Garcia-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States in June 2016 without proper documentation. She maintains that she fled Honduras with Kevin when gangs recruited Kevin and Garcia-Gonzalez’s nephew. That recruitment included kidnapping her nephew and repeatedly threatening to kill Kevin and Garcia-Gonzalez, among other acts of intimidation and violence directed at them and others in the community.

On appeal, Garcia-Gonzalez asserted primarily that the I.J.had not given her adequate notice of the consequences of failing to provide her bio-metrics on time. The BIA affirmed the I.J.’s decision, finding that the I.J.had properly informed her of the biometrics requirement. The BIA also noted that Garcia-Gonzalez did not allege IAC on appeal or provide evidence in accordance with Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 39 (B.I.A. 1988).

After the BIA’s denial, Garcia-Gonzalez retained a third attorney (also her current attorney): Raed Gonzalez. In late 2020, she moved the BIAto reopen her removal proceedings,4 claiming that both former attorneys were ineffective. She alleged that she had met the Lozada requirements; she asserted in the alternative that the BIA should reopen her case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).Almost two years later, the BIA denied her motion. It noted that an IAC claim requires not only compliance with Lozada’s evidentiary require-ments but also a showing of substantial prejudice, i.e., a prima facie showing that the applicant would have been entitled to relief absent IAC. See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638. The BIA, assuming arguendo that Garcia-Gonzalez had satisfied the Lozada evidentiary requirements, nevertheless determined that she had not made a prima facie showing on any of her claims. Garcia-Gonzalez’s asylum and withholding-of-removal claims, which were based on the gangs’ alleged persecution of Kevin’s nuclear family, failed because she had not presented any evidence that her son’s nuclear family was a cognizable PSG for purposes of asylum or withholding of removal.5

In particular, the BIA found that, while Kevin’s nuclear family “may be distinct within [Garcia-Gonzalez’s] community, she ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to conclude that this group is perceived, considered, or recognized as a group, as a whole, by Honduran society.” In other words, she did not show that Kevin’s nuclear family was viewed “as separate from the rest of the society in question.”

Next, the BIA determined that Garcia-Gonzalez did not make a prima facie showing that she was entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), because she did not provide evidence that she would be tortured or that the Honduran government would acquiesce in her torture.6Finally, the BIA declined to reopen the removal proceedings sua sponte, because Garcia-Gonzalez’s case was not an “exceptional situation” that would justify such relief.

The petition for review of the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen is DISMISSED in part for want of jurisdiction and DENIED in part.