Immigration Daily

Central America Updates: Gang and Organized Crime-Based Immigration Claims and the Growing Importance of Expert Witnesses

by Thomas Boerman

While in a certain sense the socio-political context of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala remain largely unchanged in recent years, in other respects the situation has evolved substantially and in ways that require an updated understanding on the part of Asylum Officers, attorneys and immigration judges. In general, country conditions have deteriorated significantly in of the Northern Triangle countries despite increasing infusions of aid from U.S. and other international donors, technical assistance, and fledgling efforts to establish a regional approach to crime and violence. The following sections provide a brief overview of relevant changes in each of the countries:

El Salvador. The most significant update from El Salvador is the much-ballyhooed "Gang Truce." In March 2012, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) and the Mara 18 agreed to a truce intended to reduce inter-gang violence. In exchange for directing lower level gang members to reduce the killings, incarcerated gang leaders were granted concessions. Most notably those involved transfers from harsh maximum-security prisons to more comfortable lower security facilities and increased privileges.^[1] These privileges include conjugal visits, cell phone access and opportunities to communicate directly with other gang leaders and members on the street.

For six months after its implementation the Salvadoran government denied any involvement in the truce or its negotiations, reporting that a former congressman and a representative from the Catholic Church facilitated the process. It was later revealed publicly, however, that high-ranking government security officials, including the president, were directly involved in the process from the beginning.

Initial reports indicated that the homicide rate had dropped by 60 percent following implementation of the truce, although the actual end-of-year statistics demonstrate that the decline was just over 40 percent.^[2] Determining the actual reduction is difficult however, because while reported homicides have decreased since implementation of the truce the number of disappearances has grown substantially, leading analysts to conclude that gangs are simply burying their dead as opposed to leaving the bodies in the street.^[3] An MS13 gang member interviewed during research into the truce was quoted as saying, "What truce? We have orders not to leave bodies, but the killings continue."^[4]

It is also critical to point out that since the truce was intended to reduce inter-gang violence (i.e., between MS13 and 18th St.) it does not necessarily apply to the general public nor does it affect gang criminality. Security Minister David Munguía Payes states that despite the truce gangs continue to engage in violence and have been responsible for half the country's murders since its implementation.^[5] The PNC reports that gangs have developed more sophisticated extortion practices, and that rates of extortion have increased significantly since the truce was implemented.^[6] According to a gang expert in the Salvadoran Fiscalía (Attorney General's Office), "[t]he truce is a sham. It's a lie, the gangs continue to operate, people continue getting killed, people keep disappearing and the gangs get stronger and stronger."^[7] In a statement issued by the Catholic Conference of Bishops, the church hierarchy lamented the fact that the truce has not led to a reduction in extortions, robberies or rapes and has not translated to a benefit to the public.^[8]

As opposed to a long-term reduction of crime and violence, it is more realistic to conclude that the truce reflects gangs' strategies to maintain their criminal enterprises while leveraging the government in order to gain greater degrees of political power.^[9]

Evidence of gangs' intention to leverage the truce and the government to gain increased political power has become increasingly evident. On July 12, 2012, high-ranking members of the Organization of American States (OAS)-including the head of the OAS, General Secretary José Miguel Insulza-met with incarcerated MS13 and 18th St. leaders so the gangs could present demands for what they refer to as the "Second Phase" of negotiations with the Salvadoran government. Their demands included: 1) a cessation of police anti-gang operations in areas under MS13 and 18th St. control; 2) a withdrawal of military troops a deployed to combat gangs, and 3) repeal of El Salvador's current anti-gang legislation, la Ley de Proscripción de Maras, Pandillas, Agrupaciones, Asociaciones y Organizaciones de Naturaleza Criminal (Law Prohibiting Gangs, Groups, Associations, and Organizations of a Criminal Nature) a.k.a. the Proscripción de Pandillas.^[10]

The fact that gang leaders would be granted an audience with the OAS reflects not only gangs' political aspirations, but also the degree to which they now wield power in El Salvador, and how in critical respects may hold the Salvadoran government hostage. In August 2012, the Salvadoran Security Minister announced that the government would be scaling back police operations against gangs, a complete reversal of the position he articulated prior to gang leaders' meeting with the OAS.^[11]

Analysts are concerned that as opposed to the truce increasing the Salvadoran government's power over gangs, it has increased gangs' power over the state.^[12] Reductions in the homicide rate, whatever they may be in actuality, have not been achieved through actions of the Salvadoran government but because it was perceived as advantageous to gang leaders. Not surprisingly, there is significant concern that if the process does not proceeded in a manner gang leaders see as advantageous they will simply abandon truce and the murder rate will increase to previous levels. In the words of one member, "If we want something, we threaten to put bodies on the street. Then we get what we want.^[13] Stated differently, it is realistic to conclude that gang leaders now have the Salvadoran government in a disadvantaged position and may be able to wring concessions from the state by threatening to rescind the truce and instantly drive rates of violence to previous levels, or higher.

Based on assessment of currently available information, I concur with other experts that although the truce represents a potential opening that must be fully leveraged, one must take a position of very guarded optimism. It is far too early to ascertain the actual reductions in violence associated with the truce, to conclude that those reductions will be sustainable over time, or to assess what if any improvements occur in terms of public security. Further, the implications in terms of the political dynamic between gangs and the Salvadoran government have yet to be ascertained with certainty, but initial assessments suggest that gangs may have gained power at a cost to the state.

Honduras. The 2009 coup d'état that ousted President Manual Zelaya was a boon for gangs and other organized crime groups. President Zelaya had paid little attention to the problem of crime and violence, but the interim government of Roberto Micheletti was focused on suppressing internal political dissent and it ignored entirely, resulting in significant openings for organized criminal groups to deepen their hold on the country.^[14] Consequently, as bad as things were before the coup, by the time Porfirio Lobo Sosa was inaugurated as the post-coup president in January 2010, the situation had deteriorated even further and remains in a downward spiral.

One of the most significant changes of late relates to the increased flow of narcotics through the country. Honduras has served as a transit point for drugs moving from South America to North America since the 1970s, but recently the problem has worsened significantly. According to the U.S. State Department, nearly 80 percent of cocaine smuggling flights from South to North America now pass through Honduras.^[15] With this has come a substantial increase in violence, and official corruption. The Honduran Attorney General recently stated publicly that the country has no structure for investigating crimes and that only 20 percent of homicides are investigated.^[16] This is particularly significant in that Honduras, a country roughly the size of Virginia, recorded 7,102 murders in 2012, almost 20 per day or 85.2 per 100,000, the highest in the world.^[17] Putting this figure in context, the U.S. homicide rate is roughly 6 per 100,000, and Canada's is less than 2 per 100,000.

Not surprisingly, within this context of impunity gangs have become increasingly emboldened. In one particularly outrageous example gang members actually imposed a curfew in areas of the capital, Tegucigalpa, forcing businesses, churches and public transport to shut down by 7:00 p.m.^[18] Fear, frustration and anger over such brazen acts continues to manifest in the extrajudicial killing of known and suspected gang members; an average of three young people per day are murdered extrajudicially in Honduras, bodies often cut into pieces and left in garbage bags on the streets. According to one of Honduras' most recognized human rights defenders, of those few extrajudicial executions that are investigated police are believed to be involved in 30 percent of the cases.^[19] In 2013 Honduran officials released a report citing police involvement in 149 homicides during the previous 23 months.^[20]

The Honduran government now freely acknowledges that in addition to the police, organized criminal groups have infiltrated the judiciary and military and gained substantial control over ten of the country's eighteen departments (states); home to seventy-five percent of the Honduran population. ^[21] According to a 2011 disclosure by the Vice-President of the Honduran National Congress, 40 percent of the country's police officers and ten percent of its legislators are directly linked to organized crime.^[22]

During a 2012 visit to Honduras, I met with the director of National Police, Juan Carlos "El Tigre" (The Tiger) Bonilla, who was appointed in May 2012 because of his strong anti-corruption position. It is important to note that in addition to his anti-corruption stance, while serving as a regional police commander Bonilla was accused of extrajudicial execution, including the killing of minors. After being implicated in three counts of extrajudicial murder and involvement in 11 other deaths and disappearances he went into hiding, later turning himself into authorities. He was tried and acquitted in 2004 but when questioned about his role in the killings Bonilla responded to prosecutors' by saying, "There are things that one takes to the grave. What I can tell you is that I love my country, and I am ready to defend it at all costs, and I have done things to defend it. That is all that I will say."^[23] His statement was generally considered to be an admission of guilt but because vigilantism and extrajudicial execution are considered legitimate responses to crime and violence, his likely involvement was largely forgotten. Bonilla was sacked in April 2011 and it is rumored that he intends to flee Honduras.

Recent attempts to root out corruption have thus far not produced any meaningful results. Since President Lobo Sosa took office in January 2010, not one state official has been brought to justice, nor has the Plan de Transparencia y Lucha Contra la Corrupción (Plan of Transparency and Fight against Corruption), passed in 2011, had any discernible effect. ^[24] Efforts to clean up the National Police have not been effective, either. When Director Bonilla announced the firing of 100 police officers over corruption charges in October 2012, officers sought to remove him from his position through judicial action and threatened a take over of police headquarters if the judicial approach was not successful. ^[25] At this point, 230 officers of all ranks-including department heads-that failed vetting process remain in their positions, and the head of Honduras' Independent Commission on Public Security Reform has called the National police "unreformable."^[26]

Guatemala. The combined effects of crime, violence and official corruption have brought Guatemala ...

Bloggings On Dysfunctional Government

by Angelo Paparelli

Immigration's Minnesota Nice, Sen. Al Franken, Helps Small Businesses and Regular Folks with the I-9 Process

Read More