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  • News: DOS Publishes Guidance On Iran Sanctions Act

    Federal Register, Volume 77 Issue 219 (Tuesday, November 13, 2012)
    [Federal Register Volume 77, Number 219 (Tuesday, November 13, 2012)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 67726-67731]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 2012-27642]
    
    
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    DEPARTMENT OF STATE
    
    [Public Notice 8086]
    
    
    Department of State: State Department Sanctions Information and 
    Guidance
    
    AGENCY: Department of State.
    
    ACTION: Policy guidance.
    
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    SUMMARY: The Department of State is publishing information and guidance 
    for the public addressing the State Department's sanctions authorities, 
    including under the Iran Sanctions Act, as amended, certain Executive 
    Orders related to Iran sanctions, section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran 
    Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) and 
    certain related provisions of law, and certain statutes and Executive 
    Orders related to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
    
    DATES: The Department of State will accept comments on the Guidance on 
    Iran Sanctions and the Guidance on Sensitive Technology until January 
    12, 2013.
    
    ADDRESSES: Interested parties may submit comments within 60 days of the 
    date of the publication by any email at sanctions@state.gov with the 
    subject line, ``Sanctions Guidance''.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Secretary of State has legal authority 
    to make determinations regarding sanctions on individuals and entities 
    that meet certain criteria in three areas that are important to the 
    national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States: 
    certain activities related to Iran; certain activities related to 
    weapons proliferation; and certain activities related to global 
    terrorism. This notice includes policy guidance outlining the State 
    Department's authorities under the Iran Sanctions Act, as amended, and 
    related Executive Orders (EOs); provides guidelines to further describe 
    the technologies that may be considered ``sensitive technology'' for 
    purposes of section 106 of CISADA, as required under section 412 of the 
    Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, and other 
    related provisions of law; and provides information on the State 
    Department's authorities under certain other EOs and statutory 
    provisions related to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
    
    I. Guidance on Iran Sanctions
    
        Iran Sanctions Act. Section 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 
    (ISA) (Pub. L. 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended, including by 
    the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 
    2010 (CISADA) (Pub. L. 111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 et seq.), and most 
    recently by the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 
    2012 (TRA) (Pub. L. 112-158), requires that the President impose or 
    waive sanctions on persons, and certain affiliated persons, that are 
    determined to have knowingly engaged in specified activities. The 
    President has delegated the responsibility to make these determinations 
    to the Secretary of State. As such, the Secretary of State is required 
    to impose or waive sanctions on persons, including certain affiliated 
    persons, that the Secretary of State determines have: (1) Made certain 
    investments in Iran's energy sector; (2) provided to Iran certain 
    goods, services, or technology for Iran's refined petroleum sector; (3) 
    provided certain refined petroleum products to Iran or provided goods, 
    services, technology, information, or support for refined petroleum 
    imports into Iran; (4) entered into certain types of joint ventures 
    involving the development of petroleum resources outside of Iran; (5) 
    contributed to the maintenance or enhancement of Iran's development of 
    petroleum resources and refined petroleum products; (6) contributed to 
    the maintenance or expansion of Iran's production of petrochemical 
    products; (7) been connected in certain ways with a vessel used to 
    transport crude oil from Iran (with certain exceptions made for 
    transactions related to the transportation of crude oil from Iran to 
    countries that the Secretary of State has determined qualified for an 
    exception to sanctions under section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the National 
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law 112-81, as 
    amended); or (8) been connected in certain ways with a vessel that 
    conceals the Iranian origin of the crude oil or refined petroleum 
    products.
        There is an exception, outlined in section 5(a)(9) of ISA, as 
    amended, to sanctions applicable to categories (7) and (8) above for 
    persons that provide underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance 
    if the Secretary of State determines that the person has exercised due 
    diligence in establishing and enforcing official policies, procedures, 
    and controls to ensure that the person does not provide underwriting 
    services or insurance or reinsurance for the transportation of crude 
    oil or refined petroleum products from Iran in a manner for which 
    sanctions may be imposed under either of those sections. In addition to 
    this exception, all persons involved in activities in high-risk sectors 
    should consider implementing enhanced due diligence in order to 
    minimize the risks of inadvertently becoming engaged in a sanctionable 
    transaction. This could include, but is not limited to, confirming that 
    transactions in these sectors do not involve an entity owned or 
    controlled by Iran or that Iran is not otherwise connected to any 
    entities in the commercial transactions, including by reviewing the 
    Office of Foreign Assets Control's Specially Designated Nationals and 
    Blocked Persons (SDN) List; searching commercial databases and 
    verifying ownership structures of unknown companies; and, in the case 
    of transportation or insurance of crude oil and petroleum products, 
    verifying that Iran is not the origin of the cargo. Persons with 
    questions on sections 5(a)(7)-(9) of ISA, as amended, should contact 
    the State Department's Office of Sanctions Policy and Implementation in 
    the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs at sanctions@state.gov">eb-iransanctions@state.gov or at: (202) 647-7489.
        Section 5(b) of ISA, as amended, requires the Secretary of State to 
    impose or waive sanctions on persons, and certain affiliated persons, 
    that are determined to have: (1) Exported or transferred goods, 
    services, technology, or other items that would contribute
    
    [[Page 67727]]
    
    materially to Iran's ability to acquire or develop chemical, 
    biological, or nuclear weapons, or destabilizing numbers and types of 
    advanced conventional weapons, or facilitated such activities; or (2) 
    entered into a joint venture involving Iran and activity relating to 
    the mining, production, or transportation of uranium.
        In addition to expanding the types of sanctionable activities under 
    ISA, the TRA added new sanctions that can be imposed under ISA. For 
    activities commenced on or after August 10, 2012, section 6 of ISA, as 
    amended, now permits the Secretary to choose from a list of 12 possible 
    sanctions; section 5(a) requires selection of at least five of these 
    sanctions. In addition, new section 5(a)(8)(B) of ISA, as amended, 
    which relates to concealing the Iranian origin of crude oil and refined 
    petroleum products, authorizes an additional sanction: prohibiting a 
    vessel owned, operated, or controlled by a person, including a 
    controlling beneficial owner, with respect to which the Secretary of 
    State has imposed sanctions, from landing at a port in the United 
    States for a period of not more than two years after the date on which 
    the Secretary of State imposes the sanction. If this sanction is chosen 
    by the Secretary of State, the Department of State would provide the 
    relevant information on sanctioned persons and vessels to the United 
    States Coast Guard's Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance and the 
    Captains of the Ports would inform the vessel that it is prohibited 
    from entering the United States for the prescribed period consistent 
    with the Secretary of State's decision under ISA, as amended.
        The other new sanctions, which are applicable to all sanctionable 
    activities outlined in ISA, as amended, and occurring on or after 
    August 10, 2012, are: (1) Prohibiting any U.S. person from investing in 
    or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of a 
    sanctioned person; (2) denying a visa to and excluding from the United 
    States any alien determined to be a corporate officer or principal of, 
    or a shareholder with a controlling interest in, a sanctioned person; 
    and (3) imposing on the principal executive officer or officers of any 
    sanctioned person, or on persons performing similar functions and with 
    similar authorities as such officer or officers, any of the sanctions 
    outlined in section 6(a) of ISA, as amended.
        Potential ISA sanctions that were already in place before the 
    enactment of TRA include: (1) Denying Export-Import Bank financing 
    assistance in connection with the export of goods or services to the 
    sanctioned person; (2) denying issuance of export licensing or other 
    authority to export any goods or technology to the sanctioned person; 
    (3) prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from making certain loans 
    or providing certain credits to the sanctioned person; (4) prohibiting 
    a sanctioned financial institution from acting as a primary dealer in 
    U.S. government debt instruments or serving as a repository of U.S. 
    government funds; (5) prohibiting U.S. government agencies from 
    procuring or entering into contracts for the procurement of any goods 
    or services from a sanctioned person; (6) prohibiting any transactions 
    in foreign exchange that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
    States and in which the sanctioned person has any interest; (7) 
    prohibiting transfers of credit or payments between financial 
    institutions or by, through, or to any financial institution if the 
    transactions are within the jurisdiction of the United States and 
    involve any interest of the sanctioned person; (8) blocking all 
    property and interests in the property of the sanctioned person that 
    are within the jurisdiction of the United States, and providing that 
    such property and interests in property may not be transferred, paid, 
    or otherwise dealt in; and (9) restricting or prohibiting imports of 
    goods, technology, or services into the United States from the 
    sanctioned person. In addition, section 5(b)(3) of ISA, as amended, 
    provides for additional sanctions relating to the transfer of nuclear 
    technology.
        The President initially delegated the authorities associated with 
    these sanctions to the Secretary of State, in consultation with various 
    other agencies, in 1996 (see 61 FR 64249 (Dec. 4, 1996)). Another 
    delegation was issued in 2010 when CISADA was enacted (see 75 FR 67025 
    (Nov. 1, 2010)), and Executive Order 13574 followed on May 23, 2011 
    (see 76 FR 30505 (May 25, 2011)). The most recent Presidential 
    delegation memorandum was issued on October 9, 2012, to address the 
    changes to ISA made by TRA (see 77 FR 62139 (Oct. 12, 2012)), along 
    with Executive Order 13628, issued on October 9, 2012 (see 77 FR 62139 
    (Oct. 12, 2012)). This most recent Presidential delegation memorandum 
    also delegated to the Secretary of State the President's authority 
    under section 212 of TRA, which draws on ISA authorities, to sanction 
    persons that knowingly provide underwriting services or insurance or 
    reinsurance for the National Iranian Oil Company, the National Iranian 
    Tanker Company, or a successor entity to either company. There is 
    authority to not impose sanctions under this provision with respect to 
    persons exercising due diligence in establishing and enforcing official 
    policies, procedures, and controls to ensure that such insurance is not 
    provided. There is also authority, under section 312(d) of the TRA, to 
    not impose sanctions with respect to transactions that are solely for 
    the purchase of petroleum or petroleum products and for which sanctions 
    may be imposed solely as a result of the involvement of NIOC or NITC in 
    the transactions, where the country receiving the petroleum or 
    petroleum products has been determined by the Secretary of State to 
    qualify for an exception to sanctions under section 1245(d)(4)(D) of 
    the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 
    112-81), as amended.
        For purposes of ISA, ``person'' means a natural person as well as a 
    corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, 
    financial institution, insurer, underwriter, guarantor, and any other 
    business organization, any other nongovernmental entity, organization, 
    or group, and any governmental entity operating as a business 
    enterprise, as well any successors to any such entities.
        Section 4 of ISA provides for a waiver of the application of 
    sanctions provisions under certain circumstances. Section 4 also 
    provides for the initiation of investigations and contains a ``Special 
    Rule'' outlining the circumstances under which an investigation may be 
    terminated or not initiated. In deciding whether to invoke the Special 
    Rule or take another step to mitigate sanctions such as a waiver under 
    this section, the State Department typically requires a letter 
    providing certain assurances and supporting documentation. More 
    information regarding what is specifically required is provided to 
    companies that seek to be considered for application of the Special 
    Rule. Section 7 of ISA provides authority for the Secretary of State to 
    issue advisory opinions, when specifically requested, with respect to 
    whether a proposed activity would subject a person to sanctions under 
    ISA. Section 9 of ISA, as amended, provides for delay of imposition of 
    sanctions or waiver in certain circumstances, and provides that a 
    sanction imposed under section 5 of ISA, as amended, shall remain in 
    effect for not less than two years or, if the Secretary of State 
    determines and certifies to the Congress that the sanctioned person is 
    no longer engaging in sanctionable activities and that the Secretary of 
    State has received reliable assurances that such person will
    
    [[Page 67728]]
    
    not knowingly engage in such activities in the future, for not less 
    than one year. Questions about implementation of ISA, as amended, can 
    be directed to the State Department's Office of Sanctions Policy and 
    Implementation in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs at sanctions@state.gov">eb-iransanctions@state.gov or at (202) 647-7489. A list of entities 
    sanctioned pursuant to section 5 of ISA, as amended, can be found at 
    www.state.gov/iransanctions.
        Executive Order 13590 (issued on November 20, 2011). EO 13590 
    provides for sanctions by the Secretary of State on persons knowingly 
    engaging in activities that could directly and significantly contribute 
    to the maintenance or enhancement of Iran's ability to develop 
    petroleum resources located in Iran, or the maintenance or expansion of 
    Iran's domestic production of petrochemical products, and on certain 
    affiliated persons. Entities involved in transactions in these sectors 
    are expected to conduct adequate due diligence to confirm that 
    transactions do not involve an entity owned or controlled by Iran or 
    that Iran is not otherwise connected to any entities in the commercial 
    transactions.
        For purposes of the Executive Orders addressed in this guidance the 
    term ``person'' means an individual or entity. For purposes of 
    Executive Orders and statutes addressed in this guidance, the following 
    definitions apply:
         ``Petroleum'' (also known as crude oil) means a mixture of 
    hydrocarbons that exists in liquid phase in natural underground 
    reservoirs and remains liquid at atmospheric pressure after passing 
    through surface separating facilities;
         ``Petroleum products'' includes unfinished oils, liquefied 
    petroleum gases, pentanes plus, aviation gasoline, motor gasoline, 
    naptha-type jet fuel, kerosene-type jet fuel, kerosene, distillate fuel 
    oil, residual fuel oil, petrochemical feedstocks, special naphthas, 
    lubricants, waxes, petroleum coke, asphalt, road oil, still gas, and 
    miscellaneous products obtained from the processing of: crude oil 
    (including lease condensate), natural gas, and other hydrocarbon 
    compounds. The term does not include natural gas, liquefied natural 
    gas, biofuels, methanol, and other non-petroleum fuels. Since enactment 
    of section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
    Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112-81), questions have been raised about some other 
    specific products and whether they would fall under this definition. 
    The following additional products are considered petroleum products for 
    the purposes of this guidance: condensates (occurring naturally or 
    derived from the processing of petroleum or natural gas), and liquefied 
    petroleum gases (LPGs) including propane and butane. This list, 
    however, is not exhaustive and other products not on this list that 
    fall under the definition above remain potentially sanctionable.
         ``Petrochemical products'' includes any aromatic, olefin, 
    and synthesis gas, and any of their derivatives, including ethylene, 
    propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, ammonia, methanol, and 
    urea. Since the issuance of E.O. 13590, questions have been raised 
    about some other specific products and whether they would fall under 
    this definition. The following additional products are considered 
    petrochemical products for the purposes of this guidance: butene, 
    ethylhexanol, acetic acid, acrylonitrile butadiene styrene, alachlor, 
    ammonium nitrate, ammonium sulfate, anhydrous ammonia, argon, 
    butachlor, C2+, C3+, C4 cut, chlorinated paraffin, chlorine, 
    chloracetyl chloride, citric acid, diammonium phosphate, 
    diethanolamine, ethylene glycol, diethylene glycol, dioctyl phthalate, 
    dodecycle benzene, ethane, ethoxylates, ethylbenzene, ethylene 
    dichloride, ethylene glycol, ethylene oxide, heavy alkyl benzene, high 
    density polyethylene, hydrochloric acid, isoprene, linear alkyl 
    benzene, linear low density polyethylene, low density polyethylene, 
    melamine, methyl tertiary butyl ether, methylene diphenyl diisocyanate, 
    mid density polyethylene, monoethanolamine, monoethylene glycol, nitric 
    acid, nitrogen, orthoxylene, paraxylene, pentene, perchlorine, 
    phosphoric acid, phthalic anhydride, polybutadiene, polyethylene 
    terephthalate, polypropylene, polystyrene, polyvinyl chloride, 
    propylene, purified terephthalic acid, pyrolysis gasoline, raffinate, 
    soda ash, sodium bicarbonate, sodium carbonate, sodium chloride, sodium 
    hydroxide, sodium hypochlorite, styrene, tyrene acrylonite copolymer, 
    sulfur, sulfuric acid, styrene butadiene, toluene diisocyanate, 
    triethanolamine, triethylene glycol, and vinyl chloride monomer. This 
    list, however, is not exhaustive and other products not on this list 
    that fall under the definition above remain potentially sanctionable. 
    ``Petrochemical products'' do not include finished products derived 
    from these substances, such as pipes, plastic bags, tires, and 
    solvents. For purposes of this and other E.O.'s and legislation 
    outlined in this guidance, an item cannot be both a petroleum product 
    and a petrochemical product.
        Executive Order 13622 (issued on July 30, 2012). Section 2 of E.O. 
    13622 provides for sanctions by the Secretary of State on a person 
    determined to knowingly, on or after July 31, engage in a significant 
    transaction for the purchase or acquisition of petroleum or petroleum 
    products from Iran or for the purchase or acquisition of petrochemical 
    products from Iran, and on certain affiliated persons. Entities 
    involved in transactions in these sectors are expected to conduct 
    adequate due diligence to confirm that Iran is not the country of 
    origin of the petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemicals. Certain 
    exceptions are made for transactions for the purchase of petroleum or 
    petroleum products where the Secretary of State has granted exceptions 
    to sanctions under section 1245(d)(4)(D) of the National Defense 
    Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112-81), as amended.
        Executive Order 13628 (issued on October 9, 2012). Sections 5, 6, 
    and 7 of E.O. 13628 authorize the Secretary of State to impose certain 
    sanctions in sections 5(a) and 6 of ISA that were enacted by CISADA for 
    activity occurring between July 1, 2010 and August 10, 2012. Section 
    201 of TRA amended the effective date of the relevant sanctions to 
    August 10, 2012, and did not otherwise preserve their applicability for 
    activity occurring between the enactment dates of CISADA (July 1, 2010) 
    and TRA (August 10, 2012).
        Questions about the State Department's implementation of these 
    Executive Orders can be directed to the State Department's Office of 
    Sanctions Policy and Implementation in the Bureau of Economic and 
    Business Affairs at sanctions@state.gov">eb-iransanctions@state.gov or at (202) 647-7489.
    
    II. Guidance on the Provision of ``Sensitive Technology'' to Iran and 
    Syria
    
        Section 106 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
    and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA) (Pub. L. 111-195) (22 U.S.C. 8501 
    et seq.) prohibits U.S. government agencies from entering into or 
    renewing procurement contracts with individuals or entities that export 
    ``sensitive technology'' to Iran. Further, sections 402 and 703 of the 
    Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA) (Pub. L. 
    112-158) mandate the imposition of sanctions on persons who are 
    determined to have engaged in certain activities, including, on or 
    after August 10, 2012, to knowingly transfer, or facilitate the 
    transfer of ``sensitive technology'' to
    
    [[Page 67729]]
    
    Iran or Syria, or provide services with respect to ``sensitive 
    technology'' after such technology is transferred to Iran or Syria.
        Section 106 of CISADA defines ``sensitive technology'' as 
    ``hardware, software, telecommunications equipment, or any other 
    technology, that the President determines is to be used specifically--
    (A) to restrict the free flow of unbiased information in Iran; or (B) 
    to disrupt, monitor, or otherwise restrict speech of the people of 
    Iran.'' Section 703 of TRA defines ``sensitive technology'' in the same 
    way with respect to Syria.
        These guidelines, which are required under section 412 of TRA, are 
    intended to assist individuals and entities so that, going forward, 
    they can make appropriate decisions with regard to business in Iran and 
    Syria and take steps to avoid engaging in potentially sanctionable 
    transactions under sections 106 and 105A of CISADA, as amended by 
    section 402 of TRA, Executive Order 13628, and section 703 of TRA due 
    to the similarity of the definition of ``sensitive technology'' to 
    section 106 of CISADA.
    
    Misuse of Technology in Iran and Syria
    
        Information and communications technology serves to facilitate 
    communication, share information, and connect users to each other. Over 
    the last several years, the world has witnessed the important role this 
    technology can assume in holding repressive regimes accountable, 
    assisting people in exercising their human rights and protecting 
    emerging elements of civil society. However, certain information and 
    communications technology can also provide unprecedented capabilities 
    for governments to conduct surveillance on users' communications and 
    movements, and to block or disrupt communications.
        The people of Iran and Syria use telecommunications technology and 
    networks to communicate with each other and the rest of the world. The 
    United States government supports efforts to facilitate the free flow 
    of information and freedom of expression in Iran and Syria and is 
    cognizant of the vital importance of providing technology that enables 
    the Iranian and Syrian people to freely communicate with each other and 
    the outside world.
        At the same time, the Iranian and Syrian governments have taken 
    steps to restrict the free flow of information and freedom of 
    expression over their networks, to track and monitor the communications 
    of their people for the purpose of perpetrating human rights abuses, or 
    to disrupt networks in support of military operations against their own 
    people.
    
    Determining ``Sensitive Technology''
    
        In determining whether a particular transaction involves a good or 
    technology that may be considered ``sensitive technology'' under CISADA 
    and TRA, the United States government will closely examine transactions 
    that could provide significant surveillance, censorship, or network 
    disruption capabilities to the Iranian or Syrian governments as a 
    result of the particular end-user, its end-use, or the type of 
    technology.
        The United States government recognizes that certain geolocation 
    and other monitoring capabilities are part of the basic functioning of 
    modern telecommunications networks. The United States government 
    further recognizes that online communications services commonly track 
    users' network addresses and usage patterns and may request additional 
    personal information from users. These capabilities generally would not 
    be considered ``sensitive technology'' under CISADA and TRA. Moreover, 
    ``sensitive technology'' does not generally include technology 
    essential for ordinary network operation, personal computing or private 
    communications that does not provide significant surveillance, 
    censorship or network disruption capabilities, including: Wi-Fi access 
    points, network routers, switches and mobile phone base stations; 
    cables (fiber optic, coaxial and twisted pair); basic network 
    performance monitoring tools; wireless antennas and other architectural 
    elements; mobile phones and mass market desktop, laptop and tablet 
    computers without external monitoring or surveillance capabilities such 
    as keyloggers; computer monitors, screens, speakers, mice, headphones, 
    headsets, and other accessories; defensive technologies to protect 
    individual computers against malware and related security threats 
    (including software and definition updates); software development tools 
    including libraries, integrated development environments, hosting 
    services, and collaboration platforms; mass market document creation, 
    viewing and editing tools without special surveillance capabilities; 
    censorship-circumvention technologies and services; virtual private 
    network (VPN) services; anti-tracking and encryption technologies to 
    protect user privacy, if supplied without monitoring or surveillance 
    capabilities; personal communications technologies (including software 
    updates to such technologies) such as instant messaging, chat, email, 
    social networking, photo and movie sharing, web browsing, and blogging; 
    web browser plug-ins for rendering web content; data and web hosting 
    and storage technology without monitoring or surveillance capabilities; 
    RSS feed production, distribution, and reading tools and comparable 
    information transmission technologies; and other similar equipment that 
    does not provide significant surveillance, censorship or network 
    disruption capabilities.
        When making an assessment of whether or not a company, entity, or 
    individual is exporting, transferring, facilitating the transfer of, or 
    providing services that may be considered sensitive technology with 
    regard to Iran or Syria, the State Department will review all available 
    information, including through direct communication with the entity or 
    individual if possible. It will consider, among other factors, whether 
    a company knew, or should have known, that a particular end-user of its 
    technology was likely to misuse such technology, or that a particular 
    technology has a history of being misused in Iran or Syria to further 
    human rights abuses. As such, individuals or entities engaged in 
    transactions with Iran or Syria involving telecommunications goods, 
    services or technology should conduct rigorous due diligence to ``know 
    their customer'' and assess the potential risk that a particular 
    technology is likely to be used to facilitate human rights abuses, 
    restrict the free flow of information, or disrupt, monitor, or 
    otherwise restrict speech of the people of Iran and Syria.
        For example, individuals or entities sanctioned by the U.S. 
    government for activities related to human rights abuses in Iran and 
    Syria may pose a more apparent risk of misusing technology. Under these 
    circumstances, any hardware, software, or telecommunications equipment 
    provided to persons sanctioned for human rights abuses pose the 
    potential to be considered ``sensitive technology'' for the purposes of 
    CISADA and TRA, and any type of support provided to these individuals 
    or entities may subject the provider to sanctions.
        Regardless of the recipient or known end-use, specific 
    telecommunications technologies such as ``lawful interception'' and 
    ``surreptitious listening'' devices, systems and technology for the 
    interception of wire, oral or electronic communications or to jam or 
    intercept the air interface of mobile telecommunications, have the 
    potential to be considered ``sensitive technology'' for the purposes of 
    CISADA and TRA under some, but not all,
    
    [[Page 67730]]
    
    circumstances. Similarly, keyword list blocking technology that allows 
    persons to block the transmission of content containing certain words, 
    has the potential to be considered ``sensitive technology'' for the 
    purposes of CISADA and TRA under some, but not all, circumstances. The 
    following is an illustrative, but not exclusive, list of other 
    technologies and capabilities that pose the risk of being misused by 
    the Iranian and Syrian governments, and that have the potential to be 
    considered ``sensitive technology'':
    
     Key logging technology/spyware
        [cir] Allows persons to record key strokes, mouse clicks, data 
    processes, or activity on a touchscreen without consent of the device 
    user
     Mobile device forensics data extraction and analysis 
    technology
        [cir] Allows persons to extract and analyze data from a mobile 
    phone device, even if password protected
     Nonconsensual remote forensic technology
        [cir] Allows persons to perform undetected collection and analysis 
    of data from remote target computers
     Nonconsensual tracking/monitoring technology
        [cir] Allows persons to cause a mobile or networked device to 
    reveal its geographic location, operating status or application data, 
    without consent of the device owner or content provider
     Network disruption technology
        [cir] Designed to enable disruption, inhibition or degradation of 
    networks or sub-parts
     Infection vectors technology
        [cir] Allows persons to install or execute malware or perform other 
    attacks
     Rootkit technology
        [cir] Allows persons to defeat or bypass security, hide malware, or 
    enable privileged access to computer process or network resources
     DNS poisoning technology
        [cir] Allows persons to hijack Domain Name System (DNS) requests 
    and reroute Internet traffic to illegitimate Web sites/servers
     Censorship-enhancement technology
        [cir] Designed to allow persons to enforce content blocking or to 
    fingerprint and/or defeat anti-censorship technologies
    
        This guidance was developed for its applicability to current 
    conditions in Iran, as called for by section 412 of TRA and by section 
    106 of CISADA, and in Syria, due to the similarity of section 703 of 
    TRA to section 106 of CISADA, and should not be considered 
    automatically relevant for other contexts or conditions. The State 
    Department will periodically review these guidelines and, if necessary, 
    amend them to take into account new information and circumstances 
    regarding the use of technology in Iran and Syria. U.S. entities and 
    individuals are generally prohibited from engaging in any transaction 
    involving Iran and Syria unless such transactions are authorized by the 
    Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Foreign 
    entities and individuals may also be subject to license requirements if 
    their transactions involving Iran or Syria also involve the United 
    States, such as a funds transfer that transits a U.S. bank. For 
    transactions involving exports to Iran or Syria, U.S. companies should 
    also consult with the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and 
    Security regarding relevant licensing requirements.
        Persons with questions on sensitive technology, section 106 of 
    CISADA, or TRA should contact the State Department's Office of 
    Sanctions Policy and Implementation in the Bureau of Economic and 
    Business Affairs at (202) 647-7489 or emailing CISADA106@state.gov.
    Information on Terrorism Designations
        Executive Order 13224 (issued on September 23, 2001), as amended by 
    Executive Orders 13268, 13284, and 13372, provides the Secretary of 
    State with the authority, in consultation with the Secretary of the 
    Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, 
    to designate foreign persons that the Secretary of State determines 
    have committed, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of 
    terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national 
    security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. Among other 
    things, this designation blocks, with limited exceptions, all of the 
    designated persons' property and interests in property that are in the 
    United States or come within the United States or that come within the 
    possession or control of U.S. persons. The Secretary of the Treasury 
    also may, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
    Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, designate individuals and 
    entities that are owned or controlled by the designated persons; act 
    for or on behalf of the designated persons; assist in, sponsor, or 
    provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial 
    or other services to, or in support of, the designated persons; or are 
    otherwise associated with the designated persons. Section 211 of TRA 
    also provides for certain sanctions to be imposed under E.O. 13224 in 
    connection with provision of vessels, insurance, or any other shipping 
    service for the transportation of goods to or from Iran that could 
    materially contribute to the activities of the Government of Iran with 
    respect to support for acts of international terrorism. The list of 
    individuals and entities designated by the Secretary of State pursuant 
    to E.O. 13224 is available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143210.htm.
        The Secretary of State also has authority, pursuant to section 219 
    of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (INA) (8 U.S.C. 
    1189), to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization 
    (FTO) if the Secretary of State finds that the organization is a 
    foreign organization; engages in terrorist activity or terrorism, as 
    defined by the relevant statute, or retains the capability and intent 
    to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; and the terrorist 
    activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of 
    United States nationals or the national security of the United States. 
    Additional information on the designations process and the consequences 
    of designation, along with a list of organizations designated by the 
    Secretary of State pursuant to section 219 of the INA, is available at 
    http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
    Information on Weapons of Mass Destruction Designations
        In Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994), President Clinton 
    declared a national emergency with respect to the proliferation of 
    nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction 
    or WMD) and the means of delivering them. EO 12938, as amended by EO 
    13094 and EO 13382, provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
    prohibit the importation into the United States of goods, technology, 
    or services produced or provided by any foreign person the Secretary of 
    State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, determines 
    has engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that 
    have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially 
    contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or 
    their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such 
    weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, 
    develop, transport, transfer, or use such items, by an person or 
    foreign country of proliferation concern. E.O. 12938, as
    
    [[Page 67731]]
    
    amended, also imposes the following measures against such foreign 
    persons: no departments or agencies of the United States government 
    shall procure or enter into any contract for the procurement of any 
    goods, technology, or services from these persons including the 
    termination of existing contracts; and no departments or agencies of 
    the United States government shall provide any assistance to these 
    persons, and shall not obligate further funds for such purposes.
        The complete list of foreign persons on which the Secretary of 
    State has determined to impose an import ban because of their WMD 
    proliferation activities can be found at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15233.htm.
        Executive Order 13382 (issued on June 28, 2005) provides the 
    Secretary of State with the authority, in consultation with the 
    Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and other relevant 
    agencies, to designate foreign persons that the Secretary of State 
    determines to have engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or 
    transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of 
    materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
    destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of 
    delivering such weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, 
    acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use such items, by 
    any person or foreign country of proliferation concern. Among other 
    things, this designation blocks, with limited exceptions, all of the 
    designated persons' property and interests in property that are in the 
    United States or come within the United States or that come within the 
    possession or control of U.S. persons. The Secretary of the Treasury 
    also may, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney 
    General, and other relevant agencies, designate individuals and 
    entities that: (1) Are owned or controlled by a person blocked pursuant 
    to the order, including a person designated by the Secretary of State; 
    (2) act or purport to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, 
    a person blocked pursuant to the order, including a person designated 
    by the Secretary of State; or (3) have provided, or attempted to 
    provide, financial, material, technological or other support for, or 
    goods or services in support of, a person blocked pursuant to the 
    order, including a person designated by the Secretary of State. Section 
    211 of TRA also provides for certain sanctions to be imposed pursuant 
    to E.O. 13382 in connection with the knowing sale, lease, or provision 
    of vessels, insurance, or any other shipping service for the 
    transportation to or from Iran of goods that could materially 
    contribute to the activities of the Government of Iran with respect to 
    the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The list of 
    individuals and entities designated by the Secretary of State pursuant 
    to E.O. 13382 is available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c22080.htm.
        The Arms Export Control Act and the Export Administration Act 
    require the imposition of sanctions against any foreign person that 
    knowingly transfers items on the Missile Technology Control Regime 
    (MTCR) Annex that contribute to MTCR-class missile programs in non-MTCR 
    adherent countries. Sanctions consist of a ban on export licenses and 
    U.S. government procurement, and they may also include an import ban. 
    The sanctions may be waived if it is essential to the national security 
    interest of the United States, and the sanctions need not be imposed if 
    the transfer was authorized by the laws of an MTCR adherent or if an 
    MTCR adherent has taken adequate enforcement action. These laws also 
    require imposition of sanctions against any foreign person that 
    knowingly and materially contributes to the efforts of another foreign 
    country, project, or entity to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or 
    otherwise acquire chemical and biological weapons. Sanctions consist of 
    a ban on U.S. government procurement and imports. The sanctions may be 
    waived after 12 months if it is important to the national security 
    interests of the United States, and sanctions need not be applied if 
    the government with primary jurisdiction over the offender has taken 
    effective steps to terminate the sanctions-triggering activities.
        Under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, sanctions are 
    required against entities that transfer goods or technology so as to 
    contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts by Iran and Iraq to 
    acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or destabilizing 
    numbers and types of advance conventional weapons, as defined in the 
    statute. Sanctions include a procurement ban, export prohibition on 
    items contained on the United States Munitions List, and the authority 
    to impose sanctions pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
    Powers Act. A waiver is available if it is essential to the national 
    security of the United States.
        The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act requires the 
    Secretary of State to report to Congress, and further gives the 
    Secretary the authority to sanction, a foreign entity if there is 
    credible information indicating that that the entity transferred to or 
    acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria items listed on certain 
    multilateral export control regimes or if the entity transferred to or 
    acquired from those countries goods, services or technology not listed 
    in the multilateral export regimes but which nevertheless would be if 
    they were U.S. goods, services or technology prohibited for export to 
    those countries because of their potential to make a material 
    contribution to the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical 
    weapons, or of ballistic or cruise missile systems. Sanctions include 
    those provided for under EO 12938 as well as an arms export prohibition 
    and a dual use export prohibition.
        The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 requires a cutoff 
    of government contracts with any U.S. or foreign person that 
    contributes knowingly and materially, through the export of nuclear-
    related goods or technology, to the efforts of any individual, group, 
    or nonnuclear weapon state to acquire a nuclear explosive device or 
    unsafeguarded special nuclear material. The sanction may be waived 
    after 12 months if continued imposition would have a serious adverse 
    effect on vital U.S. interests, and sanctions need not be applied if 
    the government with primary jurisdiction over the offender has taken 
    effective steps to terminate the sanctions-triggering activities.
    
    William J. Burns,
    Deputy Secretary of State, Department of State.
    [FR Doc. 2012-27642 Filed 11-9-12; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4710-31-P
    
    
    
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