />
pattern of large-scale noncompliance risks further encouraging aliens <br />
to disregard such orders under the belief that they can remain in the <br />
United States without consequence. See 90 FR 27446. Such noncompliance, <br />
in turn, undermines the integrity of the immigration system, weakens <br />
the authority of Immigration Courts, and raises fairness concerns for <br />
aliens who do comply with removal and departure requirements. See id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \4\ The term ``final executable removal order'' describes a <br />
situation where there is no legal impediment to the alien's removal. <br />
As discussed in Section III of this preamble, DHS does not issue <br />
failure to depart penalties to aliens for whom there is no final <br />
executable removal order because, for example, they have a stay of <br />
removal or other forms of protection, including Temporary Protected <br />
Status, withholding of removal, or protection under the regulations <br />
implementing the Convention Against Torture when no alternative <br />
country of removal is available, or have a DHS approved reason for <br />
remaining in the United States including an affirmative grant of <br />
deferred action. (For aliens who have protection under the <br />
regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture but for whom <br />
there is an alternative country of removal, the final order of <br />
removal may still be executable to that alternative country.) For <br />
ease of reading in this preamble, the Departments use the term <br />
``removal order'' to mean a ``final executable removal order'' when <br />
discussing civil penalties for failure to depart.<br />
    \5\ Section 241(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231(a), governs the <br />
detention and removal of aliens who have already been ordered <br />
removed. It directs DHS to remove an alien within a 90-day removal <br />
period. The statute provides: during the removal period, DHS shall <br />
detain the alien and ``[u]nder no circumstance during the removal <br />
period shall the [Secretary] release an alien who has been found <br />
[removable on certain criminal and national-security grounds].'' See <br />
INA 241(a)(1), 1231(a)(1). The prior Administration did not <br />
prioritize the apprehension, detention, and removal of all aliens <br />
with final removal orders. See United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, <br />
715 (2023) (Alito, J. dissenting) (discussing enforcement priorities <br />
memoranda issued by DHS and ICE in 2021). Instead, many simply <br />
remained in the United States without consequence. Congress, <br />
however, has not absolved such aliens of their obligation to depart <br />
the United States if they were not removed, were never detained, or <br />
were released during the removal period. Indeed, section 241 of the <br />
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231, expressly contemplates that even aliens who were <br />
never detained during the 90-day removal period have an independent <br />
obligation to leave the United States. See INA 241(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1231(a)(3) (providing that DHS may impose conditions of supervision <br />
on the alien ``[i]f the alien does not leave or is not removed <br />
within the removal period.'' Moreover, Congress has specifically <br />
authorized DHS to impose civil monetary penalties on aliens who <br />
willfully remain in the United States after a removal order which <br />
demonstrates that aliens have an independent obligation to leave the <br />
United States even if ICE did not take action to physically remove <br />
the alien or the alien was released after the expiration of the <br />
removal period. See INA 274d(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324(d)(a)(1).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Under this Administration, DHS is taking robust action, consistent <br />
with the President's direction, to ramp up efforts to locate, <br />
apprehend, detain, and remove aliens with final removal orders who were <br />
released under supervision or otherwise not subject to detention in <br />
prior years and who remain in the United States. See E.O. 14159, 90 FR <br />
8443 (Jan. 29, 2025). Managing those removals requires a significant <br />
expenditure of ICE resources in addition to costs to taxpayers.\6\ <br />
Although ICE is hiring Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) <br />
officers and expanding detention capacity pursuant to additional <br />
funding under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Public Law 119-21, 139 <br />
Stat. 72, 358-59 (2025), those efforts will take time to implement, and <br />
ICE must continue to devote immigration enforcement resources to all <br />
categories of illegal aliens that may or may not be subject to removal <br />
orders, including criminal aliens, national security risks, and other <br />
aliens unlawfully present in the United States.\7\<br />
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<br />
    \6\ See DHS, DHS Announces Historic Travel Assistance and <br />
Stipend for Voluntary Self-Deportation (May 5, 2025) (noting that <br />
currently the average cost to arrest, detain, and remove an illegal <br />
alien is $17,121) &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/05/05/dhs-announces-historic-travel-assistance-and-stipend-voluntary-self-deportation&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/05/05/dhs-announces-historic-travel-assistance-and-stipend-voluntary-self-deportation&lt;/a&gt; <br />
[&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/8ST2-RHHP&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/8ST2-RHHP&lt;/a&gt;]; see also Proclamation 10935, 90 FR <br />
20357 (``Removal flights of illegal aliens are a necessary aspect of <br />
immigration enforcement and upholding the rule of law, but they <br />
require substantial resources and manpower.'').<br />
    \7\ See DHS, Finding of Mass Influx of Aliens, 90 FR 45396-98 <br />
(Sept. 22, 2025) (explaining that in September 2025, ICE was working <br />
to fulfill a 61 percent vacancy rate for ERO officers and that the <br />
hiring of new ICE ERO officers ``takes time and includes the hiring <br />
onboarding and training of new officers''); DHS Finding of Mass <br />
Influx of Aliens 91 FR 59795, 59796-97 (Sept. 21, 2026); 59796 <br />
(Sept. 21, 2026) (explaining that ICE detention facilities are at 83 <br />
percent capacity as of August, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The IFR was also intended to complement DHS's efforts to maintain <br />
border security. Under the prior Administration, more than 8 million <br />
aliens were encountered along the southern border of the United States. <br />
90 FR 8334. In FY 2024 alone, DHS estimates that approximately 1.5 <br />
million aliens entered or attempted to enter unlawfully between ports <br />
of entry. 90 FR 27445. Although encounters have since declined in <br />
connection with this Administration's policies, these prior high <br />
encounter levels demonstrate the need for DHS to use all statutorily <br />
authorized tools to maintain border security and reduce incentives for <br />
unlawful entry. Id.<br />
    When such large numbers of aliens enter unlawfully between POEs, as <br />
occurred under the last Administration, DHS's capacity to apprehend, <br />
process, detain, and swiftly remove all such aliens diminishes.\8\ As a <br />
result, under the prior Administration, millions of aliens were <br />
released into communities nationwide, many of whom were subject to but <br />
not processed under expedited removal as envisioned by the statutory <br />
framework, imposing substantial costs on the States and encouraging <br />
additional migration by unlawful aliens who believed they would likely <br />
be released into the United States while awaiting removal proceedings <br />
that often<br />
<br />
[[Page 65392]]<br />
<br />
take years to resolve.\9\ When U.S. Border Patrol (``USBP'') officers <br />
are diverted from patrol duties to process large groups of migrants and <br />
conduct detention-related activities, criminal organizations and <br />
smugglers can exploit the diversion of resources to move illegal drugs, <br />
weapons, contraband, and aliens into the United States. See E.O. 14165, <br />
90 FR 8467 (Jan. 20, 2025). Elevated levels of unlawful border <br />
crossings also strain ICE's detention resources and impede ICE's <br />
ability to detain other aliens, including those with final removal <br />
orders. See 90 FR 45397, 45397. In combination, the prior <br />
Administration's policies and resulting incentives for unlawful entry <br />
hindered the effective operation of immigration laws designed to <br />
protect U.S. sovereignty and prevent the unlawful entry of illicit <br />
contraband, criminals, and illegal aliens.<br />
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<br />
    \8\ See Proclamation 10888, Guaranteeing the States Protection <br />
Against Invasion, 90 FR 8333 (Jan. 29, 2025) (``The sheer number of <br />
aliens entering the United States has overwhelmed the system and <br />
rendered many of the INA's provisions ineffective.''); see also <br />
Securing the Border, 89 FR 48710, 48714-15 (June 7, 2024) (interim <br />
final rule) (explaining that when large numbers of aliens cross the <br />
border unlawfully, the ``Departments' ability to refer and process <br />
[aliens] through expedited removal thus continues to be overwhelmed, <br />
creating a vicious cycle in which the border security and <br />
immigration systems cannot deliver timely decisions and consequences <br />
to all the people who are encountered at the SWB and lack a lawful <br />
basis to remain in the United States'').<br />
    \9\ See Proclamation 10888, 90 FR 8333, 8334 (Jan. 29, 2025) <br />
([T]he ``influx of illegal aliens across the southern border of the <br />
United States has placed significant costs and constraints upon the <br />
States, which have collectively spent billions of dollars in <br />
providing medical care and related human services, and have spent <br />
considerable amounts on increased law enforcement costs associated <br />
with the presence of these illegal aliens within their <br />
boundaries''); see also Securing the Border, 89 FR 48710, 48714 <br />
(discussing incentives for irregular migration during periods of <br />
high encounters at the U.S. southern border including possible <br />
release into the United States and years long delays in Immigration <br />
Court proceedings).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Additionally, elevated border crossings can severely inhibit the <br />
effective functioning of the Immigration Courts. Under the prior <br />
Administration, the record numbers of aliens encountered across the <br />
southern border overwhelmed DHS's capacity to process such aliens <br />
through expedited removal as envisioned by the statutory framework of <br />
the Act. 89 FR 81158. Instead, DHS was forced to place aliens into <br />
section 240 removal proceedings at a rate that outpaced EOIR's capacity <br />
to complete such cases in a timely manner and led to extensive delays <br />
in Immigration Court proceedings. Id. Under this Administration, the <br />
Departments have taken significant efforts to disrupt aliens' <br />
expectations of lengthy Immigration Court delays, including more robust <br />
utilization of expedited removal where available and a renewed focus on <br />
EOIR operational efficiency. Accordingly, EOIR has seen a precipitous <br />
drop in initial receipts of charging documents to initiate proceedings <br />
between FY 2024 and FY 2025, and has been continually increasing the <br />
total number of case completions.\10\ However, considering the <br />
challenges experienced under the prior administration at the southern <br />
border and the resulting consequences, the Departments have a need to <br />
use all available measures to prevent such a situation from <br />
reoccurring.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \10\ EOIR Workload &amp;amp; Adjudication Statistics, Pending Cases, New <br />
Cases, and Total Completions (July 24, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline&quot;&gt;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/B2AW-2QYD&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/B2AW-2QYD&lt;/a&gt;]; EOIR Workload &amp;amp; Adjudication Statistics, New Cases and Total <br />
Completion (July 24, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1395636/dl?inline&quot;&gt;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1395636/dl?inline&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/49J5-JTWY&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/49J5-JTWY&lt;/a&gt;].<br />
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<br />
    For these reasons, and consistent with this Administration's <br />
policies, DHS believes that it must employ all immigration enforcement <br />
authorities that Congress has provided in order to both maintain border <br />
security, including to discourage large numbers of aliens from crossing <br />
the southern border and overwhelming the Departments' abilities to <br />
effectively process and remove such aliens as occurred under the last <br />
administration, and to address the large number of aliens with removal <br />
and voluntary departure orders who have violated U.S. immigration law <br />
by remaining in the United States in contravention of such orders.<br />
    One such authority is civil monetary penalties. As explained in <br />
more detail in the IFR, Congress has authorized DHS to impose civil <br />
penalties on: (1) aliens who willfully fail or refuse to depart the <br />
United States after a final order of removal or take other action to <br />
thwart removal; (2) aliens who fail to comply with a voluntary <br />
departure order; and (3) aliens who are apprehended entering or <br />
attempting to enter the United States unlawfully (``unlawful entry <br />
penalties''). See INA 274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1); INA <br />
240B(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(1)(A); INA 275(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1325(b)(1). Congress has also specified the authorized range of penalty <br />
amounts, which DHS has adjusted for inflation. For ``unlawful entry,'' <br />
the penalty amounts range from $100 to $500 per entry or attempted <br />
entry. See INA 275(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1); 8 CFR 280.53(b)(14). For <br />
failure to comply with voluntary departure conditions, the penalty is <br />
set by an Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals <br />
(``BIA'') and may range from $1,992 to $9,970 after inflation <br />
adjustments, but the general default amount is $3,000. See INA <br />
240B(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(1)(A); 8 CFR 280.53(b)(3), 1240.26(l). <br />
For aliens ordered removed who remain in the United States, DHS may <br />
impose a penalty of up to $998 for each day the alien willfully fails <br />
to comply with the order. See INA 274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1); 8 <br />
CFR 280.53(b)(14). As the IFR explains, DHS believes that robust <br />
application of these civil penalties will deter future unlawful entries <br />
and encourage greater compliance with removal and voluntary departure <br />
orders, in line with Congress's intent and this Administration's focus <br />
on securing the border and restoring integrity to the immigration <br />
system. See 90 FR 27439-40, 27442.<br />
    Prior to the IFR, however, DHS was required to use the general <br />
civil penalty procedures at 8 CFR part 280 to impose these penalties. <br />
These procedures were promulgated by the former Immigration and <br />
Naturalization Service (``INS'') decades before Congress authorized the <br />
specific failure-to-depart and unlawful entry penalties covered by the <br />
IFR. See 90 FR 27440-41. Those regulations were designed primarily for <br />
penalties imposed on airlines and other carriers that violate INA <br />
provisions governing the transport of aliens into the United States, <br />
rather than for penalties against individual aliens for failure-to-<br />
depart or unlawful entry. Id. Under those regulations, DHS had to <br />
provide a written notice of intent to fine (``NIF''), served in person <br />
or by certified mail, and then wait at least 30 days for a response. <br />
Id. If the alien did not respond or did not contest the fine, a DHS <br />
officer could issue a final decision imposing the penalty. Id. If the <br />
alien contested the fine, the alien could request an in-person <br />
interview or submit a sworn written response; a supervisory immigration <br />
officer would then issue a written decision; the alien could seek <br />
reconsideration within DHS; after exhausting DHS procedures, the alien <br />
could appeal to the BIA. Id. As discussed in the IFR, these procedures <br />
are lengthy, resource intensive, and not tailored to the failure-to-<br />
depart and unlawful entry penalties that Congress later authorized. See <br />
90 FR 27444-46.<br />
    The IFR streamlined and simplified the process DHS uses to impose <br />
civil penalties for failure-to-depart and unlawful entry and eliminated <br />
unnecessary procedures that are not required by statute. See 90 FR <br />
27449-52. The IFR changed only the way DHS issues and adjudicates civil <br />
monetary penalties and the way an alien may contest such penalties for <br />
these specific fines. 90 FR 27454. The IFR did not require the <br />
imposition of any new penalties or otherwise change the substantive <br />
criteria for issuing civil penalties. Id.<br />
    Under the IFR, the new 8 CFR 281 allows a DHS immigration officer <br />
to initiate the penalty process by issuing a written decision and order <br />
imposing the civil monetary penalty. 8 CFR 281.1(b), (c). The decision <br />
and order must identify the statutory basis for the penalty, state the <br />
type and amount of the penalty, and provide a brief<br />
<br />
[[Page 65393]]<br />
<br />
explanation of the reasons for the decision. 8 CFR 281.1(c)(1). The <br />
decision and order must also advise the alien of the right to appeal; <br />
the process for filing an appeal; the right to be represented by <br />
counsel at no expense to the government; and the opportunity to submit <br />
written arguments and supporting documentation challenging the penalty. <br />
8 CFR 281.1(c)(2). The alien may file a written defense and supporting <br />
evidence or may simply submit a written notice of appeal. 8 CFR <br />
281.1(c)(2), (e)(1). DHS may serve the decision and order in person or <br />
by regular mail. 8 CFR 281.1(d).<br />
    The IFR also replaced the elaborate review process before DHS set <br />
forth in 8 CFR part 280 and appeal process before EOIR set forth at 8 <br />
CFR 1280.1 \11\ for these three specific civil penalties with an appeal <br />
process that takes place solely before DHS. Under the IFR, an alien <br />
must file a notice of appeal within 15 business days of service of the <br />
initial decision and order. 8 CFR 281.1(e)(1). If the alien does not <br />
file a timely appeal with DHS, the initial decision and order become <br />
final. 8 CFR 281.1(f)(3). If the alien files a timely appeal with DHS, <br />
a supervisory immigration officer who did not issue the initial <br />
decision and order will review the appeal. 8 CFR 281.1(e)(2). The <br />
supervisory officer will review the appeal within 10 days of receipt <br />
and may, in his or her discretion, request additional written briefing <br />
or documentation, which the alien must provide within 15 days of <br />
receiving the request. Id. At the alien's request, the supervisory <br />
officer will generally provide copies of pertinent documents and <br />
records relevant to the penalty. 8 CFR 281.1(e)(3). The supervisory <br />
officer will decide the appeal on the written record; the IFR does not <br />
provide for in-person interviews. Id. The record must include the <br />
initial decision and order, evidence in DHS's administrative files, and <br />
any timely written submissions, briefs, documentary evidence, or other <br />
relevant materials submitted by the alien. Id. The supervisory officer <br />
will review this record de novo, including the initial decision and <br />
order and any written arguments and evidence submitted by the alien, <br />
and will issue a final decision within 45 days. 8 CFR 281.1(e)(2). That <br />
officer's decision constitutes the final agency action, subject only to <br />
discretionary review by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the <br />
alien may not appeal the decision to the BIA. 8 CFR 281.1(e)(4), <br />
(f)(1)-(3). However, the IFR allows DHS to reopen a decision, in its <br />
sole discretion (i.e., sua sponte), at any time to reconsider the <br />
decision and reduce or rescind the fine. 8 CFR 281.1(f)(1).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \11\ Any cases appealed to the BIA would add to the BIA's <br />
pending caseload and be subject to the same case management <br />
framework as all other appeals. See 8 CFR 1003.1. To address an <br />
unprecedented caseload and an urgent need to improve the efficiency <br />
of BIA procedures, the Department has reconsidered the Board's role <br />
as an appellate tribunal and issued an IFR to streamline BIA <br />
procedures. See generally Appellate Procedures for the Board of <br />
Immigration Appeals, 91 FR 5267 (Feb. 6, 2026) (partially set aside <br />
on procedural grounds Amica Ctr. for Immigrant Rts. v. EOIR, No. CV <br />
26-696 (RDM), 2026 WL 662494, at *34 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2026)). <br />
Divesting the BIA of responsibility over DHS imposition and <br />
enforcement of civil fines and penalties, an area where there is no <br />
statutory requirement for EOIR review and where the BIA has no <br />
unique adjudicatory expertise, is consistent with BIA efforts to <br />
create operational efficiencies.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    As explained in the IFR, the Departments reasoned that these <br />
updated procedures will allow DHS to impose these civil penalties more <br />
swiftly on more aliens who unlawfully enter the United States and on <br />
those who disregard removal and voluntary departure orders. See 90 FR <br />
27442. In turn, this will help support DHS's efforts to maintain border <br />
security and enforce immigration laws by deterring unlawful entries and <br />
encouraging compliance with removal and departure orders. See 90 FR <br />
27445-46. Compared to the general procedures in 8 CFR part 280, the <br />
revised process reduces unnecessary administrative burdens and allows <br />
DHS to reach final decisions more quickly while at the same time <br />
reducing unnecessary burdens on the BIA's caseload. See 90 FR 27444-45. <br />
The IFR explained that these changes are needed to ensure that DHS can <br />
efficiently employ these statutory penalties while continuing to <br />
prioritize, without diverting resources away from, border security and <br />
the apprehension, detention, and removal of aliens who have violated <br />
the Nation's immigration laws, consistent with this Administration's <br />
policy objectives and the President's direction. See 90 FR 27444-46.<br />
    To further advance the IFR's goal of encouraging compliance with <br />
removal and departure orders, DHS has announced that it will rescind <br />
most failure to depart fines if an alien uses the U.S. Customs and <br />
Border Protection (``CBP'') Home app to arrange and complete self-<br />
departure from the United States.\12\ This policy, coupled with DHS's <br />
expanded use of these civil penalties, is intended to provide an <br />
additional clear incentive for aliens to comply with removal and <br />
departure orders and avoid civil monetary penalties by doing what the <br />
law requires: departing the United States as ordered.\13\<br />
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<br />
    \12\ See DHS, DHS Announces It Will Forgive Failure to Depart <br />
Fines for Illegal Aliens who Self-Deport Through the CBP Home App <br />
(June 9, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/06/09/dhs-announces-it-will-forgive-failure-depart-fines-illegal-aliens-who-self-deport&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/06/09/dhs-announces-it-will-forgive-failure-depart-fines-illegal-aliens-who-self-deport&lt;/a&gt; <br />
[&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/8RBN-PACA&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/8RBN-PACA&lt;/a&gt;]. As discussed below in response to <br />
comments in Section III of this preamble, DHS has recently updated <br />
its website to make clear that all non-criminal illegal aliens may <br />
register under CBP Home app to depart the United States and DHS will <br />
forgive failure-to depart civil penalties once the alien departs.<br />
    \13\ See id.; see also Proclamation 10935, 90 FR 20357.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    At the same time, the Departments determined that the revised <br />
procedures are consistent with due process. For the reasons discussed <br />
more fully in the IFR and in response to comments in Section III of <br />
this preamble, the Departments have concluded that a shortened appeal <br />
period, removal of in-person interviews, and the shift from BIA review <br />
to internal DHS review are appropriate and consistent with due process <br />
given that these civil penalties typically turn on routine and <br />
straightforward factual and legal determinations and aliens have <br />
limited grounds to contest them. 90 FR 27451-55. In addition, ICE will <br />
now also permit acceptance of a late-filed appeal based on documented <br />
mail delivery delays that ICE finds were beyond the alien's control.<br />
    First, INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b), authorizes DHS to impose a <br />
civil penalty on any alien who is apprehended while entering or <br />
attempting to enter the United States at an improper place or time. <br />
Aliens apprehended while entering unlawfully have, by definition, <br />
violated INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b), and the documented encounter <br />
provides the only fact necessary to impose these penalties. <br />
Additionally, when USBP agents apprehend an alien entering unlawfully, <br />
the agents prepare a Form I-213, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible <br />
Alien, which documents the apprehension and is sufficient to <br />
demonstrate liability for these penalties. See 90 FR 27442. As a matter <br />
of practice, USBP issues these penalties at the time that it apprehends <br />
the alien. In these circumstances, the Departments do not believe that <br />
a lengthy, multi-step appeal process is necessary. See id. The IFR's <br />
appeal structure preserves an alien's meaningful ability to contest an <br />
unlawful entry penalty if the alien believes a penalty was issued <br />
erroneously.<br />
    Second, the nature of the failure to depart penalties also supports <br />
the IFR's changes. Congress has authorized DHS to impose civil monetary <br />
penalties on aliens for failure to depart, subject to the general <br />
federal statute of limitations, 28<br />
<br />
[[Page 65394]]<br />
<br />
U.S.C. 2462, if two elements have been satisfied: (1) the alien is <br />
subject to a final order of removal or was granted voluntary departure <br />
and (2) the alien willfully fails or refuses to depart under a removal <br />
order or voluntarily fails to comply with a voluntary departure order. <br />
INA 274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1); INA 240B(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1229c(d)(1)(A). DHS maintains records of an alien's immigration <br />
history, including removal and voluntary departure orders, and has <br />
ready access to information about any pending appeals needed to verify <br />
that the alien is subject to a final removal or departure order. 90 FR <br />
27442-43. Before issuing a penalty, ICE guidance requires the <br />
immigration officer to verify that there are no DHS records of the <br />
alien's departure from the United States and reviews the alien's <br />
immigration records for information suggesting that the alien's failure <br />
to depart was not willful or voluntary. This includes information <br />
about<b></b>: automatic stays resulting from motions to reopen; certain <br />
immigration benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (``VAWA'') <br />
that stay the alien's removal; for aliens on an order of supervision, <br />
efforts the alien has made to secure travel documents at DHS's request; <br />
whether DHS has affirmatively approved the alien for deferred action; <br />
whether the Immigration Courts, DHS, or a federal court has granted a <br />
stay of removal; and whether DHS or EOIR has granted the alien <br />
protection that excuses the alien's failure to depart while the alien <br />
maintains that protection, including temporary protected status <br />
(``TPS''), protection under the Convention Against Torture (``CAT''), <br />
and withholding of removal under INA 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) <br />
when no alternative country of removal is available.<br />
    Absent evidence in records accessible to DHS showing that the alien <br />
is permitted to remain in the United States, or that the alien has <br />
departed, DHS believes the statutory prerequisites to issue a penalty <br />
will have been met where an alien ordered removed or granted voluntary <br />
departure is physically present in the United States beyond the time <br />
frame specified by the Immigration Judge. As the IFR explains, civil <br />
penalties for failure to depart are generally issued after completion <br />
of section 240 removal proceedings that resulted in a final order <br />
requiring the alien's departure from the United States immediately or <br />
within a certain time frame specified by the Immigration Judge. See 90 <br />
FR 27440. These aliens have received due process through section 240 <br />
removal proceedings where they had an opportunity to contest the <br />
charges against them, to seek relief, and to be informed by an <br />
Immigration Judge of their obligation to depart and of the consequences <br />
of failing to do so. Id. Aliens granted voluntary departure prior to <br />
the conclusion of section 240 removal proceedings have already agreed <br />
to forgo challenging removal or seeking relief in exchange for being <br />
allowed to depart voluntarily. Id. In these circumstances, and when DHS <br />
records show the removal order is executable, the Departments reasoned <br />
that an alien's continued presence in the United States is generally <br />
sufficient to establish liability for these civil penalties, absent the <br />
alien providing evidence on appeal \14\ to demonstrate otherwise. See <br />
90 FR 27442-43.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \14\ The Departments determined that such appeal should take <br />
place before DHS, and not the BIA, given the straightforward and <br />
readily determinable requirements for imposing and enforcing such <br />
penalties based on information within DHS's and the alien's <br />
possession. 90 FR 27444.<br />
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<br />
    In addition, Immigration Judges are required by law to inform <br />
aliens of their departure obligations and the consequences for failing <br />
to comply. Under INA 240(c)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(5), when an <br />
Immigration Judge orders removal, the Immigration Judge must inform the <br />
alien of the consequences for failure to depart under the order of <br />
removal, including civil penalties described at sections INA 274D, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1324(d). See 8 CFR 1240.13(d). Likewise, for voluntary <br />
departure, the INA requires that an Immigration Judge ``shall inform <br />
the alien of the penalties'' that will apply if the alien voluntarily <br />
fails to depart within the time allowed, including civil monetary <br />
penalties and ineligibility for certain forms of relief. INA <br />
240B(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(3). These advisals are mandatory <br />
components of 240 removal proceedings, not discretionary steps.<br />
    These statutory and regulatory requirements are directly relevant <br />
to the willfulness and voluntariness elements in the civil penalty <br />
statutes. Before DHS considers imposing a failure to depart penalty, <br />
the alien will ordinarily have been advised, on the record, that the <br />
law requires the alien to depart the United States and that failure to <br />
do so may result in civil fines and other adverse consequences. When an <br />
alien remains in the United States after such clear, legally required <br />
notice, his or her continued presence strongly supports the conclusion <br />
that the alien has ``willfully fail[ed] or refuse[d]'' to depart under <br />
a removal order or ``voluntarily'' failed to comply with a voluntary <br />
departure order, as required by the failure to depart civil penalty <br />
statutes. In making this assessment, DHS also relies on the presumption <br />
of regularity that attaches to official acts of government officers, <br />
including Immigration Judges. See United States Postal Serv. v. <br />
Gregory, 534 U.S. 1, 10 (2001). Under this presumption, DHS may <br />
reasonably assume that Immigration Judges complied with their legal <br />
obligations under the INA and implementing regulations and provided the <br />
required advisals concerning departure obligations and the consequences <br />
of noncompliance, absent specific evidence to the contrary in the <br />
record. In all cases, ICE considers the willfulness of an alien's <br />
violation in determining whether to impose a penalty.<br />
    Taken together--(1) the procedural protections provided in section <br />
240 removal proceedings, (2) the mandatory Immigration Judge advisals <br />
of departure obligations and penalties, (3) the presumption of <br />
regularity applicable to those advisals, and (4) DHS's careful review <br />
of U.S. Government records to confirm that the alien is subject to a <br />
final, executable order and lacks lawful permission to remain--DHS <br />
concludes that an alien's continued presence in the United States is <br />
generally sufficient to establish the willful or voluntary failure to <br />
depart required to impose these civil penalties, absent evidence <br />
provided by the alien on appeal to demonstrate that the alien is not <br />
liable. Therefore, the Departments reasoned that streamlining the <br />
issuance and adjudication of these civil penalties, and the associated <br />
appeals process, aligns more closely with the nature and intent of <br />
these straightforward civil penalties. While in most cases, DHS records <br />
sufficiently establish the facts necessary to demonstrate that the <br />
alien is subject to these civil penalties, the alien retains the right <br />
to contest them on limited grounds. See 90 FR 27442-46.<br />
    To the extent an alien believes that DHS issued a penalty <br />
erroneously--for example, because the alien is not subject to a removal <br />
order, is legally permitted to remain in the United States, or did not <br />
willfully or voluntarily fail to depart--the Departments determined <br />
that the IFR provides sufficient notice and an opportunity to contest <br />
the decision before DHS, and that further review before EOIR is <br />
unnecessary. See 90 FR 27451-55. Under the IFR, a DHS immigration <br />
officer must issue a written decision that sets forth the statutory and <br />
factual basis for the penalty and informs the alien of the requirements <br />
and deadlines for filing an appeal. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &amp;amp; <br />
Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (stating<br />
<br />
[[Page 65395]]<br />
<br />
that notice under due process must be of a sufficient nature as to <br />
reasonably convey the required information). The revised appeal process <br />
also preserves an alien's opportunity to contest a civil penalty. Under <br />
the IFR's procedures, the alien has 15 business days to appeal using <br />
the DHS-developed Form 281, Notice and Violation of Order, and a <br />
supervisory immigration officer who did not issue the initial decision <br />
will review the record de novo and may request additional evidence <br />
before making a final determination. See 90 FR 27452-54.<br />
    As explained in the IFR and in response to comments in Section III <br />
of this preamble, the Departments believe that additional procedures, <br />
beyond those contained in the IFR, would not enhance the accuracy, <br />
fairness, or reliability of the process given the straightforward <br />
nature of these penalties and the limited grounds that an alien may <br />
have to contest them. See id. Thus, for the reasons discussed in the <br />
IFR and in response to comments in Section III of this preamble, the <br />
Departments believe that the revised procedure preserves an alien's <br />
ability to contest the fine while better ensuring that the BIA does not <br />
unnecessarily expend resources in areas where DHS is better positioned <br />
to review such determinations, and that DHS can reach final decisions <br />
efficiently and apply these statutory penalties swiftly and at the <br />
scale necessary to address the large number of aliens who have entered <br />
or remain unlawfully in the United States. Accordingly, after carefully <br />
considering comments received on the IFR, the Departments are <br />
finalizing this rule with one change discussed in more detail below to <br />
account for U.S. postal delays.<br />
<br />
B. The Departments' Experience With the IFR<br />
<br />
    The IFR is working as intended. As a result of the IFR, DHS has <br />
been able to issue a significantly greater number of civil penalties <br />
compared to the pre-IFR process under 8 CFR part 280. From March 26, <br />
2025, through June 26, 2025, ICE issued 12,135 civil penalties under <br />
the pre-IFR process.\15\ From June 27, 2025, after the IFR took effect, <br />
through September 14, 2026, ICE issued approximately 110,000 failure to <br />
depart civil penalties, and CBP issued an additional 66,000 civil <br />
penalties for unlawful entry. Thus, DHS increased the number of civil <br />
penalties issued from approximately 930 per week under the pre-IFR <br />
process to nearly 2,800 per week under the IFR process.\16\ <br />
Accordingly, the IFR has allowed DHS to impose more civil penalties <br />
more quickly on a greater scale, while retaining procedural safeguards <br />
designed to promote accurate penalty assessments without diverting <br />
resources away from border security, and the apprehension, detention, <br />
and removal of aliens who have violated our immigration laws.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \15\ See Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of <br />
Alien Departures by Civil Fine, DHS Enforcement, and EOIR Case <br />
Outcomes (Oct. 7, 2026).<br />
    \16\ Id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Second, DHS's robust use of civil penalties appears to be shifting <br />
incentives for aliens with removal and departure orders who might <br />
otherwise remain unlawfully in the United States. DHS data indicates <br />
that over 82,000 aliens with removal orders and voluntary departures <br />
orders have self-departed from the United States since DHS began <br />
issuing civil penalties in March 2025 through September 14, 2026.\17\ <br />
In that same period, over 7,700 aliens have self-departed after <br />
receiving a civil penalty.\18\ Further, the number of aliens with <br />
removal orders or voluntary departure orders who have self-departed <br />
since the IFR took effect has increased significantly, as has the <br />
number of aliens who have departed after receiving a civil penalty. In <br />
the pre-IFR period from March 26, 2025, through June 26, 2025, <br />
approximately 8,600 aliens with removal or voluntary departure orders <br />
self-departed, and approximately 540 aliens self-departed the United <br />
States after receiving a civil penalty during this period.\19\ In the <br />
post-IFR period from June 27, 2025, through September 14, 2026, over <br />
74,000 aliens with removal orders or voluntary departure orders self-<br />
departed in total, and approximately 7,180 aliens self-departed after <br />
receiving a civil penalty during this period. This data indicates that <br />
DHS's robust use of civil penalties, as facilitated by the IFR's <br />
streamlined procedures, is encouraging illegally present aliens to <br />
depart the United States on their own, consistent with the IFR's <br />
objectives.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \17\ Id. For the purpose of this analysis, the term self-<br />
departure includes the sum of confirmed departures without <br />
involvement of DHS enforcement or without DHS expense including ICE-<br />
assisted repatriations at the alien's own expense and OFO <br />
repatriations. It also includes observed departures of aliens who <br />
have voluntarily departed with financial support from the U.S. <br />
Government through the CBP Home program. See Proclamation 10935, 90 <br />
FR 20357 (establishing Project Homecoming and directing DHS to <br />
establish a seamless process for illegal aliens to depart the United <br />
States including through the CBP Home program); see also DHS Fact <br />
Sheet, CBP Home: Assistance to Voluntarily Self-Deport (Sept. 1, <br />
2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/cbphome&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/cbphome&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/PWQ2-W6ZJ&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/PWQ2-W6ZJ&lt;/a&gt;] <br />
(explaining CBP Home app and departure incentives available to <br />
aliens who use the app to voluntarily self-depart). The count of <br />
departures without DHS assistance may be under-inclusive because, as <br />
explained in the IFR, DHS does not maintain comprehensive departure <br />
records for all aliens, particularly those who depart across the <br />
southern or northern land border without informing DHS. See 90 FR <br />
27443, n.17.<br />
    \18\ Id.<br />
    \19\ Id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Finally, DHS's experience implementing the civil penalties covered <br />
by this rule since March 26, 2025, confirms that many pre-IFR <br />
procedures were unnecessary and that the IFR's procedures provide a <br />
meaningful opportunity to contest penalties believed to be erroneous <br />
without unnecessarily diverting BIA resources away from adjudicating <br />
its existing pending caseload to conduct review better addressed by <br />
DHS. As discussed above, the IFR shortens the appeal period, eliminates <br />
in-person interviews, and shifts appeals from the BIA to DHS. DHS data <br />
support these changes:<br />
     Under the pre-IFR process, aliens filed written answers <br />
pursuant to 8 CFR 280.12 contesting failure to depart penalties for <br />
only 222 of the 12,135 notices of intent to fine that ICE issued, a <br />
less than 2 percent appeal rate. Under the post-IFR process through <br />
September 10, 2026, aliens appealed failure to depart civil penalties <br />
in 3,072 cases of the approximately 110,000 penalties that ICE issued <br />
between June 27, 2025, through September 14, 2026, a nearly 3 percent <br />
appeal rate. The appeal rate has therefore increased under the post-IFR <br />
process.\20\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \20\ Prior to the IFR, CBP did not issue any penalties for <br />
unlawful entry under INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b). Thus, the <br />
comparison between pre-IFR and post-IFR appeals is limited to the <br />
failure to depart penalties under INA 240B(d), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d) and <br />
INA 274D, 8 U.S.C. 1324d. Further, as discussed throughout this <br />
preamble, the Departments believe that very few aliens have grounds <br />
to appeal unlawful entry penalties issued under INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1325(b), given the even more straightforward nature of those <br />
penalties.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
     Only 4 aliens requested an in-person interview out of the <br />
222 penalty notices that aliens contested under the pre-IFR process, <br />
indicating that in-person interviews are generally unnecessary and that <br />
aliens can adequately contest these decisions through written <br />
submissions based on information in the alien's possession.<br />
     Under the pre-IFR process, only 44 aliens appealed DHS's <br />
penalty decision to the BIA under 8 CFR part 1003, further supporting <br />
the Departments' assessment that the legal issues associated with these <br />
penalties are relatively straightforward and appeals can be handled by <br />
DHS. As of September 10, 2026, the BIA has issued only two decisions in <br />
these appeals, including a published decision which<br />
<br />
[[Page 65396]]<br />
<br />
upheld the civil penalty.\21\ This further supports the Departments' <br />
decision to eliminate BIA review in favor of an internal DHS appeal <br />
process given the lengthy BIA adjudication timeframes.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \21\ See Matter of R-P-L-, 29 I&amp;amp;N Dec. 859 (BIA 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
     Aliens have successfully contested penalty decisions under <br />
the post-IFR processes. Of the appeals that DHS has adjudicated under <br />
the post-IFR process, aliens prevailed in 25 percent of the cases. This <br />
clearly demonstrates that the IFR's appeal process is meaningful, and <br />
DHS can adjudicate these penalties fairly without the need for the <br />
BIA's review.<br />
    These results support the Departments' conclusion that the IFR's <br />
streamlined procedures provide appropriate protections while allowing <br />
DHS to apply statutory penalties efficiently and at scale. DHS believes <br />
there have been fewer appeals to fines issued under 8 CFR part 281, as <br />
compared to 8 CFR part 280, because of the straightforward <br />
determinations of fact associated with fines under part 281. <br />
Additionally, the appeal process under 8 CFR part 281 discourages <br />
frivolous or non-meritorious appeals, focusing resources on cases with <br />
substantive claims.<br />
<br />
II. Statutory Authority<br />
<br />
    The Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security issue this <br />
joint final rule pursuant to their respective authorities. The Homeland <br />
Security Act of 2002 (``HSA''), Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, as <br />
amended, transferred to the Secretary many functions previously <br />
exercised by the former INS in implementing and enforcing Federal <br />
immigration law. The INA, as amended, charges the Secretary ``with the <br />
administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws <br />
relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens.'' INA <br />
103(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1). It authorizes the Secretary to take <br />
actions ``necessary for carrying out'' that responsibility. INA <br />
103(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(3). As relevant here, the INA and HSA now <br />
authorize the Secretary to impose most civil monetary penalties under <br />
the INA, including those set forth in INA 240B(d), 274D(a), and 275(b); <br />
8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), 1324d(a), and 1325(b). See INA 103(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. <br />
1103(a)(1) (reposing in the Secretary the authority to administer and <br />
enforce the immigration laws except as expressly reserved to the <br />
President, Attorney General, or Secretary of State) and HSA 402(3), 6 <br />
U.S.C. 202(3) (charging the Secretary with carrying out the immigration <br />
enforcement functions vested by statute in, or performed by, the <br />
Commissioner of the former INS).<br />
    Within DHS, the HSA allocated immigration functions and <br />
responsibilities to CBP, ICE, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration <br />
Services (``USCIS''). See HSA 411, 6 U.S.C. 211 (CBP); HSA 442, 6 <br />
U.S.C. 252 (ICE); HSA 451, 6 U.S.C. 271 (USCIS). ICE is generally <br />
responsible for interior immigration enforcement, and CBP is generally <br />
responsible for immigration enforcement at ports of entry and along the <br />
United States border. Both components have authority to administer <br />
civil monetary penalties relating to certain violations of immigration <br />
law and Immigration Court orders, including penalties authorized under <br />
INA 240B(d), 274(D)(a), and 275(b). See, e.g., 8 CFR part 280.<br />
    The Secretary may delegate or re-delegate any authority vested in <br />
DHS under the immigration laws to any DHS officer, official, or <br />
employee, including by successive delegations. See INA 103(a)(4), 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1103(a)(4); 8 CFR 2.1; Authority of the Secretary of Homeland <br />
Security; Immigration Laws, 68 FR 10922 (Mar. 6, 2003). The Secretary <br />
may delegate his authority in any manner he chooses, including by <br />
regulation, memorandum, directive, or other method. 8 CFR 2.1. In <br />
addition, HSA 102(a)(3), 6 U.S.C. 112(a)(3), vests all functions of DHS <br />
officers, employees, and organizational units in the Secretary.<br />
    The HSA retains in DOJ, under the direction of the Attorney <br />
General, the functions of EOIR. See HSA 1101, 6 U.S.C. 521, INA <br />
103(g)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(1). Immigration Judges within EOIR conduct <br />
section 240 removal proceedings and have authority to issue removal <br />
orders or grant voluntary departure. See INA 240, 240B, 8 U.S.C. 1229a, <br />
1229b. The INA further provides that the Attorney General's <br />
determinations on questions of law ``shall be controlling.'' INA <br />
103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a)(1). Nothing in this final rule alters <br />
EOIR's or the Attorney General's authority to conduct or review section <br />
240 removal proceedings, including the issuance of removal orders or <br />
grants of voluntary departure.<br />
    DOJ participates in this rulemaking because, prior to the IFR, <br />
DOJ's regulations established BIA appellate jurisdiction over certain <br />
DHS-issued civil monetary penalties authorized under the INA, including <br />
those covered by this rulemaking. The IFR removed that appellate <br />
authority, which is finalized without further change in this rule. See <br />
90 FR 27439, 27459. The INA does not require the BIA to review civil <br />
penalties, and nothing in the statute precludes the Attorney General <br />
from removing the BIA's appellate jurisdiction over civil monetary <br />
penalties imposed by another agency. To the contrary, INA 103(g)(1) and <br />
(g)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1103(g)(1)-(2), authorize the Attorney General to <br />
issue regulations necessary for carrying out EOIR's responsibilities <br />
and governing its adjudicatory structure. Consistent with that <br />
authority, through the IFR, DOJ amended its regulations to eliminate <br />
the BIA's appellate authority over these DHS-imposed penalties in order <br />
to focus EOIR's resources on its statutory functions.<br />
    This final rule addresses DHS procedures for imposing civil <br />
monetary penalties under INA 240B(d), 274D(a)(1), and 275(b), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1229c(d), 1324d(a), and 1325(b). Those statutory provisions define the <br />
categories of aliens subject to civil penalties, establish penalty <br />
amounts, and authorize DHS to impose such penalties, but they do not <br />
prescribe procedures DHS must follow or require DOJ review of those <br />
penalties. Similarly, INA 280, 8 U.S.C. 1330, addresses the collection <br />
of civil monetary penalties but does not specify assessment procedures. <br />
Accordingly, the INA affords DHS discretion to adopt reasonable <br />
procedures for assessing and issuing civil monetary penalties. See Vt. <br />
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. <br />
519, 543 (1978) (``Absent constitutional constraints or extremely <br />
compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be free to <br />
fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry <br />
capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.'') <br />
(cleaned up).<br />
<br />
III. Response to Public Comments on the IFR<br />
<br />
    The Departments received a total of 28 public comment submissions <br />
in response to the IFR. The Departments reviewed all the public <br />
comments received and have addressed relevant comments in this final <br />
rule, grouped by subject matter. While some commenters wrote that they <br />
supported the IFR, the vast majority of commenters opposed all or part <br />
of it.<br />
<br />
A. General Support<br />
<br />
    Comment: Several commenters expressed overall support for the IFR. <br />
These commenters agreed with the use of civil monetary penalties to <br />
promote compliance with immigration laws. One commenter considered such <br />
civil penalties necessary to deter unlawful presence, encourage self-<br />
departure, and help offset the costs associated with<br />
<br />
[[Page 65397]]<br />
<br />
enforcing immigration laws and carrying out removals. Another commenter <br />
recognized the government's interest in recovering some of the costs <br />
associated with removing aliens. A third commenter expressed general <br />
support for imposing civil monetary fines to strengthen overall <br />
immigration enforcement. Collectively, these comments broadly endorsed <br />
the IFR's underlying policy objective of streamlining the process for <br />
imposing civil monetary penalties on aliens subject to the violations <br />
addressed in this rule.<br />
    Response: The Departments agree that promoting compliance with the <br />
Nation's immigration laws and maintaining border security is critical, <br />
and this rule is a key part of DHS's efforts to use all statutorily <br />
available tools to help achieve those objectives consistent with the <br />
Administration's policies and priorities while also allowing EOIR to <br />
focus time and resources on completing cases that are more aligned with <br />
its statutory authorities. See 90 FR 8445-55. Specifically, the <br />
unprecedented number of aliens entering and remaining in the country <br />
illegally, in recent years necessitates this rule. See 90 FR 27442 <br />
(quoting 90 FR 8443). Congress has authorized DHS to impose civil <br />
monetary penalties on aliens who unlawfully enter the United States and <br />
those who remain after a final removal or voluntary departure order. <br />
See 90 FR 27439-41. As explained in the IFR, this rule allows DHS to <br />
preserve due process while more efficiently imposing a greater number <br />
of these civil penalties on the aliens subject to them. 90 FR 27442. <br />
The Departments believe that this effort will, in turn, encourage <br />
greater compliance with removal and voluntary departure orders and <br />
discourage future unlawful entries. Id.<br />
<br />
B. General Opposition<br />
<br />
1. Impacts on Aliens, Families, Businesses, and Communities<br />
    Comment: Many commenters opposed the IFR, asserting that it will <br />
negatively impact aliens and their families. One commenter stated that <br />
the aliens impacted by this rule could face steep civil monetary fines <br />
in excess of $1,000,000, causing significant financial distress for <br />
them and their families. Other commenters echoed this point, stating <br />
that the rule creates a substantial financial burden on aliens, and <br />
specifically viewed as particularly egregious the fine of $998-per-day <br />
for willful failure or refusal to depart after a final removal order <br />
and certain other proscribed activities. One commenter said the IFR <br />
directly harms U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents because <br />
many aliens subject to these civil monetary fines are parents and <br />
spouses of U.S. citizens and permanent residents. They characterized <br />
these fines as ``economically catastrophic for the entire household'' <br />
resulting in ``eviction, bankruptcy, or forced separation.'' This <br />
commenter also noted that aliens who fail to pay the assessed penalties <br />
may be subject to additional consequences including garnished wages, <br />
seizure of assets including homes and vehicles, and long-term financial <br />
ruin.<br />
    Another commenter reiterated this point and additionally noted the <br />
potential confiscation of savings and vehicles and imposed additional <br />
financial planning burden and financial uncertainty. This commenter <br />
claimed that the Departments' conclusion that the IFR aligns with due <br />
process was arbitrary and capricious. The commenter said that the IFR <br />
arbitrarily characterized these penalties as ``modest,'' and claimed <br />
the Departments overlooked case law recognizing heightened due process <br />
interests when the government seizes homes, confiscates savings, and <br />
imposes fines that result in significant economic impacts on families. <br />
Given the substantial penalty amounts and the collateral consequences <br />
that can result if an alien fails to pay, the commenter argued that the <br />
IFR's procedures are constitutionally inadequate.<br />
    Response: As an initial point, Congress, not the Departments, has <br />
defined both the types of violations and the monetary range for the <br />
civil penalties covered by the IFR and this rule. These penalties and <br />
their amounts reflect Congress's judgment that the conduct involved--an <br />
alien's unlawful entry and failure to depart after a removal or <br />
voluntary departure order--is serious, and in some cases substantial <br />
civil fines are necessary to encourage aliens to comply with the <br />
immigration laws. See 90 FR 27439-40. This rule does not expand the <br />
scope of these penalties, nor their minimum or maximum dollar amounts. <br />
Furthermore, the immigration consequences for failing to depart or <br />
unlawful entry flow from the underlying immigration violation, not from <br />
the failure to pay the assessed civil monetary penalties. This rule <br />
merely streamlines the process that DHS applies when imposing civil <br />
penalties that Congress has already authorized DHS to impose. <br />
Therefore, to the extent that commenters are objecting to these civil <br />
monetary penalties and the amounts authorized by Congress, such <br />
concerns are outside of the scope of this rulemaking.<br />
    DHS often assesses the maximum penalty amount to fulfill the <br />
enforcement and deterrent objectives of the statute, as intended by <br />
Congress. These amounts are also consistent with the enforcement <br />
priorities of the Administration, as reflected in recent Executive <br />
Orders. See 90 FR 8443, 8443-45; 90 FR 8467, 8467. However, the <br />
Departments note that, in the voluntary departure context, immigration <br />
officers follow the civil penalty amounts that will continue to be set <br />
by EOIR. See 8 CFR 1240.26(l).<br />
    The Departments disagree with commenters' arguments that DHS should <br />
not streamline the process for imposing these civil penalties because <br />
of the burdens the penalties create for aliens and their families. The <br />
Departments acknowledge these concerns but note that financial, <br />
emotional, and family burdens are also an inherent consequence of <br />
removal based on an alien's violation of the Nation's immigration laws. <br />
See e.g., Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416, 423 (6th Cir. <br />
2024) (``[F]inancial and emotional strains are the typical results of <br />
removal; they aren't rare''); see also Matter of Pilch, 21 I&amp;amp;N Dec. <br />
627, 631 (BIA 1996) (``[E]motional hardship caused by severing family <br />
and community ties is a common result of deportation''). The most <br />
substantial civil fines apply only to aliens who have been ordered <br />
removed or granted voluntary departure after the conclusion of <br />
immigration proceedings. These aliens have been warned of the <br />
consequences for failing to comply with the removal or departure order <br />
but have willfully ignored their departure obligations. In these <br />
circumstances, the Departments do not believe that it is unfair to <br />
impose substantial civil penalties that Congress has authorized for <br />
these violations even though it may cause additional burdens and <br />
hardships on aliens and their families.<br />
    To help alleviate the financial burden of civil penalties and <br />
incentivize compliance, DHS has announced it will reopen and rescind <br />
most outstanding civil penalties when an alien uses the CBP Home app to <br />
voluntarily self-depart the United States.\22\ This option allows <br />
aliens to avoid the civil penalties and attendant consequences that <br />
commenters have noted. The<br />
<br />
[[Page 65398]]<br />
<br />
Departments recognize that an alien's choice to exercise this option <br />
may still impose significant personal and family hardships, including <br />
to U.S. citizen or lawful permanent family members, but the Departments <br />
note that these hardships are an inherent consequence of a removal <br />
order and are compounded by the alien's willful failure to depart when <br />
that order became final and executable. See Morales-Izquierdo v. DHS, <br />
600 F.3d 1076, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting argument that ``an <br />
illegal alien with United States citizen family members cannot be <br />
removed'' because such a proposition ``would radically alter the status <br />
quo of our immigration law''). Additionally, the Departments believe <br />
that permitting removable aliens to remain in the United States would <br />
undermine immigration enforcement, the integrity of the Nation's <br />
immigration laws, American communities, and public safety.\23\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \22\ DHS, DHS Announces It Will Forgive Failure to Depart Fines <br />
for Illegal Aliens who Self-Deport Through the CBP Home App (June 9, <br />
2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/06/09/dhs-announces-it-will-forgive-failure-depart-fines-illegal-aliens-who-self-deport&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/06/09/dhs-announces-it-will-forgive-failure-depart-fines-illegal-aliens-who-self-deport&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/8RBN-PACA&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/8RBN-PACA&lt;/a&gt;]. See Presidential Proclamation 10935, <br />
Establishing Project Homecoming, 90 FR 20357 (May 9, 2025); 90 FR <br />
27442.<br />
    \23\ See 90 FR 47445-46 (discussing how an alien's failure to <br />
depart has serious consequences for immigration enforcement and the <br />
adjudication of immigration cases); see also E.O. 14159, 90 FR 8443, <br />
8444-45 (Jan. 20, 2025). (``enforcing our Nation's immigration laws <br />
is critically important to the national security and public safety <br />
of the United States''); Presidential Proclamation 10935, 90 FR <br />
20357 (May 9, 2025) (``The continued presence of illegal aliens in <br />
our Nation forces American taxpayers to bear a tremendous fiscal <br />
burden to support them, including through costs related to <br />
healthcare, food stamps, public housing, emergency services, <br />
education, and shelter, as well as the costs of crimes committed by <br />
illegal aliens.'').<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Regarding commenters' concerns that aliens may face collateral <br />
consequences if they fail to take advantage of this off-ramp and <br />
further fail to pay these civil fines, the Departments note that the <br />
IFR and this final rule do not authorize the confiscation of savings, <br />
garnished wages, or the seizure of assets. Rather, separate statutes <br />
and regulations govern the U.S. Government's debt collection activities <br />
and remedies, which are outside the scope of this rule. However, the <br />
Departments note that only DOJ's Civil Division or another authorized <br />
litigating component of DOJ, not EOIR and DHS, have authority to obtain <br />
a judgment on a debt owed to the United States. See 31 CFR 904.1-904.4. <br />
DOJ's Civil Division or another authorized litigating component must <br />
bring an action in federal court to obtain a judgment and pursue any <br />
lien against assets or confiscation of savings, and the alien has an <br />
opportunity to request a federal court hearing on the enforceability of <br />
the debt. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 3002(3)(B), 3101(d)(1), (d)(2). This <br />
provides due process before the U.S. Government seeks to obtain a <br />
judgment on an uncollected debt and before it can confiscate an alien's <br />
property or savings. Accordingly, nothing in this rule deprives an <br />
alien of the ability to challenge the imposition of particular civil <br />
penalty assessments or collection methods that the alien regards as <br />
disproportionate, excessive, or in violation of due process during a <br />
federal court hearing.<br />
    Finally, the Departments disagree that the IFR's due process <br />
analysis fails to consider the full magnitude of the departure <br />
penalties and the collateral consequences that could result, should an <br />
alien remain in the United States and fail to pay the civil monetary <br />
penalty. As an initial matter, contrary to one commenter's claim, the <br />
Departments did not characterize the penalties covered by this rule as <br />
``modest.'' Rather, the IFR used that term to contrast the penalty <br />
amounts associated with the unlawful entry and voluntary departure <br />
order penalties and the per diem fines Congress has authorized DHS to <br />
impose on aliens who willfully remain in the United States for many <br />
years after a removal order. See 90 FR 27541.<br />
    The Departments do, however, acknowledge that the per diem civil <br />
penalties can result in substantial fines, including sums of over one <br />
million dollars in certain cases, and that these amounts could impose <br />
significant economic and emotional burdens on aliens and their <br />
families. The Departments also note that DHS will cancel most <br />
outstanding penalties when an alien uses the CBP Home app to depart the <br />
United States, as discussed above. Similarly, the Departments <br />
acknowledge the collateral consequences that could result if an alien <br />
fails to pay a civil penalty or depart the United States, but the <br />
Departments reiterate that this rule does not authorize DHS or EOIR to <br />
seize an alien's property, garnish wages, or confiscate savings. That <br />
authority rests with DOJ's Civil Division or another litigating <br />
component, and the alien would be able to challenge any action in court <br />
before any deprivation occurs.<br />
    The Departments, however, also have a weighty interest in ensuring <br />
that DHS can impose statutorily authorized civil monetary penalties <br />
efficiently and at scale to create greater incentives for aliens to <br />
comply with final removal orders and to impose timely consequences on <br />
those who do not. As the Departments explained in the IFR and Section <br />
II of this preamble, the need for this rule is demonstrated by the <br />
sheer number of aliens in the United States with final removal orders <br />
and the risk that, without additional action, a significant number of <br />
the millions of aliens currently in Immigration Court proceedings may <br />
be encouraged to simply ignore final decisions ordering their removal. <br />
See 90 FR 27445. An alien's failure to comply with a removal order <br />
risks undermining the overall integrity of the immigration laws and <br />
processes and imposes significant enforcement costs on DHS. Id; see <br />
also Section II of this preamble.<br />
    On balance, the Departments believe that the IFR's streamlined <br />
civil monetary penalty procedures strike an appropriate balance <br />
between: (1) increasing DHS's ability to impose statutorily authorized <br />
civil penalties quickly against aliens who have willfully failed to <br />
comply with removal orders and (2) protecting an alien's interest in <br />
ensuring that he or she has a meaningful opportunity to contest any <br />
civil penalty that DHS may have issued erroneously. Based on its <br />
experience, DHS believes that the risk of imposing these civil fines in <br />
error is low given the straightforward nature of these civil penalty <br />
determinations, and that the IFR's procedures provide sufficient due <br />
process to aliens who contest these penalties. See 90 FR 27451-54.<br />
    Comment: Commenters claimed that these penalties will harm <br />
businesses and communities. One commenter stated that many aliens <br />
targeted by this IFR pay taxes and work in ``essential'' sectors such <br />
as agriculture, healthcare, and construction. Another commenter claimed <br />
that the threat of high civil penalties will increase fear in <br />
communities and push people into hiding. The commenter claimed that the <br />
high penalties would reduce enrollment in schools and healthcare, and <br />
deter victims and witnesses from reporting crimes, thereby harming <br />
public safety and communities. Given these claimed impacts, commenters <br />
argued that the Departments should rescind the IFR.<br />
    Response: The Departments do not dispute the contributions of <br />
lawful immigrants to United States businesses and communities. The <br />
purpose of the IFR and this rule, however, is not to harm businesses or <br />
communities but to allow DHS to more efficiently impose these <br />
statutorily authorized civil monetary penalties on the large number of <br />
aliens who violate the Nation's immigration laws by entering or <br />
remaining in the country unlawfully. Congress has authorized DHS to <br />
impose civil penalties for these violations and did not create <br />
exceptions for aliens who pay taxes, work in ``essential sectors'', or <br />
otherwise ``contribute'' to communities. An alien's engagement in these <br />
activities does not absolve him or her from complying with the <br />
immigration laws. Moreover, the Departments note that, with limited <br />
exceptions, Congress has not authorized<br />
<br />
[[Page 65399]]<br />
<br />
aliens with final executable removal and voluntary departure orders to <br />
work in the United States. INA 241(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(7). <br />
Therefore, the Departments decline to rescind the IFR based on <br />
commenters' speculation that its procedures for imposing penalties on <br />
aliens will indirectly ``harm'' businesses or essential sectors. <br />
Further, the Departments believe that any such indirect impact that the <br />
penalties themselves may have on businesses would be outweighed by <br />
their benefits, including benefits to border security, public safety, <br />
immigration enforcement, and the integrity of the immigration laws. See <br />
90 FR 27445-46; Section II of this preamble; see also 90 FR 8444-45.<br />
    Regarding comments related to the IFR's potential effects on the <br />
willingness of aliens to report crimes, while DHS does not dispute that <br />
illegal aliens might be less willing to report a crime, DHS cannot <br />
reliably estimate this rule's speculative impact on local policing, <br />
especially considering that this rule merely provides procedures for <br />
issuing civil fines that are authorized by statute. For similar <br />
reasons, the Departments decline to rescind the IFR based on other <br />
speculative community-level effects described by some commenters. <br />
Commenters provided no support for their belief that the revised civil <br />
penalty procedures will discourage eligible individuals from accessing <br />
education, healthcare, or other community services, or otherwise <br />
disengaging from their communities. The Departments believe that any <br />
such indirect impacts are also outweighed by this rule's potential <br />
benefits, including benefits to border security, public safety, <br />
immigration enforcement, and the integrity of the immigration laws.<br />
2. Impacts on Specific Populations<br />
    Comment: Commenters broadly suggested that the IFR will have a <br />
disproportionate impact on vulnerable groups such as minors, aliens <br />
with limited English proficiency, and aliens fleeing hardships and <br />
lacking sufficient funds for legal representation. Commenters asserted <br />
that such aliens may face barriers in understanding or responding to <br />
civil monetary penalties within the prescribed timeframes and that the <br />
imposition of fines could create additional hardship or deter some from <br />
challenging these penalties altogether. One commenter expressed <br />
particular concern about aliens subject to domestic violence and human <br />
trafficking. The commenter explained that these aliens may be eligible <br />
for immigration relief based on this harm, but large civil fines may <br />
impose a barrier to escaping these situations and obtaining such <br />
relief. Collectively, these commenters suggested that the IFR's <br />
streamlined penalty process, including its deadlines, should not apply <br />
to these groups.<br />
    Response: The procedures established by the IFR are designed to <br />
ensure efficiency in assessing civil penalties authorized by the INA, <br />
while maintaining the due process protections required by law. See 90 <br />
FR 27451-53. The rule does not alter eligibility for immigration <br />
benefits or relief available under other provisions of the INA, <br />
including protection for victims of trafficking or domestic violence, <br />
nor does it limit the Departments' existing discretion to consider <br />
individual circumstances consistent with applicable statutes and <br />
regulations. Moreover, ICE's guidance to immigration officers instructs <br />
that aliens with approved (or in some cases tentatively approved) <br />
applications for VAWA protections, T-visas, and U-visas for aliens who <br />
are victims of human trafficking or certain crimes should not be issued <br />
a civil fine. DHS also notes that nothing in this rule prevents <br />
immigration officers from exercising discretion in individual cases to <br />
not issue a civil monetary penalty if DHS is aware of such <br />
circumstances.<br />
    Moreover, the Departments reject commenters arguments that the <br />
IFR's procedures would have a singular impact on non-English speakers <br />
or aliens who are unrepresented, low-income, or unfamiliar with the <br />
law. First, the Departments note that all immigration documents issued <br />
to aliens by DHS, and all orders, decisions, and notices issued by <br />
EOIR--including written removal and voluntary departure orders--are in <br />
English.\24\ Therefore, the Departments do not believe that civil <br />
penalty decisions issued in English raise any inherent fairness <br />
concerns for non-English speakers, as a reasonable recipient would be <br />
on notice that further inquiry is required. See, e.g., Lopez v. <br />
Garland, 990 F.3d 1000, 1003 (6th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that English <br />
language notice typically satisfies due process because it alerts the <br />
alien to make further inquiry and seek help with any language barrier); <br />
see also Ojeda-Calderon v. Holder, 726 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2013) <br />
(citing Nazarova v. INS, 171 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 1999)) (explaining <br />
due process does not require notices to be in a language the alien can <br />
understand).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \24\ All EOIR forms are written in English with instructions for <br />
select forms available in other languages. See EOIR, Forms &amp;amp; Fees <br />
(last visited Oct. 6, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-forms&quot;&gt;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-forms&lt;/a&gt; <br />
[&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/G5PY-WDY&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/G5PY-WDY&lt;/a&gt;]; USCIS, All Forms (last visited May 29, <br />
2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/all-forms&quot;&gt;https://www.uscis.gov/forms/all-forms&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/J8A6-UASE&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/J8A6-UASE&lt;/a&gt;]. Regulations require that all documents filed with the EOIR <br />
Immigration Courts must also be in the English language or <br />
accompanied by a certified English translation. See 8 CFR 1003.33, <br />
1003.23(b)(1)(i). DHS regulations also contain English-language <br />
requirements. E.g., 8 CFR 103.2(b)(3), 204.1(f)(2).<br />
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<br />
    Second, the IFR's procedures provide all aliens with a fair <br />
opportunity to contest civil penalties. The penalty decision itself <br />
provides aliens with notice, in plain language about why the alien is <br />
subject to a civil penalty, see 90 FR 27449, and the Departments <br />
reiterate that Immigration Judges have already warned aliens subject to <br />
the failure to depart penalties about the consequences of failing to <br />
comply with removal and departure orders. See Section II of this <br />
preamble. The penalty decision also explains, in plain language, what <br />
an alien must do to contest the penalty. See 90 FR 27449. Indeed, the <br />
penalty decision, DHS Form 281, Notice of Violation and Order, contains <br />
a textbox that the alien can use to indicate that he or she is <br />
contesting the penalty decision and to provide a brief statement of <br />
reasons for the appeal. Moreover, the IFR simplifies regulatory <br />
requirements to trigger an appeal compared to the former process at 8 <br />
CFR part 280 that applies when an alien responds to a NIF. See 8 CFR <br />
280.12 (requiring written answers responding to civil penalties to be <br />
filed under oath and in triplicate). Finally, under the IFR, an alien's <br />
appeal suffices to trigger mandatory de novo supervisory review. See 8 <br />
CFR 281.1(e)(2). In these circumstances, the Departments disagree with <br />
commenters' speculative concerns that the IFR's procedures unfairly <br />
disadvantage non-English speakers and unrepresented aliens with limited <br />
financial means. With regard to commenters' concerns about minors, DHS <br />
notes that ICE guidance to immigration officers is that such penalties <br />
should not be issued to minors without exceptions.<br />
    Comment: One commenter claimed that the IFR is particularly harmful <br />
to aliens seeking asylum or protection at the border. The commenter <br />
stated that, as a result of this IFR, these aliens will now be charged <br />
a civil fine, which the commenter characterizes as an erosion of their <br />
right to seek asylum, particularly when paired with other policies <br />
limiting asylum at the border.<br />
    Response: This rule does not alter or limit any statutory or <br />
regulatory right to apply for asylum or related protections under the <br />
INA or the regulations implementing U.S. obligations under the CAT. It <br />
does not create new grounds of inadmissibility, deportability, or <br />
ineligibility for relief or protection, and<br />
<br />
[[Page 65400]]<br />
<br />
it does not authorize the imposition of penalties based solely on the <br />
act of seeking asylum or protection. Rather, the IFR streamlines the <br />
process for assessing statutorily authorized civil penalties against <br />
aliens who violate immigration laws by entering the United States <br />
unlawfully, irrespective of their purpose for doing so. The statute <br />
does not create an exception for those who enter the United States <br />
unlawfully for the purpose of seeking asylum or related protection. <br />
Aliens who present themselves at a port of entry to seek asylum or <br />
other related protection are not subject to civil penalties under this <br />
rule.<br />
3. Discrimination and Value-Based Considerations<br />
    Comment: Several commenters characterized the IFR as inconsistent <br />
with U.S. values and traditions, describing the IFR as ``un-American,'' <br />
``unjust,'' and ``contrary to national values.'' One commenter <br />
characterized the IFR as designed to ``punish'' people trying to <br />
navigate the ``labyrinthian immigration system.'' One commenter <br />
suggested that the IFR was promulgated for a pretextual political <br />
purpose rather than a legitimate administrative one. The commenter <br />
argued that the IFR punishes aliens rather than deterring violations <br />
and improving compliance with removal obligations or upholding <br />
statutory requirements. Commenters generally suggested that the <br />
Administration should pursue policies that focus on humane and fair <br />
immigration policies, rather than punitive ones.<br />
    Response: The Departments categorically reject commenters' <br />
characterization of this rule as inhumane, ``un-American,'' ``unjust,'' <br />
or ``contrary to national values.'' The United States is a nation of <br />
immigrants and a nation of laws. DHS is charged with administering and <br />
enforcing those laws, but the number of illegal aliens in the United <br />
States who are subject to final removal orders has outpaced DHS's <br />
enforcement resources. See 90 FR 27445; see also Section II of this <br />
preamble. Further, EOIR statistics indicate that there are over 3.4 <br />
million pending Immigration Court proceedings as of the third quarter <br />
of FY 2026.\25\ When completed, these cases may result in a substantial <br />
number of additional removal orders against aliens, and without <br />
additional action there is a risk that many of these aliens may remain <br />
in the United States unlawfully. Further, although this Administration <br />
has made great strides to secure the southern border, DHS is committed <br />
to maintaining operational control of the border to ensure that DHS has <br />
sufficient resources to address the public safety and national security <br />
threats that arise constantly at the border.\26\<br />
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<br />
    \25\ See EOIR Workload &amp;amp; Adjudication Statistics, Pending Cases, <br />
New Cases, and Total Completions (July 31, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline&quot;&gt;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344791/dl?inline&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/B2AW-2QYD&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/B2AW-2QYD&lt;/a&gt;]. EOIR statistics reported 3,469, 569 pending cases as of FY <br />
2026 (Third Quarter). The term ``pending cases'' includes all <br />
uncompleted cases in removal, deportation, exclusion, asylum-only, <br />
and withholding-only proceedings.<br />
    \26\ See Finding of Mass Influx, 90 FR 45396 (Sept. 22, 2025) <br />
(explaining the impact on DHS resources and the public safety and <br />
national security concerns that result when there is an influx of <br />
aliens arriving at the border and entering or attempting to enter <br />
illegally).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The Departments believe that these circumstances warrant additional <br />
action consistent with this Administration's direction to use all <br />
available statutory immigration enforcement tools including civil <br />
penalties. See 90 FR 27445-46 and Section II of this preamble; see also <br />
90 FR 8444-45. Congress has authorized DHS to apply these penalties <br />
against aliens who are entering or attempting to enter the United <br />
States unlawfully and against aliens who have failed to comply with <br />
removal and departure orders. See 90 FR 27439-41. The enforcement of <br />
these statutory penalties is a legitimate and integral component of <br />
ensuring compliance with the Nation's immigration laws and maintaining <br />
the integrity of the immigration system. See 90 FR 27444-46. Indeed, <br />
the IFR is achieving this objective, as DHS has issued over 176,000 <br />
civil penalties under the IFR (compared to approximately 12,000 <br />
penalties issued under 8 CFR part 280). These penalties have encouraged <br />
greater compliance with removal and voluntary departure orders as <br />
evidenced by the nearly 82,000 aliens with removal orders and voluntary <br />
departure orders who have self-departed the United States after DHS <br />
began issuing civil penalties in March 2025, and the nearly 7,200 <br />
aliens who self-departed from the United States after receiving notice <br />
of a civil penalty issued under the IFR.\27\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \27\ See Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of <br />
Alien Departures by Civil Fine, DHS Enforcement, and EOIR Case <br />
Outcomes (Oct. 7, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Similarly, the Departments reject the claim that this rule is <br />
intended to dehumanize or punish people navigating the immigration <br />
system. DHS notes that these penalties generally are not imposed until <br />
after the aliens have completed immigration proceedings and received a <br />
determination that they are not authorized to remain in the United <br />
States. The IFR did not create new categories of violative conduct or <br />
expand the scope of existing penalties. Instead, it updated the <br />
procedural framework that applies to these statutorily authorized <br />
penalties to ensure that DHS can assess them efficiently against aliens <br />
who have failed to comply with the Nation's immigration laws. This <br />
framework allows DHS to avoid unnecessarily diverting resources from <br />
ICE's and CBP's missions to apprehend, detain, and remove aliens who <br />
have illegally entered and are unlawfully present. See 90 FR 27447. DHS <br />
remains committed to administering these authorities in a manner <br />
consistent with principles of due process, other statutory and <br />
regulatory requirements, and the Nation's longstanding values of <br />
fairness and respect for the rule of law.<br />
    Comment: One commenter claimed that the IFR is discriminatory <br />
because its streamlined penalty process applies only to aliens, while <br />
the Departments' regulations continue to provide additional procedural <br />
protections to companies that violate the immigration laws when they <br />
are faced with a fine. The commenter characterized the IFR as saying <br />
that the Departments cannot provide aliens with the same due process <br />
protections that they can afford companies like airline carriers <br />
because of the large number of fines that ICE has issued against <br />
aliens. The commenter claimed that this is a crisis of DHS's own making <br />
rather than a rational reason for distinguishing between aliens and <br />
companies when designing civil penalty procedures. The commenter <br />
further argues that the IFR is discriminatory because other regulations <br />
require the Departments to consider mitigating circumstances when <br />
imposing penalties on employers and companies that violate immigration <br />
laws, but the IFR does not afford aliens the same treatment or allow <br />
them to seek mitigation.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree with the commenter's assertion <br />
that the IFR is discriminatory because it establishes a streamlined <br />
penalty process for aliens but not for carriers. The IFR is not <br />
intended to favor carriers over aliens. It addresses an immediate <br />
enforcement need: deterring large numbers of aliens from entering the <br />
United States unlawfully and encouraging compliance with removal and <br />
departure orders.<br />
    As an initial matter, the Departments note that aliens and carriers <br />
are not similarly situated under the INA. Aliens are the direct <br />
subjects of removal and departure orders and are personally responsible <br />
for complying with those<br />
<br />
[[Page 65401]]<br />
<br />
orders, if not removed by ICE. They receive an opportunity for a full <br />
and fair hearing during section 240 removal proceedings, including an <br />
opportunity to contest removability and seek relief.\28\ When an alien <br />
fails to comply with a removal or departure order after such <br />
proceedings, that violation directly undermines the orderly <br />
administration of the immigration system and the integrity of the <br />
immigration laws. By contrast, carriers are regulated third parties <br />
that frequently transport passengers, including aliens, into the United <br />
States, but are not directly responsible for an alien's independent <br />
decision to violate the Nation's immigration laws. Rather, their <br />
obligations are tailored to their role as carriers, arising from <br />
statutory and regulatory requirements to verify the travel documents of <br />
passengers seeking to travel to the United States, such as those in INA <br />
273(a), 8 U.S.C. 1323(a). Noncompliance by carriers is addressed <br />
through a separate statutory provision, INA 273, 8 U.S.C. 1323, through <br />
a long-standing regime of inspections, penalties, and cooperative <br />
compliance measures with CBP tailored to entities engaged in <br />
international transportation.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \28\ As noted in the IFR, under the INA, certain aliens can also <br />
be ordered removed by DHS with limited or no review by EOIR. See 90 <br />
FR 27740, n. 3 (discussing removal process outside of section 240 <br />
removal proceedings including expedited removal under INA 235(b)(1), <br />
8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), reinstatement of a prior removal order under <br />
INA 241(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5), and administrative removal <br />
orders for certain non-permanent residents aliens who are aggravated <br />
felons under INA 238(b), 8 U.S.C. 1228(b)). As the IFR explained, <br />
however, aliens ordered removed through these processes generally <br />
must be detained, which reduces the likelihood of the alien's <br />
failure to depart. Id. Therefore, while applicable to all <br />
administratively final removal orders, the failure to depart civil <br />
monetary penalties are most relevant to aliens ordered removed <br />
through section 240 removal proceedings. Id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The IFR focused on streamlining the process for collection of <br />
penalties against aliens because DHS identified an urgent need to <br />
increase the scale of such penalties and facilitate more timely <br />
processing, as well as to reduce incentives to unlawfully enter the <br />
United States and to ignore removal and departure orders. 90 FR 27447-<br />
48; see also Section II of this preamble. The streamlined process is <br />
intended to allow DHS to issue penalties more quickly and at a volume <br />
necessary to promote compliance and deterrence. DHS did not identify a <br />
comparable, immediate need to revise the penalty process for carrier <br />
violations. 90 FR 27447.<br />
    For years, CBP has assessed civil monetary penalties against <br />
carriers for violations of their obligations under the immigration laws <br />
\29\ and has routinely worked with carriers to improve compliance.\30\ <br />
Carriers that operate regular transportation services into the United <br />
States already have strong incentives to verify passengers' travel <br />
documents to avoid substantial and repeated fines, as well as the costs <br />
of securing and returning inadmissible passengers.\31\ These incentives <br />
are further reinforced by CBP programs and arrangements with carriers <br />
designed to strengthen document screening and compliance, including <br />
CBP's voluntary document validation program and memoranda of <br />
understanding under which civil penalties may be reduced if carriers <br />
submit to CBP review of their screening processes and demonstrate <br />
successful screening procedures, as described in INA section 273, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1323 violations.\32\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \29\ As discussed in the IFR, between October 1, 2022, and May <br />
5, 2025, CBP initiated 1,428 carrier fines. 90 FR 27447; see also <br />
Advanced Passenger Information System: Electronic Validation of <br />
Travel Documents, 88 FR 7016, 7027 (Feb. 2, 2023) (noting that ``the <br />
average number of penalties issued annually between 2015 and 2019 <br />
was 415 and explaining that the number of civil penalties for the <br />
years 2020-2022 was affected by the COVID-19 global pandemic <br />
consistent with a decrease in arrivals).<br />
    \30\ For example, CBP's carrier liaison program enhances border <br />
security by providing standardized training and assistance to <br />
international air carriers related to admissibility and fraudulent <br />
document detection. See CBP Carrier Liaison Program, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.help.cbp.gov/s/article/Article-1664?language=en_US&quot;&gt;https://www.help.cbp.gov/s/article/Article-1664?language=en_US&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/F3NW-MFU6&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/F3NW-MFU6&lt;/a&gt;] (Nov. 4, 2025). Additionally, CBP has <br />
established a process, first created by the legacy INS, for carriers <br />
to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with CBP that results in <br />
automatic mitigation of carrier fines if the carrier agrees to <br />
certain conditions and the carrier demonstrates successful screening <br />
procedures by achieving satisfactory performance levels measured by <br />
the number of violations under INA 273, 8 U.S.C. 1323. See <br />
Mitigation of Carrier Fines for Transporting Aliens Without Proper <br />
Documents; Modification of Memorandum of Understanding and <br />
Recalculation of Performance Levels To Measure Carrier Performance; <br />
CBP Dec. 09-06, 75 FR 7616 (Feb. 22, 2010).<br />
    \31\ See INA 273(c)-(e), 8 U.S.C. 1323(c)-(e). See also Advanced <br />
Passenger Information System: Electronic Validation of Travel <br />
Documents, 88 FR 7016, 7027 (Feb. 2, 2023) (noting that the cost of <br />
a penalty under INA 273, 8 U.S.C. 1323, and the cost of securing and <br />
transporting the passenger out of the United States, which amounts <br />
to about $10,000 for a single passenger).<br />
    \32\ See, e.g., 88 FR 7018, 7026 (discussing CBP's voluntary <br />
Document Validation Program, which allows CBP to vet travel document <br />
information submitted by carriers for passengers on international <br />
flights arriving in the United States prior to departure, and noting <br />
that, as a result of carrier participating in the program, 67 <br />
percent of commercial air passengers were covered by document <br />
validation as of FY 2021); see also CBP Dec. 09-06, 75 FR 7616 (Feb. <br />
22, 2010).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    As explained in the IFR, carrier fines also raise distinct <br />
considerations, including different grounds for violations and issues <br />
related to statutorily authorized mitigation procedures, that are not <br />
present for the alien-focused civil penalties covered by this rule. See <br />
90 FR 27447-48. These factors can in some cases make carrier penalty <br />
processes more complex and less suitable for the streamlined procedures <br />
adopted in the IFR. In addition, the existing regulations in 8 CFR part <br />
280 were designed initially for carrier fines, not for the alien-<br />
focused civil penalties covered by this rule. See 90 FR 27440-41; see <br />
also National Fines Office, 54 FR 18648 (May 2, 1989) (describing 8 CFR <br />
part 280 procedures as applying to ``violations of the [INA] by <br />
transportation companies''). The Departments concluded that addressing <br />
these carrier-specific issues in the IFR could have delayed action on <br />
the more pressing need to streamline penalties for aliens.<br />
    Quite simply, the IFR leaves the existing penalty framework for <br />
carriers intact while addressing a separate enforcement challenge <br />
related to aliens who unlawfully enter or remain in the United States <br />
in violation of the immigration laws. The Departments agree that it <br />
remains important to ensure that carriers comply with their obligations <br />
under immigration laws and that CBP can administer carrier penalties <br />
efficiently and effectively. Focusing this rulemaking on alien <br />
penalties does not preclude future consideration of whether changes to <br />
carrier penalty procedures may be warranted. The decision to address <br />
alien penalties first reflects prioritization based on pressing <br />
enforcement needs, not discrimination against aliens in favor of <br />
carriers. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401, 409-<br />
10 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, <br />
935 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (agencies may address problems in stages and <br />
``treat a problem partially'' or regulate ``in a piecemeal fashion.''). <br />
The Departments therefore reject the claim that it is irrational or <br />
discriminatory to focus this rule on civil penalties against aliens <br />
without amending the procedures that apply to carriers.<br />
    For similar reasons, the Departments disagree with the commenter's <br />
claim that the need for streamlined procedures is a ``problem of DHS's <br />
own making,'' which, according to the commenter, was created by DHS's <br />
decision to issue large numbers of penalties against aliens. The <br />
Departments acknowledge that ICE rarely issued such fines prior to this <br />
Administration. As explained in the IFR, however, the Departments have <br />
determined that DHS must now use these penalties more robustly in light <br />
of the significant number of aliens who<br />
<br />
[[Page 65402]]<br />
<br />
have violated removal and departure orders and have unlawfully entered <br />
the country in recent years. 90 FR 27446-47. The increased use of <br />
penalties is intended to deter continued violations of the immigration <br />
laws and is consistent with this Administration's enforcement policies. <br />
Simply put, the IFR addresses the widespread failure by certain aliens <br />
to comply with the immigration laws and with removal or departure <br />
orders. The streamlined procedures in the IFR reflect a legitimate and <br />
rational interest in promoting timely and efficient enforcement against <br />
aliens who violate these laws. Congress provided these penalties and <br />
related authority in the INA; this rule merely modifies DHS's <br />
administration of collecting those penalties to implement that existing <br />
statutory authority more efficiently.<br />
    Finally, the streamlined procedures preserve the essential elements <br />
of due process for aliens. Aliens subject to these penalties continue <br />
to receive notice of the proposed penalty and an opportunity to seek <br />
review. Agencies may design procedures that take account of enforcement <br />
realities and deterrent effect, provided that the procedures preserve <br />
the core protections of meaningful notice and opportunity for a <br />
hearing. This rule maintains those protections while allowing DHS to <br />
more effectively enforce existing statutory penalties.<br />
    The Departments also disagree with the commenter's claims that the <br />
IFR discriminates against aliens in favor of companies because the IFR <br />
does not allow aliens to seek mitigation of civil penalties. The <br />
commenter's assertion overlooks that Congress established distinct <br />
statutory frameworks governing civil penalties imposed on employers and <br />
carriers, on the one hand, and the civil penalties at issue in this <br />
rule, on the other.<br />
    First, the commenter's reference to certain mitigating <br />
considerations for employer-related penalties under INA 274A, 8 U.S.C. <br />
1324a, is misplaced. Congress has explicitly directed EOIR <br />
Administrative Law Judges (``ALJs'') to consider the ``mitigating'' <br />
factors cited by the commenter when imposing a civil penalty against an <br />
employer under INA 274A, 8 U.S.C. 1324a. See INA 274A(e)(5), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1324a(e)(5). By contrast, the INA civil penalty provisions underlying <br />
this rule contain no comparable statutory requirement to consider <br />
mitigating factors. Compare INA 274A(e)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(e)(5), with <br />
INA 240B(d)(1)(A), 274D(a)(1), and 275(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(1)(A), <br />
1324d(a)(1), 1325(b)(1). The differing procedures therefore reflect <br />
differences Congress itself intended in these statutory schemes, not <br />
disparate treatment by the Departments, and the rule properly <br />
implements the procedures authorized for these distinct violations.<br />
    Second, the Departments disagree with the commenter's statement <br />
that ``an [alien's] right to seek mitigation'' has been curtailed under <br />
the IFR. The prior penalty process at 8 CFR part 280 did not provide <br />
all aliens subject to the civil penalties covered by this rule with a <br />
right to seek mitigation. Rather, 8 CFR 280.5 clarifies that an <br />
individual subject to a civil penalty covered by 8 CFR part 280 may <br />
only seek mitigation if it ``is authorized by the [INA].'' By statute, <br />
only certain individuals and entities subject to civil penalties <br />
covered by 8 CFR 280 are eligible to seek mitigation. For example, INA <br />
273(e), 8 U.S.C. 1323(e), directs DHS to reduce, refund, or waive <br />
certain carrier penalties upon a showing of circumstances that would <br />
justify reduction, refund, or waiver. However, for the reasons <br />
discussed more fully in Section III.D.7 of this preamble, the INA does <br />
not authorize aliens to seek mitigation of the failure to depart and <br />
unlawful entry civil penalties. Accordingly, the Departments disagree <br />
that the aliens had a right to seek mitigation under 8 CFR part 280 and <br />
that this IFR denies them that right. For this reason, the Departments <br />
also disagree with the commenter that the IFR is facially <br />
discriminatory because it does not allow aliens to seek mitigation but <br />
preserves companies and corporations' ability to do so. Rather, the IFR <br />
merely implements Congress's choice. It is Congress, not the <br />
Departments, that has authorized carriers, companies, and employers to <br />
seek mitigation of certain immigration-related civil penalties, while <br />
not extending the same opportunity to aliens.<br />
<br />
C. Justification and Need for the Rule<br />
<br />
1. Nature of the Civil Fines<br />
    Comment: Several commenters took issue with the IFR's claim that <br />
the straightforward and readily verifiable nature of the failure to <br />
depart penalties supports the Departments' decision to streamline the <br />
underlying penalty process. 90 FR 27441-46. Commenters claimed that DHS <br />
has erroneously issued many civil fines over the past year under the <br />
prior penalty process, including to aliens with temporary or permanent <br />
immigration status and with an approved visa petition and related <br />
waiver request. A commenter also claimed that DHS has issued fines to <br />
aliens with pending motions seeking to reopen or rescind removal <br />
orders. One commenter claimed that their client received a NIF that <br />
incorrectly stated a voluntary departure order had been issued several <br />
years prior to the date of actual issuance. Another alleged that, based <br />
on their clients' experiences, DHS frequently does not use or seek out <br />
the relevant information to determine whether aliens are willfully <br />
evading a removal order, thus frequently making incorrect assessments <br />
of such civil monetary penalties. One commenter stated that DHS appears <br />
to be issuing these fines in bulk through an automated system, often <br />
based on incomplete or inaccurate records and without considering <br />
aliens' individual circumstances. Collectively, these commenters argued <br />
that the number of alleged errors seen in these fines contradict the <br />
IFR's assertion that these penalties are straightforward and readily <br />
verifiable and raise concerns that the number of errors will be even <br />
higher under the IFR's streamlined process.<br />
    Response: Civil penalties are issued based on the facts of an <br />
alien's case; an alien who chooses to appeal to DHS may present <br />
evidence relevant to their specific circumstances. Prior to issuing a <br />
failure to depart civil penalty, immigration officers verify there are <br />
no applications or actions pending litigation--including appeals, <br />
motions, and petitions for review (``PFRs'')--that would affect the <br />
finality of a removal order or allow the alien to lawfully remain in <br />
the United States. In the jurisdictions in which the filing of a PFR <br />
results in an automatic stay of removal, ICE generally will not issue <br />
the civil fine until there are no legal impediments to removal. <br />
Additionally, when calculating a fine under INA 274D, 8 U.S.C. 1324d, <br />
immigration officers account for any periods after the removal order <br />
became administratively final during which the alien was authorized to <br />
remain in the United States due to, for example, a stay of removal <br />
issued by EOIR, DHS, or a federal circuit court of appeals.<br />
    DHS rejects the claim that it is issuing these penalties in bulk <br />
through ``an automated system'' without a human verifying that there is <br />
a final executable removal order, and there are no legal impediments to <br />
removal. DHS further notes that aliens assessed a failure to depart <br />
civil penalty may raise on appeal any issues that purportedly affect <br />
the finality of the removal order, dates of issuance, or the alien's <br />
willfulness in failing to depart.<br />
    Finally, ICE acknowledges that, in some limited number of cases, it <br />
mistakenly issued penalties under the pre-IFR procedures in 8 CFR part <br />
280.<br />
<br />
[[Page 65403]]<br />
<br />
However, ICE does not agree that the risk of such errors will increase <br />
under the more streamlined IFR procedures that this rule finalizes. The <br />
IFR was designed to simplify and speed up the process of issuing and <br />
finalizing ICE civil penalty decisions. It does not change ICE's <br />
process for deciding in the first place whether an alien is subject to <br />
a civil penalty. Moreover, as discussed above in Section II of this <br />
preamble, aliens have appealed civil penalties under both the pre-IFR <br />
and post-IFR procedures, albeit to different agencies, and have <br />
succeeded in having penalties set aside when issued in error at similar <br />
rates under both procedures. For these reasons, DHS continues to <br />
believe that the IFR provides aliens with sufficient opportunity to <br />
challenge a penalty they believe was issued in error and to have those <br />
penalties rescinded. The commenters' examples of errors in a limited <br />
number of individual cases under the pre-IFR process do not, on their <br />
face, call into question the adequacy of the IFR's process for error-<br />
correction. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (finding <br />
that ``procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error <br />
inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to the generality of <br />
cases.'').<br />
2. Compliance With Removal Orders<br />
    Comment: One commenter disagreed with the IFR's premise that <br />
increased use of civil penalties will deter immigration violations. <br />
Another commenter disagreed that the IFR would encourage individuals to <br />
comply with removal and departure orders through self-departure. The <br />
commenter stated that the IFR fails to account for the practical <br />
realities faced by many aliens who are unable to depart the United <br />
States, including aliens who cannot obtain travel documents because of <br />
the lack of U.S. consular relations with their home government and <br />
those who face dangers returning over land. According to the commenter, <br />
fining aliens who genuinely cannot depart is unjust and inconsistent <br />
with encouraging compliance with removal orders.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree with commenters' claims that <br />
this rule will not encourage compliance with removal and departure <br />
orders through self-departure. In fact, since March 26, 2025, when DHS <br />
began issuing civil penalties, over 82,000 aliens with removal orders <br />
or voluntary departure orders have self-departed. DHS's ability to <br />
impose statutorily authorized civil penalties swiftly and in proportion <br />
to the large number of aliens with removal and departure orders is a <br />
critical part of DHS's efforts to encourage such aliens to depart the <br />
United States. Indeed, the IFR is achieving this objective, as DHS has <br />
issued approximately 176,000 fines under the IFR (compared to <br />
approximately 12,100 fines issued under 8 CFR part 280). These fines <br />
have encouraged greater compliance with removal and voluntary departure <br />
orders as evidenced by the over 7,700 illegal aliens who self-departed <br />
from the United States after receiving notice of a civil fine issued <br />
under the IFR. Moreover, DHS believes that these civil penalties are <br />
likely having a broader effect on encouraging compliance with removal <br />
orders as indicated by the total number of aliens with removal or <br />
voluntary departure orders who have self-departed the United States <br />
since DHS began issuing these penalties.<br />
    DHS disagrees that it failed to consider that certain aliens may <br />
face impediments to departing the United States, including aliens who <br />
cannot obtain travel documents through U.S. consular relations with <br />
their country of citizenship or nationality. When an alien remains in <br />
DHS custody, immigration officers help them obtain and complete the <br />
necessary paperwork, including assisting where possible with consulate <br />
interaction.\33\ When an alien has been released on supervision, the <br />
alien must sign ICE Form 220B, attesting that he or she will assist DHS <br />
in obtaining necessary travel documents in the event that a final order <br />
of removal is issued.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \33\ ICE notes that aliens in this situation could be subject to <br />
a range of options, including further detention, orders of <br />
supervision, removal to a third country, or in some cases, parole. <br />
These options do not grant the alien status in the United States and <br />
aliens remain subject to their final order of removal. 8 CFR 241.13.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    DHS notes that aliens subject to a final order of removal who fail <br />
to timely depart the United States will be subject to civil penalties. <br />
Evidence that an alien has made a good faith attempt to obtain travel <br />
documents needed to timely depart is held by only aliens and DHS is not <br />
privy to this evidence until an alien presents it to DHS. During the <br />
appellate process, the alien or counsel may present evidence of the <br />
alien's inability to obtain travel documents due to no fault of his or <br />
her own. DHS officers retain the discretion to rescind civil penalties <br />
depending on the circumstances, such as a good-faith attempt to obtain <br />
travel documents. In addition, an alien need not depart to their <br />
country of citizenship or nationality; they need only depart the United <br />
States.<br />
    Moreover, as directed by the President, DHS has removed many <br />
impediments to an alien's ability to self-depart the United States. See <br />
90 FR 8443. For example, DHS in partnership with the State Department <br />
is offering aliens free flights and providing travel document <br />
assistance to any non-criminal alien who uses the CBP Home app to <br />
indicate their intent to depart whether to their home country or a <br />
third country other than the United States. See DHS Press Release, DHS <br />
Announces Historic Travel Assistance and Stipend for Voluntary Self-<br />
Deportation (May 5, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://dhs.gov/news/2025/05/05/dhs-announces-historic-travel-assistance-and-stipend-voluntary-self-deportation&quot;&gt;https://dhs.gov/news/2025/05/05/dhs-announces-historic-travel-assistance-and-stipend-voluntary-self-deportation&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/8ST2-RHHP&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/8ST2-RHHP&lt;/a&gt;]. Indeed, DHS data indicates <br />
that over 104,000 aliens have voluntarily departed the United States <br />
through this program since the IFR took effect on June 27, 2025 through <br />
September 14, 2026.\34\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \34\ See Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of <br />
Alien Departures by Civil Fine, DHS Enforcement, and EOIR Case <br />
Outcomes (Oct. 7, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: Another commenter explained that pressuring aliens to <br />
depart the United States to avoid civil fines undermines their existing <br />
rights and forecloses eligibility for immigration relief. One commenter <br />
said that leaving during removal proceedings can result in the loss of <br />
the statutory right to a fair hearing before an Immigration Judge. <br />
These commenters argued that departing interrupts the continuous <br />
presence requirement for cancellation of removal, thereby depriving <br />
qualifying aliens of this form of relief. Similarly, a commenter stated <br />
that departing terminates an alien's pending application for adjustment <br />
of status, impacting eligibility for lawful permanent resident status. <br />
Commenters also noted that departure can trigger statutory re-entry <br />
bars, creating barriers to lawful return and future immigration <br />
benefits. In this regard, one commenter characterized the IFR's goal of <br />
incentivizing aliens to self-depart as a ``legal trap'' that deprives <br />
aliens of due process and access to immigration benefits while barring <br />
their reentry.<br />
    Response: The Departments acknowledge that an illegal alien's <br />
departure from the United States can trigger various immigration <br />
consequences. However, the Departments disagree with the claim that <br />
this rule, which uses civil penalties and the CBP Home application to <br />
encourage aliens to leave the United States, unfairly denies them <br />
access to Immigration Court proceedings or immigration relief. Rather, <br />
the penalties covered by this rule primarily apply to<br />
<br />
[[Page 65404]]<br />
<br />
aliens who have already gone through Immigration Court proceedings, <br />
which have resulted in an order of removal or grant of voluntary <br />
departure, and have failed to depart as required after the conclusion <br />
of such proceedings. Thus, commenter concerns about the implications of <br />
an alien's departure on the outcome of removal proceedings are <br />
unfounded. Relatedly, concerns about impacts to continuous physical <br />
presence are equally unfounded. The alien would stop accruing <br />
continuous physical presence, at the latest, on the date that they were <br />
served with the Notice to Appear to implement the removal proceedings <br />
that resulted in a final order of removal or grant of voluntary <br />
departure, not the date that they departed after being notified that <br />
they are subject to civil fines and penalties. INA 240A, 8 U.S.C. <br />
1229b(d)(1). Departures for reasons other than the imposition of civil <br />
fines and penalties that may take place prior to the commencement of, <br />
or during, an alien's removal proceedings are beyond the scope of this <br />
rulemaking.<br />
    Moreover, aliens who are subject to removal orders or have failed <br />
to comply with voluntary departure orders are generally not eligible <br />
for, or face significant barriers to obtaining, the forms of relief <br />
mentioned by commenters. Under INA 240B(d)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1229(d)(1)(B), aliens who fail to comply with voluntary departure <br />
orders are generally ineligible, for a period of 10 years to seek <br />
cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, and other forms of <br />
relief. Furthermore, aliens under removal orders generally must reopen <br />
their removal proceedings to seek such immigration relief. However, the <br />
BIA has held that reopening is generally not justified for relief based <br />
on eligibility that arose after the removal order. See Matter of H-Y-Z-<br />
, 28 I&amp;amp;N Dec. 156, 161 (BIA 2020) (``[E]quities that were acquired <br />
while [an alien] remained illegally in the United States after being <br />
ordered removed . . . generally do not . . . warrant discretionary <br />
reopening''); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I&amp;amp;N Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) <br />
(``[U]ntimely motions to reopen to pursue . . . adjustment of status . <br />
. . will ordinarily be denied''). More broadly, aliens subject to final <br />
executable removal orders do not have a right to remain in the United <br />
States to apply for motions to reopen or potential immigration benefits <br />
and, in many instances, they do not even have a right to remain to <br />
pursue pending applications for immigration benefits or motions to <br />
reopen.\35\ There may be limited circumstances where penalizable aliens <br />
can obtain the relief that the commenters mention. The number of cases <br />
in which an alien could obtain such relief in these circumstances is <br />
small, and civil penalties do not actually prevent aliens from applying <br />
for such relief. At most, it has an incidental deterrent impact on the <br />
alien, which is justified by the policies that the rule promotes. <br />
Therefore, the Departments disagree with commenters' claims that the <br />
IFR's goal of encouraging self-departure impermissibly deprives an <br />
alien of potential eligibility for immigration benefits or relief.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \35\ See, e.g. Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 21 (2008) <br />
(explaining that an alien subject to a removal order ``may be <br />
removed by the DHS . . . even if the motion to reopen has yet to be <br />
adjudicated''); Dada Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1264 <br />
(7th Cir. 1985) (``Congress has not given deportable aliens a right <br />
to the reopening of deportation proceedings.''); see also Riasati v. <br />
I.N.S., 738 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1984) (``[a] pending visa <br />
application does not entitle an alien to a stay of deportation'') <br />
(citations and quotations omitted). The Departments acknowledge that <br />
certain aliens may be entitled to a stay of removal after filing for <br />
certain immigration benefits or certain motions to reopen. See, <br />
e.g., 8 CFR 214.205(g) (T-visas with a positive bona fide <br />
determination); INA 240(c)(7)(C)(iv), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv) <br />
(VAWA self-petitioners); INA 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C) <br />
(motions to reopen an in-absentia order based on lack of notice). As <br />
explained in Section III.E.2 of this preamble, DHS does not issue <br />
civil fines in these circumstances.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    For similar reasons, the Departments also disagree with the claim <br />
that the IFR's goal of encouraging self-departure creates a ``legal <br />
trap'' for aliens who may become subject to reentry bars if they leave <br />
the United States. The Departments acknowledge that aliens who are <br />
subject to final removal orders or have accrued unlawful presence may <br />
be barred from re-admission to the United States for a certain number <br />
of years after departing. INA 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9). However, <br />
Congress did not intend for such consequences to excuse an illegal <br />
alien's continued presence in the United States. Enactment of these <br />
reentry bars plainly demonstrates that Congress intended immigration <br />
violations to carry significant consequences and did not view the <br />
possibility of future inadmissibility as a reason to excuse compliance <br />
with departure obligations. Accordingly, it is important for the <br />
Departments to faithfully carry out Congress's intent in a streamlined <br />
manner within the bounds of the law.<br />
    Moreover, the Departments note that relief may be available to <br />
certain aliens who are barred under these inadmissibility grounds if <br />
they later have a valid basis to re-enter the United States. See INA <br />
212(a)(9)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii) (exception to re-entry <br />
bar for certain aliens ordered removed who seek permission to re-<br />
enter); see also INA 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (waiver <br />
to unlawful presence bars for certain aliens).<br />
    Finally, to the extent that commenters are concerned about the <br />
impact of the unlawful entry civil monetary penalties, the Departments <br />
believe that concerns about aliens leaving the United States and <br />
abandoning removal hearings or benefits applications to avoid these <br />
specific penalties are speculative. The Departments do not believe that <br />
it is reasonable to assume that such aliens would abandon viable claims <br />
for relief or ongoing Immigration Court hearings given the more modest <br />
amount of these penalties.\36\ See DHS, Press Release DHS Announces It <br />
Will Forgive Failure to Depart Fines for Illegal Aliens who Self-Deport <br />
Through the CBP Home App (June 9, 2025). Furthermore, Congress has made <br />
clear that aliens who enter unlawfully are subject to such penalties <br />
notwithstanding the initiation or pendency of removal proceedings. See <br />
INA 275(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \36\ Indeed, the Departments note that the fees for filing many <br />
immigration benefits applications, including cancellation of removal <br />
and adjustment of status, are higher than the civil penalty for <br />
unlawful entry.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: One commenter questioned DHS's reliance on the CBP Home <br />
application as an available mechanism for compliance incentives. The <br />
commenter asserted that the application is not broadly accessible to <br />
all aliens subject to civil monetary penalties under the IFR but is <br />
limited to aliens who entered at or between a port of entry, those who <br />
arrived under a parole program, and those whose Temporary Protected <br />
Status had been terminated. The commenter stated that the application <br />
therefore excludes many aliens who could be fined under this rule and <br />
does not provide meaningful relief from fines or available incentive <br />
programs.<br />
    Response: All non-criminal aliens who schedule their self-departure <br />
through the CBP Home App and depart will receive forgiveness of any <br />
civil penalties issued by DHS for failing to depart the United States. <br />
DHS has updated its website to reflect the full scope of the DHS <br />
policy.\37\ Thus, the departure incentives announced by DHS are not <br />
limited to the category of aliens identified by commenters, and DHS <br />
encourages all aliens subject to removal<br />
<br />
[[Page 65405]]<br />
<br />
or departure orders to take advantage of this opportunity and receive <br />
forgiveness for any civil penalty.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \37\ See, DHS Press Release, CBP HOME: Assistance to Voluntarily <br />
Self-Deport, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dhs.gov/cbphome&quot;&gt;https://www.dhs.gov/cbphome&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/PWQ2-W6ZJ&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/PWQ2-W6ZJ&lt;/a&gt;] (Sept. 1, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: Several commenters questioned the IFR's empirical basis <br />
for the assertion that civil monetary penalties will deter immigration <br />
violations and promote compliance with removal and departure orders. <br />
One stated that the IFR lacks evidence-based support for this <br />
justification and pointed to ICE's prior use of fines and subsequent <br />
recission of that policy as demonstrating that these fines are <br />
ineffective at achieving these purposes. One commenter stated that <br />
previous rules understood this and resultingly did not enforce these <br />
penalties, due to the cost of administering them far outweighing any <br />
fines collected. Collectively, these commenters viewed the IFR as <br />
lacking an empirical foundation, unlikely to alter behavior, and <br />
ineffective in achieving its compliance and enforcement goals.<br />
    One commenter claimed that behavioral research on sanctions and <br />
procedural justice shows that fines do not deter unlawful behavior or <br />
encourage compliance with the law if the process for imposing them is <br />
unfair. The commenter cited to a ``policy briefing'' \38\ discussing <br />
research suggesting that people are more likely to comply with court <br />
orders when they believe that the underlying process is respectful, <br />
neutral, accessible, and provides an opportunity for them to <br />
participate before a decision is rendered.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \38\ Emily Gold LaGratta, Criminal Justice Alliance, To Be Fair: <br />
Procedural Fairness in Courts (Oct. 2014), &lt;a href=&quot;https://justiceinnovation.org/publications/be-fair-procedural-fairness-courts&quot;&gt;https://justiceinnovation.org/publications/be-fair-procedural-fairness-courts&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/YL4F-UVU9&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/YL4F-UVU9&lt;/a&gt;].<br />
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<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree with the assertion that this <br />
rule lacks an empirical basis or relies on unsupported assumptions <br />
regarding deterrence. Congress has expressly authorized civil monetary <br />
penalties for the violations addressed in this rule and has long <br />
identified such penalties as a tool that may promote compliance with <br />
these statutory obligations. See 90 FR 27439-40. The Departments' role <br />
in this rulemaking is to ensure that DHS can efficiently utilize these <br />
statutory penalties consistent with Congress's objective in enacting <br />
them, not to reconsider the policy judgement underlying those statutory <br />
authorities or to undertake a new empirical assessment of their <br />
effectiveness. Moreover, as explained in Section I of this preamble, <br />
the IFR is achieving its intended incentive and deterrence <br />
objectives.\39\<br />
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<br />
    \39\ See Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of <br />
Alien Departures by Civil Fine, DHS Enforcement, and EOIR Case <br />
Outcomes (Oct. 7, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    As explained in the IFR, DHS does not believe that its prior <br />
limited experience assessing these penalties in 2019 demonstrates that <br />
these penalties are ineffective. When ICE rescinded the prior penalty <br />
policy in 2021, there were only 26 active cases,\40\ which DHS <br />
concluded was an insufficient sample size to judge the effectiveness of <br />
these civil penalties. DHS explained its belief that these civil <br />
penalties would be more effective at achieving their deterrence and <br />
compliance objectives if applied quickly and at scale. In addition, the <br />
IFR was designed to address many of those administrative challenges <br />
that ICE faced when issuing civil penalties in 2019, by streamlining <br />
the procedures for these civil monetary penalties, thereby reducing <br />
operational burden and costs. Finally, the Departments noted that DHS's <br />
decision to stop issuing civil penalties under the prior Administration <br />
was based on that Administration's findings that there is no indication <br />
that these penalties promoted compliance with the alien's departure <br />
obligations. On January 20, 2025, President Trump directed DHS to focus <br />
enforcement resources on carrying out final orders of removal and <br />
enforcing laws related to illegal entry and unlawful presence. E.O. <br />
14159 also directed DHS to assess and collect all fines and penalties <br />
authorized by law. This rule is needed to help DHS meet these <br />
directives. See 90 FR 27447-48.<br />
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<br />
    \40\ See ICE Memorandum for Tae D. Johnson, Acting Dir., ICE, <br />
from Corey A. Price, Acting Exec. Assoc. Dir., Enforcement and <br />
Removal Operations, ICE, Re: Recission of Civil Penalties for <br />
Failure to Depart (Aug. 6, 2021).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    With respect to comments on sanctions and ``procedural justice,'' <br />
the Departments note that the rule preserves the core procedural <br />
protections necessary to ensure fairness and meaningful participation, <br />
including written notice of the proposed penalty, information about the <br />
factual basis for it, an opportunity to present a written response with <br />
supporting evidence, and independent supervisory review by an official <br />
who was not involved in the initial determination. These protections <br />
reflect the principles of neutrality, respect, accessibility, and <br />
meaningful opportunity to be heard that the cited research suggests may <br />
support voluntary compliance.<br />
    Finally, while commenters questioned whether civil penalties would <br />
deter unlawful behavior, Congress has already determined that these <br />
penalties may serve an enforcement and compliance function, and the <br />
Departments' procedural refinements help ensure these penalties can be <br />
administered efficiently and fairly in accordance with due process <br />
principles required by law. In any event, the Departments believe that <br />
DHS's robust use of these penalties is helping to achieve their <br />
compliance function as demonstrated by the over 82,000 aliens with <br />
removal and voluntary departure orders who self-departed after DHS <br />
began issuing these penalties, and as demonstrated by the fact that <br />
nearly 7,200 aliens self-departed after receiving a civil fine under <br />
the IFR.\41\ Accordingly, the Departments conclude that the rule has a <br />
sufficient basis.<br />
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<br />
    \41\ See Office of Homeland Security Statistics analysis of <br />
Alien Departures by Civil Fine, DHS Enforcement, and EOIR Case <br />
Outcomes (Oct. 7, 2026).<br />
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<br />
3. Use of Government Resources<br />
    Comment: Commenters said that a large-scale penalty process will <br />
waste government time and resources. One claimed that issuing fines on <br />
a large scale would be an inefficient use of DHS resources because few <br />
aliens will pay them. Commenters discussed several factors that make <br />
collection improbable and administrative enforcement costly. They noted <br />
that many aliens have limited financial resources to pay these fines <br />
and the amounts are so high that aliens will not take them seriously. <br />
One commenter also said that the IFR will only further confuse many <br />
aliens as they do not understand the immigration system and many will <br />
not pay if they will be deported anyway. Another commenter said that <br />
sending a large number of fines to the Treasury Department for <br />
collection is wasteful because DHS itself cannot verify that aliens <br />
subject to these fines are actually in the United States, citing the <br />
IFR's statement that DHS records do not always reliably indicate which <br />
aliens actually remain in the United States after a removal or <br />
departure order. Another commenter also pointed to DHS's prior <br />
conclusion that the resources needed to impose these penalties <br />
outweighed the potential collections from a transient alien population <br />
that generally lacks the means to pay. Accordingly, commenters claimed <br />
that DHS should not expend substantial time and resources pursuing <br />
these penalties.<br />
    Response: The Departments do not agree that this rule's goal of <br />
streamlining the civil penalty process is wasteful or an improper use <br />
of Government<br />
<br />
[[Page 65406]]<br />
<br />
resources. As an initial matter, the IFR and this rule are a critical <br />
part of DHS's efforts to use all statutorily available tools to achieve <br />
the Administration's immigration enforcement and border security <br />
objectives. This includes issuance of civil monetary penalties to <br />
encourage aliens to comply with removal and voluntary departure orders <br />
and to deter unlawful entries. The purpose of the rule is to streamline <br />
the civil penalty process to ensure that DHS can use these statutorily <br />
authorized penalties swiftly and at the scale needed to respond to the <br />
large number of aliens who have entered the United States or remain <br />
unlawfully. See 90 FR 27442; see also Section I of this preamble. Quite <br />
simply, this rulemaking is intended to help ensure that DHS has a <br />
workable process for issuing civil monetary penalties against aliens <br />
who unlawfully entered or failed to depart the United States as part of <br />
ICE's and CBP's missions to apprehend, detain, and remove aliens who <br />
have illegally entered the United States and are unlawfully present.<br />
    More fundamentally, the Departments do not agree that civil <br />
penalties are an ineffective solution to the problem that many aliens <br />
remain in the United States in contravention of removal and departure <br />
orders. To the contrary, Congress has authorized DHS to impose these <br />
civil penalties on such aliens as a means to encourage them to comply <br />
with removal and departure orders and to impose consequences on those <br />
who fail to comply. 90 FR 27446. Indeed, DHS's use of these statutorily <br />
authorized tools is working to achieve the objective as discussed above <br />
in Section I of this preamble.<br />
    Similarly, the Departments disagree with one commenter's claims <br />
that attempting to collect failure to depart penalties is wasteful <br />
because DHS cannot verify that aliens issued fines remain in the United <br />
States. As discussed in the IFR, DHS acknowledges that it does not <br />
maintain comprehensive departure records for all aliens, particularly <br />
for aliens who cross land borders, and, therefore, DHS may have issued <br />
a certain number of penalties to aliens who have already departed. 90 <br />
FR 27445. ICE believes however, based on its experience, that it is <br />
reasonable to assume that a large number of aliens with final removal <br />
and departure orders remain in the United States.\42\ Id. Therefore, <br />
consistent with the President's direction in section 8 of E.O. 14159, <br />
90 FR 8444-45, DHS believes that the IFR's goal of quickly imposing <br />
penalties to encourage compliance with removal and departure orders <br />
justifies the resource expenditure, even if some number of penalties <br />
are not collected because the alien departed.<br />
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<br />
    \42\ According to data in DHS's ENFORCE Alien Removal Module, <br />
there are 1.9 million aliens with final executable orders of removal <br />
out of a total of 2.1 million final orders of removal (last visited <br />
Sep. 10, 2026).<br />
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<br />
    Finally, the IFR fully explains why the Departments believe that <br />
this rule is needed notwithstanding ICE's prior determination in 2021 <br />
that the resource burdens outweigh the amount that can be collected <br />
from a transient population of aliens that lacks the means to pay. 90 <br />
FR 27446-47. In the IFR, DHS first noted that its limited experience <br />
implementing these civil monetary penalties in prior years does not <br />
demonstrate that these penalties are innately ineffective. 90 FR 27447. <br />
Moreover, DHS explained that the IFR is intended to reduce potential <br />
resource burdens that DHS previously experienced when issuing these <br />
penalties by streamlining the underlying civil penalty process. Id. <br />
Additionally, DHS noted that the collection of civil penalties was not <br />
the only or even the primary goal; rather, DHS believes that maximizing <br />
the use of these civil penalties will encourage illegal aliens who are <br />
subject to them to voluntarily depart the United States. Id. As <br />
discussed above, DHS's use of these civil penalties is achieving this <br />
objective, and the use of the CBP Home app to self-deport is a cost-<br />
effective means of achieving this objective.<br />
    Comment: At least one commenter suggested that pursuing fines on a <br />
large scale would merely divert limited agency resources away from <br />
higher priority enforcement objectives, such as apprehending aliens who <br />
pose threats to public safety or national security. The commenter <br />
concluded that the IFR's approach would ultimately increase costs for <br />
the Departments without meaningfully advancing enforcement goals. <br />
Similarly, one commenter claimed that the IFR would not promote public <br />
safety but would have the opposite effect by heightening fear and <br />
discouraging engagement with law enforcement amongst immigrant <br />
communities. According to the commenter, imposing high civil fines on <br />
aliens, including those without criminal histories, would lead to fewer <br />
reports of crime, diminishing public safety for all. Another commenter <br />
suggested that a more effective and resource-efficient approach would <br />
be to focus enforcement on employers who hire unauthorized workers, <br />
suggesting that such entities can be expected to understand and comply <br />
with employment verification laws and will be better motivated by civil <br />
penalties, or the threat of civil penalties, to follow those laws.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that implementing the civil <br />
penalty process described in the IFR will divert resources away from <br />
higher priority enforcement objectives or fail to advance statutory <br />
enforcement goals. Congress has expressly authorized the imposition and <br />
collection of civil penalties under INA 240B(d), 8 U.S.C. 1229c; INA <br />
274D, 8 U.S.C. 1324d; and INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325. The Departments <br />
therefore have a responsibility to maintain procedures that enable the <br />
effective administration of these statutory authorities. Implementing a <br />
clear, streamlined penalty process does not diminish the Departments' <br />
ability to prioritize cases involving threats to public safety or <br />
national security, including cases where the alien fails to depart or <br />
illegally enters the United States. Rather, the IFR promotes <br />
administrative efficiency by updating and consolidating procedural <br />
steps.<br />
    Additionally, the concerns about the imposition of civil penalties <br />
heightening fear and discouraging engagement with law enforcement by <br />
the immigrant community is speculative. The commenter failed to provide <br />
information or evidence to support the concern that civil penalties <br />
will discourage aliens from reporting crime or engaging with law <br />
enforcement. Even if there is a disincentive to report crime or engage <br />
with law enforcement, the commenter failed to provide a basis to <br />
conclude that these disincentives stem from making the process of <br />
imposing civil penalties more efficient, rather than from the existence <br />
of civil penalties or immigration enforcement more generally.<br />
    The Departments also disagree that the penalty process undermines <br />
public safety by discouraging aliens from reporting crime or engaging <br />
with law enforcement. The penalties addressed in the IFR apply only in <br />
limited circumstances specified by statute and do not alter DHS's <br />
longstanding policies and efforts aimed at encouraging victims, <br />
witnesses, and other individuals to cooperate with law enforcement <br />
regardless of immigration status. Nothing in the IFR changes <br />
protections for victims of crime, humanitarian programs, or DHS's <br />
ability to exercise discretion on a case-by-case basis. The <br />
Departments, therefore, do not expect the procedural updates in the IFR <br />
to meaningfully affect crime reporting or relationships between <br />
immigrant communities and law enforcement.<br />
<br />
[[Page 65407]]<br />
<br />
    The Departments further disagree that focusing enforcement <br />
resources on employers who hire unauthorized workers would be a more <br />
effective or statutorily appropriate approach. Employer sanctions and <br />
worker-related civil penalties are governed by distinct provisions of <br />
the INA, and the IFR did not amend or affect those frameworks. While <br />
the Departments enforce employer compliance laws through separate <br />
authorities, those efforts do not displace the need to implement civil <br />
monetary penalties against aliens where Congress has authorized their <br />
use and vested DHS with authority to enforce them. The IFR ensures <br />
streamlined procedures for carrying out the statutory provisions for <br />
civil monetary penalties applicable to aliens for failure to depart, <br />
failure to voluntarily depart, and improper entry, while employer-<br />
related enforcement continues under its own statutory framework.<br />
    For these reasons, the Departments conclude that the IFR's civil <br />
penalty procedures are an appropriate use of agency resources. The <br />
procedures promote efficient administration of existing statutory <br />
penalty authorities to meet immigration enforcement priorities and <br />
challenges.<br />
<br />
D. Comments on Specific Provisions<br />
<br />
    1. Removal of Notice of Intent To Fine<br />
    Comment: Several commenters asserted that eliminating the notice of <br />
intent to fine (NIF) erodes procedural protections by transforming what <br />
was once a preliminary document signaling DHS's intent to issue a fine <br />
into a final agency decision. Commenters stated that this change <br />
reduces the time that aliens have to understand and respond to fines, <br />
seek legal advice, and submit an appeal. Additionally, one commenter <br />
suggested that eliminating the NIF process--which the commenter <br />
characterizes as being designed to notify aliens of potential penalties <br />
and allowing them to rectify the violation--is inconsistent with the <br />
goal of incentivizing aliens to comply with removal and departure <br />
orders.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree with commenters' <br />
characterization of the rule. Although the IFR eliminated the NIF <br />
process for these penalties, it continues to require written notice of <br />
penalties that identify the factual and legal basis for liability, see <br />
8 CFR 281.1(c), and provides aliens with an opportunity to submit a <br />
written response with supporting evidence before a final determination <br />
is made, see 8 CFR 281.1(e). Indeed, the differences between the NIF <br />
process prior to the IFR under 8 CFR part 280 and the process <br />
established by the IFR under 8 CFR part 281 are less substantial than <br />
commenters suggest. Under both regulations, if an alien fails to <br />
respond to the NIF or the penalty decision, as applicable, the alien <br />
will be liable for the penalty. See generally 90 FR 27449-54 (comparing <br />
8 CFR 280 and 8 CFR 281). The only difference is that, under the part <br />
280 process, a supervisory officer must convert a NIF into a final <br />
unappealable decision; under the IFR, the penalty decision <br />
automatically becomes final if the alien does not appeal. Compare 8 CFR <br />
280.13(a)(2), with 8 CFR 281.1(f)(3). Under both regulations, an alien <br />
who timely appeals a penalty decision is entitled to additional process <br />
before a final decision is issued. Compare 8 CFR 280.13(b), with 8 CFR <br />
281.1(e). Therefore, the IFR merely converts the prior two-stage NIF <br />
process under 8 CFR part 280 into a single process that eliminates <br />
duplicate administrative steps and paperwork if an alien does not <br />
appeal, but the fundamental safeguards of notice and an opportunity to <br />
be heard remain unchanged. Id.<br />
    The Departments acknowledge that the IFR reduces the amount of time <br />
that an alien has to contest a penalty and to submit supporting <br />
evidence compared to the NIF process. Prior to the IFR an alien <br />
generally was required to answer a NIF within 30 calendar days and <br />
could submit supporting evidence at an in-person hearing, if requested. <br />
8 CFR 280.12. Under the IFR, an alien must file an appeal postmarked <br />
within 15 business days of the date of service of the civil penalty <br />
decision and the alien is generally required to submit all evidence in <br />
support of the appeal at the time of filing. 8 CFR 281.1(e)(1). <br />
However, as explained in the IFR and in response to related comments in <br />
this preamble, the Departments believe that shortening the timeline for <br />
appeals and evidentiary submissions is appropriate for the failure to <br />
depart and unlawful entry penalties due to the straightforward and <br />
readily determinable nature of these penalties.<br />
    Moreover, the Departments note that in some respects the IFR <br />
simplified the process for aliens to contest civil penalties compared <br />
to the procedures under 8 CFR part 280. An alien may trigger an appeal <br />
under the 8 CFR 281.1 process by simply filing a notice of written <br />
appeal indicating that the alien is contesting the penalty. Indeed, DHS <br />
uses the Form 281, Notice of Violation and Order, which includes a <br />
field for aliens to use to appeal a penalty. The alien may, but is not <br />
required to, submit written argument or documentary evidence contesting <br />
the penalty. Id. In contrast, under the NIF process, the alien must <br />
provide a written defense, in duplicate, under oath setting forth the <br />
reasons why a fine should not be imposed. See 8 CFR 280.12.<br />
    In addition, this final rule amends 8 CFR 281.1(e) to permit aliens <br />
to file an appeal that is postmarked after the 15-business-day deadline <br />
where the alien asserts, and ICE determines after considering on a <br />
case-by-case basis all the evidence presented with the appeal, that <br />
there was a mail delay in receiving the immigration officer's decision <br />
and order issued under 8 CFR 281.1(c)(1). Additionally, to help ensure <br />
timely processing and avoid administrative delays by postal carriers on <br />
the backend, DHS encourages aliens to obtain contemporaneous, time-<br />
stamped evidence of deposit of their mailed appeal directly from the <br />
U.S. Postal Service (``USPS'') or their chosen commercial carrier <br />
because merely depositing an appeal in a standard mail collection box <br />
does not guarantee an immediate postmark or proof of the date of <br />
dispatch. This amendment, which provides an exception to the 15-<br />
business-day deadline to appeal, addresses commenters' concerns <br />
relating to the reduced time for aliens to submit an appeal under 8 CFR <br />
part 281. Even assuming that the IFR's streamlined process makes it <br />
more challenging for aliens to appeal and submit supporting evidence in <br />
some cases, the Departments believe that this risk is outweighed by <br />
DHS's strong interest in the revised civil penalty process as discussed <br />
further in the IFR and this preamble.<br />
    Finally, regarding one commenter's claim that eliminating the NIF <br />
is inconsistent with the IFR's goal of incentivizing compliance with <br />
removal and departure orders, the Departments note that the IFR was <br />
designed to achieve several goals. As explained in the IFR preamble, <br />
one goal of this rule was to ensure that DHS has a workable process for <br />
issuing civil penalties against aliens without diverting resources away <br />
from ICE's and CBP's missions to apprehend, detain, and remove illegal <br />
aliens. 90 FR 27447; see also Section I of this preamble. Eliminating <br />
the NIF serves this goal by removing a duplicative step (i.e., the <br />
requirement to issue a separate final decision) in cases where an alien <br />
does not appeal the civil penalty decision. The Departments note that <br />
aliens continue to have an avenue to rectify any fines resulting from <br />
these immigration violations. As the IFR explains, DHS will rescind <br />
outstanding civil penalties in cases where a qualifying alien uses the <br />
CBP Home app<br />
<br />
[[Page 65408]]<br />
<br />
to depart the United States. See 90 FR 27444.<br />
    Comment: One commenter claimed that eliminating the preliminary NIF <br />
makes notice and the opportunity to be heard occur only after DHS <br />
imposes a civil monetary penalty, violating due process. Citing Mathews <br />
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the commenter argues that similar to <br />
how the government must give a disability benefits recipient notice and <br />
an opportunity to submit information prior to terminating benefits, DHS <br />
must give aliens notice of the fine and an opportunity to challenge the <br />
accuracy of DHS's information and its conclusions before DHS imposes <br />
the fine. The commenter contends that the IFR violates due process <br />
because aliens are given no opportunity to submit information or <br />
contest the penalty prior to the final decision.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree with the commenter's <br />
characterization of the IFR. The IFR provides aliens with notice and an <br />
opportunity to contest civil penalties before they become final. As <br />
explained in the IFR, a decision imposing a civil monetary penalty <br />
becomes final only if the alien does not timely file an appeal, not at <br />
the time of issuance of the civil penalty.\43\ See 8 CFR 281.1(f)(3); <br />
see also 90 FR 27450. If the alien timely appeals, the initial penalty <br />
decision will remain inoperative during the pendency of the appeal. 8 <br />
CFR 281.1(e)(1), (f)(3). At the end of the appeal process, and after <br />
considering any arguments and evidence submitted by the alien, a <br />
supervisory immigration officer who did not issue the initial penalty <br />
decision issues a final decision in writing affirming the initial <br />
penalty decision or withdrawing the decision and serves it on the <br />
alien. See 8 CFR 281.1(e). Therefore, contrary to the commenter's <br />
claim, the IFR provides an alien with both notice and an opportunity to <br />
challenge the penalty decision prior to the alien becoming liable for <br />
the penalty, in accordance with the pre-deprivation process upheld in <br />
Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. at 319.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \43\ As a practical matter, the same is true of the NIF process; <br />
if an alien does not timely answer the NIF, DHS may issue a final <br />
decision imposing the penalty which the alien cannot appeal. See 8 <br />
CFR 280.13(a)(2).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: Citing 5 U.S.C. 554(b), a commenter claimed that <br />
``eliminating the NIF also violates the [Administrative Procedure Act] <br />
because there is no notice of the matters of fact and law asserted, <br />
including what constitutes willfulness under these circumstances, and <br />
what factors are relevant to defenses or challenges to the penalty.'' <br />
More broadly, the commenter claims that the removal of the NIF violates <br />
``a foundational principle of administrative law: meaningful notice <br />
must precede the imposition of civil penalties to satisfy due process <br />
requirements.'' The commenter notes that federal statutes, including <br />
immigration statutes, consistently underscore the importance of notice <br />
in administrative proceedings, and discusses 8 U.S.C. 1182(n)(2)(C), <br />
which governs the civil penalty process for employers who violate <br />
certain labor conditions under the H1-B visa program as an example.<br />
    Response: As an initial matter, the Departments note that, although <br />
the IFR eliminates the NIF process for these penalties, it continues to <br />
require DHS to issue a written notice that sufficiently identifies the <br />
basis for liability and provides aliens with an opportunity to contest <br />
such penalties before they become final. Under 8 CFR 281.1(c)(1), the <br />
initial penalty decision must include the statutory basis for the <br />
penalty, the amount and type of the penalty being imposed, and a brief <br />
statement of the reasons for the decision. DHS implements this <br />
requirement through Form 281, Notice of Violation and Order, which <br />
provides aliens with all of the required information, including <br />
information about the date that the alien became subject to a final <br />
removal or departure order or when the alien was apprehended entering <br />
the United States unlawfully. For the failure to depart penalties under <br />
section 274D(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1), the Form 281 also <br />
identifies the particular violation--e.g., willful failure or refusal <br />
to depart pursuant to a removal order; willful failure or refusal to <br />
make timely application in good faith for travel documents; willful <br />
failure or refusal to present for removal as required by DHS.<br />
    This information ensures that aliens understand the basis for the <br />
penalty and have the requisite information in the event they seek to <br />
challenge it. See 90 FR 27449. Indeed, DHS notes that the NIF process <br />
does not require DHS to provide the alien with any additional <br />
information about the basis for a civil penalty beyond what the IFR and <br />
this rule require. See 8 CFR 280.1, 280.11. Moreover, as discussed in <br />
response to the comment immediately above, under the IFR an alien <br />
retains an opportunity to challenge a civil penalty decision issued <br />
pursuant to the IFR before it becomes final. Therefore, the Departments <br />
disagree that by eliminating the NIF this rule violates any <br />
``principles of administrative law'' related to notice in the civil <br />
penalty context.<br />
    The Departments also note that the IFR's procedures are not subject <br />
to the requirements in 5 U.S.C. 554(a) because they are not <br />
adjudications ``required by statute to be determined on the record <br />
after opportunity for an agency hearing.'' Moreover, unlike the H1-B <br />
civil penalty statute cited by the commenter, the civil penalty <br />
statutes relevant to this rule do not specify the procedures that DHS <br />
must follow to impose these penalties. 90 FR 27448. As discussed in the <br />
IFR, Congress has set forth detailed procedures that the Government <br />
must follow when imposing certain immigration-related civil penalties, <br />
but Congress's omission of similar procedures for the penalties covered <br />
by this rule indicates that Congress intended to give DHS discretion to <br />
employ procedures that DHS reasonably believes are appropriate for such <br />
penalties. See id.; see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. <br />
at 543 (concluding that ``[a]bsent constitutional constraints or <br />
extremely compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should <br />
be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods <br />
of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous <br />
duties'') (cleaned up). For the reasons discussed further in the IFR <br />
and throughout this preamble, the Departments believe that the IFR's <br />
streamlined process, including the removal of the NIF, is reasonable <br />
and appropriate for these penalties given their typically <br />
straightforward nature and DHS's need to ensure that it has an <br />
efficient process for issuing these penalties more quickly and at scale <br />
to deter unlawful entries and to encourage compliance with removal and <br />
departure orders, while also providing aliens with sufficient notice of <br />
the basis for the penalty decision and opportunity to contest it before <br />
it becomes final.<br />
2. Notice of Grounds for the Penalty<br />
    Comment: Commenters objected to adequacy of the notice of the <br />
grounds for issuing the civil monetary penalties. One commenter said <br />
that the IFR's requirement that DHS must include a ``brief statement of <br />
the reasons'' for imposing a penalty is inconsistent with DHS's burden <br />
of proving by ``clear and convincing, and unequivocal evidence'' that <br />
an alien is liable. Commenters suggested that aliens cannot defend <br />
against fines without additional information or explanation in the <br />
penalty decision. One commenter said that the IFR violates the <br />
Administrative Procedure Act (``APA''), citing 5 U.S.C. 556, and due <br />
process principles requiring notice to reasonably apprise parties of <br />
the action and provide an<br />
<br />
[[Page 65409]]<br />
<br />
opportunity to present objections, because DHS is not required to <br />
provide a complete record supporting the penalty.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that the penalty decision <br />
contains insufficient information for an alien to understand the basis <br />
for the penalty or to challenge it or that the IFR deprives aliens of <br />
their due process notice and hearing rights through lack of a record. <br />
There is no such requirement in statute for a hearing to be on the <br />
record in the civil penalties context or any indication that Congress <br />
intended the APA's procedures governing adjudications to apply. <br />
Therefore, DHS was not required to adopt the adjudication procedures in <br />
5 U.S.C. 554 and the follow-on procedures in 5 U.S.C. 556 that apply to <br />
adjudications governed by 5 U.S.C. 554. Regardless, new section 8 CFR <br />
281.1(e)(3) provides the materials that compose the record supporting a <br />
particular civil penalty.<br />
    As an initial matter, DHS reiterates that the legal and factual <br />
predicates for these penalties are relatively straightforward and <br />
readily determinable based on information within DHS's and the alien's <br />
possession. 90 FR 27442; see also Section II of this preamble. For <br />
example, the INA authorizes DHS to impose a civil monetary penalty for <br />
failure to depart if two conditions are met: (1) the alien was granted <br />
voluntary departure or is subject to a final executable order of <br />
removal; and (2) the alien voluntarily failed to depart in the allotted <br />
time set forth in the voluntary departure order or willfully failed to <br />
depart under a final removal order. See INA 240B(d)(1), 274D(a)(1)(A), <br />
8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(1), 1324d(a)(1)(A).\44\ The penalty decision provides <br />
aliens with sufficient information as to each of these elements.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \44\ The Departments focus on the failure to depart penalties <br />
consistent with the scope of commenters' concerns. To the extent <br />
that commenters are raising similar concerns about the unlawful <br />
entry penalties, commenters' concerns are addressed in Section <br />
III.E.2 of this preamble.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    With respect to the first element (the removal or departure order), <br />
the civil penalty decision, i.e., DHS Form 281, Notice of Violation and <br />
Order, explicitly lists whether the alien is being fined on the basis <br />
of a voluntary departure order or a removal order, and it provides the <br />
date that such an order was issued. DHS does not agree with commenters <br />
that DHS can only prove the existence of a removal or voluntary <br />
departure order by attaching the order to the penalty decision. The <br />
information contained in the penalty decision reflects that the <br />
immigration officer issuing the penalty has reviewed relevant DHS <br />
records and the alien's immigration files as required by ICE guidance <br />
and has determined based on those records that the alien is subject to <br />
a final executable removal order or voluntary departure order. See 90 <br />
FR 27442-43; see also Section I of this preamble. To the extent that an <br />
alien believes that DHS records are mistaken, the alien can appeal the <br />
penalty decision and provide documentary evidence needed to dispute the <br />
decision. DHS assumes that aliens retain important documents, including <br />
legal documents demonstrating, for example, that the alien has been <br />
granted a stay of removal or has a pending appeal, or other documents <br />
reflecting that the alien is not subject to a final executable removal <br />
or departure order. Commenters have provided only speculative reasons <br />
to believe otherwise. Moreover, under the IFR's process, if an alien <br />
requests a copy of the relevant documents in connection with an appeal, <br />
the IFR requires DHS to provide such documents. 8 CFR 281.1(e)(3). <br />
Commenters have not provided any concrete evidence demonstrating that <br />
requiring DHS to provide a copy of the alien's removal or voluntary <br />
departure order would allow aliens to more effectively challenge a <br />
penalty decision. Indeed, ICE notes that the prior process under 8 CFR <br />
part 280 did not require DHS to provide a copy of an alien's removal or <br />
voluntary departure order when issuing a NIF and the DHS sees no reason <br />
for requiring it now. See 8 CFR 280.11.<br />
    With respect to the second (willfulness or voluntariness) element, <br />
the penalty decision lists whether the alien is being issued a civil <br />
penalty for willfully failing or refusing to depart the United States, <br />
or for instead, voluntarily failing to comply with a voluntary <br />
departure order. DHS does not believe that any additional information <br />
is required. As the Departments explained in the IFR and in Section II <br />
of this preamble, statutory and regulatory requirements impose a duty <br />
on Immigration Judges to inform aliens of their obligation to depart <br />
and of the consequences of failing to do so, including that they could <br />
be liable for civil penalties. See 90 FR 27440-41. Absent contrary <br />
evidence, the presumption of regularity satisfies DHS's burden to <br />
demonstrate that an Immigration Judge provided notice of these <br />
obligations and consequences, see U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 <br />
U.S. 1, 10 (2001), and an alien's failure to comply with the order <br />
after receiving notice of the consequences satisfies DHS's burden to <br />
demonstrate that the alien is liable for the penalty. See Section I of <br />
this preamble. To the extent that an alien contests the voluntary or <br />
willful nature of his or her failure to depart due to circumstances <br />
beyond the alien's control (e.g., hospitalization, incarceration, <br />
inability to obtain travel documents, lack of notice of a removal or <br />
voluntary departure order), the Departments note that the alien, not <br />
DHS, is in the best position to produce such evidence and may do so <br />
during the available appeals process before DHS. See Zenith Elec. Corp. <br />
v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (``The burden of <br />
production should belong to the party in possession of the necessary <br />
information.'').<br />
    For these reasons, the Departments conclude that the information <br />
provided in the penalty decision is facially consistent with DHS's <br />
burden of proof to demonstrate an alien's liability for a civil penalty <br />
covered by this rule. Commenters argue that DHS must meet the ``clear <br />
and convincing evidence standard'' described in Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. <br />
276, 277 (1964). However, this standard applies to the burden of proof <br />
for deportable aliens in removal proceedings, not in the civil <br />
penalties' context. See 8 CFR 1240.8(a). Even assuming that DHS must <br />
meet the same ``clear and convincing evidence standard'' here, any <br />
challenge that DHS did not meet its burden of proof must be raised by <br />
an alien during the appeal process and based on the facts in his or her <br />
individual case.<br />
    Finally, with respect to commenters' claim that the IFR violates 5 <br />
U.S.C. 556 because it does not require DHS to provide a complete record <br />
supporting the penalty, DHS notes that 5 U.S.C. 556 applies only to <br />
hearings required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or 554. To the extent that the <br />
commenter is suggesting that civil penalty ``adjudications'' fall <br />
within the ambit of 5 U.S.C. 554(a) and therefore require DHS to follow <br />
the procedures in both 5 U.S.C. 554 and 556, DHS disagrees. There is no <br />
requirement in statute for a hearing to be on the record in the civil <br />
penalties context, let alone to comply with the procedures in 5 U.S.C. <br />
554 and the follow-on procedures under 5 U.S.C. 556 that also apply to <br />
adjudications governed by 5 U.S.C. 554. See Marathon Oil Co. v. E.P.A., <br />
564 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that ``[t]he failure of <br />
Congress to provide for any hearing whatsoever within an administrative <br />
process may well be a valid indication that Congress either did not <br />
feel that it was providing for an ` ``adjudication'' ' in the <br />
traditional sense of the word or did not intend the APA procedures to <br />
apply''); see also City of West Chicago, Ill. v. NCR, 701 F.2d 632,<br />
<br />
[[Page 65410]]<br />
<br />
641 (7th Cir. 1983) (``Congress must clearly indicate its intent to <br />
trigger the formal on-the-record hearing provisions of the APA.''). <br />
Regardless, 8 CFR 281.1(e)(3) provides the materials that compose the <br />
record supporting a particular civil penalty and as explained in <br />
response to other comments in this preamble, the IFR's other procedures <br />
satisfy due process.<br />
    Comment: One commenter claimed that the IFR should require DHS to <br />
attach a copy of the underlying voluntary departure order when imposing <br />
a fine for failure to depart under INA 240B(d), 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d). The <br />
commenter also states that many voluntary departure orders do not <br />
comply with INA 240B(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(3), which, according to <br />
the commenter, requires orders to include written warnings about <br />
potential fines for failure to depart. Accordingly, the commenter <br />
suggests that DHS can only meet its burden of proof to impose a fine if <br />
DHS provides a copy of the order containing the required warning.<br />
    Response: As an initial matter, the Departments disagree that <br />
Immigration Judges and the BIA regularly do not provide statutorily <br />
required civil monetary penalty warnings when granting voluntary <br />
departure. Absent information to the contrary, the presumption of <br />
regularity applies as both Immigration Judges and the BIA are legally <br />
required to provide these warnings. See Gregory, 534 U.S. at 10; 8 CFR <br />
1240.26(k)(3). The commenter's general assertion--in ``many'' cases <br />
Immigration Judges and the BIA do not comply with this obligation--<br />
without any factual basis is speculative and insufficient to overcome <br />
the presumption of regularity. To the extent an alien's voluntary <br />
departure order does not contain the required warning, the alien can <br />
file a timely appeal of the penalty decision and submit a copy of the <br />
allegedly deficient order. Moreover, for the reasons discussed in the <br />
IFR and in the comment response above, the Departments believe that, <br />
given the straightforward nature of these penalties, the penalty <br />
decision provides sufficient notice to the alien of the basis for the <br />
penalty and how to contest it. See also 90 FR 27443-44, 27452.<br />
3. Service by First Class Mail<br />
    Comment: Several commenters claimed that the change in service of <br />
process raises due process concerns. One commenter observed that the <br />
rule permits DHS to unilaterally send fines by ordinary mail despite <br />
previously issuing NIFs by personal service or certified mail. Another <br />
commenter states that previous rules required that communications be <br />
sent by certified mail or served in person, guaranteeing receipt, and <br />
that the IFR removing this provision to instead allow service by <br />
ordinary mail will dramatically increase the likelihood that intended <br />
recipients will not receive information about their fine, miss their <br />
appeal window, and unknowingly accrue large amounts in civil monetary <br />
penalties. Another commenter suggests that these risks are amplified in <br />
this context given the highly transient nature of the population <br />
subject to these fines. One commenter explained that service by regular <br />
mail will not reasonably apprise aliens of the fine because regular <br />
mail makes it significantly less likely that the alien will receive the <br />
decision in a timely manner if at all. This commenter also points out <br />
that in the removal proceedings context in which DHS uses service by <br />
regular mail a significant amount of the information provided in <br />
mailings is also available online unlike in this civil penalty context. <br />
They state that here, in this context, aliens have no other way to <br />
access the information or be on notice that they have penalties brought <br />
against them. They also note that this is particularly an issue for <br />
those who have been fined incorrectly and explain that since the <br />
beginning of 2025 they have heard from permanent residents who have <br />
been in the United States for decades and would have no reason to <br />
believe there are pending proceedings against them who received NIFs. <br />
Other commenters also raised that authorizing service by regular mail <br />
increases the likelihood of delay or non-receipt, one noting that <br />
regular mail cannot be tracked.<br />
    Another commenter claimed that the IFR fails to explain how <br />
ordinary mail saves money and staff time compared to personal service <br />
or certified mail. The commenter also noted that the IFR does not <br />
explain why ICE cannot use personal service for aliens with removal <br />
orders because, as the IFR notes, these aliens are required to attend <br />
in-person check-ins with ICE.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that permitting service of civil <br />
monetary penalty determinations by regular mail raises due process <br />
concerns or fails to provide constitutionally adequate notice. Due <br />
process does not require use of any particular method of service or <br />
guarantee of actual receipt. Rather, it requires that the chosen method <br />
be ``reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,'' to inform <br />
interested parties of the action and to permit them an opportunity to <br />
respond. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (stating that notice under due <br />
process must be of a sufficient nature as to reasonably convey the <br />
required information). Service by regular mail has long been recognized <br />
as a constitutionally sufficient method of notice in civil, <br />
administrative, and immigration contexts, including in removal <br />
proceedings, and other DHS communications. See e.g., Gardner v. City of <br />
Columbus, Ohio, 841 F.2d 1272, 1279 (6th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that <br />
service by regular mail satisfied due process notice requirements, <br />
while among other factors, noting government's observation that service <br />
by certified mail would be more costly); Urbina-Osejo v. INS, 124 F.3d <br />
1314, 1317 (9th Cir.1997) (stating that ``notice of a deportation <br />
hearing sent by regular mail to the last address provided by the alien <br />
to the INS satisfies the requirements of constitutional due process''); <br />
Matter of Grijalva, 21 I&amp;amp;N Dec. 27 (BIA 1995) (holding that notice sent <br />
by regular mail is presumed sufficient if it is properly addressed and <br />
mailed according to established procedures and that the presumption of <br />
delivery may be rebutted with evidence of non-receipt). The IFR adopted <br />
this established practice.<br />
    Penalty determinations are sent to the address the alien has <br />
provided to DHS or that otherwise appears on file. As the IFR explains, <br />
DHS has a reasonable expectation that aliens will take these <br />
requirements seriously because failure to do so can result in a range <br />
of consequences including criminal penalties. INA 266, 8 U.S.C. 1306. <br />
In general, aliens in the United States are under specific statutory <br />
and regulatory obligations to register their presence, see INA 261-264, <br />
8 U.S.C. 1301-1304; 8 CFR part 264, and to keep the U.S. Government <br />
apprised of their current address while in the country, see INA 265, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1305; 8 CFR 265.1. Most aliens subject to the monetary penalties <br />
covered by this rule are warned of their address obligations upon <br />
initiation of section 240 removal proceedings, and DHS is taking steps <br />
to ensure that all aliens are aware of, and comply with, registration <br />
and address requirements consistent with this Administration's <br />
policies. Additionally, DHS provides convenient and reliable ways for <br />
aliens to update their addresses including through online portals, and <br />
immigration officers have access to current address data maintained in <br />
DHS and EOIR databases.<br />
    Although some commenters expressed concern that personal service or <br />
certified mail had previously been used for NIFs, the governing <br />
statutory provisions do not require the use of those methods for civil <br />
monetary penalty notices, and neither do due process principles impose <br />
such a<br />
<br />
[[Page 65411]]<br />
<br />
requirement. INA 240B(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(1)(A); INA <br />
274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1); &amp;amp; INA 275(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1). <br />
See also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (``Personal service has not in all <br />
circumstances been regarded as indispensable to the process due to <br />
residents, and it has more often been held unnecessary as to <br />
nonresidents. We disturb none of the established rules on these <br />
subjects.''); Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 161-62 (2002) <br />
(upholding notice sent by certified mail to a prison, even though <br />
inmate claimed he never received it, demonstrating that due process <br />
does not require proof of actual receipt, and explaining that Mennonite <br />
Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 797 n.3 (1983) did ``not say <br />
that the State must provide actual notice, but that it must attempt to <br />
provide actual notice'') (emphasis in original).\45\ Furthermore, even <br />
a Notice to Appear (NTA), which initiates section 240 removal <br />
proceedings and thus carries greater legal consequences, may be served <br />
by regular mail. INA 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1). Although the <br />
statute previously required certified mail, Congress removed that <br />
requirement in IIRIRA, expressly permitting service by other forms of <br />
mail. See INA 239(a)(1)-(2), as amended by IIRIRA, Public Law 104-208, <br />
div. C, tit. III, 304(a)(3), 308(b)(6), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587-<br />
88, 3009-615. The INA now provides that service by mail ``shall be <br />
sufficient if there is proof of attempted delivery to the last address <br />
provided by the alien.'' INA 239(c), 8 U.S.C. 1229(c). By contrast, the <br />
INA is silent as to the method of service for civil monetary penalties <br />
under INA 240B(d), 274D(a), 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), 1324d(a), <br />
1325(b). Accordingly, this final rule will allow DHS to use routine <br />
service, including regular mail which in turn will lessen DHS's <br />
administrative burdens, such as the time and resources needed for <br />
personal service and the additional costs and increased processing <br />
times associated with certified mail. Routine service also provides an <br />
alien appropriate notice of the imposition of a civil monetary penalty.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \45\ The agency acknowledges that in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. <br />
220 at 232 (2006), the Supreme Court held that a person's failure to <br />
comply with a statutory address update requirement does not forfeit <br />
the right to constitutionally sufficient notice, and that additional <br />
reasonable steps may be required before the government takes certain <br />
actions. The Court emphasized, however, that due process adequacy <br />
requires balancing the government's interests against the individual <br />
interests at stake. Id. at 229. For the reasons discussed in the <br />
IFR, the Departments believe that the Supreme Court's decision is <br />
distinguishable. See 90 FR 27452 n.44.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The Departments also disagree that service by regular mail <br />
increases the likelihood that aliens will unknowingly accrue penalties <br />
or be deprived of an opportunity to appeal. First, the rule's <br />
procedures are reasonably designed to prevent aliens from unknowingly <br />
accruing civil monetary penalties. Under INA 262, 8 U.S.C. 1302, most <br />
aliens present in the United States for 30 days or more are required to <br />
apply for registration and fingerprinting. As a result, most aliens are <br />
subject to the address update requirement in INA 265, 8 U.S.C. 1305. <br />
Moreover, most aliens subject to the penalties addressed in this rule <br />
are specifically advised of these obligations upon initiation of <br />
section 240 removal proceedings. INA 239(a)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1229(a)(1)(F). DHS provides convenient and reliable ways for aliens to <br />
update their addresses, including use of online portals, and <br />
immigration officers have access to current address data maintained in <br />
DHS and EOIR databases. 90 FR 27452.<br />
    Against that backdrop and as noted in the IFR, the Supreme Court <br />
has recognized that service by regular mail may, in some circumstances, <br />
provide better notice than certified mail or other methods. Jones, 547 <br />
U.S. at 234-35. This rule adopts that approach. 90 FR 27453. Based on <br />
ICE's experience, service by ordinary mail is often more likely to <br />
reach aliens, including those who may be attempting to evade detection <br />
or who have moved without updating their address. Id. Such aliens, or <br />
members of their household, may be less likely to answer the door for <br />
personal service or to accept certified mail, whereas regular mail is <br />
delivered directly to their mailbox. Id. Even when an alien has moved, <br />
regular mail may still result in the current occupant forwarding <br />
address information or otherwise alerting the intended recipient. Id. <br />
(citing Jones, 547 U.S. at 235). Moreover, the rule does not mandate <br />
use of regular mail in all cases. DHS retains discretion to use other <br />
methods of service where appropriate. 90 FR 27453 (citing 8 CFR <br />
281.1(d)). Accordingly, DHS reasonably believes that notices sent to <br />
the most recent address provided by the alien satisfy due process <br />
requirements.<br />
    Secondly, the rule includes sufficient procedural protections that <br />
mitigate the effects of any variation in mail delivery times and afford <br />
a meaningful opportunity for appeal. Consistent with 8 CFR 281.1(e), an <br />
alien shall file a written notice of appeal with the Department <br />
postmarked within 15 business days of the date of service of the <br />
decision. Although service of the immigration officer's decision is <br />
complete upon mailing, the rule mitigates the effects of variability in <br />
mail delivery times at the appeal stage by defining timeliness based on <br />
the postmark date of the appeal rather than the date of receipt. As <br />
explained in the IFR, ``DHS will calculate the timeliness of an appeal <br />
based on the date that the alien's appeal is postmarked.'' 90 FR 27450 <br />
(citing 8 CFR 281.1(e)). Under this framework, an alien who mails an <br />
appeal within the 15-business-day period is not penalized for postal <br />
delays occurring after the appeal is sent. This approach allocates the <br />
risk of mail delay at the filing stage to the Government and helps <br />
ensure that ordinary variations in mail delivery do not result in <br />
forfeiture of appeal rights.<br />
    Along with the notice of appeal, an alien may, but is not required <br />
to, provide a written defense or documentary evidence, or both, setting <br />
forth the reasons why a penalty should not be imposed. Id. After the <br />
appeal is filed, a supervisory immigration officer who did not review <br />
the initial decision and order must conduct a de novo review and may <br />
request supplemental evidence or information, in which case aliens <br />
receive an additional 15 days to provide supporting material. 90 FR <br />
27450 (citing 8 CFR 281.1(e)(2)). The officer may, in their discretion, <br />
call for additional briefing or written filings from the alien, and the <br />
alien will have 15 days from the receipt of that request to provide the <br />
information. Id. The officer will also provide the alien with copies of <br />
pertinent documents and records relevant to the penalty, if the alien <br />
requests, unless they are law enforcement sensitive, or disclosure is <br />
prohibited by law. 90 FR 27450 (citing 8 CFR 281.1(e)(3)). Moreover, if <br />
the alien files a notice of appeal, the initial civil penalty decision <br />
will remain inoperative during the appeal. 90 FR 27450 (citing 8 CFR <br />
281.1(e)(1)).<br />
    In addition, the Departments recognize that aliens may, in limited <br />
circumstances, experience delayed or untimely delivery of notices <br />
served by mail that is outside aliens' control. To address this concern <br />
while preserving the integrity and administrability of the appeals <br />
process, this rule provides a narrow, case-by-case mechanism for <br />
accepting appeals filed after the 15-day filing period when the alien <br />
demonstrates that the delay resulted from mail delivery issues. Under <br />
the rule, an alien who files an appeal after the applicable deadline <br />
and asserts that the delay was caused by untimely or delayed mail <br />
delivery must submit a written explanation and any available<br />
<br />
[[Page 65412]]<br />
<br />
documentary evidence supporting that assertion. If, based on the <br />
information submitted, ICE determines that the appeal was filed late <br />
due to mail delay beyond the alien's control, ICE will accept the <br />
appeal as timely filed and consider it on the merits. By requiring <br />
aliens to affirmatively raise mail delay and provide supporting <br />
evidence, the rule ensures that aliens are not prejudiced by mail <br />
delivery delays beyond their control, while maintaining finality and <br />
administrative efficiency.<br />
    The Departments acknowledge commenters' concerns that certain <br />
populations may be more mobile or may have limited access to online <br />
resources. However, DHS's service method here is identical to the <br />
method used for numerous other immigration-related notices, including <br />
those in removal proceedings where similar concerns may exist. Even if <br />
mobile, aliens have a statutory duty to register their presence and <br />
keep the U.S. Government apprised of their current address, and DHS has <br />
a reasonable expectation that aliens will comply with such <br />
requirements. INA 266, 8 U.S.C. 1306. While the information in penalty <br />
notices is not available online like it is for removal proceedings <br />
notices, the constitutionally relevant question is whether the method <br />
of service is reasonably calculated to inform, not whether parallel <br />
avenues for accessing the same information exist. See Mullane, 339 U.S. <br />
at 315 (``The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of <br />
any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself <br />
reasonably certain to inform those affected.''). The penalty notice <br />
itself contains the relevant information: the statutory basis for the <br />
penalty, the factual allegations, the amount sought, and clear <br />
instructions on how to appeal. See 8 CFR 281.1(c)(1); 90 FR 27449. Due <br />
process does not require DHS to maintain a public online portal for <br />
civil monetary penalty notices, nor does the lack of such a portal make <br />
regular mail constitutionally insufficient. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at <br />
315.<br />
    The Departments also disagree with commenters' suggestion that ICE <br />
must use personal service for individuals who attend in-person check-<br />
ins. Not all aliens subject to civil penalties are enrolled in programs <br />
involving in-person reporting, and requiring personal service in every <br />
case would impose significant operational burdens without materially <br />
improving notice. Regular mail ensures efficient and consistent <br />
delivery of notices for geographically dispersed aliens.<br />
    Finally, while one commenter questioned whether ordinary mail saves <br />
time or resources, the IFR explains that allowing service by regular <br />
mail promotes efficiency. As discussed in the IFR, personal delivery <br />
often may require burdensome manual efforts to locate the alien. It may <br />
further require the use of multiple DHS agents or officers to appear on <br />
location to ensure officer safety, and multiple attempts at personal <br />
service if not effectuated on the first attempt, thereby diverting <br />
officers from their other duties. 90 FR 27444-45. Service by certified <br />
mail involves preparation of individual mailings in each case, <br />
including handwriting envelopes, which has proven to be costly and <br />
resource intensive and would become even more so as DHS expands its use <br />
of these civil penalties. Indeed, ICE estimates that the certified mail <br />
requirement costs the agency $23.53 for each civil monetary penalty, <br />
which includes certified mail fees, materials, and labor. 90 FR 27444. <br />
Consequently, personal service or certified mail imposes higher costs <br />
and increases processing times and is unnecessary to satisfy <br />
constitutional or statutory notice requirements. See Mullane, 339 U.S. <br />
at 306. The Departments also recognize commenters' concerns that some <br />
individuals, including lawful permanent residents, may have reported <br />
receiving penalty-related notices in error. The IFR's service <br />
provisions do not increase the likelihood of incorrect notices. <br />
Instead, the procedural framework contains safeguards and corrective <br />
mechanisms, including written notice and a mandatory de novo <br />
supervisory review over any appeal. The initial civil penalty decision <br />
remains inoperative while a timely administrative appeal is pending. <br />
This provides structured mechanisms to correct any errors promptly. Any <br />
alien who believes a notice was issued in error may file a simple <br />
written appeal explaining as much, triggering the supervisory review <br />
process. These procedures ensure that aliens have meaningful <br />
opportunities to contest errors.<br />
    Accordingly, the Departments conclude that service by regular mail, <br />
coupled with the exception to the 15-business-day deadline to appeal <br />
when ICE determines that there was a mail delay under 8 CFR <br />
281.1(e)(2), is a reasonable, appropriate, and constitutionally <br />
sufficient method of providing notice of civil monetary penalty <br />
determinations under the INA, particularly given the IFR's procedural <br />
safeguards that ensure aliens retain meaningful opportunity to contest <br />
penalties. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.<br />
4. 15-Day Appeal Deadline and Process<br />
    Comment: Commenters argued that a 15-business-day appeal deadline <br />
will prevent aliens from being able to contest these civil fines. <br />
Commenters listed several barriers they claim will prevent aliens from <br />
meeting the appeal deadline. One commenter asserted that a significant <br />
number of aliens that receive these fines speak a language other than <br />
English, but the IFR lacks any language accommodation, creating a <br />
barrier to responding within 15 days. Another commenter also noted that <br />
some may struggle to understand fine-related communications not <br />
delivered in their primary language. They noted that they expect this <br />
to be a common occurrence given that DOJ's July 14, 2025, memorandum <br />
regarding implementation of Executive Order 14224, Designating English <br />
as the Official Language of the United States, 90 FR 11363 (Mar. 6, <br />
2025), directed a reduction in multilingual services at federal <br />
agencies. This commenter also asserted that a 15-day appeal period is <br />
unrealistic and unfair because aliens will lack sufficient time to <br />
understand the fines and their applicability and legal nuances and the <br />
related processes and will be unfamiliar with the IFR's new provisions. <br />
Another commenter stated that the 15-business-day period would make <br />
obtaining legal representation difficult and expensive and asserted <br />
that the IFR minimized the complexity of proving and imposing civil <br />
penalties. Another commenter stated that the 15-business-day period <br />
does not account for the time needed to access the necessary <br />
information required to contest a penalty decision. They note that some <br />
medical records are accessible online but that many health networks <br />
cite a 7-to-14-business-day turn around to provide medical records and <br />
that federal law requires medical records to be processed in 30 days. <br />
They also explained that state and local incarceration, court records, <br />
and travel documents are difficult to access and involve waiting times <br />
in excess of 15 business days. The commenter also claimed that <br />
obtaining travel documents takes significant time because many <br />
countries' embassies are located in Washington, DC and require aliens <br />
to appear in person. The commenter also noted that aliens whose <br />
citizenship is not recognized by a country may have difficulty securing <br />
an appointment.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that the 15-day deadline for <br />
submitting an administrative appeal will prevent aliens from contesting <br />
civil penalties. The revised process continues to provide aliens with <br />
written notice of the<br />
<br />
[[Page 65413]]<br />
<br />
proposed penalty that identifies the factual and legal basis for the <br />
determination and explains the steps to request the review. The <br />
Departments also disagree that the lack of language accommodation in <br />
the IFR, such as a requirement to translate penalty determinations and <br />
appeal instructions into each respondent's native language, prevents <br />
aliens from meeting the 15-day appeal deadline. As with other <br />
immigration notices and charging documents, including NTAs, removal <br />
orders, voluntary departure orders, and USCIS decision notices, civil <br />
monetary determinations are issued in English, and neither the INA nor <br />
the Constitution obligates DHS to translate such documents into every <br />
alien's native language. See Ojeda-Calderon v. Holder, 726 F.3d 669, <br />
675 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Nazarova v. INS, 171 F.3d 478, 483 (7th <br />
Cir. 1999) (explaining that due process does not require immigration <br />
notices to be in a language the alien can understand). Civil penalty <br />
decisions issued under this final rule will continue to include written <br />
instructions explaining how to file an appeal. Aliens may also seek <br />
assistance from legal representatives, community organizations, or <br />
interpreters. Aliens may provide additional documentation if the <br />
supervisory officer requests supplemental briefing during de novo <br />
review. Accordingly, the Departments conclude that the English language <br />
format of penalty notices is consistent with longstanding immigration <br />
practice and constitutional requirements as well as DOJ's memorandum <br />
implementing Executive Order 14224 by minimizing non-essential <br />
multilingual services, redirecting resources toward English-language <br />
education and assimilation, and ensuring compliance with legal <br />
obligations through targeted measures where necessary. Memorandum for <br />
all Federal Agencies, from Pamela Bondi, Attorney General, Re: <br />
Implementation of Executive Order No. 14,224: Designating English as <br />
the Official Language of the United States of America at 2, 7 (July 14, <br />
2025) &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1407776/dl&quot;&gt;https://www.justice.gov/ag/media/1407776/dl&lt;/a&gt;.<br />
    Aliens also remain free to seek legal representation at any point <br />
in the process, including after filing the initial written appeal <br />
request. Nothing in the IFR limits a respondent's ability to obtain <br />
counsel or work with legal service providers. The IFR merely <br />
standardizes the timeframe for the initial appeal filing while <br />
preserving a meaningful opportunity, through mandatory de novo review <br />
and a potential supplemental briefing period, to submit evidence or <br />
legal argument. Considering these procedural safeguards, the <br />
Departments conclude that the 15-day appeal period is a reasonable and <br />
appropriate procedural requirement.<br />
    In addition, the IFR also only requires that the alien submit a <br />
written appeal explaining the basis for contesting the civil penalty, <br />
as the grounds on which an alien may contest a civil penalty are <br />
limited and generally involve facts uniquely within the alien's <br />
knowledge. As the IFR noted, aliens will ordinarily possess the <br />
necessary information to contest these fines. 90 FR 27450. If an alien <br />
submits an appeal with assertions that are unsupported by documentary <br />
evidence because there was no time for the alien to obtain these <br />
documents, then the supervisory immigration officer reviewing the <br />
appeal can request the documents during the course of the appeal to <br />
verify the validity of the alien's assertions. See 8 CFR 281.1(e)(3). <br />
Additionally, the fact that it takes an alien longer than 15 days to <br />
obtain travel documents is irrelevant because the fines are issued <br />
after the time period aliens have been given to obtain travel documents <br />
and depart has elapsed. The streamlined procedures are designed to <br />
ensure timely resolution of cases and maintain the integrity of <br />
enforcement actions. DHS believes the 15-day appeal period, coupled <br />
with ICE's discretion to equitably toll the appeal deadline when ICE <br />
determines that there was a mail delay under 8 CFR 281.1(e)(2), strikes <br />
an appropriate balance between efficiency and fairness, providing <br />
adequate opportunity for aliens to contest violations and demonstrate <br />
lawful status or other circumstances that may preclude liability.<br />
    Comment: Commenters also expressed concern with the interaction <br />
between the 15-day appeal deadline and the IFR's provisions allowing <br />
DHS to serve fines by regular mail. One commenter pointed out that, <br />
according to the U.S. Postal Service, ordinary mail takes 1-5 business <br />
days to reach its destination. The commenter noted that this leaves an <br />
alien with only 10 days to appeal a fine once received and, if sent in <br />
advance of a weekend, an alien only has 8 days. Another commenter <br />
reiterated that this 15-day appeal period is not enough time to <br />
meaningfully respond and noted that other federal regulations governing <br />
civil penalties include a 5-day mail presumption. They also stated they <br />
``were aware of many people who have received notices that were dated <br />
several days before they were mailed out.''<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that the interaction between the <br />
15-business-day appeal deadline and the IFR's service provisions <br />
prevents aliens from having a meaningful opportunity to appeal. The <br />
Departments recognize that aliens may, in limited circumstances, <br />
experience delayed or untimely delivery of notices served by mail that <br />
is outside the alien's control. To address this concern while <br />
preserving the integrity and administrability of the appeals process, <br />
this final rule amends 8 CFR 281.1(e) to provide a case-by-case <br />
mechanism for accepting appeals filed after the 15-day filing period <br />
when the alien demonstrates that the delay resulted from mail delivery <br />
issues. Under the rule, an alien who files an appeal after the <br />
applicable deadline and asserts that the delay was caused by untimely <br />
or delayed mail delivery must submit a written explanation and any <br />
available documentary evidence supporting that assertion. If, based on <br />
the information submitted, ICE determines that the appeal was filed <br />
late due to mail delay beyond the alien's control, ICE will accept the <br />
appeal as timely filed and consider it on the merits. By requiring <br />
aliens to affirmatively raise mail delay and provide supporting <br />
evidence, the rule ensures that aliens are not prejudiced by mail <br />
delivery delays beyond their control, while maintaining finality and <br />
administrative efficiency. In addition, although one commenter merely <br />
referenced anecdotal reports to assert some notices may have been <br />
mailed after the date listed on the document, this new exception to the <br />
15-day filing period will provide aliens more time file their appeal <br />
for mail delays that occur while the notice is in transit and for <br />
processing delays from the time date the notice is signed until it is <br />
placed in the mail.<br />
    Moreover, due process principles require that notice be reasonably <br />
calculated to inform the respondent of the action and provide a <br />
meaningful opportunity to respond. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. The <br />
combination of written notice, the exception to the 15-business day <br />
deadline to appeal when ICE determines that there was a mail delay <br />
under 8 CFR 281.1(e)(2), mandatory de novo review, and a potential 15-<br />
day period for supplemental briefing satisfies these constitutional <br />
requirements and provides aliens with a realistic and fair opportunity <br />
to contest civil fines. DHS believes that the nature of the failure to <br />
depart and unlawful entry penalties typically turn on routine and <br />
straightforward determinations of fact, meaning that an appeal period <br />
greater than 15-days is unnecessary. In fact, there has been a higher <br />
appeal rate of<br />
<br />
[[Page 65414]]<br />
<br />
civil penalties for failure to depart issued under 8 CFR part 281, as <br />
compared to 8 CFR part 280, which suggests that aliens are able to <br />
meaningfully file appeals within the shortened timeline. DHS believes <br />
this is because of the straightforward factual issues associated with <br />
these penalties. Additionally, the appeal process under 8 CFR part 281 <br />
discourages frivolous or non-meritorious appeals, focusing resources on <br />
cases with substantive claims.<br />
    Comment: Commenters raised general due process and fairness <br />
concerns with the 15-day appeal deadline and process. One commenter <br />
asserted that shortening the appeal deadline from 30- to 15-days <br />
eliminates a key due process safeguard. Commenters also claimed that <br />
DHS's interest in reducing the appeal period to avoid a backlog of <br />
penalties is outweighed by the alien's interest in having enough time <br />
to meaningfully respond to these penalties, especially given the <br />
amounts. One commenter stated that shortening the appeal period <br />
increases the chance that an alien could face serious penalties without <br />
even realizing what they are accused of. As an example, one commenter <br />
claimed that many aliens, including those who were brought to the <br />
United States as children, may not even be aware that they are subject <br />
to a removal order. A commenter claimed that, in light of the many <br />
barriers that aliens face responding to these penalties, the appeal <br />
period is ``clearly designed'' to prevent as many aliens from <br />
contesting these civil penalties as possible.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that the 15-day appeal deadline <br />
or the revised procedures deprive aliens of due process or create <br />
unfair barriers to contesting civil penalties. Due process requires <br />
that individuals receive notice reasonably calculated to inform them of <br />
the proposed action and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before a <br />
determination becomes final. The IFR preserves these core protections. <br />
Aliens continue to receive written notice setting out the factual and <br />
statutory basis for the penalty and providing clear instructions on how <br />
to appeal as explained in more detail in responses to comments about <br />
the appeal deadline in this Section, III.D., of the preamble.<br />
    Comment: Commenters also took issue with the lack of extensions for <br />
good cause. One commenter alleged that the lack of extensions for good <br />
cause further contributes to the erosion of procedural protections. <br />
Another commenter suggested that DHS should account for demonstrations <br />
of good faith compliance efforts.<br />
    Response: The Departments decline to modify the IFR to permit good <br />
cause extensions for late-filed appeals because the Departments do not <br />
believe that creating exceptions to the appeal deadline will <br />
meaningfully reduce the risk of error. See Bowen v. City of New York, <br />
476 U.S. 467 (1986) (recognizing that agencies may impose deadlines for <br />
appeals, and that equitable tolling (exceptions) is only appropriate in <br />
exceptional circumstances and that routine or general exceptions are <br />
not required for due process). The Departments believe the risk of <br />
error is minimized through the robust procedures already in place, <br />
which ensure that aliens are provided with notice of the fine, an <br />
opportunity to appeal, and clear instructions on how to contest the <br />
penalty. The appeal process focuses on factual determinations, and <br />
aliens are best positioned to produce the necessary information to <br />
contest a fine within the established timeframe.<br />
    On the other hand, the Departments note that permitting good-cause <br />
extensions or excusing late filed appeals impedes DHS's ability to <br />
efficiently administer the penalty process as DHS expands its use of <br />
these penalties. DHS has a strong interest in ensuring that it can <br />
finalize penalty decisions quickly in response to the large number of <br />
aliens who have entered the United States unlawfully in recent years <br />
and the significant numbers of aliens who have failed to comply with <br />
removal and voluntary departure obligations. See 90 FR 27422-23; see <br />
also Section II of this preamble. It would be inconsistent with DHS's <br />
finality interests to allow late filed appeals. Such appeals would <br />
delay or impede DHS's ability to move forward with the collection <br />
process or would require DHS to re-open or pull back any final penalty <br />
decisions already transmitted for collection. Therefore, a strict <br />
appeal deadline allows DHS to have greater certainty in the finality of <br />
its penalty decisions and it allows DHS to more effectively achieve the <br />
IFR's objectives of incentivizing compliance with the immigration laws <br />
and imposing consequences on those who do not comply.<br />
    DHS acknowledges these finality concerns could, to some extent, be <br />
mitigated by imposing an outer deadline on late-filed appeals or by <br />
restricting the length of ``good cause'' extensions. The Departments <br />
decline to adopt this approach for several reasons. First, DHS believes <br />
that such an approach would undermine the Departments' goals regarding <br />
the 15-day appeal deadline. See 90 FR 27442-43. Allowing an alien to <br />
have a certain amount of time to file an untimely appeal would, as a <br />
practical matter, merely extend the appeal 15-day appeal deadline. As <br />
discussed in the IFR and in response to the other similar comments in <br />
this preamble, the Departments believe that a 15-day appeal period <br />
supports DHS's need to have an efficient and administrable process <br />
while also affording the alien meaningful appellate rights especially <br />
given the straightforward nature of these penalties. See 90 FR 27444-<br />
45. For similar reasons, granting extensions would also unnecessarily <br />
delay the appeal process. The Departments believe that, in the vast <br />
majority of cases, aliens should have ready access to any information <br />
needed to contest these penalties and therefore do not need additional <br />
time to file an appeal. In these circumstances, allowing extensions <br />
would unnecessarily hinder DHS's ability to effectively administer the <br />
appeal process and impose civil penalties more swiftly and at scale to <br />
achieve the IFR's intended purposes.<br />
    Second, although adopting a ``good cause'' or ``good faith'' <br />
standard may reduce the number of aliens eligible to receive an <br />
extension or file an untimely appeal, these amorphous standards are <br />
likely to invite inconsistent practices among immigration officers and <br />
inconsistent results among similarly situated aliens. Although these <br />
standards are ubiquitous in law, they are hard to define, context <br />
specific, and often require a balancing of various legal issues. See <br />
Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 I &amp;amp; N Dec. 405, 412 (A.G. 2018) (stating that <br />
``definitions of good cause tend to be nebulous and elusive'' and <br />
noting that courts have ``elaborated context-specific multifactor <br />
balancing tests, rather than bright-line rules''). The Departments <br />
believe that imposing an additional time-intensive burden on <br />
immigration officers to make such determinations would be inconsistent <br />
with the IFR's purpose of streamlining appeals for these <br />
straightforward penalties.<br />
    Comment: One commenter noted that a 15-day appeal period is much <br />
shorter than the timeframe that other agencies afford for other civil <br />
monetary penalties. The commenter cited several regulations that <br />
provide a 60-day appeal period governing civil monetary penalties for <br />
fraud, misrepresentations, and false claims in social security and <br />
health care benefits programs. The commenter claimed ``[t]hese <br />
timelines reflect a broader regulatory recognition that individuals <br />
must be afforded adequate time to receive, review, and respond to <br />
significant legal determinations'' which, according to the commenter, <br />
the IFR does not provide.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that the 15-day appeal period is<br />
<br />
[[Page 65415]]<br />
<br />
inadequate merely because other federal agencies afford longer <br />
timelines for contesting civil monetary penalties in unrelated <br />
statutory schemes. Appeal periods vary widely across federal <br />
programs,\46\ and the timelines cited by the commenter arise under <br />
distinct statutes with different penalty structures, evidentiary <br />
frameworks, and administrative adjudication procedures. The INA <br />
provisions for the straightforward civil penalties at issue here, INA <br />
240B(d), 274D, and 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), 1324d, and 1325(b), do <br />
not prescribe any particular appeal period, and nothing in due process <br />
jurisprudence requires the Departments to align procedures with <br />
unrelated programs such as those governing Social Security, healthcare <br />
fraud, or false claims penalties. See Clev. Board of Educ. v. <br />
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (reaffirming that the formality and <br />
procedural requisites for due process vary depending on the importance <br />
of the interests involved and the circumstances); see also Mathews, 242 <br />
U.S. at 319. The relevant question is whether the procedures <br />
established by this rule provide sufficient notice and a meaningful <br />
opportunity to be heard before the determination becomes final. The <br />
rule satisfies this standard. The appeal requires only a brief written <br />
request for review and allows for the submission of written supporting <br />
evidence or documentation. Additionally, as explained above, upon <br />
appeal, the supervisory immigration officer must conduct a de novo <br />
review of the record within 10 days and may request additional evidence <br />
or information, affording the respondent another 15 days to provide it.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \46\ For example, in February 2026, EOIR issued an IFR <br />
establishing a generally applicable 10-day deadline for filing an <br />
appeal from a decision of an Immigration Judge. Appellate Procedures <br />
for the Board of Immigration Appeals, 91 FR 5267 (Feb. 6, 2026) <br />
(partially vacated on procedural grounds by Amici Ctr. for Immigr. <br />
Rts. v. EOIR, 822 F. Supp. 3d 119, 168 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2026)). These <br />
processes were implemented within the context of the robust <br />
procedures afforded to the aliens before the Immigration Court prior <br />
to any administrative appeal, the availability of electronic filing, <br />
and the need for immediate efficiency reforms in light of the BIA's <br />
historic pending caseload. See 91 FR 5272. Moreover, those processes <br />
do not involve the imposition of monetary fines, or any other <br />
penalties, but rather involve legal determinations regarding an <br />
alien's removability from the United States. Further, even in other <br />
situations which do involve civil monetary penalties in an <br />
immigration context--i.e. those imposed under INA 274A and 274C, 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1324a and 1324c--the administrative appellate deadline is <br />
only 10 days. See 28 CFR 68.54(a).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Moreover, these penalties differ from the examples cited by the <br />
commenter. The penalties addressed in this IFR implement longstanding <br />
statutory requirements tied to an individual's immigration history and <br />
do not involve the complex evidentiary or program-eligibility <br />
determinations characteristic of Social Security or health-care fraud <br />
adjudications. These penalties are straightforward in nature and turn <br />
on routine and straightforward determinations of fact that can be <br />
decided quickly on a written record. The narrow factual bases for these <br />
penalties support the reasonableness of the 15-day appeal window, in <br />
which aliens can submit written evidence or documentation for de novo <br />
review.<br />
    Comment: Commenters also raised concerns with the appeal process <br />
itself. One commenter argued that the IFR allows the appellate reviewer <br />
to conduct factfinding in the first instance. The commenter argued that <br />
fact finding should be reserved for the initial decisionmaker. Another <br />
commenter stated that permitting supervisory immigration officers to <br />
call for additional evidence on a 15-day schedule but mandating a <br />
decision no later than 45 days after the alien appeals will force <br />
officers to choose between gathering critical information and meeting <br />
the 45-day deadline.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that the IFR impermissibly <br />
allows supervisory immigration officers to conduct fact finding in the <br />
first instance. The initial penalty determination is made by the <br />
enforcement officer based on the available evidence. The supervisory <br />
review stage is an internal appellate review designed to ensure <br />
accuracy and procedural fairness. Allowing the reviewing officer to <br />
request supplemental evidence and information does not convert the <br />
supervisory officer into a primary factfinder. Rather, it enables the <br />
reviewer to ensure that the existing record is complete, and that the <br />
respondent has had a full opportunity to present information relevant <br />
to the determination. Nothing in the IFR authorizes the supervisory <br />
immigration officer to engage in unrestricted factfinding. The <br />
officer's role is limited to reviewing the record and evaluating any <br />
supplemental evidence or information.<br />
    The Departments also disagree that the 45-day timeline for issuing <br />
a final decision places the supervisory immigration officer in an <br />
untenable position. The IFR provides a structured sequential process <br />
that ensures adequate time for both review and supplemental filing as <br />
needed. The officer conducts a de novo review of the record within 10 <br />
days of the appeal filing. If additional information is necessary for a <br />
fair and complete adjudication, the officer may request supplemental <br />
evidence or information, and the respondent then has 15 days from <br />
receipt of that request to submit materials. The supervisory officer <br />
then retains the remaining portion of the 45-day period to complete the <br />
review and issue a decision. This framework provides sufficient time <br />
for both the respondent's submission and the officer's analysis, while <br />
promoting timely resolution, an important consideration in <br />
administering statutory civil monetary penalty schemes.<br />
    The Departments note that the 45-day timeframe balances the <br />
government's interest in prompt resolution and administrative <br />
efficiency with the respondent's interest in a meaningful opportunity <br />
to supplement the record when necessary. The structured process ensures <br />
that respondents are heard, that determinations are made based on a <br />
complete record, and that decisions are issued in a timely manner.<br />
    Accordingly, the Departments conclude that the supervisory review <br />
process, including the ability to request supplemental evidence or <br />
information and the 45-day timeline for issuing a final decision, is <br />
appropriate and reasonable.<br />
5. Removal of In-Person Hearings<br />
    Comment: Several commenters claimed that eliminating in person <br />
hearings will deprive aliens of due process protections that ensure <br />
their appeal is thoroughly presented and fully considered. Citing <br />
Mathews v. Eldridge, one commenter said in-person hearings are critical <br />
because they allow aliens to present oral evidence and clarify <br />
misunderstandings. Another commenter stated that eliminating in-person <br />
hearings means that DHS will only review written filings, briefs, and <br />
any documentary evidence submitted which, according to the commenter, <br />
deprives aliens from a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Another <br />
commenter alleged that the limited due process rights under the new <br />
process will contribute to an ``extremely high'' possibility for error.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that eliminating in-person <br />
hearings deprives respondents of due process protections or prevents <br />
their appeals from being fully and fairly considered. As an initial <br />
matter, as discussed above in Section I of this preamble, the <br />
Departments note that only four aliens requested an in-person interview <br />
of the 450 appeals and over 12,000 civil penalties under the pre-IFR <br />
process, indicating that aliens do not place much value on the need for <br />
in-person hearings to contest civil penalties. Moreover, under the <br />
Mathews balancing test, the<br />
<br />
[[Page 65416]]<br />
<br />
question is whether the procedures established by the IFR provide <br />
notice reasonably calculated to inform the alien of the action and a <br />
meaningful opportunity to be heard before a final decision is issued. <br />
The IFR satisfies both requirements. Aliens receive written notice <br />
detailing the factual basis and statutory grounds for the penalty and <br />
are afforded the opportunity to file an appeal with the option of <br />
including a written defense or documentary evidence. The initial appeal <br />
requires only a brief written request for review, and aliens may <br />
provide additional documentation if the supervisory immigration officer <br />
requests supplemental evidence or information. The supervisory officer <br />
must conduct a de novo review, ensuring that the respondent's written <br />
submissions and any relevant evidence are fully considered.<br />
    The Departments also disagree with commenters' assertions that in-<br />
person hearings are necessary to present oral evidence or clarify <br />
misunderstandings. Civil monetary penalties under INA 240B(d), 274D, <br />
and 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), 1324d, and 1325(b), turn on objective <br />
factual bases such as a prior removal order or a failure to comply with <br />
terms of voluntary departure that are typically documented in DHS <br />
records. Written submissions allow respondents to contest factual <br />
inaccuracies, provide additional documentation, or explain <br />
circumstances that negate the willfulness of the alien's failure to <br />
depart. As explained in the IFR, an in-person interview would not <br />
enhance the fairness or accuracy of the civil monetary penalty process <br />
because of the straightforward issues and types of evidence involved in <br />
these cases, which do not turn on credibility determinations or require <br />
the cross-examination of witnesses. If an alien, through no fault of <br />
his or her own, did not receive notice of the removal or voluntary <br />
departure order or was prevented from complying due to circumstances <br />
beyond his or her control, the alien can provide a written explanation <br />
and simple documentary evidence to support the claim. Accordingly, a <br />
requirement for in-person hearings would not meaningfully improve the <br />
accuracy or fairness of determinations, given the narrow factual issues <br />
typically involved in these penalties. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343-44 <br />
(considering for due process purposes both the nature of the issues to <br />
be decided and the nature of the evidence to be presented, such as <br />
whether it consists mainly of documents or whether the resolution of <br />
the issue hinges on the need for in person testimony).<br />
    The risk of error is also mitigated by the IFR's multi-layered <br />
procedural safeguards. Aliens may file supplemental evidence if invited <br />
by the supervisory officer, and the officer must independently evaluate <br />
the record before issuing a final decision. These safeguards ensure <br />
that errors can be identified and corrected without necessitating <br />
formal, trial-type hearings. The Departments note that many <br />
administrative penalty and adjudication schemes, including certain <br />
USCIS benefit adjudications, and numerous civil penalty processes <br />
across the federal government operate without in-person hearings, and <br />
courts have recognized such frameworks as consistent with due process <br />
requirements.<br />
    For these reasons, the Departments conclude that an in-person <br />
hearing is not required and that the written, supervisory review <br />
process established by the IFR provides respondents with a fair and <br />
meaningful opportunity to present their claims.<br />
    Comment: One commenter also said that eliminating in-person <br />
hearings will put vulnerable populations at risk, such as aliens with <br />
low-income, a lack of representation, and a limited understanding of <br />
English. Citing Goldberg v. Kelly, the commenter alleged that because <br />
the respondents in this context are often low income, non-English <br />
speaking, and unrepresented by legal counsel, review of the paper file <br />
only is an insufficient means to afford due process. Another commenter <br />
also cites Goldberg v. Kelly, alleging that where DHS imposes such a <br />
toll on families and target ``very means by which to live,'' the <br />
private interests cannot be described as ``modest.''<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that eliminating in-person <br />
hearings fails to protect vulnerable populations or violates due <br />
process principles, including those discussed in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 <br />
U.S. 254 (1970). The Supreme Court has long recognized that procedural <br />
due process generally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard <br />
before the Government deprives an individual of a protected property <br />
interest, while also emphasizing that due process ``has never been a <br />
term of fixed and invariable content,'' FCC v. WJR, U.S. 265, 275 <br />
(1949), as its ``exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content <br />
varies according to specific factual contexts,'' Hannah v. Larche, 363 <br />
U.S. 420, 442 (1960). The circumstances presented here differ <br />
materially from those at issue in Goldberg. In Goldberg, the Court <br />
considered the termination of ongoing public assistance benefits that <br />
were essential to recipients' subsistence and daily living expenses. <br />
The Court considered the deprivation at issue to be immediate and <br />
uniquely harmful, distinguishing it from ``virtually anyone else whose <br />
governmental entitlements are ended.'' Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263-64. <br />
The Court therefore concluded that a pre-termination evidentiary <br />
hearing was required to minimize risk of an erroneous deprivation. Id.<br />
    By contrast, the IFR concerns not the deprivation of a <br />
constitutional property interest but the imposition of civil monetary <br />
penalties authorized by statute for violations of INA 274D(a)(1), 8 <br />
U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1); INA 240B(d)(1)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d)(1)(A)-(B); <br />
and INA 275(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1). These penalties do not involve <br />
the termination of subsistence benefits or other government benefits. <br />
Nor do such determinations typically turn on complex credibility <br />
assessments; rather, they generally involve documentary evidence and <br />
objective statutory criteria. Therefore, the risk of government error <br />
is minimal, and the appeal process provides an adequate opportunity for <br />
error correction. Accordingly, the procedural concerns present in <br />
Goldberg are not implicated to the same degree here. Generally, civil <br />
fines are issued after aliens have received sufficient due process to <br />
challenge the findings against them and after the aliens have been <br />
adequately warned, by ICE and the immigration judge, of the <br />
consequences of failing to abide by the terms of the final order.<br />
    Under the Mathews framework, due process requires procedures that <br />
are reasonably designed to ensure fairness in light of the private <br />
interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the <br />
Government's interest. Applying those factors here confirms that an in-<br />
person hearing is not required. The private interests at stake, while <br />
important, are financial in nature, not subsistence-level. The risk of <br />
error is mitigated by the IFR's multi-layered procedural safeguards, <br />
including written notice, an initial appeal requiring only a brief <br />
written request and explanation, mandatory de novo review by a <br />
supervisory immigration officer, and the ability of that officer to <br />
request supplemental evidence, giving aliens an additional 15 days to <br />
provide evidence or explanation. These safeguards provide aliens, <br />
including those that are recent arrivals, low-income, or limited-<br />
English proficient,<br />
<br />
[[Page 65417]]<br />
<br />
with meaningful opportunities to be heard.<br />
    The Departments also disagree that vulnerable populations require <br />
an in-person hearing to ensure adequate participation. Aliens may seek <br />
assistance from legal service providers or community organizations. <br />
Because the initial appeal filing is minimal and does not require <br />
complex filing, aliens are not required to navigate technical <br />
evidentiary matters within the initial 15-day period. The ability to <br />
supplement the record during supervisory review further ensures that <br />
aliens can clarify misunderstandings, correct errors, or provide <br />
additional information without the need for a formal oral hearing.<br />
6. Removal of BIA Review<br />
    Comment: Several commenters took issue with the IFR's justification <br />
for moving appellate review from the BIA to DHS, suggesting that it was <br />
insufficient. These commenters broadly suggested that the Departments <br />
erroneously discounted the legal complexity of these penalties, <br />
asserting that DHS immigration officers do not have the legal training <br />
and experience necessary to adjudicate complex legal challenges. One <br />
commenter also challenged the IFR's statement that the BIA lacks <br />
experience adjudicating these civil penalties, noting that the IFR <br />
itself relied on a BIA precedent decision to explain the scope of the <br />
voluntary departure penalty. Additionally, commenters also said that <br />
the BIA's backlog of cases is not a valid reason to eliminate BIA <br />
review. One commenter said that the backlog is a self-created problem <br />
attributable to the Attorney General's recent decision to reduce the <br />
size of the BIA. Another commenter argued that the BIA's backlog is a <br />
result of Congressional funding decisions, and the Departments should <br />
not try to solve this funding problem by eliminating the BIA's <br />
jurisdiction over certain categories of cases.<br />
    Response: As an initial matter, the Departments disagree with the <br />
commenters' suggestion that the Departments' explanations for removing <br />
the BIA's jurisdiction over these penalties are insufficient. The IFR <br />
fully explains the Departments' reasons for eliminating BIA review. <br />
These reasons include: (1) the straightforward nature of these <br />
penalties and the lack of an operational need, such as an established <br />
subject-matter expertise, for the BIA to adjudicate such appeals; (2) <br />
the fact that the BIA has a large backlog of cases and appeals take a <br />
long time to resolve; (3) the need to prevent these cases from <br />
exacerbating the BIA's backlog; and (4) the need to focus EOIR's <br />
resources on its statutorily prescribed functions under the INA, which <br />
do not include civil penalty appeals. See 90 FR 27441, 27444-47. The <br />
Departments believe that these reasons are sound and refer readers to <br />
the IFR for further discussion.<br />
    The Departments disagree that these penalties involve complicated <br />
legal issues that warrant BIA review. The Departments are not persuaded <br />
by commenter arguments related to the constitutionality of the IFR's <br />
streamlined procedures, civil penalty amounts, statute of limitations <br />
issues, and the scope of the unlawful entry penalty, which have been <br />
addressed below at Parts III.D.8, and E. Therefore, the commenters' <br />
examples are inconsequential to the Departments' conclusions that BIA <br />
review is (1) unnecessary because these civil penalties typically turn <br />
on straightforward issues of fact that supervisory immigration officers <br />
are prepared to adequately review and (2) inadvisable because the BIA's <br />
limited, specialized resources are better used to address its <br />
unprecedented pending caseload rather than to review decisions that can <br />
be adequately reviewed by supervisory immigration officers. See 90 FR <br />
27453. Further, the Departments note that if an alien believes that a <br />
supervisory immigration officer's penalty decision was legally <br />
erroneous, the alien may, after exhausting administrative remedies, <br />
seek judicial review under the APA or may challenge the decision in <br />
connection with any enforcement action brought to collect the penalty.<br />
    Regarding one commenter's claim that the value of BIA review is <br />
demonstrated by the fact that the IFR's preamble relied on a BIA <br />
precedent decision to explain the scope of the voluntary departure <br />
penalty, the Departments note that the IFR cited that decision only to <br />
show that aliens generally will have limited defenses to these <br />
penalties. See 90 FR 27443. As a preliminary matter, the cited <br />
decision, Matter of Zmijewska, did not involve a civil penalty issue <br />
but instead addressed an alien's ineligibility for immigration relief <br />
because of the alien's failure to comply with a voluntary departure <br />
order. 24 I&amp;amp;N Dec. 87, 93-95 (BIA 2007).<br />
    Even still, Matter of Zmijewska clarifies that the sole exception <br />
to an alien being penalized for failure to depart after being granted <br />
voluntary departure is narrowly ``limited to situations in which an <br />
alien, through no fault of his or her own, is unaware of the voluntary <br />
departure order or is physically unable to depart''--which turns not on <br />
complicated issues of law but on issues of fact that can easily be <br />
demonstrated by the alien and adjudicated by a supervisory immigration <br />
officer. Id. at 945. Therefore, this BIA decision does not undermine <br />
the Departments' decision to remove BIA review but instead actively <br />
supports it.<br />
    Further, while the BIA is certainly qualified to adjudicate cases <br />
as straightforward as these civil penalties cases, it has not developed <br />
specialized expertise through historical practice, as it has only ever <br />
reviewed civil penalties cases, not adjudicated the factual findings <br />
they involve in the first instance. Moreover, as the IFR correctly <br />
points out, the BIA has little specialized expertise even in reviewing <br />
appeals of these civil penalties. See 90 FR 27450 (noting that only a <br />
handful of appeals resulted from civil penalties issued under President <br />
Trump's first term); see also Section I of this preamble (discussing <br />
the small number of BIA appeals in proportion to the number of civil <br />
penalties issued in the months leading up to the IFR). Because of this, <br />
there is effectively no operational necessity to this review being <br />
performed by the BIA instead of by a supervisory immigration officer <br />
within DHS, the administrative body that has the historical practical <br />
experience of adjudicating these penalties and providing internal DHS <br />
review over such determinations, even under a framework where the BIA <br />
had appellate authority. Thus, the Departments reaffirm that the BIA's <br />
lack of experience adjudicating these penalties in the first instance <br />
and lack of meaningful expertise even in reviewing them are valid bases <br />
(but not the sole bases) for removing BIA appellate review.<br />
    Finally, the Departments disagree that the BIA's backlog is not a <br />
valid reason to remove BIA review of these penalty decisions. As <br />
discussed above, the BIA's backlog has prompted a need for <br />
reconsideration of the BIA's role as an appellate tribunal and renewed <br />
focus on implementing streamlining case processing measures. As such, <br />
in February 2026, the BIA issued an IFR establishing, among other <br />
efficiency measures, that the BIA will generally summarily dismiss <br />
appeals unless it votes en banc to consider the appeal on the merits. <br />
91 FR 5267, 5270.\47\ Divesting the BIA responsibility over DHS <br />
imposition and enforcement of civil fines and penalties, an area where <br />
there is no statutory requirement for<br />
<br />
[[Page 65418]]<br />
<br />
EOIR review and where the BIA has no unique adjudicatory expertise, <br />
creates operational efficiencies, as the BIA need not devote resources <br />
to adjudicate such appeals, which may fluctuate over time and with the <br />
IFR's streamlined processes aimed at issuing such penalties at scale.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \47\ See Amica Ctr. for Immigrant Rts. v. EOIR, No. CV 26-696 <br />
(RDM), 2026 WL 662494, at *34 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2026) (partially <br />
vacating the rule).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Additionally, the Attorney General's recent decision to reduce the <br />
number of permanent Appellate Immigration Judges who sit on the BIA <br />
does not undermine the Departments' concerns that preserving BIA review <br />
could unnecessarily delay the penalty process and exacerbate the BIA's <br />
backlog. Rather, as EOIR explained in a recent rule, ``increasing the <br />
size of the BIA has not necessarily equated to a corresponding increase <br />
in the number of cases adjudicated or a reduction in the pending <br />
caseload.'' \48\ Reducing the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals, <br />
90 FR 15525, 15526 (Apr. 14, 2025). EOIR also noted that the size of <br />
the BIA has had ``significant institutional costs, including effects on <br />
the cohesiveness of the Board's decision-making process and the <br />
collegiality among Board members, a loss of uniformity in its non-<br />
precedent decisions, increased difficulty providing effective <br />
leadership, as well as an administrative and supervisory strain on the <br />
Board's limited legal staff.'' Id. None of these reasons for reducing <br />
the size of the BIA contradict the Departments' stated justification <br />
for removing the BIA's jurisdiction over these penalties, including <br />
concerns about BIA adjudication timelines and its backlog. For similar <br />
reasons, the Departments do not agree that they must wait for Congress <br />
to provide additional funding for the BIA, rather than removing BIA <br />
jurisdiction over certain categories of cases. As discussed in the IFR, <br />
Congress has not required EOIR or the BIA to review these civil penalty <br />
decisions, and nothing in the INA precludes the Attorney General from <br />
exercising his authority to remove the BIA's regulatory appellate <br />
authority over these penalties. 90 FR 27448.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \48\ As EOIR noted in another recent rule, between fiscal year <br />
2015 and the end of fiscal year 2025, as the number of permanent <br />
Appellate Immigration Judges increased, the BIA's pending case load <br />
increased more than five-fold--from 37,285 pending appeals to <br />
202,946 pending appeals. Appellate Procedures for the Board of <br />
Immigration Appeals, 91 FR 5267, 5270 (Feb. 6, 2026) (citing EOIR, <br />
Adjudication Statistics: All Appeals Filed, Completed, and Pending <br />
(Nov. 18, 2025), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline&quot;&gt;https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1344986/dl?inline&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/88C5-MU4N&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/88C5-MU4N&lt;/a&gt;]).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Comment: Several commenters argued that replacing BIA appellate <br />
review with DHS appellate review impermissibly consolidates enforcement <br />
and adjudication powers within one agency. They further argued that the <br />
IFR's appeal structure creates an inherent conflict of interest because <br />
DHS cannot be impartial when reviewing its own actions. One commenter <br />
argued that this consolidation of enforcement and adjudication <br />
functions violates due process. The commenter explained that the <br />
Supreme Court has long recognized that due process requires <br />
impartiality from adjudicators, and that any arrangement that gives <br />
rise to even a ``possible temptation'' to act in a biased way that <br />
benefits the decisionmaker violates due process. See Ward v. Village of <br />
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972). The commenter asserted that DHS <br />
assessing these penalties and reviewing appeals raises at least a <br />
possibility of temptation to impermissibly affirm the determinations, <br />
noting that the IFR itself was issued to allow DHS to impose these <br />
penalties more swiftly and at scale. Another commenter noted that these <br />
civil penalties are deposited into a DHS account that directly funds <br />
immigration detention, removal operations, and border wall <br />
construction. They suggested that this creates a powerful institutional <br />
incentive for DHS to maximize fine revenue, and, therefore, BIA review <br />
is needed to mitigate this potential conflict of interest. To address <br />
these concerns, this commenter urged the Departments to restore BIA <br />
review or to create an independent review board, separate from ICE and <br />
CBP, to review civil penalty appeals. They also suggested that if the <br />
IFR's structure is preserved, the rule should, at minimum, sever the <br />
financial interest DHS has in imposing these fines by redirecting civil <br />
penalty revenue to the Department of the Treasury's general fund rather <br />
than retaining it in DHS's enforcement accounts.<br />
    Response: DHS strongly rejects commenters' speculative suggestion <br />
that DHS immigration officers cannot be impartial and neutral when <br />
adjudicating civil penalty appeals. DHS has designed the appeal process <br />
to ensure that an alien's appeal is fairly and fully considered on the <br />
merits alone. Indeed, the IFR makes clear that any appeal of a penalty <br />
decision must be reviewed by a separate supervisory immigration officer <br />
who was not involved in the initial civil monetary penalty decision. <br />
Additionally, the IFR instructs the supervisory officer to review the <br />
appeal record de novo, which ensures that officers decide each appeal <br />
solely on the law and facts presented without providing any weight in <br />
favor of the initial decision. There is a presumption of regularity <br />
that attaches to the actions of government agencies, see U.S. Postal <br />
Serv., 534 U.S. at 10, and commenters have offered no support for their <br />
claim that immigration officers will deny otherwise meritorious <br />
challenges to civil penalties simply because they are employed by the <br />
same agency that issues and enforces these penalties.<br />
    Moreover, the Supreme Court has long held that it does not violate <br />
due process to combine enforcement and adjudication functions within a <br />
single agency. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56-58 (1975) <br />
(holding that the fact that the initial charge in an administrative <br />
proceeding is brought by the same agency that later adjudicates the <br />
matter is not, in and of itself, violative of due process); see also <br />
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (rejecting the argument that the <br />
former INS's comingled prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, under <br />
a prior version of the INA, deprived aliens of due process in <br />
deportation proceedings). Thus, the Departments disagree with <br />
commenters' suggestion that the consolidation of enforcement and <br />
adjudication functions within the same agency violates due process or <br />
inherently increases the risk of biased decision-making.<br />
    The caselaw cited by one commenter does not undermine the <br />
Departments' conclusion that the IFR's appeal procedures comport with <br />
due process. At most, the cited cases stand for the principle that an <br />
agency's adjudicatory procedures could violate due process if the <br />
adjudicator has a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the outcome <br />
of the case, has prejudged the case, or has some other concrete <br />
conflict of interest. These cases, however, do not support the <br />
commenter's broad argument that DHS immigration officers cannot be <br />
neutral and unbiased merely because they are part of DHS. Rather the <br />
caselaw is clear: there is a presumption of honesty and integrity in <br />
administrative officials exercising adjudicative functions, even where <br />
there is a combination of investigative and adjudicative functions, and <br />
some evidence of actual bias must be presented to overcome this <br />
presumption. See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 311; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47; <br />
see also Baran v. Port of Beaumont Navigation District, 57 F.3d 436, <br />
446 (5th Cir. 1995). The commenter has not offered any actual and non-<br />
speculative reason to think that DHS officers cannot be neutral but <br />
will instead be ``tempted'' to impermissibly affirm penalty decisions <br />
issued by other DHS officers.<br />
    The other concerns cited by commenters do not support their<br />
<br />
[[Page 65419]]<br />
<br />
contention that civil penalty appeals must be adjudicated by the BIA or <br />
an agency outside of DHS. The Departments acknowledge that INA 280(b), <br />
8 U.S.C. 1330(b), provides that any civil monetary penalties collected <br />
from aliens shall be deposited into a DHS account that funds <br />
immigration detention, removal operations, and border wall <br />
construction. DHS disagrees, however, with one commenter's view that <br />
DHS officers adjudicating civil penalty appeals will be encouraged to <br />
maximize fine revenue for this DHS fund. DHS officers adjudicating <br />
civil penalty appeals are bound by strict legal and procedural <br />
standards to ensure impartiality and fairness in their decision-making <br />
processes.\49\ These officers are tasked with applying the law and <br />
evaluating the facts of each case independently, without regard to the <br />
financial implications of their decisions.\50\ DHS has robust <br />
supervisory review mechanisms in place to ensure that adjudications are <br />
conducted in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and ethical <br />
standards. The fine amounts are governed by statute and regulations <br />
and, once an immigration officer determines that a civil penalty should <br />
be issued, the officer's discretion in choosing the fine amount is <br />
bound by those statutory and regulatory limits, and this rule does not <br />
alter the penalty amounts themselves authorized by statute. <br />
Furthermore, the primary purpose of civil monetary penalties under the <br />
INA is to enforce compliance with immigration laws, not to generate <br />
revenue. DHS remains committed to upholding the integrity of the <br />
adjudication process and ensuring that decisions are made based solely <br />
on the merits of each case, rather than any external considerations <br />
related to funding.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \49\ E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) <br />
(recognizing that government decisionmakers adjudicating matters <br />
involving property must be impartial).<br />
    \50\ Id.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Similarly, DHS disagrees that officers will have an incentive to <br />
affirm penalty decisions on appeal because the IFR's preamble <br />
emphasizes DHS's desire to maximize the use of these penalties. The <br />
Departments agree that the IFR was designed to maximize DHS's ability <br />
to impose civil penalties in proportion to the scale of illegal aliens <br />
in the United States--not the total amount of the penalties. The IFR <br />
achieves this purpose by streamlining the penalty process, but it does <br />
not dictate the outcome of any penalty appeal or otherwise pressure <br />
immigration officers to affirm initial penalty decisions. Rather, as <br />
discussed above, the IFR makes clear that a supervisory officer must <br />
review appeals de novo based solely on DHS records and any evidence or <br />
argument submitted by the alien. Moreover, the IFR provides officers <br />
with a 45-day period to adjudicate appeals, which will ensure that they <br />
have ample time to consider all of the evidence and arguments provided <br />
by the alien. Accordingly, DHS believes that statements in the IFR's <br />
preamble will not cause immigration officers to prejudge appeals or <br />
impermissibly affirm penalty decisions. DHS clarifies that it expects <br />
each supervisory immigration officer to decide individual appeals based <br />
solely on the law and the facts presented.<br />
    Finally, the Departments note that BIA review is not needed to <br />
ensure that immigration officers comply with these regulatory <br />
requirements and decide each appeal on the basis of its own facts and <br />
circumstances. If an alien believes that an immigration officer's <br />
decision was erroneous and not based on the applicable law and the <br />
facts of the case, then after exhausting administrative remedies, the <br />
alien may seek judicial review under the APA or may challenge the <br />
decision in connection with any enforcement action brought by DOJ to <br />
collect the penalty.<br />
    For all of these reasons, individually and collectively, the <br />
Departments decline to modify the IFR to restore BIA review. Similarly, <br />
DHS declines to create an independent body, separate from ICE and CBP, <br />
to adjudicate civil penalty appeals because DHS believes that ICE and <br />
CBP supervisory officers are fully capable of deciding each appeal on <br />
the basis of its individual facts and circumstances without bias or <br />
prejudgment. Additionally, creating an independent board or body would <br />
conflict with the purpose of the IFR to streamline the civil penalty <br />
process, including the appeal process, because it could take additional <br />
time to create and to put in place processes that would ensure that the <br />
board receives filings and records in a timely manner. Finally, with <br />
respect to one commenter's claim that, in order to remove any conflict <br />
of interest, DHS should redirect penalty revenue to a general Treasury <br />
fund rather than retaining it in DHS accounts, DHS notes that it cannot <br />
redirect funds in contravention of INA 280(b), 8 U.S.C. 1330(b).<br />
    Comment: Several commenters characterized the IFR's appeal process <br />
as lacking transparency and accountability. They noted that the BIA <br />
makes its decisions publicly available and has a well-established <br />
process for publishing decisions on emerging legal issues. In contrast, <br />
commenters noted that the IFR does not require DHS to make its civil <br />
fine decisions public or treat them as precedential in cases raising <br />
similar issues. Commenters argued that this will contribute to <br />
arbitrary and inconsistent decisions and a lack of accountability.<br />
    Response: As discussed in the IFR and above, the civil penalties <br />
covered by this rule typically turn on straightforward issues of fact, <br />
rather than complicated questions of law. See 90 FR 27453. Accordingly, <br />
the Departments disagree with commenters that there is a need for DHS <br />
to establish a process for publishing decisions on emerging legal <br />
issues involving these penalties. DHS also notes that ICE and CBP have <br />
issued guidance to immigration officers regarding these penalties, <br />
including guidance on the various legal issues that commenters have <br />
identified and that are discussed throughout this preamble. Finally, <br />
nothing in this rule prevents an alien from bringing a federal court <br />
challenge to a penalty decision or from raising any legal defense that <br />
may be available to the alien in connection with a DOJ enforcement <br />
action to collect the penalty. DHS will comply with any adverse court <br />
ruling and will apply any legal precedent applicable to these penalties <br />
that results from such a challenge.<br />
    To the extent that commenters are suggesting that DHS must publish <br />
civil penalty decisions to provide transparency, accountability, and <br />
consistency in the penalty amounts being assessed, ICE and CBP are <br />
applying a uniform practice of assessing the maximum statutorily <br />
authorized penalty amount in each case, consistent with the statute of <br />
limitations. DHS has an interest in issuing these penalties quickly and <br />
at the maximum authorized amount to encourage aliens to comply with <br />
removal and voluntary departure orders. To achieve these dual <br />
objectives, DHS has determined that ICE and CBP should assess the <br />
maximum penalties authorized by law.<br />
7. Mitigation Factors; Motions To Reopen<br />
    Comment: Commenters argued that the rule should allow aliens to <br />
seek mitigation, and it should clarify that DHS should consider <br />
mitigating factors when assessing penalties. One commenter recommended <br />
a tiered penalty system based on severity and good faith compliance <br />
efforts. Another commenter recommended that the agencies adopt a means-<br />
tested fine structure that considers the recipient's<br />
<br />
[[Page 65420]]<br />
<br />
financial capacity. Another commenter points out that the government <br />
considers mitigating factors for employers subject to penalties. They <br />
state that in assessing fines against employers of aliens under the <br />
Immigration Reform and Control Act, the government considers factors <br />
such as the size of their business, their good faith, the seriousness <br />
of the violations, whether the employee is an alien, and the employer's <br />
history of previous violations. Finally, one commenter argues that the <br />
rule undermines procedural fairness by eliminating any right for aliens <br />
to request reopening while preserving reopening authority for DHS.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that the IFR should authorize <br />
aliens to seek mitigation of penalty amounts, create a tiered penalty <br />
structure, or adopt a means-tested framework for assessing penalties. <br />
The civil monetary penalties addressed in this rule arise under INA <br />
240B(d), 274D, and 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), 1324d, and 1325(b). These <br />
statutory provisions do not require DHS or DOJ to adjust penalty <br />
amounts based on mitigating circumstances, financial capacity, or <br />
subjective good-faith factors, nor do they provide a means for aliens <br />
to request discretionary mitigation. In contrast, several of the <br />
statutes cited by commenters, including those governing certain <br />
employer sanctions under the IRCA, explicitly establish mitigating <br />
factors that DHS or DOJ must consider when assessing penalties. <br />
Congress included no such language in the statutory provisions at issue <br />
here. Additionally, President Trump's Executive orders direct DHS to <br />
``ensure the assessment and collection of all fines and penalties [DHS] <br />
is authorized by law to assess and collect from aliens unlawfully <br />
present in the United States'' \51\ and to ``take all appropriate <br />
action to secure the borders of our Nation . . . [including by] <br />
deterring and preventing the entry of illegal aliens into the United <br />
States.'' \52\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \51\ E.O. 14159, Protecting the American People Against <br />
Invasion. E.O. 14159, 90 FR 8443 (Jan. 20, 2025).<br />
    \52\ E.O. 14165, Securing Our Borders, 90 FR 8467 (Jan. 20, <br />
2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    At the same time, the IFR does not foreclose DHS from rescinding or <br />
reopening decisions on its own initiative, where doing so is necessary <br />
to ensure administrative accuracy, correct an error, or address other <br />
considerations relevant to sound enforcement. This internal authority <br />
is procedural in nature and serves the agency's interest in <br />
consistency, fairness, and error correction. Allowing aliens to file <br />
motions to reopen before DHS for the purpose of seeking mitigation, <br />
particularly after the supervisory review process, would undermine the <br />
Department's legitimate interests in finality, administrative <br />
efficiency, and the timely initiation of the collection process, which <br />
are essential to administering a nationwide penalty scheme. The civil <br />
monetary penalties addressed in this rule arising under INA 240B(d), <br />
274(D), and 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), 1324d, and 1325(b), do not <br />
confer a statutory right on aliens to request reopening of a final <br />
civil monetary penalty determination. The Departments therefore decline <br />
to create a new regulatory mechanism that would effectively grant <br />
aliens a right to reopen final decisions or seek mitigation after <br />
supervisory review has concluded.<br />
    The Departments also disagree with commenters who argued that <br />
fairness requires adopting mitigation factors analogous to those <br />
applicable to employers sanctioned under the IRCA. That comparison is <br />
misplaced. IRCA explicitly directs the government to consider certain <br />
mitigating factors when assessing employer penalties. By contrast, the <br />
penalties at issue here are based on statutory conditions, such as <br />
failure to comply with voluntary departure or the presence of a prior <br />
removal order, that turn on objective, records-based facts. These <br />
provisions do not require a discretionary, multi-factor penalty <br />
assessment. The Departments are not required to import into these <br />
statutes mitigation frameworks that Congress has chosen to include <br />
elsewhere but omitted here.<br />
    For these reasons, the Departments conclude that the IFR <br />
appropriately reflects the statutory framework governing civil <br />
penalties under INA 240B(d), 274D, and 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), <br />
1324d, and 1325(b), and that adopting a mitigation regime, a tiered <br />
fine system, a means-tested structure, or respondent-initiated motions <br />
to reopen is not required by the governing statutes, and is <br />
administratively impractical and beyond the scope of this rulemaking.<br />
8. Civil Penalty Amounts; 8 CFR 281.1(g)<br />
    Comment: Some commenters argued that the fines imposed by the IFR <br />
implicate the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. They contend <br />
that, under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, even if a penalty is deemed <br />
``civil,'' it constitutes punishment for purposes of the Excessive <br />
Fines Clause if it serves retributive or deterrent purposes, rather <br />
than remedial ones. They broadly claimed that the IFR authorizes DHS to <br />
issue fines that serve no remedial purpose, and the IFR's self-<br />
expressed intent--to deter future unlawful entries and encourage <br />
greater compliance with removal and voluntary departure orders--<br />
reflects a punitive purpose. Commenters broadly stated that these <br />
penalties are excessive under the Eighth Amendment because they can <br />
result in sums ``disproportionate'' to the underlying immigration <br />
violations.<br />
    One commenter noted that there is a wide range of circumstances <br />
surrounding an alien's decision to come to the United States or remain <br />
in the country after a removal order or voluntary departure order and <br />
suggested that the Departments' failure to consider these circumstances <br />
violates the Excessive Fines Clause. The commenter listed examples, <br />
including aliens fleeing persecution or seeking a better life for their <br />
children, aliens who were unable to depart due to illness, financial <br />
problems, aliens with pending challenges to a removal order, and aliens <br />
who were removed in absentia and were unaware of the order. One <br />
commenter suggested that DHS should cap fines at levels that reflect <br />
the nature of the violation and an alien's ability to pay.<br />
    Response: As an initial matter, the Departments note that the IFR <br />
did not change the scope or amount of the civil monetary penalties that <br />
Congress has established. It only changed the procedures for issuing <br />
and adjudicating these civil monetary penalties and for allowing an <br />
alien to contest them. See 90 FR 27454. DHS has imposed the maximum <br />
statutory penalties under both the IFR's streamlined penalty process <br />
and the prior penalty process in 8 CFR part 280. This indicates that <br />
commenters' Eighth Amendment concerns are directed primarily at the <br />
penalty amounts authorized by Congress, not at the IFR's procedures, <br />
and are therefore outside of the scope of this rule. Nevertheless, in <br />
so far as commenters are suggesting the IFR is unlawful because it does <br />
not require DHS immigration officers to assess proportionality or <br />
consider mitigating factors before imposing the maximum penalty amount, <br />
the Departments respond as follows: (1) these civil monetary penalties <br />
do not fall within the Eighth Amendments Excessive Fines Clause, and <br />
(2) even if treated as ``fines,'' they are not excessive under the <br />
factors in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).<br />
    The Supreme Court has never held that civil monetary penalties for <br />
immigration violations are ``fines'' for purposes of the Excessive <br />
Fines Clause.<br />
<br />
[[Page 65421]]<br />
<br />
The Court's cases in this area have either involved sanctions ordered <br />
as penalties for criminal conduct, or civil forfeiture actions imposed <br />
after a criminal conviction, where the property was used in the <br />
commission of the crime. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, <br />
558 (1993) (criminal forfeiture of property); Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at <br />
328 (criminal forfeiture of currency); Austin v. United States, 509 <br />
U.S. 602, 619-22 (1993) (civil forfeiture of property used to commit <br />
drug crimes). By contrast, the penalties covered by this rule are not <br />
imposed in connection with criminal offenses. They are civil measures <br />
designed to promote compliance with the immigration laws and support <br />
DHS's enforcement efforts. The Supreme Court has long recognized that <br />
Congress may impose civil monetary penalties for violations of the <br />
Nation's immigration laws, and that such penalties are not criminal in <br />
nature. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, <br />
337 (1909). Moreover, the fact that these penalties are intended to <br />
serve a deterrence purpose does not render them subject to the <br />
Excessive Fines Clause because ``deterrence may serve civil as well as <br />
criminal goals.'' Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 105, (1997) <br />
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Garner v. U.S. Dep't of <br />
Labor, 221 F.3d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 2000) (``That a statute serves to <br />
deter future conduct does not automatically render it punitive.''). In <br />
addition, Congress clearly intended these penalties to serve a remedial <br />
purpose. As explained in Section II of this preamble, apprehending, <br />
detaining, and removing removable aliens, and conducting section 240 <br />
removal proceedings imposes significant costs on the Departments, and a <br />
large number of unlawful entries strain resources at the border. <br />
Congress recognized these harms and authorized civil penalties to both <br />
encourage compliance with the immigration laws and to help fund DHS's <br />
border security and removal efforts. See INA 280(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1330(b)(3) (providing that the Immigration Enforcement Account is <br />
available for removal of criminal aliens and structures along certain <br />
portions of the United States border); see also H. Rep. No. 104-469 pt. <br />
1 at 155 (1996).<br />
    Even if these penalties were considered fines under the Excessive <br />
Fines Clause, DHS's decision to impose the maximum amount authorized by <br />
Congress without considering each alien's individual reasons for <br />
unlawful entry or failure to depart after a removal or departure order <br />
is neither excessive nor unconstitutional. Courts of appeals generally <br />
apply the following factors from Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-40, to <br />
determine whether a fine is ``grossly disproportional'' to the gravity <br />
of an offense: (1) the amount of the penalty authorized by Congress and <br />
the nature of the harm that results from a violation; (2) the class of <br />
persons to whom the statute principally applies; and (3) a comparison <br />
with potential criminal penalties. Taken together, these factors <br />
support the conclusion that the IFR need not be amended to limit DHS's <br />
authority to impose the maximum statutory penalties or to require a <br />
proportionality analysis before issuing a civil penalty or otherwise <br />
consider mitigating factors.<br />
    With respect to the first factor, judgments about the appropriate <br />
penalty amount for a violation ``belong in the first instance to the <br />
legislature.'' Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 322. The civil monetary <br />
penalties covered by this rule reflect Congress's considered judgment <br />
that the conduct involved--an alien's unlawful entry or failure to <br />
depart after a removal or departure order--is particularly serious and <br />
warrants substantial fines to promote compliance with immigration laws. <br />
See 90 FR 27454. Consistent with Congress's judgment and current <br />
enforcement priorities, DHS has determined that imposing the maximum <br />
authorized penalties is an appropriate response to the large number of <br />
aliens who have unlawfully entered the United States or have violated <br />
removal and departure orders in recent years. See Section II of this <br />
preamble. Courts have held that an agency's civil penalty decision is <br />
not excessive under the Eighth Amendment when it does not exceed the <br />
statutory maximum. See Newell Recycling Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 204, 210 <br />
(5th Cir. 2000) (``No matter how excessive (in lay terms) an <br />
administrative fine may appear, if the fine does not exceed the limits <br />
prescribed by the statute authorizing it, the fine does not violate the <br />
Eighth Amendment''); see also Pharaon v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. <br />
Res. Sys, 135 F.3d 148, 155-57 (D.C. Cir. 1998).<br />
    The specific statutorily authorized penalty amounts are also <br />
proportionate to the underlying immigration law violations. For the <br />
unlawful entry penalty, the maximum penalty (adjusted for inflation) is <br />
$500 for each entry. See 8 CFR 280.53(b)(15). That amount is not <br />
disproportionate to unlawful entries, including repeated unlawful <br />
entries, in violation of the immigration laws in light of Congress's <br />
concerns when enacting this penalty. See H. Rep. No. 104-469 at 155 <br />
(1996) (noting that unlawful entry ``with no consequences undermines <br />
the credibility of our efforts to secure the border'').<br />
    For voluntary departure civil penalties, Congress has authorized <br />
Immigration Judges to set penalties between $1,992 and $9,970 (as <br />
adjusted for inflation). See 8 CFR 280.53(b)(3). Under longstanding <br />
regulations, Immigration Judges or the BIA must select an amount within <br />
that range that reflects the likelihood that the alien will comply with <br />
voluntary departure or may apply a presumptive amount of $3,000. See 8 <br />
CFR 1240.26(l); 73 FR 76927, 76936 (Dec. 18, 2008). DHS adheres to the <br />
amount set by EOIR. That amount is not excessive because it reflects <br />
both the adjudicator's assessment of the incentive needed to secure <br />
compliance and Congress's desire to ensure consequences for violating <br />
departure orders. See H. Rep. No. 104-469, at 122 (noting how aliens <br />
with voluntary departure and had ``very little incentive'' to actually <br />
depart the United States prior to IIRIRA).<br />
    For failure to depart after a removal order, Congress has <br />
authorized DHS to impose a penalty of $998 per day (as adjusted for <br />
inflation) for each day an alien willfully fails to depart. Commenters <br />
argue that these penalties are excessive because the cumulative total <br />
may, in some cases, exceed $1,000,000. The Departments disagree. <br />
Congress designed this provision so that each day of willful failure to <br />
depart constitutes a separate, repeating violation. See Section III.E. <br />
of this preamble. In this context, proportionality is assessed by <br />
looking at each per day penalty, not the cumulative amount. See e.g. <br />
United States v. Schwarzbaum, 127 F.4th 259, 276 (11th Cir. 2025). A <br />
$998 per diem penalty is not excessive compared to other immigration-<br />
related civil penalties. It reflects Congress's judgment as to the <br />
seriousness of the harm that flows from each day an alien remains in <br />
the United States in willful violation of a removal order and how these <br />
willful violations undermine the credibility of the immigration laws <br />
and warrant a separate penalty.<br />
    Even when viewed cumulatively, the per diem failure to depart <br />
penalty is not excessive. Congress added this authority in IIRIRA to <br />
strengthen immigration enforcement and to increase the consequences for <br />
ignoring removal orders, in response to the problem of aliens remaining <br />
in the United States--sometimes for years--after final deportation <br />
orders. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at 160 (1996) (explaining <br />
when enacting IIRIRA that ``aliens who have final orders of deportation <br />
[often]<br />
<br />
[[Page 65422]]<br />
<br />
remain in the United States indefinitely'' and noting that ``[a]s a <br />
result, the resources expended to identify, apprehend, and provide a <br />
hearing to a deportable alien are all too often wasted''). Against this <br />
backdrop, Congress expressly authorized DHS to impose per-day penalties <br />
that may reach substantial sums when an alien willfully remains in the <br />
United States for extended periods in violation of a removal order. In <br />
these circumstances, imposing the maximum daily amount, even where it <br />
results in a large total, is not excessive because the total directly <br />
reflects a long-running, repeated violation. See Schwarzbaum, 127 F.4th <br />
at 284 (``when a cumulative fine is made up of constitutionally <br />
proportionate penalties, the cumulative fine ``is, literally, directly <br />
proportionate to the offense'') (citation and internal quotations <br />
omitted).<br />
    Taken together, the three penalties covered by this rule reflect <br />
Congress's calibrated assessment of the harm associated with each type <br />
of violation. Lower penalties for unlawful entry generally apply to <br />
aliens apprehended while entering and who are often subject to prompt <br />
return or expedited removal, thereby conserving resources associated <br />
with section 240 removal proceedings. Higher penalties for failure to <br />
depart reflect Congress's judgment that remaining in the United States <br />
after a departure or removal order both seriously undermines the <br />
integrity of the immigration system and results in wasted enforcement <br />
and adjudicative resources. See H. Rep. No. 104 469, pt. 1, at 160. <br />
Accordingly, the Departments believe that imposing the maximum <br />
statutorily authorized amount of these penalties is both consistent <br />
with Congress's purpose in enacting these penalties and not excessive <br />
given those amounts reflect the value of the harm Congress placed on <br />
such violations. See United States v. Chaplin's, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, <br />
852 (11th Cir. 2011) (``Congress, as a representative body, can distill <br />
the monetary value society places on harmful conduct'').<br />
    The second Bajakajian factor--whether the penalties apply to the <br />
class of persons for whom the statute was principally designed--also <br />
supports the Departments' position. Aliens subject to these penalties <br />
fall squarely within the class Congress targeted. For unlawful entry <br />
penalties, an alien's apprehension while attempting to enter the United <br />
States unlawfully is sufficient to support the penalty. For failure to <br />
depart penalties, ICE guidance instructs officers to confirm that the <br />
alien is subject to a final removal or voluntary departure order, that <br />
there is no DHS record of the alien's departure, and that, based on <br />
available records, there are no legal impediments or other <br />
circumstances that would negate a willful or voluntary failure to <br />
depart. For per diem penalties, ICE guidance further requires officers <br />
to exclude periods when the alien was lawfully permitted to remain in <br />
the United States, such as during the pendency of a stay of removal. <br />
This is all Congress has required. Congress has clearly provided that <br />
any alien who engages in the proscribed conduct--unlawfully entering <br />
the United States or willfully or voluntarily failing to depart after a <br />
removal or departure order--is subject to a civil penalty up to the <br />
statutory maximum. By contrast to other immigration-related civil <br />
penalties \53\ and contrary to commenters' suggestion, Congress has not <br />
required DHS to adjust the penalty based on proportionality or to <br />
consider specific mitigating circumstances. To the extent that <br />
commenters are suggesting that DHS must consider factors such as an <br />
alien's inability to obtain travel documents, hospitalization, or other <br />
circumstances beyond the alien's control, such factors could negate the <br />
``willfulness'' or ``voluntariness'' of an alien's conduct and, if the <br />
alien demonstrates them on appeal, the alien may not be subject to the <br />
penalty at all. However, the alien is best positioned to raise these <br />
considerations on appeal because DHS would generally not have knowledge <br />
of such circumstances. The second Bajakajian factor therefore supports <br />
DHS's decision to assess these penalties up to the maximum statutorily <br />
authorized amount without first conducting a proportionality analysis <br />
or considering mitigating circumstances.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \53\ See e.g., INA 274A(e)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1324a(e)(5) (listing <br />
various factors that must be considered when determining the <br />
appropriate amount of the penalty for certain employment-related <br />
immigration violations); INA 273(e), 8 U.S.C. 1323(e) (directing DHS <br />
to prescribe regulations for reducing carrier penalties for <br />
transporting undocumented aliens in appropriate circumstances).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The third Bajakajian factor--comparison to potential criminal <br />
sanctions--likewise weighs against a finding of excessiveness. In <br />
IIRIRA, Congress not only created the civil failure to depart penalty <br />
but also amended INA 243, 8 U.S.C. 1253, to make it a criminal offense <br />
for an alien to willfully fail or refuse to depart within 90 days of a <br />
final removal order. Congress authorized imprisonment of up to four <br />
years, a fine, or both, with enhanced penalties for certain criminal <br />
aliens. See INA 243(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1). Congress has also <br />
authorized criminal penalties for unlawful entry, including up to six <br />
months' imprisonment, a fine, or both, with increased penalties for <br />
repeat offenses. See INA 275(a), 8 U.S.C. 1325(a). These criminal <br />
penalties are significantly more severe than the civil penalties at <br />
issue, and Congress specifically provided that the maximum civil <br />
penalties may be imposed in addition to any criminal sanctions. See INA <br />
274D(b), 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1324d(b), 1325(b). In light of this statutory <br />
framework, all three Bajakajian factors weigh strongly against <br />
commenters' arguments that imposing the maximum statutory civil <br />
penalties violates the Excessive Fines Clause.<br />
    For these reasons, the Departments decline to amend the rule to <br />
limit the discretion of DHS immigration officers to impose the maximum <br />
statutory penalty amounts or require that they apply proportionality <br />
factors before doing so. Finally, regarding one commenter's concern <br />
about ``ability to pay,'' the Departments note that Congress has not <br />
required DHS to consider an alien's ability to pay in assessing these <br />
penalties, and the Supreme Court has not held this factor must be <br />
analyzed under the Excessive Fines Clause. Absent a legal requirement <br />
for DHS to consider an alien's ability to pay, DHS believes that <br />
adjusting a fine amount lower based on an alien's ability to pay would <br />
diminish the rule's deterrent effect.<br />
    Comment: One commenter alleged that 8 CFR 281.1(g) is inconsistent <br />
with 8 CFR 1240.26(l) mandating that the Immigration Judge or BIA <br />
advise the alien of the civil penalty amount at the time of granting <br />
voluntary departure or a presumptive amount of $3,000 will be set. <br />
Another commenter noted that DHS has increased the penalty amounts in 8 <br />
CFR 280.53 for failure to depart violations incrementally over time <br />
from $500 per diem penalty in 2011, to a $998 per diem penalty in 2025, <br />
with DHS making incremental adjustments each year in between. The <br />
commenter claims that ``the amount of fines that allegedly accrued on <br />
any given day should have been limited to the amount authorized by the <br />
regulation in effect on that day.'' The commenter acknowledges that the <br />
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Improvements Act of 2015 <br />
allows DHS to adjust civil penalty amounts for inflation each year and <br />
to apply adjustments retroactively, but the commenter argues that <br />
``charging a lump sum without itemizing the exact amounts that DHS <br />
alleges to have accrued on any specific dates nor any explanation for <br />
why DHS believes fines accrued during this particular timeframe<br />
<br />
[[Page 65423]]<br />
<br />
deprives respondents of critical information necessary to contest such <br />
charges.'' The commenter argues the IFR is defective because it does <br />
not require DHS to itemize penalties that ``DHS alleges to have accrued <br />
on any specific dates nor [provides] any explanation for why DHS <br />
believes fines accrued during this particular timeframe.''<br />
    Response: First, DHS notes that the IFR does not direct immigration <br />
officers to apply the penalty amounts listed in 8 CFR 280.53. Rather, 8 <br />
CFR 281.1(g) merely refers them to that provision so that they have <br />
access to information concerning the current inflation adjusted amount <br />
for each penalty. Immigration officers must determine how to apply <br />
those inflation adjusted rates in the context of each individual case, <br />
or whether to apply those rates at all, consistent with ICE and CBP <br />
guidance. Indeed, contrary to one commenter's claim, ICE guidance <br />
directs immigration officers to apply the penalty amount set by an <br />
Immigration Judge or the BIA or a $3,000 amount if no penalty amount is <br />
included in the voluntary departure order when assessing voluntary <br />
departure civil penalties. Accordingly, DHS is assessing voluntary <br />
departure penalties consistent with 8 CFR 1240.26(l).<br />
    Further, the Departments do not agree that DHS should itemize <br />
penalty amounts in penalty decisions imposing fines for willful failure <br />
to depart under INA 274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1). The commenter's <br />
suggestion that ``the amount of fines that allegedly accrued on any <br />
given day should [be] limited to the amount authorized by the <br />
regulation in effect on that day'' is inconsistent with the Federal <br />
Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Improvements Act of 2015, Public <br />
Law 114-74 (Nov. 2, 2015), 28 U.S.C. 2461 note. The 2015 Amendments <br />
amended section 6 of the Inflation Adjustment Act to provide that <br />
``[a]ny increase under this Act in a civil monetary penalty shall apply <br />
only to civil monetary penalties, including those whose associated <br />
violation predated such increase, which are assessed after the date the <br />
increase takes effect.'' Congress's specific reference to applying the <br />
adjustments to civil monetary penalties ``whose associated violation <br />
predated'' the effective date of the adjustment clearly contemplates <br />
that inflation adjustments after 2015 can be applied to violations <br />
occurring prior to the effective date of the increased civil penalty <br />
amounts--but only if the civil penalties are ``assessed after the date <br />
the increase takes effect.'' That is precisely how DHS applies the <br />
failure to depart penalties under INA 274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1324d(a)(1). <br />
Specifically, DHS applies the inflation adjusted amount that is in <br />
effect on the day that the penalty is ``assessed''--i.e., when DHS <br />
issues the penalty decision--regardless of the date of the removal <br />
order or the amount that was authorized on any one day in the period <br />
for which the penalty applies--i.e., any day that the alien willfully <br />
failed to depart the United States after the final removal order.<br />
    To the extent that the commenter is concerned about DHS applying <br />
the current inflation adjusted rate to violations that occurred prior <br />
to the Inflation Adjustment Improvements Act of 2015, DHS notes that <br />
the commenter's concern is misplaced. As discussed above in this <br />
preamble, an alien is liable for a per diem penalty for each day he <br />
willfully remains in the United States after a final removal order <br />
regardless of when the removal order first became final. However, DHS <br />
is applying the failure to depart penalty for only five years back from <br />
the date of the penalty decision. Therefore, DHS would only assess the <br />
per diem penalty at the adjusted rate in place at the time of the <br />
penalty decision for a total of five years back from the date of the <br />
decision, even if the alien's removal order became final prior to 2015.<br />
    Regarding commenters' suggestion that DHS needs to itemize penalty <br />
decisions because the alien may not be liable for a per diem penalty <br />
for some portion of the period that the alien remained in the United <br />
States, ICE guidance directs immigration officers account for any <br />
periods after the removal order became administratively final during <br />
which the alien was authorized to remain in the United States (e.g., a <br />
stay of removal, a later approved immigration benefit). See Section <br />
III.E.2 of this preamble. To the extent that an alien's individual <br />
circumstances excused an alien's willful or voluntary failure to depart <br />
for some period of time (e.g., the alien was hospitalized or <br />
incarcerated or otherwise was unable to depart due to circumstances <br />
beyond the alien's control), the alien is best positioned to raise <br />
these issues on appeal. DHS cannot be expected to know about an alien's <br />
individual circumstances that prevented the alien from departing.<br />
<br />
E. Other Matters Related to the IFR<br />
<br />
1. Statute of Limitations<br />
    Comment: Several commenters asserted that the rule does not explain <br />
how the federal statute of limitations applies to the civil penalties <br />
imposed under the IFR. One commenter suggested that the IFR's <br />
streamlined penalty procedures make it difficult for aliens to raise <br />
statute of limitations defenses, and the complexity of these defenses <br />
undermines the IFR's assumption about the readily verifiable and <br />
straightforward nature of these penalties. One commenter argued that <br />
the IFR does not require DHS to include information in the penalty <br />
decision about when the violation occurred which makes it difficult for <br />
aliens and their counsel to determine if DHS is correctly applying the <br />
statute of limitations. The commenter suggested that the 15-day appeal <br />
period, combined with the use of ordinary mail to serve decisions, <br />
could prevent aliens and their attorneys from investigating statute of <br />
limitations issues and raising the statute of limitations as a defense <br />
to these penalties. The commenter argued that eliminating BIA review is <br />
particularly problematic because DHS immigration officers do not have <br />
the legal expertise to resolve complex statute of limitations issues, <br />
and DHS does not have a mechanism to issue binding decisions on legal <br />
issues including those involving statutes of limitation.<br />
    Commenters offered their views regarding how the federal statute of <br />
limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2462, applies to the penalties covered by this <br />
rule. For the failure to depart penalties, commenters claimed that the <br />
five-year statute of limitations begins to run the moment the voluntary <br />
departure period ends or when a removal order becomes final. They <br />
stated that DHS cannot impose fines for conduct that happened more than <br />
five years ago, such as remaining in the United States after a <br />
voluntary departure order period expired or after a removal order <br />
became final, particularly when there is no caselaw or statute <br />
recognizing a ``continuing violation'' theory for these penalties. For <br />
the unlawful entry penalties, commenters said that the limitations <br />
period begins to run once an alien is apprehended while in the process <br />
of entering or attempting to enter the United States.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree that the rule should be <br />
rescinded because it fails to include a statute of limitations <br />
provision. As an initial matter, the Departments emphasize the IFR's <br />
limited scope. The IFR changed only the procedures by which DHS issues <br />
and adjudicates certain civil monetary penalties and the manner in <br />
which aliens may contest them. The IFR did not change or alter the <br />
criteria for issuing these penalties, including how DHS interprets or <br />
applies the general federal statute of limitations for these penalties. <br />
Indeed, the Departments note that none of the Departments' other civil<br />
<br />
[[Page 65424]]<br />
<br />
monetary penalty regulations contain a statute of limitations <br />
provision, including 8 CFR 280, which, prior to the IFR, governed the <br />
process for assessing the penalties covered by this rule. Accordingly, <br />
the Departments believe that it was reasonable and appropriate to limit <br />
the scope of the IFR consistent with the scope of the Departments' <br />
other civil penalty regulations, especially because of the IFR's narrow <br />
purpose of streamlining the process for the failure to depart and <br />
unlawful entry penalties. Therefore, the Departments decline to amend <br />
the rule to add a statute of limitations provision. For the same <br />
reasons, the Departments do not agree with commenters' suggestion that <br />
failure to include a statute of limitations provisions renders the rule <br />
arbitrary or capricious.\54\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \54\ To the extent that any civil penalties issued under the IFR <br />
were determined to be inconsistent with the statute of limitations, <br />
addressing such fines would be outside of the scope of this final <br />
rulemaking. The preamble to a final rule exists to satisfy the APA's <br />
requirement of ``a concise general statement of [the rule's] basis <br />
and purpose,'' 5 U.S.C. 553(c), and addressing fines already issued <br />
under the IFR--to the extent that is even necessary--plainly falls <br />
outside of that.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The Departments also disagree that the IFR's streamlined <br />
proceedings make it too difficult for aliens to assert a statute of <br />
limitations defense. Consistent with 8 CFR 281.1(c)(1), each penalty <br />
decision lists the date when the alien became subject to a final <br />
removal or a voluntary departure order, or when the alien was <br />
apprehended entering or attempting to enter the United States <br />
unlawfully. See DHS Form 281, Notice of Violation and Order. Therefore, <br />
to the extent that an alien believes that the violation occurred <br />
outside of the statute of limitations, the penalty decision itself <br />
contains the relevant information to dispute the penalty. Further, <br />
aliens should already possess any documents needed to dispute the <br />
information contained in the penalty decision. For example, an alien <br />
who disputes the date of a final removal or voluntary departure order <br />
can simply provide a copy of his removal or departure order or any <br />
documents showing that the alien's removal order or voluntary departure <br />
period was delayed because of an appeal or a stay of removal. The same <br />
is true for aliens subject to civil penalties for unlawful entry: the <br />
relevant charging document will list the date that DHS apprehended the <br />
alien entering or attempting to enter the United States. Commenters do <br />
not explain why aliens cannot retain these important documents, and the <br />
Departments will not assume otherwise. Accordingly, the Departments <br />
believe that the penalty decision contains sufficient information to <br />
allow an alien to raise a statute of limitations defense, and the IFR's <br />
15-day appeal period provides ample time for aliens and their <br />
attorneys, if any, to gather evidence to compliment or prepare such a <br />
defense.<br />
    Similarly, the Departments do not agree with commenters' position <br />
that BIA review is needed because legal questions regarding the statute <br />
of limitations cannot adequately be resolved by DHS immigration <br />
officers on appeal.<br />
    ICE and CBP both apply the statute of limitations for these <br />
penalties in a straightforward way that refutes commenters' arguments <br />
that additional procedures, including BIA review, are needed due to the <br />
complexity of statute of limitations issues. First, ICE only assesses <br />
penalties under INA 240B(d), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), if an alien's voluntary <br />
departure period expired within five years of the order imposing the <br />
penalty.\55\ CBP only assesses penalties under INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1325(b), against aliens apprehended in the last five years while <br />
entering (or attempting to enter) the United States. The Departments <br />
note these approaches are consistent with commenters' interpretation of <br />
the general statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2462, applicable to these <br />
penalties. This application ensures consistency in the assessment of <br />
these penalties and provides clear direction to immigration officers on <br />
how far back to assess these penalties. Therefore, aliens do not need <br />
to prepare, and immigration officers do not need to decide, complicated <br />
statute of limitations defenses for these penalties in light of this <br />
approach. If an alien believes a penalty is contrary to this approach, <br />
the alien can appeal the civil penalty decision and provide a copy of <br />
the voluntary departure order indicating the date of the violation or, <br />
in the case of an unlawful entry penalty, the charging document listing <br />
the date and location of apprehension.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \55\ DHS acknowledges that some fines have been issued based on <br />
violations that occurred more than five years after the voluntary <br />
departure period and is taking action to ensure fines issued in the <br />
future are consistent with the statute of limitations.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    With respect to penalties under INA 274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1324d(a)(1), for willful failure to comply with a removal order, <br />
immigration officers can impose these penalties regardless of the date <br />
of the post-IIRIRA final removal order, but the per diem penalty amount <br />
should be assessed only for the five-year period preceding the date <br />
that the penalty is issued. Contrary to commenters' arguments, this is <br />
consistent with the plain language of the statute and caselaw <br />
interpreting similar penalty statutes for the purposes of determining <br />
the application of the general five-year statute of limitations under <br />
28 U.S.C. 2462. Section INA 274D(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. <br />
1324d(a)(1), provides that ``any alien subject to a final removal order <br />
who--willfully fails or refuses to depart from the United States . . . <br />
shall pay a civil penalty of not more than $500 to [DHS] for each day <br />
the alien is in violation of this section.'' (emphasis added). When a <br />
civil penalty statute imposes a per diem penalty, the ``continuing <br />
violation'' doctrine applies, and the Government may assess the penalty <br />
even if the first violation occurred more than five years back. See <br />
Interamericas Invs., Ltd. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., <br />
111 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that ``[w]here the civil <br />
penalty provision at hand contemplates per diem penalties for <br />
violations, then continuing violations are cognizable under the general <br />
statute of limitations.''). Similarly, when a statute contemplates <br />
``repeated violations,'' each new violation restarts the statute of <br />
limitations, but penalties can be assessed only for the violations <br />
occurring within that limitations period. See Hamer v. City of <br />
Trinidad, 924 F.3d 1093, 1100 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining the repeated <br />
violation doctrine). Under either doctrine, INA 274D(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1324d(a)(1), plainly indicates that Congress intended for an alien to <br />
be subject to a continuing or new penalty each day he remains in the <br />
United States in violation of a removal order regardless of when the <br />
final removal order was issued. And, as a matter of policy, ICE is <br />
applying the per diem penalty amount only for the five-year period <br />
preceding the date that the penalty is issued, consistent with the <br />
``repeated violations'' doctrine.<br />
    Additionally, the Departments note that aliens can seek judicial <br />
review of final penalty decisions, after exhausting administrative <br />
remedies. See 5 U.S.C. 704. Aliens can also raise any available <br />
defense, including statute of limitations defenses, in connection with <br />
any enforcement action that DOJ brings to collect these fines.<br />
    For these reasons, individually and collectively, the Departments <br />
disagree with commenters' view that the IFR should be rescinded or <br />
revised because it does not address how the statute of limitations <br />
applies to these penalties. For the same reasons, commenters' views <br />
about the complexity of statute of limitations issues do not undermine <br />
the Departments' determination that the process for these penalties can <br />
be<br />
<br />
[[Page 65425]]<br />
<br />
streamlined because of their straightforward nature.<br />
2. Implementation Matters and Alternatives<br />
    Comment: Implementation concerns and alternatives were also raised. <br />
One commenter expressed concern that the rule lacks adequate safeguards <br />
to prevent civil monetary penalties from being applied to aliens who <br />
currently hold, or are eligible for, lawful or protected status. The <br />
commenter stated that the rule provides no clear guidance on how DHS <br />
will avoid imposing fines on individuals who have been granted TPS, <br />
asylum, or relief under the VAWA or the T and U visa programs. These <br />
groups, the commenter explained, often have pending or approved <br />
immigration benefits that authorize their continued presence in the <br />
U.S. or excuse prior periods of unlawful presence. The commenter also <br />
noted that the IFR does not address how DHS will handle cases where <br />
aliens are beneficiaries of prosecutorial discretion, deferred action, <br />
or stays of removal. According to the commenter, the absence of <br />
explicit instructions combined with the IFR's streamlined process, <br />
risks imposing fines on aliens who are lawfully present under DHS <br />
policy or court order. The commenter stated it was critical to <br />
recognize that individuals with lawful or protected status are not <br />
obligated to depart.<br />
    Another commenter suggested that DHS should implement this rule as <br />
a limited pilot program before implementing it nationwide. The <br />
commenter said that a pilot-and-evaluate model would allow DHS to <br />
collect empirical evidence to assess the impact of civil fines on <br />
compliance, family stability, and financial impact of these penalties <br />
on aliens and their families. Using this empirical evidence to guide <br />
adjustments would ensure that civil fine enforcement evolves in <br />
response to real-world outcomes rather than theoretical assumptions.<br />
    Response: As an initial matter, the Departments reiterate that the <br />
IFR did not change the categories of aliens subject to civil penalties <br />
or ICE's process for deciding whether an alien is subject to a civil <br />
penalty. Rather, the IFR was issued as a procedural rule and governs <br />
only the procedures that apply to these penalties. Therefore, DHS <br />
declines to modify the IFR in this final rule to clarify the category <br />
of aliens who are or are not subject to these penalties. Immigration <br />
officers confirm an alien's current status based on available records <br />
before assessing a civil fine by referencing multiple platforms and <br />
immigration databases. ICE's guidance to immigration officers provides <br />
that aliens with approved applications for lawful or protected status--<br />
such as TPS, Form I-730 Refugee/Asylee Relative benefits, VAWA <br />
protections, DACA, and T-visas and U-visas--should not be issued a <br />
civil fine. ICE also accounts for any deferrals of removal triggered by <br />
the filing of certain applications before USCIS, consistent with <br />
applicable statutes and regulations. When calculating a fine under INA <br />
274D, immigration officers account for any periods after the removal <br />
order became administratively final during which the alien was <br />
authorized to remain in the United States due to, e.g., a stay or <br />
deferral of removal. As part of the individual case review process, <br />
immigration officers review documents and supporting information across <br />
multiple immigration systems, including systems and platforms of <br />
entities such as USCIS, CBP, and DOJ/EOIR. DHS clarifies that lawful <br />
status cannot be conferred through an immigration officer's exercise of <br />
discretion and that the immigration officer cannot excuse an alien's <br />
obligation to depart pursuant to a final removal order. Rather, this <br />
measure reflects a determination not to pursue enforcement action at <br />
the time such discretion is exercised. As such, individuals who are <br />
beneficiaries of this measure remain subject to the underlying <br />
immigration laws and obligations, including potential civil penalties <br />
for violations.<br />
    Comment: One commenter asserted that the rule misinterprets and <br />
overextends the scope of the civil monetary penalty authorized by INA <br />
275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b). The commenter stated that, by statute, these <br />
penalties apply only to aliens who are ``apprehended while entering (or <br />
attempting to enter)'' the United States, and not to those later <br />
encountered within the interior after an unlawful entry. The commenter <br />
objected to language in the IFR suggesting that DHS may rely on Form I-<br />
213 or other records of interior apprehension to establish liability <br />
under INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b). The commenter argued that such an <br />
interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute <br />
and could lead to the improper assessment of fines against aliens who <br />
were not apprehended at the time of entry. The commenter urged DHS to <br />
revise the rule to clarify that INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b) penalties <br />
cannot be imposed on aliens apprehended after entry or encountered away <br />
from the border. The commenter also stated that the rule should require <br />
DHS to include specific evidentiary information in any order imposing <br />
this penalty such as the date of the attempted entry and the date and <br />
location of the arrest, to ensure that the penalty is applied only in <br />
circumstances consistent with statutory authority.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree with the commenter's <br />
characterization that the rule overextends the scope of penalties under <br />
INA 275(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1). The rule does not expand the <br />
statutory application of 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1) but rather <br />
provides procedural clarity for the assessment and collection of civil <br />
monetary penalties. The Departments interpret INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. <br />
1325(b)(1) to apply to aliens who are apprehended while entering or <br />
attempting to enter the United States. In practice, CBP will assess an <br />
INA 275(b), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1), penalty only when it apprehends an <br />
alien who has entered (or attempted to enter) the United States without <br />
inspection in the past seven days and who has not yet reached their <br />
destination, consistent with the statutory language and legislative <br />
intent of INA 275(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1325(b)(1). As indicated above, the <br />
applicable statute of limitations runs five years from the date of <br />
apprehension.<br />
    Comment: Commenters expressed concern that the rule does not <br />
address how civil monetary penalties would apply to aliens whose prior <br />
removal orders are later reopened, vacated, or otherwise resolved in a <br />
manner that permits adjustment of status or other immigration relief. <br />
They noted that DHS often agrees to join motions to reopen removal <br />
proceedings to allow individuals to pursue lawful status or relief. <br />
They stated that it was ``critical to recognize that those with lawful <br />
status in the U.S. are under no obligation to depart,'' and that <br />
``[t]heir continued presence in the U.S. is not a willful failure to <br />
depart, but a lawful consequence of the status conferred upon them. <br />
Another commenter urged DHS to clarify that civil penalties assessed <br />
must be rescinded when a removal order is reopened and will not be used <br />
as a basis to deny the alien's future attempts to regularize their <br />
immigration status. The commenter suggested, without much elaboration, <br />
that the IFR should clarify that DHS should not apply fines against <br />
aliens with in absentia removal orders.<br />
    Response: ICE's guidance to immigration officers provides that <br />
aliens whose removal order is stayed should not be issued an INA 274D, <br />
8 U.S.C. 1324d, failure to depart penalty. ICE confers with DHS's <br />
Office of the Principal Legal Advisor before issuing a<br />
<br />
[[Page 65426]]<br />
<br />
failure to depart penalty in any case in which a Motion to Reopen <br />
(``MTR'') has been adjudicated for review of the reasons for reopening <br />
asserted by the alien and any circuit-specific case law that may affect <br />
the viability of the penalty. ICE confirms an alien's current case <br />
status before assessing or collecting any fine by referencing its <br />
internal systems. DHS disagrees that fines should not apply to any <br />
alien with an in absentia removal order but notes that, where an alien <br />
files an MTR and claims that the alien did not receive notice, their <br />
removal order is stayed. INA 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(5)(C). DHS <br />
emphasizes that the assessment of civil penalties is tied to the <br />
existence of a valid removal order and the alien's willful failure or <br />
refusal to depart as required by law. If a removal order is reopened, <br />
vacated, or dismissed, DHS will review the circumstances to determine <br />
whether the assessed civil penalties remain appropriate.<br />
<br />
F. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements<br />
<br />
1. Administrative Procedure Act<br />
i. Procedural Rule Exception<br />
    Comment: Several commenters generally asserted that Departments <br />
lacked authority to issue the IFR without first publishing a notice of <br />
proposed rulemaking and providing a pre-promulgation comment period in <br />
accordance with the APA, 5 U.S.C. 553. First, commenters argued that <br />
the Departments cannot properly characterize the IFR as a procedural <br />
rule under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). Commenters identified changes such as <br />
eliminating the NIF before issuing a final penalty, reducing the time <br />
to respond from 30 days to 15 days, allowing service by regular mail <br />
instead of certified or personal service, and moving appeals from the <br />
BIA to DHS. They asserted that these changes remove or weaken existing <br />
protections, implicate due process, change rights and obligations of <br />
affected individuals, and therefore render the rule substantive, which <br />
would require compliance with the APA's notice and comment <br />
requirements.<br />
    Response: The Departments disagree. This rule was properly issued <br />
without prior notice and comment under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A), which <br />
exempts from those requirements ``rules of agency organization, <br />
procedure, or practice.'' Under the APA, notice and comment is required <br />
for substantive rules. By contrast, agency rules that prescribe agency <br />
organization, procedure, or practice are exempt from the notice-and-<br />
comment requirement. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). The ``critical feature of <br />
the procedural rule exception is that it covers agency actions that do <br />
not themselves alter the rights or interests of parties, although it <br />
may alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their <br />
viewpoints to the agency.'' JEM Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d <br />
320, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). In JEM Broadcasting, the D.C. <br />
Circuit upheld a rule that changed the timing and processing of <br />
applications, not the substantive criteria for deciding them, and <br />
treated the rule as procedural and exempt from notice and comment. Id.<br />
    As explained in the IFR, this rule fits within that procedural rule <br />
exemption. See 90 27454. This rule merely prescribes how the <br />
Departments conduct internal penalty proceedings and administrative <br />
reviews. The IFR does not alter the statutory obligations under INA <br />
240B(d), 274D(a)(1), and 275(b); 8 U.S.C. 1229c(d), 1324d(a), and <br />
1325(b), that authorize civil monetary penalties against aliens who <br />
fail to depart voluntarily, who willfully refuse to depart after a <br />
final order of removal, or who are apprehended while unlawfully <br />
entering or attempting to enter. It does not change the amount of these <br />
penalties or create new categories of violators or new statutory <br />
rights. The substantive legal liability remains as defined by statute.<br />
    Rather, the IFR merely revised the process by which the Departments <br />
impose these civil monetary penalties. For example, allowing DHS to <br />
serve penalty notices by regular mail (and no longer only by certified <br />
mail or personal service); shortening the period within which a <br />
respondent must contest the fine or exercise appeal rights from 30 to <br />
15 days, moving the appeals process from the BIA to DHS, and other <br />
procedural streamlining merely alters the manner in which parties <br />
present themselves or their viewpoints to the Departments. Under the <br />
IFR, aliens continue to receive written notice of the penalty by <br />
regular mail and a meaningful opportunity to present a written response <br />
with supporting evidence before any final determination is made. <br />
Likewise, replacing BIA review with review by a DHS supervisory <br />
official who was not involved in the initial decision preserves <br />
neutral, independent oversight while streamlining the adjudication <br />
process. Accordingly, this rule is properly classified as a procedural <br />
rule and exempt from prior notice and comment procedures under the APA.<br />
    Moreover, though not required to do so, the Departments nonetheless <br />
solicited post-promulgation comments following publication of the IFR <br />
on June 27, 2025, and accepted comments through July 28, 2025. The <br />
Departments have carefully reviewed and considered all comment <br />
submissions received at the docket in developing this final rule.<br />
ii. Foreign Affairs Exemption<br />
    Comment: Commenters also asserted that the Departments' reliance on <br />
the foreign affairs exemption under 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1) is legally <br />
unsupported. They argued that the rule's subject matter--imposing fines <br />
on aliens--is purely domestic enforcement activity that neither <br />
regulates nor directly impacts foreign affairs. Additionally, these <br />
commenters challenged the Departments' assertion that the rule supports <br />
U.S. foreign policy negotiations as vague, too attenuated, and <br />
overbroad. One commenter said that under the Departments' reasoning, <br />
nearly any domestic policy that ``comes up in negotiations with a <br />
foreign country'' could be exempt from notice and comment. The other <br />
commenter claimed that the Departments invoked the exception in bad <br />
faith, arguing that traditional examples of rules meeting the foreign <br />
affairs exemption involve rules relating to international trade and <br />
visa issuance.<br />
    One commenter suggested that the Departments did not demonstrate an <br />
immediate foreign affairs need to bypass the APA's notice and comment <br />
and delayed-effective-date requirements, noting that the fines covered <br />
by the IFR have been codified in law for years but only rarely used by <br />
DHS. The commenter also took issue with the Departments' assertion that <br />
immediate action is needed to address the shared problem of irregular <br />
migration to the southern border. The commenter asserted that the IFR <br />
will not have an appreciable impact on border operations because the <br />
Administration has already ``shutdown asylum process at the Southern <br />
border'' and the IFR is primarily targeted at aliens who are already <br />
illegally present within the United States.<br />
    Response: The IFR is excepted from the APA's notice-and-comment and <br />
delayed-effective-date requirements because it involves a ``foreign <br />
affairs function of the United States.'' 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1). As an <br />
initial matter, contrary to one commenter's claim, the foreign affairs <br />
exception is not limited to rules relating to international trade and <br />
visa issuance. The Supreme Court has never determined what constitutes <br />
a ``foreign affairs function of the United States.'' Lower federal <br />
courts have held that this exception applies when the rule in question <br />
is ``clearly and directly<br />
<br />
[[Page 65427]]<br />
<br />
involve[d]'' in ``a foreign affairs function.'' E.B. v. U.S. Dep't of <br />
State, 583 F. Supp. 3d 58, 63 (D.D.C. 2022) (cleaned up). In addition, <br />
although the text of the APA does not require an agency invoking this <br />
exception to show that such procedures may result in ``definitely <br />
undesirable international consequences,'' some courts have required <br />
such a showing. See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. <br />
2008) (quotation marks omitted). The IFR satisfies both standards. Even <br />
though the Departments issued an IFR, an opportunity for public comment <br />
after issuing the IFR was provided and this final rule responds to <br />
those comments. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul <br />
Home, 591 U.S. 657, 683-84 (2020).<br />
    The Departments disagree with commenters' assertions that the IFR <br />
involves only domestic immigration enforcement and thus does not <br />
directly impact foreign affairs. First, as discussed in the IFR, the <br />
rule is directly and clearly connected to a foreign affairs function of <br />
the United States because it supports this Administration's efforts to <br />
address the shared international challenge of border security and <br />
illegal migration. The Secretary of State has made clear that <br />
``securing America's borders and protecting its citizens from external <br />
threats is the first priority foreign affairs function of the United <br />
States,'' In this regard, the United States continues to work closely <br />
with foreign partner countries to address migration in the Western <br />
Hemisphere region to secure America's borders and protect its citizens, <br />
and this rule is clearly and directly related to, and responsive to, <br />
the United States efforts in this regard. Specifically, the IFR and <br />
this rule are intended to allow DHS to streamline and maximize its use <br />
of civil penalties against aliens who are apprehended entering or enter <br />
unlawfully at the southern border. DHS believes that this additional <br />
tool will allow it to discourage, prepare for, and respond to unlawful <br />
migration by increasing the consequences on aliens who make the <br />
dangerous journey to the United States and enter unlawfully. Therefore, <br />
measures like the IFR advance the United States' foreign policy <br />
objectives by demonstrating to partner countries that the United States <br />
is serious about the shared problem of irregular migration and border <br />
security and that the Administration is doing its part to address these <br />
challenges by using all available tools even if they originate from <br />
U.S. law. Further, the Departments disagree with one commenter's <br />
suggestion that the Departments invoked the exemption in ``bad faith.'' <br />
To the contrary, the Departments have relied on the foreign affairs <br />
exception, under several Administrations, when issuing rules designed <br />
to help address the shared international challenge of migration to the <br />
United States southern border.\56\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \56\ See e.g., Securing the Border, 89 FR 48710, 48759-62 (June <br />
7, 2024); see also Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, <br />
84 FR 33829, 33842 (June 16, 2019).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    The Departments acknowledge that this rule also applies to aliens <br />
in the interior of the United States who have violated the immigration <br />
laws by failing to depart after a removal or voluntary departure. The <br />
Departments disagree, however, that the problem that the IFR seeks to <br />
address is purely a domestic one. Rather, as explained in the IFR, the <br />
United States' ability to address the challenge of aliens remaining in <br />
the country unlawfully after removal and departure orders depends in <br />
part on the willingness of other nations to accept the return and <br />
repatriation of their citizens from the United States. Contrary to <br />
commenters' claims, the Departments have provided concrete examples of <br />
the United States' foreign negotiations and efforts aimed at <br />
encouraging other countries to support the return of their citizens, <br />
including those with outstanding removal and voluntary departure <br />
orders. See 90 FR 27455. These efforts include encouraging other <br />
countries to promptly issue travels documents that allow their <br />
residents to return home, and more broadly to cooperate with DHS's <br />
efforts to successfully implement Presidential Proclamation 10935, <br />
Establishing Project Homecoming, 90 FR 20357 (May 9, 2025), which <br />
provides aliens with a process to voluntarily depart the United States <br />
and return to their home countries. See 90 FR 27455-56. All of these <br />
efforts indicate that the removal and voluntary return of aliens with <br />
no legal right to remain in the United States is a critical foreign <br />
policy objective of the United States. For these foreign policy efforts <br />
to continue to succeed, DHS must continue to demonstrate its own <br />
commitment to this foreign policy objective, including by encouraging <br />
aliens to take advantage of these expanded opportunities that the <br />
United States Government has secured through international efforts. The <br />
IFR directly and clearly serves this purpose by incentivizing aliens to <br />
comply with departure obligations, including through these expanded <br />
departure options, and by imposing consequences on those who fail to <br />
depart.<br />
    In addition to the IFR's clear and direct involvement in foreign <br />
affairs, the Departments believed that issuing the rule after notice <br />
and comment, and with a delayed effective date, could have led to <br />
definitely undesirable international consequences. As discussed in the <br />
IFR, these consequences include negative impacts to border security, <br />
which is a shared regional problem, and DHS's inability to capitalize <br />
on the momentum that the United States Government had achieved in <br />
encouraging countries to support the return of their citizens, <br />
including those with outstanding removal and departure orders. In this <br />
regard, the Departments disagree with commenters that claimed that the <br />
Departments did not demonstrate an immediate need for the IFR because <br />
this Administration's asylum policies at the southern border had <br />
already reduced irregular border encounters. The IFR acknowledged that <br />
encounters between POEs at the southern border had decreased <br />
significantly from their historic highs under the prior Administration. <br />
See 90 FR 27455. The Departments explained, however, that the IFR would <br />
help DHS to continue to build on the then-recent progress that DHS had <br />
achieved at the southern border. See 90 FR 27446, 27455-56. The <br />
Departments note that DHS was encountering nearly 1,000 aliens per day <br />
at the southern border only six months prior to the IFR's publication <br />
and nearly 2,000 aliens per day between June and December 2024.\57\ <br />
Therefore, although encounter numbers had declined when the IFR was <br />
issued in large part due to the Administration's border policies, DHS <br />
reasonably believed at the time that there was a substantial risk that, <br />
without additional tools in place at the southern border encounters, <br />
like this IFR, encounters could once again increase.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \57\ See Nationwide Encounters, U.S. Customs and Border <br />
Protection (Sept. 16, 2026), &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters&quot;&gt;https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/nationwide-encounters&lt;/a&gt; (select Region: ``US SW Land Border'' and <br />
Component: U.S. Border Patrol).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Further, the Departments also disagree with the claim that the <br />
Departments did not demonstrate an immediate need to implement the rule <br />
under the foreign affairs exception because these civil monetary <br />
penalties have been authorized for many years but rarely used, and DHS <br />
has mainly applied them to aliens in the interior. As an initial <br />
matter, regardless of the past administrations' policies, this <br />
Administration has made clear that that the rapid return of illegal <br />
aliens to their home countries is a critical foreign policy objective <br />
of the United States and<br />
<br />
[[Page 65428]]<br />
<br />
it has conducted its recent foreign policy efforts consistent with this <br />
objective. In the months prior to issuing this IFR, the Administration <br />
had been engaged in discussions with several countries aimed at <br />
ensuring that those countries promptly issue travels documents to <br />
facilitate the return of their nationals. Moreover, in the weeks prior <br />
to issuing the IFR, the President directed the Secretary of State and <br />
the Secretary of Homeland to take all appropriate ``actions to enable <br />
the rapid departure of illegal aliens from the United States'' \58\ <br />
including assisting aliens with obtaining travel documents or <br />
relocating to another country and providing financial incentives and <br />
support to such aliens. The President also directed the Secretaries to <br />
notify aliens that should they choose not to take advantage of these <br />
incentives they will face consequences, including civil fines covered <br />
by this rule.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \58\ Proclamation 10935, 90 FR 20357, 20357 (May 9, 2025).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    In light of these efforts, the Departments explained that by <br />
issuing the IFR immediately DHS would be able to capitalize on these <br />
recent foreign policy efforts by encouraging aliens, through the use of <br />
civil penalties, to take advantage of these expanded opportunities <br />
achieved through international discussions and cooperation, to depart <br />
the United States. The Departments also explained that the IFR would <br />
allow the U.S. Government to build on this foreign policy momentum by <br />
demonstrating to other countries that it is committed to using all <br />
necessary tools to facilitate the rapid departure of illegal aliens and <br />
that other nations should support the Administration's continued <br />
efforts to achieve this objective. Quite simply, if the United States <br />
is unable to demonstrate, through measures like the IFR, that it is <br />
committed to taking quick and robust action to remove aliens and <br />
encourage them to depart the United States voluntarily, which depends <br />
in large part on international cooperation, countries may be less <br />
inclined to engage with the United States on these ongoing efforts in <br />
the future. Accordingly, the Departments believe that, contrary to <br />
commenters' claim, immediate issuance of this rule was appropriate and <br />
necessary to avoid undesirable international consequences.<br />
iii. Good Cause<br />
    Commenters also argued that the Departments lacked good cause to <br />
make the IFR effective immediately upon publication, and one commenter <br />
asserted that the Departments improperly invoked the good cause <br />
exception under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) to issue and immediately implement <br />
the IFR without prior notice and comment. Commenters argued that the <br />
IFR does not respond to sudden or unforeseeable emergency, and any need <br />
for the IFR was an emergency of DHS's own making--i.e., DHS's own <br />
decision to restart issuing civil penalty program despite previously <br />
ending that program in 2021 after determining that civil penalties were <br />
ineffective and legally vulnerable. Commenters also argued that the <br />
public burden imposed by immediate implementation, particularly on <br />
immigrant communities and service providers far outweighs any <br />
government benefit from accelerating enforcement.<br />
    Response: As an initial matter, the Departments note that the IFR <br />
did not invoke good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) to dispense with <br />
notice and comment. Rather, the Departments issued the IFR under the <br />
procedural rule exception under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A) and the foreign <br />
affairs exception under 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1) and invoked good cause under <br />
5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) solely to make the rule effective upon publication. <br />
Section 553(d)(3) permits an agency to waive the standard 30-day <br />
delayed-effective-date requirement when it finds good cause for the <br />
rule to take immediate effect, balancing the agency's need for <br />
immediate implementation against affected persons' need for a <br />
reasonable amount of time to prepare for the effective date of its <br />
ruling. As explained in the IFR and reaffirmed here, the Departments <br />
determined that the ordinary reason for delay in a rule's effective <br />
date, to give members of the regulated community time to prepare and <br />
adjust their behavior, does not apply here because the IFR does not <br />
affect any person's substantive rights. Rather, it merely modifies the <br />
manner in which DHS issues and adjudicates civil monetary penalties and <br />
how an alien may contest such penalties. Moreover, the Departments <br />
found that the benefits of immediate implementation, ensuring <br />
uniformity, and administrative efficiency in the imposition and <br />
collection of civil monetary penalties, outweighed any need for <br />
affected parties to prepare for the effective date and adjust their <br />
behavior accordingly as this rule does not affect substantive right. <br />
Thus, the Departments conclude that invocation of the good cause under <br />
553(d)(3) was lawful and appropriate.<br />
iv. Comment Period Duration<br />
    Comment: Commenters argued that the 30-day post-promulgation <br />
comment window was inadequate given the breadth and complexity of the <br />
rule, which alters established practices related to assessing and <br />
collecting civil penalties under the three INA provisions. Commenters <br />
also cited Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR <br />
51735, 51740, directing agencies to ``afford the public a meaningful <br />
opportunity to comment on any proposed regulation, which in most cases <br />
should include a comment period of not less than 60 days'' and argued <br />
that the abbreviated timeframe prevented comprehensive analysis of the <br />
rule's many substantive changes.<br />
    Response: As an initial matter, commenters did not suggest or <br />
indicate what additional issues the comment period precluded them from <br />
addressing; to the contrary, the comments received reflect both a <br />
breadth and a level of detail which suggests that the period was more <br />
than sufficient. Cf. City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 246 (D.C. <br />
Cir. 2003) (``In [showing prejudice] in the context of a violation of <br />
notice-and-comment requirements, petitioners may be required to <br />
demonstrate that, had proper notice been provided, they would have <br />
submitted additional, different comments that could have invalidated <br />
the rationale for the revised rule.'').<br />
    The APA does not prescribe any specific minimum duration for public <br />
comment periods. While agencies often provide a 30-day period for <br />
proposed rules, and sometimes longer for complex or economically <br />
significant rulemakings, the statute simply requires that agencies <br />
generally afford interested parties an opportunity to participate <br />
through submission of written data, views, or arguments.<br />
    Although not required to do so, the Departments nonetheless <br />
provided a 30-day comment period following publication of the IFR on <br />
June 27, 2025, accepting comments through July 28, 2025. That period <br />
afforded the public a meaningful opportunity to review the IFR and <br />
provide input. Indeed, federal courts have presumed 30 days to be a <br />
reasonable comment period length. See Nat'l Lifeline ***'n v. Fed. <br />
Commc'ns Comm'n, 921 F.3d 1102, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Here, the <br />
detailed public comments the Departments received are evidence that the <br />
30-day period was sufficient for the public to meaningfully review and <br />
provide informed comments. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Saints <br />
Peter and Paul Home, 140 S. Ct. at 2385 (``The object [of notice and <br />
comment], in short, is one of fair notice.'') (citation omitted).<br />
    The Departments received and carefully considered all timely <br />
submissions. Providing a 30-day<br />
<br />
[[Page 65429]]<br />
<br />
window for comments on a rule of limited procedural scope is consistent <br />
with longstanding administrative practice and the guidance reflected in <br />
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563, which encourage agencies to provide <br />
meaningful participation. The Departments' post-promulgation comment <br />
process thus satisfied the APA's requirements and furthered its <br />
purposes of transparency and public involvement, even though prior <br />
notice and comment were not legally required under 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1) <br />
and (b)(A).<br />
2. E.O. 12866 Analysis<br />
    Comment: One commenter asserted that the IFR would impose <br />
substantial new economic burdens on affected aliens and their <br />
households, with potentially significant aggregate impacts. They <br />
contended that the IFR's increased and accelerated civil monetary <br />
penalties, particularly daily fines approaching $1,000 for failure to <br />
depart following a final order of removal, could result in liabilities <br />
large enough to cause long-term financial hardship, including wage <br />
garnishment, asset seizure, and bankruptcy. They further stated that <br />
these costs would likely fall disproportionately on low-income <br />
individuals and mixed-status families, potentially creating spillover <br />
effects for U.S. citizen spouses and children and exacerbating economic <br />
insecurity in immigrant communities. The commenter also argued that the <br />
IFR may generate billions of dollars in annual penalties, and that <br />
DHS's retention of penalty revenues could create institutional <br />
incentives to maximize fine issuance. They maintained that the IFR was <br />
implemented without sufficient economic analysis or public input and <br />
recommend alternatives such as means-based penalties, hardship waivers, <br />
or installment plans, independent review mechanisms, and pilot <br />
implementation to evaluate real world economic effects before <br />
nationwide implementation.<br />
    Response: The Departments do not agree that this rule needs <br />
additional economic analysis or that it was adopted without considering <br />
financial impacts. As previously discussed, the rule does not create <br />
any new fines, change who can be fined, or increase the dollar amounts <br />
Congress has already set; it only changes the internal process DHS uses <br />
to issue and review those fines. Any financial hardship, including <br />
possible collection actions, comes from the underlying law and from an <br />
alien's choice to remain in the United States after being ordered to <br />
leave, not from these procedural updates. DHS's goal is to encourage <br />
people to follow removal and departure orders and to deter unlawful <br />
entry, not to generate revenue, and DHS will cancel most failure to <br />
depart fines when eligible aliens use the CBP Home app to leave the <br />
country. OMB has reviewed the rule as significant under Executive Order <br />
12866. DHS has weighed the limited added economic effects of these <br />
process changes against their enforcement benefits, and the Departments <br />
provided a 30-day comment period and considered economic and other <br />
feedback before finalizing the rule.<br />
<br />
IV. Severability<br />
<br />
    The changes made by the IFR, as amended by this final rule, impact <br />
provisions that are not necessarily interrelated and can function <br />
independent of one another. As such, the Departments believe that most <br />
of the provisions of this final rule can function sensibly and <br />
independently of other provisions. Therefore, in the event that any <br />
provisions in this rule are invalidated by a reviewing court, the <br />
Departments intend the remaining provisions to remain in effect to the <br />
fullest extent possible.<br />
<br />
V. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements<br />
<br />
A. Administrative Procedure Act<br />
<br />
    The Departments have determined that this rule can take immediate <br />
effect notwithstanding the 30-day delayed effective date requirement in <br />
5 U.S.C. 553(d).<br />
    Generally, there is good cause for this rule to take immediate <br />
effect. See 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3). This rule generally adopts the <br />
provisions of the IFR, with one change to help mitigate the potential <br />
effect of mail delays that could impact the amount of time an alien has <br />
to contest a civil penalty. See 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(1) (excepting from the <br />
delayed effective date requirements substantive rules that grant or <br />
recognize an exemption or relieve a restriction). The purpose of the <br />
30-day waiting period is ``to give affected parties time to adjust <br />
their behavior before the final rule takes effect.'' Riverbend Farms, <br />
Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1485 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, however, <br />
that purpose would not be served by delaying the effective date of this <br />
final rule or the rule's amendment to account for mail delays because <br />
the public does not need advanced notice in order to conform their <br />
behavior to the rule.<br />
    This final rule largely adopts the provisions of the IFR, which <br />
took effect on June 27, 2025. Consequently, aliens and legal service <br />
providers who may represent such aliens have long been on notice of <br />
those procedures and processes this rule adopts. See United States v. <br />
Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1104 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that the <br />
``legislative history of the APA'' indicates that the waiting period <br />
``was not intended to unduly hamper agencies from making a rule <br />
effective immediately,'' but intended ``to `afford persons affected a <br />
reasonable time to prepare for the effective date of a rule . . . or to <br />
take other action which the issuance may prompt' '' (citing S. Rep. No. <br />
752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1946); H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., <br />
2d Sess. 25 (1946))). Indeed, the Departments have consistently <br />
communicated an intent to finalize the IFR.\59\ The fact that the IFR's <br />
effective date was recently stayed \60\ does not change the <br />
Departments' determination--the brief period between the entry of the <br />
stay on October 5, 2026, and October 14, 2026, does not alter the fact <br />
that the public operated under the rule's provisions for more than a <br />
year and has long been on notice of the Departments' intent to make <br />
them final.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \59\ See 2026 Unified Agenda, RIN 1653-AA96, Imposition and <br />
Collection of Civil Penalties for Certain Immigration-Related <br />
Violations, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202510&amp;amp;RIN=1653-AA96&quot;&gt;https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202510&amp;amp;RIN=1653-AA96&lt;/a&gt; [&lt;a href=&quot;https://perma.cc/T87D-AN6A&quot;&gt;https://perma.cc/T87D-AN6A&lt;/a&gt;] (showing August 2026 as the expected timeline for publication <br />
of this final rule); Def.'s Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. to Compel, Maria L. <br />
v. Mullin, No. 1:25-cv-13471 (DDC filed May 11, 2026), dkt. 69 <br />
(``Third, the Interim Final Rule (``IFR'') Plaintiffs challenge is <br />
currently the subject of ongoing final rulemaking. The agencies are <br />
reviewing comments, including the comment Plaintiff Immigration <br />
Legal Resource Center (``ILRC'') submitted, and will issue a final <br />
rule in due course.'').<br />
    \60\ See Maria L. v. Mullin, No. CV 25-13471-GAO, 2026 WL <br />
2983111 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2026).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    Similarly, the change this final rule makes does not alter the <br />
calculus merely because it has not been part of the status quo under <br />
the IFR for the past year. The minor amendment is designed to benefit <br />
aliens by recognizing that an alien's untimely appeal may nonetheless <br />
be accepted if the late appeal was caused by a mail delay. See 5 U.S.C. <br />
553(d)(1). Even so, it relates solely to agency procedure and practice <br />
and thus is not subject to the 30-day effective date for ``substantive <br />
rule[s]'' under 5 U.S.C. 553(d). The procedural rule exception ``covers <br />
agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interests of <br />
parties, although it may alter the manner in which the parties present <br />
themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.'' JEM Broad. Co., Inc. v. <br />
FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Batterton v. Marshall, <br />
648 F.2d 694, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Mendoza v. Perez, 54 F.3d <br />
1002, 1023-24 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The amendment in this final rule<br />
<br />
[[Page 65430]]<br />
<br />
does not change an alien's right to appeal a penalty under the IFR's <br />
15-business day appeal deadline and therefore ``impose[s] no new <br />
substantive obligations or burdens upon the parties' rights and <br />
interests.'' Am. Fed'n of Lab. &amp;amp; Cong. of Indus. Organizations v. Nat'l <br />
Lab. Rels. Bd., 57 F.4th 1023, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting EPIC v. <br />
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011).\61\ <br />
Rather, while the amendment directs aliens to provide evidence of a <br />
mail delay in connection with an untimely appeal, this simply <br />
establishes a clear process for the agency to evaluate such a claim. <br />
Therefore, this evidentiary requirement is merely a procedural step, <br />
not a substantive change to the right to appeal itself.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \61\ The Departments further maintain that the 15-day appeal <br />
deadline is likewise a procedural change, rather than a substantive <br />
one, for the reasons explained in the IFR. 90 FR 27454.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    In finding good cause to bypass the 30-day delayed effective date <br />
requirement, the Departments have ``balanc[ed] the necessity for <br />
immediate implementation against principles of fundamental fairness <br />
which require that all affected persons be afforded a reasonable <br />
[amount of] time to prepare for the effective date of [the rule].'' <br />
Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citation <br />
omitted). Here, the balance tips sharply in favor of immediate <br />
implementation. The United States Government and the American people <br />
have a strong interest in making the final rule effective immediately <br />
to ensure that DHS can continue implementing the IFR's provisions. As <br />
discussed in Section I.B. of this preamble, the IFR has reduced agency <br />
resource burdens by streamlining the civil penalty process and has <br />
allowed DHS to exercise its statutorily authorized civil penalty <br />
authority at scale in response to the large number of aliens who have <br />
unlawfully entered the United States or have failed to comply with <br />
removal and voluntary departure orders in recent years. In turn, this <br />
has allowed DHS to encourage greater compliance with such orders and <br />
provides DHS with another tool to disincentive future unlawful entries <br />
at the border.<br />
<br />
B. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review)<br />
<br />
    Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR 51735 <br />
(Sept. 30, 1993), and Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and <br />
Regulatory Review, 76 FR 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011), direct agencies to <br />
assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, <br />
if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that <br />
maximize net benefits. The Office of Management and Budget has <br />
determined this rule is significant under Executive Order 12866.<br />
    This final rule will allow DHS to more quickly impose a greater <br />
number of civil penalties on aliens who have unlawfully entered the <br />
United States and those who remain after a removal or voluntary <br />
departure order. DHS has not assessed the extent to which this final <br />
rule will result in an increase in civil penalties collected by the <br />
Government. DHS believes that this effort will reduce potential agency <br />
resource burdens by streamlining the process, discourage future <br />
unlawful entries, and encourage greater compliance with removal and <br />
departure orders.<br />
<br />
C. Executive Order 14192 (Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation)<br />
<br />
    This final rule is not an Executive Order 14192 regulatory action <br />
because it is being issued with respect to an immigration-related <br />
function of the United States. The rule's primary direct purpose is to <br />
implement or interpret the immigration laws of the United States (as <br />
described in section 101(a)(17) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(17)) or <br />
any other function performed by the United States Federal Government <br />
with respect to aliens. See OMB Memorandum M-25-20, Guidance <br />
Implementing Section 3 of Executive Order 14192, titled ``Unleashing <br />
Prosperity Through Deregulation'' at 5-6 (Mar. 26, 2025).<br />
<br />
D. Regulatory Flexibility Act<br />
<br />
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (``RFA''), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, <br />
as amended, requires federal agencies to consider the potential impact <br />
of regulations on small entities during rulemaking. A regulatory <br />
flexibility analysis is not required when a rule is exempt from notice-<br />
and-comment rulemaking. This final rule finalizes an IFR that was <br />
exempt from the notice-and-comment rulemaking. Therefore, a regulatory <br />
flexibility analysis is not required.<br />
    However, even assuming that this rule is not exempt from notice-<br />
and-comment procedures and therefore not exempt from the requirements <br />
of the RFA, the Departments have reviewed this rule in accordance with <br />
the RFA. The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Acting Director of <br />
EOIR certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact <br />
on a substantial number of small entities. See 5 U.S.C. 605(b).<br />
    First, aliens are not ``small entit[ies]'' as defined by the RFA. <br />
See 5 U.S.C. 601(6) (defining ``small entity'' as having the same <br />
meaning as ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small <br />
government jurisdiction'' as defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3)-(5)).<br />
    Second, to the extent that legal service organizations qualify as <br />
``small entities,'' any economic effects of this rule on such <br />
organizations would not be significant under the RFA. The rule will not <br />
economically impact representatives of aliens in contesting these <br />
penalties. It does not limit the fees they may charge or the number of <br />
cases a representative may ethically accept under the rules of <br />
professional responsibility. For example, the IFR's changes to the <br />
procedures for contesting a civil penalty do not change the overall <br />
requirement that aliens must respond to a civil penalty notice to <br />
challenge the penalty; rather the IFR simply changed the procedures for <br />
how that appeal is filed, in what time frame, and which U.S. Government <br />
officials are responsible for adjudicating the appeal. The IFR's <br />
changes to shorten the appeal period required legal service providers <br />
to adjust to these new timelines. The Departments expect, however, that <br />
legal service organizations have quickly acclimated to this change <br />
without substantial disruption. Indeed, the IFR was in effect for over <br />
a year, and the appeal rate increased under the IFR compared to the <br />
pre-IFR process for these civil penalties under 8 CFR part 280. Thus, <br />
any costs incurred in adapting to the IFR's timelines were not <br />
significant under the RFA. And the one change in this final rule to the <br />
IFR's provisions is not expected to increase such costs significantly <br />
(if at all) given that it discretely applies to demonstrated mail <br />
delays.<br />
    In any event, this rule does not limit or otherwise dictate the <br />
fees that legal service providers may charge or the number of civil <br />
penalty cases the organization may ethically and competently accept. <br />
See Mid-Tex Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. FERC, 773 F.2d 327, 342-43 (D.C. Cir. <br />
1985) (concluding ``an agency may properly certify that no regulatory <br />
flexibility analysis is necessary when it determines that the rule will <br />
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small <br />
entities that are subject to the requirements of the rule'' and stating <br />
that legislative history of the RFA ``gives rise to an inference that <br />
Congress did not intend to require that every agency consider every <br />
indirect effect that any regulation might have on small businesses in <br />
any stratum of the national economy'').<br />
    Moreover, any effects this rule may have on legal service <br />
organizations, other representatives of aliens, or other entities that <br />
provide services to aliens subject to civil penalty procedures are<br />
<br />
[[Page 65431]]<br />
<br />
indirect. The rule does not impose reporting, recordkeeping, staffing, <br />
fee, or other compliance requirements on those entities. Rather, it <br />
establishes procedures governing DHS's issuance and review of civil <br />
penalties and the process by which an alien may seek administrative <br />
review of a penalty determination. Although a legal service <br />
organization or other representative may choose to adjust its internal <br />
practices in response to procedures or timelines applicable to its <br />
clients, any such effects result from the entity's provision of <br />
services to affected aliens and not from a regulatory requirement <br />
imposed directly on that entity by this rule. The RFA does not require <br />
an agency to assess indirect effects on small entities that are not <br />
themselves subject to the rule's requirements. Accordingly, the <br />
Departments do not treat such indirect effects as regulatory compliance <br />
costs imposed on small entities by this rule.\62\<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \62\ See U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, <br />
A Guide for Government Agencies: How to Comply with the Regulatory <br />
Flexibility Act 22-23 (Aug. 2017), &lt;a href=&quot;https://advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/How-to-Comply-with-the-RFA.pdf&quot;&gt;https://advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/How-to-Comply-with-the-RFA.pdf&lt;/a&gt; (explaining <br />
that courts have held that the RFA requires analysis of impacts on <br />
small entities directly regulated by a rule, rather than indirect <br />
effects on entities that provide services to or otherwise interact <br />
with directly affected persons); Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc., 773 F.2d <br />
at 342-43; see also Am. Trucking ***'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, <br />
1044 (D.C. Cir. 1999).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
E. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995<br />
<br />
    This final rule would not result in the expenditure by State, <br />
local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private <br />
sector, of $100 million or more in any one year, and it will not <br />
significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no <br />
actions are deemed necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded <br />
Mandates Reform Act of 1995.<br />
<br />
F. Congressional Review Act<br />
<br />
    This final rule is not a ``rule'' as defined by the Congressional <br />
Review Act, Public Law 104-121. See 5 U.S.C. 804(3)(C) (defining the <br />
term ``rule'' to exclude ``any rule of agency organization, procedure, <br />
or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or <br />
obligations of non-agency parties''). The Departments will nonetheless <br />
submit this final rule to both houses of Congress and the Comptroller <br />
General before the rule takes effect.<br />
<br />
G. Privacy Act<br />
<br />
    In accordance with the Privacy Act of 1974, DHS/ICE-011 Criminal <br />
Arrest Records and Immigration Enforcement Records (CARIER) System of <br />
Records Notice provides privacy coverage supporting the final rule <br />
consistent with system purpose (``To track the process and results of <br />
administrative and criminal proceedings, including compliance with <br />
court orders and hearing dates, against individuals who are alleged to <br />
have violated the INA or other laws enforced by DHS'') and categories <br />
of records in the system. 89 FR 55638 (July 5, 2024).<br />
    Additionally, DHS/CBP-023 Border Patrol Enforcement Records, System <br />
of Records Notice provides coverage supporting the final rule <br />
consistent with system purpose (``Enforcement-related data including: <br />
Case number, record number, and other data describing an event <br />
involving alleged violations of criminal, immigration, or other laws <br />
(location, date, time, event category, types of criminal or immigration <br />
law violations alleged, types of property involved, use of violence, <br />
weapons, or assault against DHS personnel or third parties, attempted <br />
escape, and other related information); CBP encounter management <br />
information, including: Category (event categories describe broad <br />
categories of criminal law enforcement, such as smuggling and human <br />
trafficking), agent or officer, location of officer or officer's <br />
vehicle, date/time initiated, date/time completed, assets used for <br />
encounter (bike, horse, vehicle, etc.), results of the encounter, and <br />
any agent or officer notes and comments.''), 81 FR 72601 (Oct. 20, <br />
2016).<br />
<br />
H. National Environmental Policy Act<br />
<br />
    DHS and its components analyze final actions to determine whether <br />
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (``NEPA''), 42 U.S.C. <br />
4321 et seq., applies to them and, if so, what degree of analysis is <br />
required. DHS Directive 023-01 Rev. 01 \63\ and Instruction Manual 023-<br />
01-001-01 Rev. 01 (``Instruction Manual'') establish the policies and <br />
procedures that DHS and its components use to comply with NEPA.<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    \63\ DHS, Implementation of the National Environmental Policy <br />
Act, Directive 023-01, Revision 01 (Oct. 31, 2014).<br />
---------------------------------------------------------------------------<br />
<br />
    NEPA allows Federal agencies to establish categories of actions <br />
(``categorical exclusions'') that experience has shown do not, <br />
individually or cumulatively, have a significant effect on the human <br />
environment and, therefore, do not require an environmental assessment <br />
(``EA'') or environmental impact statement (``EIS''). An agency is not <br />
required to prepare an EA or EIS for a proposed action ``if the <br />
proposed agency action is excluded pursuant to one of the agency's <br />
categorical exclusions.'' 42 U.S.C. 4336(a)(2). The Instruction Manual, <br />
Appendix A, lists the DHS Categorical Exclusions. For an action to be <br />
categorically excluded under DHS's Instruction Manual, the action must <br />
satisfy each of the following three conditions: (1) the entire action <br />
clearly fits within one or more of the categorical exclusions; (2) the <br />
action is not a piece of a larger action; and (3) no extraordinary <br />
circumstances exist that create the potential for a significant <br />
environmental effect.<br />
    This final rule is categorically excluded from DHS's NEPA <br />
implementing procedures, because it satisfies all three relevant <br />
conditions. First, the Departments have determined that the IFR fits <br />
clearly within categorical exclusions A3(a) of DHS's Instruction <br />
Manual, Appendix A, for the promulgation of rules of a ``strictly <br />
administrative or procedural nature.'' This final rule merely changes <br />
the procedures that DHS and DOJ apply when assessing civil monetary <br />
penalties authorized under certain sections of the INA. This change in <br />
procedures does not result in a change in their environmental effect. <br />
Second, this final rule is a standalone rule and is not part of any <br />
larger action. Third, the Departments are not aware of any <br />
extraordinary circumstances that would cause a significant <br />
environmental impact. Therefore, this final rule is categorically <br />
excluded, and no further NEPA analysis or documentation is required.<br />
<br />
I. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)<br />
<br />
    This final rule would not have substantial direct effects on the <br />
States, on the relationship between the national Government and the <br />
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the <br />
various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with section 6 <br />
of Executive Order 13132, the Departments believe that this FR would <br />
not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation <br />
of a federalism summary impact statement.<br />
<br />
J. Paperwork Reduction Act<br />
<br />
    This final rule does not impose any new reporting or recordkeeping <br />
requirements or call for a collection of information under the <br />
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.<br />
<br />
List of Subjects in 8 CFR Part 281<br />
<br />
    Administrative practice and procedure, Immigration, Penalties.<br />
<br />
[[Page 65432]]<br />
<br />
Amendments to the Regulations<br />
<br />
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY<br />
<br />
    Accordingly, the interim final rule amending 8 CFR part 281, which <br />
was published at 90 FR 27439 on June 27, 2025, is adopted as final with <br />
the following change:<br />
<br />
PART 281--IMPOSITION AND COLLECTION OF PENALTIES UNDER SECTIONS <br />
240B(d), 274D(a)(1), and 275(b) OF THE ACT<br />
<br />
0<br />
1. The authority citation for part 281 continues to read as follows:<br />
<br />
    Authority: 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1221, 1223, 1227, 1229, 1229c, 1253, <br />
1322, 1323, 1325, 1324d, 1330; 5 U.S.C. 301; Public Law 107-296, 116 <br />
Stat. 2135 (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.); 66 Stat. 173, 195, 197, 201, 203, <br />
212, 219, 221-223, 226, 227, 230; Pub. L. 101-410, 104 Stat. 890, as <br />
amended by Pub. L. 114-74, 129 Stat. 599.<br />
<br />
<br />
0<br />
2. Amend 281.1, by redesignating paragraphs (e)(2) through (e)(4) as <br />
(e)(3) through (e)(5) and adding new paragraph (e)(2) to read as <br />
follows:<br />
<br />
<br />
Sec.  281.1  Exclusive procedures for civil monetary penalties under <br />
sections 240B(d), 274D(a)(1), and 275(b) of the Act.<br />
<br />
* * * * *<br />
    (e) * * *<br />
    (2) Appeals affected by mail delay. An alien who files an appeal <br />
after the 15-business days filing period prescribed in paragraph (e)(1) <br />
of this section and asserts that the untimely filing resulted from <br />
delayed or untimely mail delivery of the immigration officer's decision <br />
must include with the appeal a written explanation and any available <br />
documentary evidence demonstrating the mail delay. An alien who files <br />
an appeal after the 15-business day filing period prescribed in <br />
paragraph (e)(1) of this section may also produce contemporaneous, <br />
time-stamped evidence of deposit of their mailed appeal directly from <br />
the U.S. Postal Service (``USPS'') or their chosen commercial carrier. <br />
If ICE determines that the appeal was filed after the deadline due to <br />
mail delay beyond the alien's control, ICE will accept the appeal as <br />
timely filed and consider it on the merits. In making this <br />
determination, ICE will consider the mailing and actual receipt dates, <br />
the cause and length of the delay, and the alien's good faith efforts <br />
in pursuing the appeal after receipt. ICE's determination will be case <br />
by case considering all evidence presented with the appeal.<br />
* * * * *<br />
<br />
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE<br />
<br />
0<br />
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, and by the <br />
authority invested in the Director, Executive Office for Immigration <br />
Review, the Attorney General Order Number 6260-2025, the interim final <br />
rule amending 8 CFR parts 1003 and 1280, which was published at 90 FR <br />
27439 on June 27, 2025, is adopted as final without change.<br />
<br />
Markwayne Mullin,<br />
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.<br />
<br />
Sirce E. Owen,<br />
Acting Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of <br />
Justice.<br />
[FR Doc. 2026-21024 Filed 10-9-26; 4:15 pm]<br />
BILLING CODE 9111-CB-P; 4410-30-P<br />
<br />
&lt;/pre&gt;]]></content:encoded>
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			<title>Oct 14 - CRS on El Salvador</title>
			<link>https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/recent-issues/645157-oct-14-crs-on-el-salvador</link>
			<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 13:47:07 GMT</pubDate>
			<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: CRS on El Salvador &lt;br&gt; 
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About 
CRS Report on El Salvador in Brief: Overview and U.S. Relations 
and more. Please scroll down to...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Comment: CRS on El Salvador &lt;br&gt;<br />
Today's Immigration Daily Issue Features Several Items of Interest, Including Articles, Blogging and News About<br />
CRS Report on El Salvador in Brief: Overview and U.S. Relations<br />
and more. Please scroll down to find the item(s) below.<br />
Please let us know your thoughts by writing to us at &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:editor@ilw.com&quot;&gt;editor@ilw.com&lt;/a&gt;<br />
&lt;/p&gt;<br />
<br />
&lt;!-- END Comment --&gt;<br />
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<br />
<br />
<br />
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://discuss.ilw.com/articles/news/645045-news-crs-report-on-el-salvador-in-brief-overview-and-u-s-relations&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;<br />
News: CRS Report on El Salvador in Brief: Overview and U.S. Relations<br />
<br />
&lt;br /&gt;<br />
&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;<br />
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&lt;p&gt;<br />
Headline: Trump again attacks Rep. Ilhan Omar, a US citizen, over immigration allegations<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://abcnews.com/Politics/trump-blasts-rep-ilhan-omar-position-us-citizen/story?id=137218882&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: Sotomayor, Gorsuch call out 'constitutional absurdity' in immigrant case<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2026/10/13/justices-call-out-double-jeopardy-in-immigration-case/2941791913744/&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: Texas DA says ICE intentionally hit immigrant with a car and may have withheld evidence<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/texas-da-says-ice-intentionally-hit-immigrant-car-may-withheld-evidenc-rcna603243&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: People Released From Immigration Detention Sue ICE for Refusing to Return Their Property<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.acludc.org/press-releases/people-released-from-immigration-detention-sue-ice-for-refusing-to-return-their-property/&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
Headline: United States: Trump Administration Again Proposes Elimination of Deference to Prior Approvals of Immigration Petitions<br />
&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fragomen.com/insights/united-states-trump-administration-again-proposes-elimination-of-deference-to-prior-approvals-of-immigration-petitions.html&quot; target =&quot;_blank&quot;&gt; Click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;<br />
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